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Abstract	
This	 research	 sets	 out	 to	 explore	 the	 origins,	 nature	 and	 effects	 of	 relations	
between	Czechoslovakia	and	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania	in	the	late	colonial	and	early	
post‐colonial	period	 from	1958	up	 to	and	 including	1970.	 It	 identifies	 the	motivations	
and	 intentions	 with	 which	 both	 parties	 entered	 into	 these	 relations.	 It	 examines	 in	
particular	the	matter	of	how	Czechoslovak	activities	and	interactions	with	local	political	
parties	and	leading	politicians	influenced	political	and	economic	development	in	Kenya,	
Uganda	and	Tanzania	in	this	period.	Using	a	unique	set	of	previously	unstudied	primary	
historical	sources	 it	 identifies	 the	primary	and	secondary	objectives	that	Czechoslovak	
foreign	policy	set	out	for	relations	with	these	countries,	the	most	common	and	the	most	
effective	 strategies	 used	 to	 attain	 these	 objectives,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	
objectives	were	eventually	successfully	reached.	Ultimately,	by	a	comparative	analysis	of	
the	 three	case	studies	 it	 concludes	which	were	 the	most	effective	strategies	as	well	as	
identifying	the	necessary	preconditions	that	allowed	Czechoslovakia	to	interfere	actively	
in	the	political	development	of	these	states	and	eventually	to	come	close	to	reaching	its	
stated	objectives.	
The	 findings	 of	 this	 research	 show	 that	 if	 Czechoslovakia	 was	 to	 have	 had	 a	
realistic	chance	of	reaching	any	of	its	political	objectives	in	East	Africa	a	combination	of	
specific	 conditions	 had	 to	 be	 met.	 The	 most	 effective	 form	 of	 exerting	 influence	 on	
political	development	in	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika	proved	to	be	special	military	or	
security	assistance.	However,	 this	was	effective	only	when	Czechoslovakia	was	able	 to	
ensure	political	support	of	the	Kenyan,	Ugandan	or	Tanganyikan	political	leadership.	In	
order	 to	 sustain	 the	 political	 influence	 gained	 by	 Czechoslovakia,	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	
provide	the	assisted	country	with	effective	economic	support	or	technical	aid	that	would	
drive	 that	 country’s	 development.	 If	 all	 of	 these	 conditions	were	met,	 Czechoslovakia	
was	able	actively	 to	 influence	 the	political	development	of	 local	 states,	undermine	 the	
position	of	the	West	and	come	close	to	reaching	and	sustaining	her	political	objectives.	
However,	 if	 any	 of	 these	 conditions	were	not	 present	 or	 other	 forms	of	 support	were	
provided	instead,	the	Czechoslovak	capacity	to	influence	political	development	in	Kenya,	
Uganda	and	Tanganyika	was	very	low.						
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Introduction	
In	the	late	summer	of	1945	the	greatest	and	most	destructive	conflict	of	human	
history	 finally	 ended.	 The	 world	 that	 emerged	 from	 it	 could	 not	 have	 been	 more	
different	 from	that	which	saw	 the	beginning	of	 the	war	 in	1939.	 Immense	destruction	
and	massive	forced	migration	of	millions	of	people	were	the	most	visible	outcomes	of	six	
years	of	warfare,	but	a	number	of	changes	that	the	war	caused	were	not	so	apparent	at	
first,	 and	 their	 effects	were	 yet	 to	 be	 unravelled.	 The	 global	 political	 system	 that	 had	
existed	before	the	war	and	that	had	been	based	on	the	dominance	of	European	colonial	
empires	was	 fundamentally	shaken	and	ready	to	disintegrate.	The	new	global	political	
order	was	to	be	dominated	by	 two	superpowers,	 the	Soviet	Union	and	the	USA,	which	
had	united	in	their	war	effort	to	subdue	German	Nazism	and	Japanese	imperialism,	only	
to	quickly	drift	apart	once	the	war	ended.	Very	quickly,	global	political	affairs	became	re‐
defined	 by	 the	 new	 kind	 of	 conflict,	 an	 undeclared	 Cold	 War	 characterised	 by	 deep	
ideological,	political	and	economic	rivalry	between	the	socialist	and	capitalist	camps.	
One	of	the	effects	of	the	Second	World	War	that	was	not	immediately	apparent	
when	 the	 war	 finished	 was	 the	 beginnings	 of	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 colonial	 empires	 of	
France,	 Britain,	 Belgium	 and	 other	 European	 states.	 Asian	 and	 African	 nations	 were	
directly	 affected	 by	 the	 war	 events	 which	 started	 far‐reaching	 social,	 political	 and	
economic	change.	The	vanquished	nations	of	the	Middle	East,	Africa	and	Asia	began	to	
intensify	their	calls	for	the	right	of	national	self‐determination,	for	political	sovereignty	
and	 for	 economic	 independence,	 and	 they	 set	 out	 to	 challenge	 the	 very	 principles	 of	
European	 colonial	 domination	 over	 their	 lands.	 Frontrunner	 in	 this	 process	 of	
decolonisation	was	 India,	 followed	by	 the	 countries	of	 the	Middle	East	 and	 south‐east	
Asia.	Even	though	Africa	was	a	comparative	 latecomer	to	 this	political	struggle,	by	 the	
second	 half	 of	 1950s	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 European	 colonisers	 would	 have	 neither	 the	
political	 will,	 the	 military	 might,	 nor	 the	 economic	 means	 to	 stop	 the	 steady	
disintegration	of	their	African	empires.		
The	 British	 government	 was	 first	 challenged	 by	 the	 expanding	 nationalist	
African	parties	in	western	Africa	and	it	eventually	decided	to	grant	their	colonies	there	
self‐government	under	British	supervision;	this	soon	evolved,	however	into	the	granting	
of	complete	independence.	Matters	were	more	complicated	in	British	East	Africa	due	to	
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the	 presence	 of	 substantial	 white‐settler	 communities	 in	 Kenya	 and	 small,	 but	
economically	 significant,	 white‐owned	 farms	 in	 Tanzania,	 and	 the	 growing	 conflict	
between	 traditional	 rulers	 and	 emerging	nationalist	 politicians	 in	Uganda.	 The	British	
government	did	not	anticipate	the	rapid	spread	of	nationalist	politics	to	East	Africa	and	
it	 lacked	a	coherent	policy	 to	deal	with	 this	new	political	 reality.	 In	 the	early	1950s	 it	
faced	the	bloody	insurgency	of	Mau	Mau	in	Kenya	aimed	against	the	British	political	and	
economic	 dominance.	 The	 horrors	 of	 this	 campaign	 worked	 as	 a	 warning	 should	 the	
granting	of	 independence	 to	East	African	countries	be	poorly	prepared	or	 ill‐executed.	
Britain	 resented	 the	 granting	 in	 East	 Africa	 of	 substantial	 political	 concessions	 to	 the	
African	nationalists	when	it	brought	a	high	risk	of	tragic	consequences	for	local	settlers.	
Britain	was	also	uncertain	whether	it	would	be	able	to	maintain	and	further	develop	its	
economic	interests	in	the	region	after	independence.	For	this	reason	the	frontrunners	of	
local	 national	 liberation	 movements	 and	 their	 leaders,	 Jomo	 Kenyatta	 and	 the	 Kenya	
African	National	Union	(KANU),	Apollo	Milton	Obote	and	the	Uganda	People’s	Congress	
(UPC)	 and	 Joseph	 Nyerere	 and	 the	 Tanganyika	 African	 National	 Union	 (TANU)	 faced	
much	opposition	from	the	British	administration	in	their	quest	for	national	liberation.		
In	their	pursuit	of	national	liberation	East	African	political	parties	often	sought	
external	 support	 to	 their	 struggle	 wherever	 they	 could	 find	 it.	 They	 needed	 to	 find		
international	political	support	in	order	to	put	pressure	on	Britain	to	grant	them	political	
concessions,	 but	 they	 also	 needed	 financial	 and	 material	 aid	 in	 order	 to	 function,	 to	
campaign	for	popular	support,	to	build	organisational	structure,	to	take	part	in	elections,	
and	to	recruit	professionals	who	would	be	able	to	participate	in	the	running	of	the	future	
independent	 state.	 It	 was	 from	 this	 standpoint	 that	 political	 parties	 of	 East	 Africa	 in	
pursuit	of	national	liberation	in	the	late	1950s	engaged	with	Czechoslovakia.		
Socialist	Czechoslovakia	was	by	this	time	fully	entrenched	in	the	Soviet	sphere	
of	 influence	 and	 it	 held	 the	 position	 of	 one	 of	 the	most	 significant	 Soviet	 satellites	 in	
Europe.	 Industrial,	 economic,	 military	 and	 political	 capacities	 of	 Czechoslovakia	 were	
fully	devoted	to	building	Soviet‐style	socialism	by	applying	the	ideological,	political	and	
economic	principles	of	scientific	Marxism‐Leninism.	Up	until	1954	the	countries	of	 the	
Soviet	 camp	 including	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 Czechoslovakia	 were	 expecting	 Western	
aggression	 to	 take	place	 imminently.	That	 is	why	governments	of	socialist	 states	were	
concentrating	on	consolidating	 the	dominant	position	of	 local	Communist	or	Workers’	
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Parties	 and	 boosting	 countries’	 economic	 development	 under	 the	 new	 economic	
paradigms.		
From	 1954	 the	 fears	 of	 an	 imminent	 escalation	 of	military	 conflict	 decreased	
and	the	Soviet	Union	alongside	Czechoslovakia	began	altering	their	political	objectives.	
Much	higher	priority	was	given	to	the	sphere	of	foreign	political	relations.	Execution	of	
Soviet	and	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	was	now	fully	aimed	at	achieving	the	newly‐set	
objectives.	Fully	in	line	with	the	Soviets,	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	was	to	be	aimed	at	
exporting	 socialism,	 increasing	 the	 Soviet	 sphere	 of	 influence,	 acting	 against	 the	
interests	 of	 the	 USA,	 Britain	 and	 other	 capitalist	 powers,	 seeking	 external	 economic	
relations	 that	 would	 be	 beneficial	 for	 the	 Czechoslovak	 economy	 and	 supporting	 the	
ongoing	national	liberation	struggle	of	Asian	and	African	peoples	in	order	to	undermine	
the	last	remnants	of	Western	imperialism.	Among	the	socialist	countries	Czechoslovakia	
was	 the	 best	 suited	 particularly	 for	 this	 last	 objective	 and	 from	 1956	 it	 rapidly	
intensified	 and	 spread	 its	 activities	 on	 the	 African	 continent.	 	 Czechoslovakia	 quickly	
earned	 a	 reputation	 as	 a	 fervent	 supporter	 of	 African	 and	Asian	 nations	 in	 their	 anti‐
colonial	struggle.		
By	the	end	of	the	1950s	when	its	officials	were	first	approached	by	East	African	
freedom	fighters,	Czechoslovakia	managed	to	establish	a	working	system	of	cooperation	
with	a	number	of	Northern	and	Western	African	states	that	had	already	reached	or	were	
about	 to	 reach	 independence.	 That	 is	 why	 by	 this	 point	 Czechoslovakia	 was	 able	 to	
provide	the	KANU,	the	UPC	and	the	TANU	with	various	forms	of	effective	support	that	
significantly	 contributed	 to	 their	 ultimate	 political	 success	 in	 attaining	 independence.	
Czechoslovakia	 acted	 as	 a	 political	 advocate	 of	 these	 countries	 in	 international	
organisations,	 provided	 them	 with	 financial	 and	 material	 help	 and	 organised	
professional	 training	 for	 Kenyans,	 Ugandans	 and	 Tanganyikans	 in	 a	 number	 of	 fields,	
from	 propaganda	 to	 military	 courses.	 However,	 Czechoslovakia’s	 foreign	 political	
objectives	 in	 East	 Africa	 went	 beyond	 merely	 contributing	 to	 successful	 national	
liberation.	Czechoslovakia	sought	to	establish	close	cooperation	with	Kenya,	Uganda	and	
Tanganyika,	to	provide	them	with	a	feasible	political	and	economic	alternative	to	their	
traditional	 relations	 with	 Britain,	 to	 bring	 them	 closer	 to	 the	 socialist	 camp	 and	
ultimately	to	contribute	to	the	introduction	of	socialism	in	these	countries.					
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Definition	of	subject	matter,	research	objectives,	fundamental	
hypothesis	and	related	research	questions	
This	 research	 sets	 out	 to	 explore	 the	 origins,	 nature	 and	 effects	 of	 relations	
between	Czechoslovakia	and	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania	in	the	late	colonial	and	early	
post‐colonial	period	 from	1958	until	1970.	 It	 identifies	 the	motivations	and	 intentions	
with	which	both	parties	entered	these	relations.	It	looks	particularly	into	the	matter	of	
how	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 and	 interactions	 with	 local	 political	 parties	 and	 leading	
politicians	 influenced	 political	 and	 economic	 developments	 in	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	
Tanzania	in	this	period.	Using	a	unique	set	of	previously	unexamined	primary	historical	
sources	 it	 identifies	 the	 primary	 and	 secondary	 objectives	 that	 Czechoslovak	 foreign	
policy	 set	 out	 for	 relations	 with	 these	 countries,	 the	 most	 common	 and	 the	 most	
effective	 strategies	 used	 to	 reach	 these	 objectives,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 these	
objectives	were	eventually	successfully	attained.	Ultimately,	by	comparative	analysis	of	
the	three	case	studies	it	decides	which	were	the	most	effective	strategies	as	well	as	the	
necessary	preconditions	that	allowed	Czechoslovakia	to	interfere	actively	with	political	
development	 in	 these	 states,	 eventually	 coming	 close	 to	 reaching	 its	 particular	
objectives.	The	main	hypothesis	of	this	research	states	that	only	unwavering	support	to	
seeking	 cooperation	with	 Czechoslovakia	 by	 Kenyan,	 Ugandan	 and	 Tanzanian	 leaders	
(first	 independent	 variable),	 in	 combination	with	 well‐	 managed	 and	 well‐timed	 civil	
and	 special	 technical	 assistance,	 development	 aid	 and/or	 rich	 trade	 relations,	 (second	
independent	variable),	 could	provide	Czechoslovakia	with	a	 realistic	opportunity	 to	at	
least	 partially	 fulfil	 her	 ultimate	 political	 objectives	 (dependent	 variable).	 An	ultimate	
objective	of	 Czechoslovakia’s	 involvement	 in	 the	political	 development	of	East	African	
states	was	 bringing	 them	 into	 socialist	 sphere	 of	 influence	 and	 introducing	 socialism,	
preferably	a	Soviet‐style	one,	into	their	political	system.		
It	needs	to	be	established	here	that	this	primary	objective	was	never	completely	
accomplished	in	the	time	period	studied	by	this	research,	but	in	the	case	of	Tanzania	and	
partially	 also	 Uganda,	 it	 came	 close.	 Tanzania’s	 decision	 to	 introduce	 the	 politics	 of	
ujamaa,	 and	 simultaneously	 allowing	 socialist	 countries	 to	 actively	 support	 Marxist	
Southern‐African	 freedom	 fighters	 from	 its	 territory,	 was	 viewed	 as	 a	 major	
accomplishment	of	the	socialist	camp.	Paradoxically,	in	the	studied	period,	Czechoslovak	
cooperation	with	Tanzania	never	reached	a	quality	or	intensity	that	would	have	made	it	
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a	 decisive	 influence	 on	 this	 political	 development.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Czechoslovak	
activities	 in	 Uganda	 and	 close	 relations	 with	 President	 Obote’s	 UPC	 were	 of	 major	
significance	for	the	internal	political	development	of	Uganda	that	eventually	also	led	to	
the	introduction	to	Ugandan	society	and	economy	of	the	Move	to	the	Left,	a	set	of	policies	
based	 on	 socialist	 principles,	 and	 close	 cooperation	 with	 several	 socialist	 states.	 The	
attainment	of	the	ultimate	objective	of	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	in	Uganda	was	only	
prevented	by	the	military	coup	d’état.	 	Czechoslovak	activities	 in	Kenya	ended	up	very	
far	from	reaching	CS	primary	objectives	despite	the	high	hopes	of	Czechoslovak	policy‐
makers,	even	though	Kenya	reached	independence	with	substantial	support	provided	to	
its	national‐liberation	movement	by	Czechoslovakia.	
Czechoslovakia	met	with	a	 similarly	varied	rate	of	 success	also	 in	 reaching	 its	
secondary	 objectives	 in	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanzania,	 vital	way‐points	 leading,	 it	was	
hoped,	to	the	ultimate	goal.		
These	preliminary	tasks	were	often	precursors	to	the	eventual	fulfilment	of	the	
main	 one.	 Among	 these	 tasks	 was	 effective	 contribution	 to	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 the	
colonial	system	in	these	countries,	establishing	and	maintaining	relations	with	the	most	
suitable	local	political	candidate,	strengthening	his	political	position,	contributing	to	his	
successful	emergence	on	the	top	of	 the	political	hierarchy	 in	these	countries	where	he	
could	be	most	useful	for	Czechoslovak	purposes,	undermine	the	political	and	economic	
position	 of	Western	 powers,	 and	 provide	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanzania	 with	 effective	
support	in	such	fields	where	the	Czechoslovak	political	and	economic	influence	could	be	
most	 effectively	 exerted.	 These	 tasks	 were	 being	 completed	 by	 different	 means	 and	
naturally	also	with	mixed	results.			
It	 is	very	difficult	 to	apply	an	adequate	evaluation	 technique	 that	would	allow	
for	establishing	any	kind	of	concise	and	precise	assessment	of	the	rate	of	Czechoslovak	
success.	 The	 only	 analytical	 approach	 that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 interpret	 the	 primary	 and	
secondary	data	collected	during	this	research	is	qualitative	analysis	which	by	its	nature	
eludes	the	formation	of	a	rigid	evaluation	framework.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	judge	
and	evaluate	the	extent	of	success	in	fulfilling	various	objectives	in	every	particular	case	
separately	and	in	an	adequate	country‐specific	context.	
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The	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 not	 only	 to	 evaluate	 the	 rate	 of	 Czechoslovak	
success	 in	 reaching	 its	 various	 foreign‐political	 objectives.	 The	 historical	 narrative	 of	
Czechoslovak‐East	 African	 relations	 between	 1958	 and	 1970	 provides	 at	 least	 partial	
answers	 to	 the	 following	questions,	 some	of	which	were	 already	mentioned	 above.	 In	
what	way	were	Czechoslovak	actions	determined	by	 the	context	of	Cold	War	and	how	
did	 they	 coincide	 with	 Soviet	 activities	 in	 this	 part	 of	 Africa?	 What	 were	 the	 most	
effective	 strategies	 and	 tools	 in	 reaching	 Czechoslovak	 foreign	 political	 objectives	 as	
formulated	 in	 the	1961	Africa	Policy?	Which	 factors	were	adverse	and	hostile	 to	 these	
objectives	and	disqualified	Czechoslovakia	in	their	pursuit?	With	what	expectations	and	
goals	did	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika	enter	into	relations	with	Czechoslovakia,	how	
did	 these	 expectations	 evolve	 over	 time	 and	 how	 did	 they	 reflect	 the	 countries’	
specificities?	 What	 were	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	
Tanganyika	to	allow	for	effective	cooperation	with	Czechoslovakia	to	develop?	In	what	
way	 did	 Czechoslovak	 relations	 with	 these	 countries	 affect	 political	 or	 economic	
development	 in	 these	 countries?	 How	 did	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 in	 East	 Africa	 clash	
with	the	interests	of	Britain,	the	USA	or	China	and	what	were	the	effects	of	their	rivalry?	
And	finally,	how	decisive	was	the	personal	consent	of	charismatic	nationalist	leaders	in	
Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika	to	the	establishment	of	a	working	cooperation	between	
Czechoslovakia	and	its	East‐African	partners?		
Czechoslovak‐East	African	relations	in	the	wider	academic	context	of	the	
study	of	history	and	international	relations	and	the	significance	of	this	
research		
There	 are	 several	 aspects	 of	 this	 research	 which	 justify	 its	 pursuit	 and	
determine	 its	 academic	 relevance	 and	 significance.	 Firstly,	 the	 narrative	 presented	 in	
this	thesis	is	relevant	to	several	fields	of	political	history	of	the	twentieth	century	which	
can	benefit	by	the	findings	of	this	particular	research	–	Cold	War	history,	the	history	of	
decolonisation	of	British	East	Africa	and	the	history	of	the	early	political	development	of	
Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania.	All	of	 these	histories	are	substantially	complemented	by	
the	 findings	of	 this	particular	research	and	they	are	enriched	by	the	application	of	 the	
new	historical	perspective	made	possible	by	the	analysis	of	new	historical	documentary	
evidence.	
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Secondly,	by	undertaking	this	research	project,	a	large	set	of	primary	historical	
data	was	 collected,	 analysed	and	 interpreted,	much	of	 it	 for	 the	 first	 time.	 It	was	 thus	
made	 more	 accessible	 for	 further	 historical	 examination	 or	 for	 use	 as	 a	 secondary	
reference	 in	 future	history	projects.	 In	 this	respect	 this	research	project	certainly	 took	
full	advantage	of	newly	acquired	access	to	rich	documentary	sources	of	historical	data	as	
new	 collections	 of	 archival	 records	 are	 being	 progressively	 opened	 up	 in	 the	 Czech	
Republic	and	Slovakia.		
Thirdly,	 findings	 produced	 by	 this	 research	 project	 represent	 new	 subject	
matter	 for	 the	 eternal	 discussion	 on	 theoretical	 approaches	 in	 the	 field	 of	 political	
science	and	international	relations.	
	 The	study	of	Czechoslovak‐East	African	relations	 in	 the	approximate	period	of	
the	1960s	is	a	historical	study	in	the	field	of	political	history	and	international	relations.	
More	 specifically	 it	 falls	 into	 the	 wide	 corpus	 of	 Cold	 War	 history	 that	 represents	
perhaps	the	 largest	bulk	of	political	historiography	of	 the	twentieth	century.	Cold	War	
historiography	 addresses	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 historical	 topics	 in	 various	 fields	 and	 on	
multiple	 levels	 of	 historical	 insight,	 ranging	 from	 micro‐studies	 of	 local	 phenomena,	
through	country	case	studies,	all	the	way	to	the	study	of	the	global	development	of	this	
political‐ideological	 conflict	 in	 its	 widest	 perspective.	 Czechoslovak‐East	 African	
relations	are	in	this	respect	somewhere	around	the	middle	of	this	range.	They	represent	
a	comparatively	specific	topic	that	can	be	perceived	as	a	subsection	of	the	wider	theme	
of	 Soviet	 engagement	 in	 the	Third	World.	 It	 has	 been	one	 of	 the	 fundamental	 themes	
targeted	 and	 examined	 by	 Cold	 War	 historiography	 for	 several	 decades.1	 Close	
involvement	 of	 both	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 USA	 with	 the	 developing	 states	 of	 the	
Third	World	was	both	the	strategy	and	the	means	to	achieve	the	ultimate	goal	of	global	
political	dominance.	In	some	cases	the	Soviets	and	to	a	lesser	extent	also	the	Americans	
delegated	 contacts	with	 some	 regions	 or	 specific	 countries	 to	 allies	 or	 satellites.	 This	
tactic	would	be	used	if	the	superpower	itself	did	not	possess	the	necessary	capacities	to	
establish	satisfactory	mutual	political	relations	or	if	it	expected	to	meet	with	uncertain	
or	negative	reactions	in	the	country	being	approached.	This	research	project	forms	the	
                                                            
1 Eg. Hosmer, Stephen T. and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1983); Porter, Bruce D., The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and 
Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945‐1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univestity Press. 1984);  Fukuyama, Francis and 
Andrzej Korbonski, ed., The Soviet Union and the Third World: the Last Three Decades (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1987). 
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narrative	of	how	such	tactics	were	used	by	the	Soviets	in	East	Africa	in	the	late	colonial	
and	early	post‐colonial	period	when	Czechoslovakia	was	acting,	 if	not	always	blatantly	
on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Soviets,	 than	 certainly	 fully	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Soviet	 foreign	 political	
objectives	of	the	export	and	spread	of	socialism	to	newly	independent	countries.	
Cold	War	 historiography	 has	 lately	 been	 undergoing	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 theoretical	
approach	to	its	subject	matter	as	well	as	 in	forms	of	 its	interpretation.2	The	increasing	
availability	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 archives	 was	 identified	 as	 a	 crucial	
determinant	of	a	fundamental	shift	in	the	historiography	of	the	Cold	War3.	‘For	the	first	
time,	the	focus	of	scholarly	activity	has	shifted	from	the	United	States	and	the	Western	bloc	
to	 the	Soviet	Union	and	 its	 former	allies.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	has	been	a	noteworthy	
shift	from	an	emphasis	on	geopolitics	to	a	stress	on	ideology,	from	a	concern	with	interests	
to	a	preoccupation	with	culture,	from	analyses	of	the	international	system	and	the	threats	
emanating	therefrom	to	a	concern	with	regime‐types	and	with	personalities.’4	The	Soviet	
part	of	the	Cold	War	equation	is	becoming	central	for	new	Cold	War	historiography	for	
many	historians.5	This	research	thesis	aspires	to	be	the	valid	product	of	this	content	and	
the	 methodological	 shift	 and	 to	 contribute	 by	 its	 findings	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 new	
perspectives	and	new	insights	into	the	understanding	of	the	Cold	War.	
	
Study	 in	 the	 field	 of	 political	 history	 is	 always	 closely	 connected	 to	 other	
academic	 disciplines	 such	 as	 political	 theory	 or	 international	 relations	 theory	 as	 it	
produces	the	subject	matter	which	can	be	and	often	is	used	to	form	or	support	widely	
applicable	 theories	 in	 these	 academic	 fields.	 This	 relationship	 is	 however	 a	 two‐way	
affair	 as	 the	 established	 and	 accepted	 theoretical	 approaches	 of	 politics	 and	
international	 relations	 often	 have	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 order	 to	 interpret	 the	 empirical	
findings	 of	 historical	 research.	 Various	 theories	 of	 political	 science	 and	 international	
relations	provide	historians	with	an	analytical	extension	to	their	historiography	product	
which	 is	 not	 always	 necessary	 but	 certainly	 significantly	 improves	 the	 relevance	 and	
                                                            
2 Westad, Odd Arne, “Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War,” in Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, 
Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad (New York: Routledge, 2013), 3. 
3 Leffler, Melvyn P. “Bringing it Together: The Parts and the Whole,” in Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, 
Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad (New York: Routledge, 2013), 43. 
4 Leffler, ”Bringing,” 43. 
5 Westad, “Introduction,” 6. 
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academic	 value	 of	 every	 historical	 study.	 The	 application	 of	 a	 valid	 and	 appropriate	
theoretical	 filter	 not	 only	 allows	 for	 effective	 interpretation	 of	 historical	 findings	 but	
sometimes	 also	 results	 in	 unravelling	 historical	 causality	 that	 might	 otherwise	 have	
remained	unidentified.	
International	 relations	 theorists	 were	 already	 using	 the	 Cold	 War	 as	 their	
subject	matter	while	the	conflict	was	still	taking	place.	Many	of	the	initial	results	of	their	
research	were	seriously	challenged,	however,	by	the	sudden	and	totally	unexpected	end	
of	the	Cold	War.6	The	school	of	thought	of	international	relations	most	affected	by	this	
was	 that	 of	 realism,	 and	 neo‐realism,	 which	 had	 always	 emphasised	 the	 paradigm	 of	
bipolar	 stability	 induced	 into	 global	 international	 relations	 by	 the	 causality	 of	 the	
balance‐of‐threat.7	
The	findings	of	this	historical	research	address	a	number	of	questions	including	
the	motivations	of	participating	states	in	seeking	mutual	relations	with	each	other,	the	
forms	 that	 these	 relations	 eventually	 adopted,	 the	 influence	 of	 leading	 political	
personalities	of	 these	states	on	the	 formation	and	development	of	relations,	as	well	as	
the	effects	that	this	cooperation	had	on	a	country’s	political	development.	Some	of	these	
answers	are	integral	to	the	international	relations	debate	on	the	nature	of	the	Cold	War.			
Several	fundamental	principles	of	realist	and	neo‐realist	theories	are	still	valid	
for	 studying	 and	 analysing	 Cold	 War	 relations	 and	 therefore	 they	 represent	 an	
appropriate	 theoretical	 approach	 for	 interpretation	 of	 Czechoslovak‐East	 African	
relations.	Neo‐realists	view	the	Cold	War	conflict	as	the	competition	of	two	rival	entities,	
where	 winning	 a	 decisive	 advantage	 over	 the	 enemy	 endangers	 the	 status	 quo	 in	 a	
global	 system	 of	 power.8	 	 They	 also	 view	 the	 struggle	 for	 power	 as	 central	 to	
international	 relations,	 which	 is	 certainly	 a	 valid	 point.	 The	 power	 struggle	 was	 the	
driver	on	the	Soviet	side	of	the	conflict,	which,	as	was	well	illustrated	by	numerous	cases	
of	 Soviet	 expansionism	shortly	after	 the	Bolshevik	 revolution,	 as	well	 as	by	 the	Soviet	
expansion	across	Eastern	Europe	with	 the	 end	of	World	War	 II,	 and	 eventually	 in	 the	
late	1950s	when	various	Third	World	countries	were	being	approached	either	directly	
by	the	USSR	or	by	its	satellites	acting	on	the	Soviets’	behalf.	An	eventual	clash	with	the	
                                                            
6 Westad, “Introduction,” 6. 
7 Wohlworth, William C., “Realism and foreign policy,“ in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, ed. Steve 
Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 36. 
8 Drulák, Petr, Teorie mezinárodních vztahů, (Praha: Portál, 2003), 176‐178. 
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enemy,	in	reality	represented	by	the	capitalist	West,	was	unavoidable	and	it	was	clearly	
theoretically	formulated	by	Lenin	and	later	put	into	practice	by	Stalin.9	In	an	attempt	to	
reach	the	ultimate	goal	of	establishing	a	Communist	society,	the	factor	of	consolidation	
of	all	political	power	was	considered	crucial	by	Russian	Bolsheviks,	as	well	as	 later	by	
the	leaders	of	Communist	and	Workers’	parties	in	Central	Europe.	On	a	larger	scale	the	
export	 of	 socialism,	 first	 to	 Eastern	 Europe	 and,	 in	 the	 next	 stage,	 to	 Third	 World	
countries,	 including	 Africa,	 was	 certainly	 an	 ideological	 move;	 however,	 it	 was	 even	
more	so	a	strategic	step	towards	securing	more	power	over	the	West.	In	political	reality	
implementation	of	these	principles	meant	that	conflict	with	the	West	was	inevitable.	
In	the	case	of	the	Cold	War	the	neorealist	argument	of	the	centrality	of	power	
also	 works	 on	 the	 American	 side	 of	 the	 conflict,	 yet	 in	 a	 slightly	 different	 way.	 The	
struggle	 for	power	was	necessitated	by	 the	 increasing	 Soviet	 expansionism	and,	 in	 its	
initial	phase,	it	was	imposed	on	the	American	government.	Unlike	in	the	Soviet	Union,	no	
ideology	 perpetuated	 the	 expansionist	 power	 struggle	 of	 the	 American	 government,	
except	perhaps	for	the	interests	of	a	liberal	American	economy.	Nevertheless,	the	Soviet	
advance	left	the	American	administration	with	no	choice	but	to	to	enter	the	competition	
for	 power	 in	 order	 to	 defend	 the	 democratic	 principles	 rooted	 in	 the	 American	
constitution	 and	 eventually	 to	 overcome	 the	 opponent.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 ultimate	
competition	for	power	of	two	superpowers	did	indeed	create	a	system	of	international	
relations	 which	 was	 stable	 for	 four	 decades	 is	 another	 argument	 in	 support	 of	 the	
realist‐neorealist	approach	to	international	relations.	The	concept	of	a	power	struggle	as	
a	 driver	 of	 political	 development	 is	 absolutely	 valid	 for	 Czechoslovak	 relations	 with	
Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania	 in	 the	1960s.	Not	only	did	Czechoslovakia	and	the	Soviet	
Union	compete	with	Britain,	the	USA	and	China	for	political	influence	in	these	countries,	
but	 they	 also	 supported	political	 rivalry	 between	 various	 politicians	 for	 dominance	 in	
their	 parties.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 realists	 and	 neo‐realists	 fail	 in	 attempting	 to	
explain	the	sudden	end	of	the	Cold	War	conflict,	but	some,	however,	argue	that	the	end	
of	 the	 Cold	War	 was	 a	 deviation	 from	 normality	 that	 can	 never	 be	 explained	 by	 the	
systematic	theoretical	framework.10		
                                                            
9 Heywood, Andrew,  Key concepts in politics (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 48‐51.; Miller, David, 
Janet Coleman, William Connolly, and Alan Ryan, ed, Blackwellova encyklopedie politického myšlení (Czech 
Republic: Barrister a Principal, 2003), 464.  
10 Westad, “Introduction,” 7.   
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While	analysing	and	interpreting	the	findings	of	this	research	some	principles	of	
the	 latest	 theoretical	 approach	 to	 international	 relations,	 the	 post‐positivist	 approach,	
became	highly	 relevant.	 Post‐positivists	 refuse	 to	perceive	 international	 relations,	 and	
the	 Cold	 War	 is	 the	 perfect	 example	 for	 this	 argument,	 as	 a	 field	 of	 knowledge	
measureable	by	the	methodology	of	natural	sciences	or	economics,	as	does	the	neo‐neo	
discourse,	 and	 they	 criticise	 the	omission	 of	 the	 human	 factor	 in	 the	 equation.11	With	
virtually	limitless	power	on	the	part	of	the	leader	in	decision‐making	in	the	Soviet	Union	
and	 the	 other	 countries	 of	 the	 Eastern	 bloc	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 with	 the	 American	
presidential	 system,	where	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 president	 has	 vast	 power	 as	well,	 on	 the	
other,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 ignore	 the	 influence	 of	 factors	 such	 as	 character,	 mental	 or	
physical	health,	integrity,	religion,	culture,	etc.	in	the	decision‐making	of	leaders	such	as	
Stalin,	Khrushchev,	Kennedy,	Gottwald,	Truman,	Nyerere,	Kenyatta	and	others.	Stalin’s	
late	anti‐Semitism,	Khrushchev’s	 lack	of	education,	Kenyatta’s	 ethnic	 links	 to	a	Kikuyu	
tribe	and	Gottwald’s	life‐long	panic‐fear	of	Stalin	are	just	some	of	the	personal	features	
that	determined	everyday	decision‐making	in	Cold	War	development.	The	real	influence	
of	 such	 factors	 on	 the	 final	 decision	 is	 impossible	 to	 measure.	 The	 post‐positivist	
argument	 is	highly	relevant	 for	relations	between	Czechoslovakia	and	 the	countries	of	
East	 Africa.	 The	 decision‐making	 of	 charismatic	 East‐African	 leaders	 was	 the	 most	
important	determinant	of	Czechoslovak	relations	with	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania.	
It	 is	 only	 natural	 that	 in	 writing	 the	 history	 of	 such	 a	 complex	 and	 versatile	
process	as	were	the	relations	between	Czechoslovakia	and	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania,	
the	rigid	 theoretical	 framework	of	political	science	and	 international	relations	will	not	
be	applicable	without	resort	to	serious	compromises.	It	is	perhaps	an	advantage	of	the	
nature	 of	 historical	 research	 in	 comparison	 to	 political	 science	 and	 international	
relations	that	a	researcher	does	not	have	to	work	with	a	 firmly	established	theoretical	
framework.	Instead	he	can,	as	in	this	case,	draw	on	valid	aspects	of	various	theoretical	
approaches	to	facilitate	the	most	appropriate	interpretation	of	his	findings.			
	
                                                            
11 Drulák, Teorie mezinárodních vztahů, 134‐139. 
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Review	and	critical	assessment	of	relevant	secondary	literature		
The	 subject	matter	 of	 this	 thesis,	 that	 is,	 ‘Czechoslovak‐East	 African	 relations	
between	1958	and	1970‘	has	not	been	previously	studied	 in	any	academic	work	 in	 its	
entirety,	complexity,	or	scope	as	covered	by	this	research.	Therefore	there	is	not	a	single	
academic	 work	 which	 would	 act	 as	 a	fundamental	 point	 of	 reference	 for	 this	 thesis.	
There	 are,	 however,	 some	 texts	 that	 proved	 essential	 throughout	 the	 writing	 of	 the	
majority	of	this	thesis	while	other	works	were	of	the	utmost	importance	for	one	or	two	
sections	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 particular	 topic.	 Some	works	 were	 invaluable	 as	 a	 source	 of	
historical	 data,	 some	 offered	 a	unique	 interpretation	 of	 historical	 events,	 or	 an	
alternative	perspective	on	notoriously	well‐known	events.		
The	bulk	of	secondary	literature	that	was	studied,	quoted,	referenced	or	simply	
consulted	 in	 the	 process	 of	 creating	 this	 thesis	 is	 extensive.	 Due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
studied	subject	matter	it	includes	a	large	variety	of	historiographical	or	social‐scientific	
works	 from	 several	 fields	 –	political	 history,	 economic	history,	 international	 relations,	
comparative	 politics	 etc.	 Secondary	 literature	 sources	 that	 were	 used	 for	 this	 thesis	
include	 a	 variety	 of	 works	 as	 regards	 the	 time	 they	were	written	 and	 the	 country	 of	
origin	of	their	author.	Some	works	were	written	as	the	events	studied	by	this	research	
were	still	unfolding,	allowing	 the	reader	 to	get	a	grasp	of	historical	development	 from	
the	unique	standpoint	of	a	 contemporary.	 In	 some	cases	 the	sense	of	being	present	 in	
the	 midst	 of	 unfolding	 history	 provides	 one	 with	 a	 unique	 perspective	 that	 makes	 it	
easier	to	understand	the	causality	of	the	history	under	examination.	On	the	other	hand	
contemporary	 works	 of	 current	 authors	 benefit	 from	 the	 advantage	 of	 a	 time	 gap	
between	 analysis	 and	 the	 studied	 event.	 The	main	 advantage	 lies	 in	 the	 likelihood	 of	
greater	objectivity	based	on	the	authors	in	question	having	more	complex	data	available	
and	studying	the	historical	event	or	period	in	its	entirety	knowing	the	full	story.				
The	 authors	 are	 as	 complex	 and	 varied	 as	 their	 works.	 They	 are	
a	heterogeneous	group	that	includes	predominantly	professional	historians,	economists	
and	 social	 scientists,	 besides	 these,	 however,	 there	 are	 also	 diplomats,	 soldiers,	
politicians,	 and	 spies,	 from	 Britain,	 Africa,	 Czechoslovakia,	 the	 USA,	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	
China	and	other	countries,	writing	in	a	more	or	less	professional	way	about	the	events	
that	they	themselves	took	part	 in	or	had	the	chance	to	observe	very	closely.	Works	by	
such	authors	are	naturally	more	prone	to	bias	and	are	often	of	dubious	academic	value,	
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but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 provide	 one	 with	 a	unique	 insight	 into	 historical	 event	 or	
epoch,	and	often	they	are	primary	historical	sources	in	their	own	right.						
This	 secondary	 literature	 review	 sets	 out	 to	 outline,	 introduce	 and	 critically	
assess	the	most	important	secondary	sources	that	were	used	during	the	writing	of	this	
thesis.	Works	dealt	with	in	this	section	are	divided	primarily	according	to	the	topic	they	
cover.	 Subsequently	 they	 are	 further	 subdivided	 according	 to	 more	 specific	
characteristics	 –	 the	 time	 of	 their	 creation,	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 of	 their	 author,	 the	
applied	methodology	etc.			
	
Czechoslovak‐African	relations		
	If	 there	had	to	be	one	work	chosen	that	was	used	as	a	 fundamental	reference	
for	 this	 research	 it	 would	 be	 that	 of	 Czech	 historian	 and	 journalist	 Petr	 Zídek	
Československo	 a	 francouzská	 Afrika	 1948‐68.12	 Zídek	 looks	 in	 this	 book	 in	
unprecedented	detail	into	relations	between	Czechoslovakia	and	the	francophone	states	
of	western	 Africa	 that	 received	 independence	 in	 the	 late	 1950s	 and	 early	 1960s.	 The	
book	is	a	unique	piece	of	current	Czech	historiography	focusing	on	the	sphere	of	foreign	
political	 relations	 of	 socialist	 Czechoslovakia	 never	 previously	 addressed	 in	 one	
coherent	study.	Findings	in	this	book	are	most	of	all	based	on	evidence	from	extensive	
archival	 research	 in	 various	 Czech	 archives,	 complemented	 by	 approximately	 twenty	
interviews	 with	 Czechoslovak	 citizens	 who	 were	 engaged	 in	 contacts	 with	 western	
Africa	in	this	period.		
While	Zidek’s	book	benefits	greatly	 from	the	 large	amount	of	original	archival	
material	 and	 from	 the	 insights	 collected	 through	 interviews,	 there	 are	 also	 some	
shortcomings	to	it	that	its	author	did	not	prevent.	Data	collection	was	limited	to	Europe	
and	 the	 author	 did	 not	 conduct	 any	 archival	 research	 or	 interviews	 in	 Africa.	 Also,	
despite	 the	 fact	 that	his	 list	of	 secondary	resources	 is	quite	exhaustive,	very	 little	was	
done	in	setting	the	Czechoslovak	activities	 in	particular	western	African	countries	 into	
the	wider	political	context	of	local	politics	or	the	Cold	War	rivalry	between	the	USA,	the	
UK,	France	and	the	Soviet	Union.	The	study	works	very	well	as	an	overview	of	activities	
                                                            
12 Zídek, Petr, Československo a francouzská Afrika 1948‐1968 [Czechoslovakia and French Africa] (Czech 
Republic: Libri, 2006). 
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of	Czechoslovak	state	institutions	and	organs	in	western	Africa	and	helps	to	identify	the	
motives	 for	 Czechoslovak	 activism	 in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 world	 in	 the	 period	 studied	 by	
Zidek		but	does	not	provide	much	analytical	insight.	It	works	as	a	more	detailed,	region‐
specific	 extension	 of	 Zídek’s	 other	 book	 Československo	 a	 subsaharská	 Afrika	 v	 letech	
1948‐198913	which	 is	a	complete	overview	of	Czechoslovak	state	 relations	with	all	 the	
countries	of	sub‐Saharan	African	during	the	Cold	War.	This	second	work	is	 fully	based	
on	archival	data	collection	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	besides	the	overview	of	particular	
relations	 it	 also	 explains	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 	 Czechoslovak	Africa	 policy,	 and	 offers	 a	
periodization	of	Czechoslovak‐African	relations	during	the	Cold	War	that	can,	however,	
be	 challenged	 for	 overgeneralising	 and	 oversimplifying.	 This	 (second)	 book	 does	 not	
aspire	to	provide	any	analytical	output,	but	it	is	very	useful	as	a	comprehensive	and	very	
complete	 overview	 of	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 in	 the	 whole	 of	 Africa	 during	 this	
particular	period	and	works	well	as	a	point	of	departure	for	further	research.	
Besides	 the	 studies	 mentioned	 above,	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 journal	 articles14		
exist	 that	 address	 country‐specific	 Czechoslovakian	 involvement	 in	 Africa	 at	 different	
periods	during	the	twentieth	century.	In	most	cases	the	main	concern	of	these	articles	is	
Czechoslovakia’s	subversive	actions	against	Western	interests.	Among	these	articles	one	
stands	 out	 in	 a	 rather	 negative	way.	 The	 1963	World	 Politics	 article	 Czechoslovakia’s	
penetration	 of	 Africa,	 1955‐1962	 written	 by	 Curt	 Beck15	 is	 an	 example,	 way	 below	
academic	standards,	of	highly	unprofessional	handling	of	primary	sources,	in	the	form	of	
newspaper	 and	 journal	 articles;	 there	 is	 inadequate	 critical	 assessment	of	 the	 sources	
used.	The	article	is	for	the	most	part	based	on	articles	from	the	Czechoslovak	newspaper	
Rudé	právo	which	was	the	main	communist	media	in	the	country	after	1948.	Even	in	the	
illiberal,	censored	media	environment	of	socialist	Czechoslovakia	where	all	newspapers	
had	to	support	and	celebrate	the	building	of	socialism,	Rudé	právo	was	notorious	for	its	
heavily	 ideologically‐biased,	 propaganda‐driven,	 erroneous	 or	 downright	 false	
reporting.	The	author	of	the	article	in	question	quotes	Rudé	právo	or	the	similarly	biased	
                                                            
13 Zídek, Petr, and Karel Sieber, Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech 1948‐1989 [Czechoslovakia and 
subsaharan Africa] (Czech Republic: Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, 2007).          
14 Eg. Olša Jr, Jiří, “History of Czechoslovak Consular Presence in Southern Rhodesia between the Wars,” 
Heritage of Zimbabwe, No. 23. (2004): 127‐139.;   Sieber, Karel, “Československo a Nigérie v letech 1961‐1967,” 
Historie a vojenství 1/2002, (2002): 3‐31.; Sieber, Karel, “Československá vojenská pomoc Ugandě (1965‐
1970),” Historický obzor XIII, 9‐10/2002, (2002): 223‐230. 
15 Beck, Curt F., “Czechoslovakia's Penetration of Africa, 1955‐1962,” World Politics 15, No. 3 (Apr., 1963): 403‐
416. 
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ČTK	 (Československá	 tisková	kancelář)	 on	 a	number	of	 occasions	without	 exposing	 the	
content	to	any	kind	of	critique.	Beck	thus	ends	up	basing	his	conclusions	on	material	of	
clearly	propagandistic	purpose	drafted	by	various	government	offices	and	intended	as	a	
celebration	of	 foreign‐political	 successes	of	 socialist	Czechoslovakia	 for	 the	 readership	
at	 home.	Methodological	 and	 factual	 shortcomings	 of	 this	 article	 however	 do	 not	 end	
here.	 Beck	 completely	 ignores	 the	 relations	 that	 had	 existed	 previously	 between	
Czechoslovakia	 and	 African	 countries,	 and	 erroneously	 places	 the	 beginning	 of	
Czechoslovak	 involvement	 in	Africa	 in	 the	 year	 1955.16	 Beck	 continues	 to	 provide	 his	
readers	with	an	overview	of	Czechoslovak	activities	across	Africa	 in	 the	1950s	as	 they	
were	presented	in	various	Czechoslovak	newspapers.	Beck	fails	to	distinguish	between	
the	real	accomplishments	of	Czechoslovak	activities	in	various	African	countries	and	the	
ambitious	plans	announced	by	the	Czechoslovak	government	that	were	to	take	place	in	
the	 	 future,	 and	 never	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 cases	 executed.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 Beck	
succeeds	in	identifying	correctly	Czechoslovak	importance	for	the	Soviet	Union’s		Africa	
policy	 as	 well	 as	 pointing	 out	 the	 political‐economic	 reasoning	 of	 the	 Czechoslovak	
government	which	motivated	the	pursuit	of	closer	cooperation	with	African	states.17	
		
Foreign	policy	of	socialist	Czechoslovakia	
Development	 of	 Czechoslovak	 foreign	 policy	 was	 the	 main	 determinant	 of	
Czechoslovak	relations	with	 the	states	of	East	Africa.	Surprisingly,	 there	are	not	many	
contemporary	historiographical	or	political	science	works	that	deal	with	this	topic	in	its	
entirety.	Works	of	an	earlier	date	are	of	 limited	use	due	to	their	heavy	ideological	bias	
and	one‐sided	emphasis	on	the	relations	within	the	socialist	camp.	One	of	few	existing	
works	that	deal	with	the	topic	of	Czechoslovak	foreign	relations	development	during	the	
20th	 century	 is	 František	 přil’s	 Československá	 a	 česká	 zahraniční	 politika:	minulost	 a	
současnost.18	 This	 study	 concentrates	 on	 the	most	 prominent	 events	 that	marked	 the	
development	of	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	and	therefore	only	a	small	proportion	of	the	
text	 deals	 with	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 in	 Cold	 War	 relations	 in	 the	 Third	 World,	
including	Africa.	Major	events	that	marked	the	cooperation	between	Czechoslovakia	and	
                                                            
16 Beck, “Czechoslovakia's Penetration,” 406. 
17 Beck, “Czechoslovakia's Penetration,” 415. 
18 Zbořil, František, Československá a česká zahraniční politika: minulost a současnost [Czech and Czechoslovak 
foreign policy] (Czech Republic: Leges, 2010). 
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Kenya,	Uganda	 and	Tanzania	 are	 only	mentioned	briefly	 in	 the	 text.	Nevertheless,	 the	
book	 is	 very	 useful	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 socialist	
Czechoslovakia	and	the	Soviet	Union,	the	mechanisms	of	decision‐making,	the	structure	
of	 relevant	 institutions	 that	 formed	 or	 executed	 these	 relations,	 and	 the	 implications	
these	 relations	had	 for	 the	 formation	of	Czechoslovak	 foreign	policy	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
West	as	well	as	to	Third	World	countries.		
A	 similar	 topic,	 but	 from	 a	 more	 radical	 standpoint,	 critical	 of	 Soviet	
expansionist	 politics,	 is	 presented	 in	 Josef	 Kalvoda’s	 Role	 Československa	 v	sovětské	
strategii.19	Kalvoda	thoroughly	analyses	the	origins	of	Czechoslovak‐Soviet	relations	and	
examines	 the	 historical	 events	 that	 made	 Czechoslovakia	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	
Soviet	allies	in	Europe.		In	a	well‐constructed	argument,	Kalvoda	presents	the	vital	role	
that	Czechoslovak	economic	and	political	capacities	played	in	the	global	spread	of	Soviet	
communism.	 	 His	 explanation	 of	 how	 the	 democratic	 victory	 of	 communism	 in	
Czechoslovakia	worked	as	an	example	proudly	presented	to	the	developing	countries	of	
the	Third	World	is	highly	relevant	for	this	particular	research	topic.20				
The	 extensive	 political‐economic	 study,	 by	 Václav	 Průcha	 and	 colleagues,	
entitled	 Hospodářské	 a	 sociálni	 dějiny	 Československa	 1918‐199221	 was	 invaluable	 in	
explaining	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 causality	 that	 determined	 the	 exercise	 of	
Czechoslovak	 foreign	 policy.	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 liberal,	 capitalist,	 industry‐oriented	
economy	 of	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 its	 development	 before	 the	 Second	 World	 War	
fundamentally	determined	Czechoslovak	relations	with	the	African	continent	in	the	pre‐
war	 period.	 Far‐reaching	 political	 turbulence	 after	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 caused	
immense	structural	changes	in	the	Czechoslovak	economy	which	inadvertently	affected	
the	 implementation	 of	 Czechoslovak	 foreign	 policy	 everywhere,	 including	 East	 Africa.	
Understanding	 the	 connection	 between	 centralised	 economic	 planning	 and	 its	
implication	for	Czechoslovakia’s	external	relations	explains	why	socialist	Czechoslovakia	
struggled	to	reach	its	ambitious	goals	in	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania.	
	
	
	
                                                            
19 Kalvoda, Josef, Role Československa v sovětské strategii [Role of Czechoslovakia] (Czech Republic: Dílo, 1999). 
20 Kalvoda, Role, 275.  
21 Průcha, Václav, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918‐1992. 2. díl, Období 1945‐1992 [Economic 
and social history] (Czech Republic: Doplněk, 2009). 
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Historiography	of	the	Cold	War	and	of	Soviet	engagement	in	Africa	
Czechoslovak	engagement	 in	East	Africa	 in	 the	1960s	was	a	 result	of	 the	Cold	
War	 conflict	 which	 created	 a	 bipolar	 international	 political	 system	 defined	 by	 the	
ideological	 clash	 of	 two	 superpowers	 and	 their	 allies.	 Therefore	 the	 historiography	 of	
Cold	War	 conflict	 represents	 a	 source	 of	wider	 historical	 background	 for	 this	 present	
historical	 research,	 allowing	 investigation,	 analysis	 and	 explanation	of	 the	 causality	 of	
relations	between	Czechoslovakia	and	the	countries	of	East	Africa.	As	mentioned	above,	
the	 four	 decades	 of	 complex	 and	 complicated	 historical	 processes	 that	 together	
constitute	 the	Cold	War	conflict	motivated	 the	creation	of	perhaps	 the	 largest	body	of	
twentieth‐century	 historiography.	 Both	 subject	 matter	 and	 methodological	 and	
analytical	approaches	used	to	study	it	have	over	time	evolved	so	much	that	substantial	
academic	debate	exists	as	to	how	the	Cold	War	should	be	studied	and	analysed.	The	best	
grasp	of	this	academic	discourse	is	provided	by	Odd	Arne	Westad	in	his	introduction	to	
Reviewing	the	Cold	War,	22				where	he	explains	the	main	approaches	to	study	of	Cold	War	
history	and	he	introduces	his	audience	to	works	of	 leading	academics	of	this	historical	
field	who	are	representatives	of	their	respective	approaches	to	Cold	War	history.		
While	 the	 work	 of	 Odd	 Arne	Westad	 cited	 above	 (Reviewing	 the	 Cold	War23)	
provides	one	with	a	very	good	overview	of	this	field	of	history,	the	best	entry	point	into	
study	of	the	crucial	historical	events	of	the	Cold	War	is	given	in	the	three‐volume	set	The	
Cambridge	 History	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,24	 a	 collection	 of	 some	 fifty	 articles	 by	 various	
scholars	 compiled	 and	 edited	 by	 Odd	 Arne	Westad	 and	Melvyn	 P.	 Leffler,	 two	 of	 the	
leading	 scholars	 in	 this	 field.	Both	editors	begin	 their	work	by	explaining	 some	of	 the	
most	common	issues	that	a	historian	faces	when	undertaking	research	in	this	wide	and	
complex	 field.	 Participating	 academics	 continue	 by	 explaining	 that	 the	 ideological	
origins	of	the	Cold	War	conflict	 lay	in	an	inevitable	clash	between	American	liberalism	
and	the	Soviet	application	of	Marxist	socialist	philosophy.	‘Soviet	and	American	ideology	
were	 both	 universalistic;	 they	 both	 held	 that	 their	 conceptions	 of	 society	 applied	 to	 all	
                                                            
22 Westad, Odd Arne, “Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War,” In Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, 
Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad (New York: Routledge, 2013): 1‐27. 
23 Westad, Odd Arne, ed., Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (New York: Routledge, 
2013). 
24 Westad, Odd Arne, Melvyn P. Leffler, ed., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1‐3 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
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nations	 and	 peoples.	 Both	 nations	 prided	 themselves	 on	 their	 modernity,	 seeking	 to	
supplant	 what	 they	 saw	 as	 the	 moribund	 traditions	 of	 Europe	 –	 and	 ultimately	 to	
transform	 Europe	 itself.	 […]	 Each	 side	 feared	 the	 advance	 of	 the	 other	 as	 a	 step	
backward.’25	 Once	Westad	 has	 explained	 how	 these	 ideological	 origins	made	 the	 Cold	
War	more	or	less	inevitable,	the	separate	studies	of	various	aspects	and	case	studies	of	
Cold	 War	 development	 are	 presented.	 For	 this	 present	 research,	 Bradley’s	 study,	
Decolonization,	 the	 global	 South	 and	 the	 Cold	War	 1919‐196226	 	 is	 particularly	 useful.	
Bradley	 investigates	 here	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Cold	 War	 and	 the	 growth	 of	
nationalism	 amongst	 African	 and	 Asian	 peoples;	 it	 was	 a	 process	 at	 first	 not	 much	
influenced	 by	 Soviet‐American	 rivalry,	 but	 in	 later	 stages	 it	was,	 however,	 very	much	
affected	by	the	realities	of	Cold	War.	Among	other	things	Bradley	explains	how	Cold	War	
political	 rivalry	 led	 to	 the	 Bandung	 Conference	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 non‐aligned	
movement.27	 Two	 other	 studies	 that	 provide	 this	 present	 research	 with	 important	
historical	 background	 is	 Kemp‐Welch’s	 Eastern	 Europe:	 From	 Stalinism	 to	 Solidarity28	
and	Latham’s	Cold	War	in	the	Third	World,	1963‐1975.29	
The	 third	 of	 Westad’s	 large	 historical	 works	 on	 the	 Cold	 War	 should	 not	 be	
omitted.	In	his	The	Global	Cold	War30	Westad	provides	his	readership	with	a	particularly	
good	 account	 of	 the	 ideology	 that	motivated	 Soviet	 expansionism	 and	 he	 explains	 the	
forms	of	political	 imagination	 in	 the	Soviet	camp	which	played	a	significant	role	when	
the	Soviets	were	setting	out	their	foreign	political	objectives	towards	the	Third	World.			
While	all	the	works	mentioned	in	previous	paragraphs	are	recent	studies	of	the	
Cold	War	and	thus	can	benefit	from	the	fact	that	their	studied	subject	matter	is	no	longer	
developing	 and	 changing,	 there	 is	 a	 large	 body	 of	 historiography	 that	 was	 produced	
                                                            
25 Engerman, David C., “Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1919‐1962,“ in The Cambridge History of the 
Cold War, Volume 1: Origins, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 23. 
26 Bradley, Mark Philip, “Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919‐1962, “ in The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 464. 
27 Bradley, “Decolonization, the global South,“ 479. 
28 Kemp‐Welch, Anthony, “Eastern Europe: Stalinism to Solidarity,“ in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 
Volume 1: Origins, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
29 Latham, Michael E., “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963‐1975,“ in The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War, Volume 1: Origins, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
30 Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39‐73. 
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while	the	Cold	War	was	still	ongoing,	or	immediately	after	it	had	ended.	Some	of	these	
earlier	 works,	 such	 as	 Fritz	 Schatten’s	 1966	 work,31	 	 investigate	 the	 Communist	
ideology.	 Schatten	 explores	 the	 various	ways	 through	which	 the	 Communist	 ideology	
was	penetrating	African	politics	and	society,	 to	what	extent	this	was	the	result	of	Cold	
War	rivalry	and	tries	to	establish	what	the	implications	were	for	the	immediate	political	
developments	 in	 Africa.	 Another	 highly	 influential	 work	 from	 this	 period	 is	 Legvolds’	
1970	Soviet	Policy	in	West	Africa32	which	examines	how	the	Soviet	Union	dealt	with	the	
historical	opportunity	 to	establish	 itself	 in	 this	part	of	Africa	after	 the	 colonial	 regime	
was	 deconstructed,	 how	 its	 approach	 to	 Africa	 changed	 during	 the	 1960s	 and	 what	
lessons	were	learnt	by	the	Soviet	political	leadership	from	this	period.				
Some	of	the	works	from	the	1980s	and	early	1990s,	such	as	Breslauer’s	edited	
volume	of	Soviet	policy	in	Africa,33	Rothenberg’s	The	USSR	and	Africa:	New	Dimensions	of	
Soviet	 Global	 Power34	 or	 Fukuyama	 and	 Korbonski’s	 The	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 Third	
World35	 look	 into	 how	 Soviet	 political	 objectives	 developed	 over	 time	 and	 what	 the	
implications	 of	 this	 change	 were	 for	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 Soviet	 policy	 in	
Africa.	The	main	part	of	 the	historical	narrative	 in	these	works	 is,	however,	concerned	
with	 Soviet	 actions	 under	 Brezhnev’s	 leadership	 in	 the	 late	 1970s	 and	 early	 1980s.	
Therefore	 they	provide	only	very	 little	historical	data	 for	 this	particular	 research.	The	
insight	provided	into	the	mechanism	of	ideology’s	influence	on	foreign	policy‐making	in	
the	USSR	is,	however,	applicable.		
The	 new	 accessibility	 of	 Russian	 archives	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 oral	
testimonies	of	direct	participants	prompted	increased	activity	by	Russian	authors	on	the	
subject	 of	 Soviet	 involvement	 in	 the	 Third	 World	 during	 the	 Cold	 War.	 The	 leading	
Russian	 historiographic	work	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 Sergey	Mazov’s	A	Distant	 	Front	 in	 the	
Cold	War.36	Even	though	Mazov	examines	Russian	activities	in	West	Africa,	a	number	of	
his	conclusions	are	relevant	for	this	particular	research	as	well.	Mazov	investigates	the	
                                                            
31 Schatten, Fritz, Communism in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1966). 
32 Legvold, Robert, Soviet policy in West Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
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34 Rothenberg, Morris, The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power (Advanced International 
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forms	 and	 means	 used	 by	 Soviets	 to	 enter	 Africa	 as	 well	 as	 the	 foreign	 political	
framework	under	which	these	proceedings	were	taking	place.		
	
Historiography	of	British	decolonisation		
The	decolonisation	of	 the	British	Empire	 is	 another	 field	 of	 twentieth‐century	
historiography	 that	 has	 motivated	 extensive	 historical	 research	 and	 given	 rise	 to	 a	
number	of	high‐quality	historiographic	works.	No	particularly	deep	historical	excursion	
into	 the	history	of	British	decolonisation	was	needed	 for	 the	purposes	of	 this	 present	
research.	 A	 set	 of	 widely	 accepted	 and	 well‐appraised	 historical	 works	 were	 used	 to	
furnish	a	 satisfactory	background	 context	 in	 relation	 to	British	decolonisation.	Two	of	
these	 books	 are	 works	 of	 general	 political	 history	 of	 Africa	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	
(Meredith	 2005,37	 Cooper	 200238);	 	 a	 further	 one	 deals	 with	 the	 history	 of	 British	
Empire	(Fergusson	200339)	and		a	fourth	specifically	addresses	the	British	retreat	from	
its	colonial	dominance	(Darwin	198840)		
John	Darwin’s	work,	Britain	and	Decolonisation:	The	Retreat	from	Empire	in	the	
Post‐War	 World,	 was	 the	 main	 referential	 guide	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 British	
decolonisation	section	of	this	thesis.	Darwin	first	introduces	his	readers	to	the	topic	of	
decolonisation;	 he	 defines	 the	 crucial	 concepts	 and	 explains	 the	 applied	 analytical	
approach	in	order	to	clarify	the	effects	of	decolonisation	in	the	wider	context.	He	goes	on	
to	 establish	 the	 main	 historical	 factors	 that	 had	 started	 the	 decolonisation	 of	 British	
Empire,	as	well	as	those	that	sped	up	and	intensified	the	process	at	a	later	stage.	Darwin	
then	introduces	various	factors	(British,	African,	and	international)	that	contributed	to	
the	 disintegration	 and	 eventual	 demise	 of	 the	 British	 Empire.	 In	 his	 section	 on	 East	
Africa	 he	 provides	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 historical	 data	 which	 clearly	 explains	 the	
causality	of	those	local	historical	developments	that	eventually	resulted	in	independence	
being	granted	despite	the	initial	unwillingness	of	the	colonial	administration.41		
                                                            
37 Meredith, Martin, The State of Africa (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 
38 Cooper, Frederick, Africa since 1940‐ The Past of the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).            
39 Ferguson, Niall, Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2005). 
40 Darwin, John, Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post‐war World (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education, 1988). 
41 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 183‐194. 
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A	different	methodological	and	analytical	approach	to	the	study	of	the	history	of	
British	decolonisation	was	used	by	Frederick	Cooper	in	his	Africa	since	1940:	the	Past	of	
the	Present.	Cooper	puts	more	emphasis	on	the	wider	 interdisciplinary	approach	as	he	
uses	various	social	and	economic	data	 to	 identify	non‐political	drivers	of	 this	ultimate	
political	change.	Historical	events	are	approached	by	Cooper	in	a	very	novel	way	which	
in	 effect	 allows	him	 to	draw	original	 and	 surprising	yet	 fully	plausible	 and	acceptable	
conclusions.	Yet	another	slightly	different	approach	to	this	topic	was	chosen	by	Martin	
Meredith	in	his	State	of	Africa;	he	places	great	emphasis	on	the	personalities	of	African	
leaders,	 and	 correctly	 so,	 as	 Kenyatta,	 Obote	 and	 Nyerere	 were	 all	 of	 the	 utmost	
importance	 in	 changing	 the	 political	 settings	 of	 their	 respective	 countries.	 A	 final	
member	 of	 the	 list	 of	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 topic,	 Niall	 Fergusson,	 one	 of	most	
controversial	 figures	 of	world	 historiography,	 draws	 a	unique	 narrative	 of	 the	 British	
retreat	from	colonial	power	in	his	Empire	by	concentrating	on	one	or	two	episodes	that	
best	characterise	this	process.	Subsequently	he	offers	a	brief	but	solid	explanation	of	the	
UK’s	economic	weakness	being	a	decisive	factor	in	the	British	retreat.42	
Specific	 details	 of	 the	 decolonisation	 of	 British	 East	 Africa	 are	 more	 closely	
targeted	by	two	other	works,	Daniel	Branch’s	Defeating	Mau	Mau,	Creating	Kenya43	and	
David	 Anderson’s	 Histories	 of	 the	 Hanged,44	 which	 were	 also	 consulted	 during	 this	
research	 but	 which	 were	 not	 referenced	 in	 the	 final	 version	 of	 this	 thesis.	 They	 can,	
however,	be	 recommended	as	more	detailed	accounts	of	decolonisation	 in	East	Africa,	
more	specifically	in	Kenya.	
	
Late	colonial	and	early	post‐independence	historiography	of	Kenya,	Uganda	
and	Tanganyika	
The	 last	 tranche	 of	 secondary	 literature	 sources	 was	 used	 to	 explain	 the	
historical	context	of	political	development	in	East	Africa	in	the	late	1950s	and	the	whole	
of	 the	 1960s.	 These	 sources	 to	 some	 extent	 address	 the	 same	 topic	 as	 the	 works	
mentioned	above,	but	they	do	so	from	the	perspective	of	the	liberation	struggle	rather	
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than	 from	 that	 of	 the	 failing	 colonial	 system.	 Even	 though	 in	 a	sense	 the	 historical	
processes	 studied	 are	 the	 same,	 the	 historical	 narrative	 created	 is	 strikingly	 different.	
Historians	of	the	East	African	liberation	struggle	concentrate	on	the	African	part	of	the	
story,	on	the	African	motivations	and	incentives	that	drove	the	process	of	change	and	on	
the	African	agents	and	actors	that	precipitated	it.	Also	the	limits	of	the	period	studied	for	
this	 thesis	 are	 rather	 different.	 Where	 the	 story	 of	 decolonisation	 ends,	 another	
completely	new	historical	narrative,	that	of	African	independence,	continues.	
Various	forms	of	Czechoslovak‐East	African	relations	were	taking	place	mostly	
in	East	Africa,	in	the	late	colonial	and	early	post‐colonial	political	landscape.	The	internal	
political	development	of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika	provided	the	historical	settings	
for	 these	 relations.	 In	 order	 to	depict	 these	 relations	 in	 their	 entirety	 and	 complexity,	
one	 has	 to	 understand	 the	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 processes	 that	 were	 taking	
place	in	these	countries	at	the	period	that	concerns	this	thesis.	The	historical	narrative	
of	Czechoslovak‐East	African	relations	only	can	be	satisfyingly	built	in	the	context	of	the	
historical	development	of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika.		
The	historiography	of	 political	 history	of	East	Africa	 of	 the	period	 covered	by	
this	 thesis	 is	 surprisingly	 substantial.	 There	 are	 several	 books	 which	 act	 as	 general	
histories	of	each	particular	East	African	country.	 	A	number	of	other	books	and	journal	
articles	 address	 more	 specific	 topics	 of	 historical	 development,	 in	 some	 cases	 with	 a	
cross‐disciplinary	approach.	During	 the	depiction	of	 the	historical	 context	of	 the	 three	
countries	studied	several	country‐specific	works	functioned	as	core	sources	of	historical	
data	on	each	of	 the	 three	countries.	Other	 sources	 then	addressed	some	more	specific	
but	highly	relevant	topics.	
Timothy	Parsons’	book	The	1964	Army	Mutinies	and	the	Making	of	Modern	East	
Africa45	acted	as	a	point	of	entry	for	the	excursion	into	the	political	history	of	East	Africa,	
and	 as	 a	 main	 referential	 guide	 throughout	 all	 three	 case	 studies.	 Even	 though	 the	
central	topic	that	this	book	addresses,	i.e.	the	mutinies	of	East	African	armies	soon	after	
independence,	is	quite	specific,	Parsons	uses	these	events	very	successfully	as	a	basis	for	
creating	 a	wider	 picture	 of	 local	 political	 environments	 and	 developments.	 Parsons	 is	
very	 effective	 in	 presenting	 the	 major	 political	 burdens	 inherited	 from	 the	 colonial	
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regime	and	explaining	what	effects	they	had	on	post‐independence	history.	Even	though	
the	 time	 scope	 of	 Parsons’	 book	 is	 quite	 short,	 it	 coincides	with	 the	period	 of	 highest	
intensity	of	Czechoslovak	activities	in	East	Africa.	This	work	was	also	highly	relevant	for	
the	present	thesis	on	account	of	its	deep	analytical	insight	into	the	role	of	military	and	
security	 in	 the	 newly	 independent	 states,	 two	 fields	 which	 were	 of	 the	 utmost	
importance	 for	 Czechoslovak	 objectives	 in	 this	 part	 of	 Africa.	 Parsons	 was	 also	 very	
successful	in	explaining	the	implications	of	army	mutinies	for	the	political	development	
of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika.	The	topic	of	army	mutinies	was	also	investigated	by	
Tony	 Laurence’s	 The	 Dar	 Mutiny	 of	 196446	 and	 in	 several	 journal	 articles	 by	 other	
authors.47								
There	 were	 several	 works	 that	 provided	 the	 author	 of	 this	 research	 with	 a	
general	historical	 context	 in	 the	case	of	each	country.	Perhaps	 the	richest	of	 the	 three	
national	historiographies	 is	Kenya’s,	which	has	 lately	been	enriched	by	 two	very	well‐
received	works.	 Charles	 Hornsby’s	Kenya:	A	History	 since	 Independence48	 	 is	 the	 opus	
magnum	of	Kenya’s	post‐independence	history	and	a	typical	example	of	political	history	
study	in	relation	to	the	research	method	applied,	the	analytical	approach	as	well	as	the	
historical	narrative	produced.	It	addresses	all	the	relevant	aspects,	agents	and	episodes	
of	 Kenyan	 political	 development	 in	 the	 last	 fifty	 years	 to	 a	 satisfactory	 depth	 leaving	
greater	detail	 to	 the	attention	of	other	historians’	 further	research.	Very	similar	 in	 the	
time	scope	to	Hornsby	but	somewhat	different	in	the	emphasis	on	the	internal	political	
division	of	Kenya	is	Daniel	Branch’s	Kenya:	Between	Hope	and	Despair,	1963	and	2002.49	
Most	 relevant	 for	 thesis	 is	 Branch’s	 investigation	 of	 the	 internal	 division	 of	 Kenya’s	
political	 leadership	 due	 to	 ethnic	 tensions	 and	 competing	 visions	 of	 Kenya’s	 way	
forward.	This	same	topic	is	very	well	researched,	analysed	and	explained	in	a	somewhat	
older	 work	 (1970)	 by	 Cherry	 Gertzel:	 The	 Politics	 of	 Independent	 Kenya.50	 Gertzel	
concentrates	 in	 this	 book	 on	 discovering	 mechanisms	 and	 factors	 that	 resulted	 in	
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shortcomings	of	the	Kenyan	institutional	system	as	well	as	Kenya’s	early	political	parties	
in	the	decades	after	independence.		
Ofcansky’s	 simple	 historical	 overview	Uganda:	Tarnished	Pearl	of	Africa51	and	
an	older,	 yet	more	detailed	and	more	 sophisticated	work	by	 Jan	 Jorgensen,	Uganda:	A	
Modern	History52	both	do	 for	Uganda	what	Hornsby	does	 for	Kenya.	Both	books	were	
capable	 of	 providing	 a	 basic	 overview	 of	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 Uganda	 in	 the	
period	this	thesis	covers	with	some	level	of	detail.	Nevertheless	for	a	more	thorough	and	
accurate	reconstruction	of	Uganda’s	political	history	number	of	journal	articles	had	to	be	
consulted	and	eventually	also	referenced.	Kabwegyere’s	The	Politics	of	State	Formation	
and	 Destruction	 in	 Uganda53	was	 very	 useful	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 research.	 The	
author	 explains	 here	 the	 major	 determinants,	 agents	 and	 limitations	 of	 Uganda’s	
political	system,	together	with	the	practical	outcomes	it	had	on	Uganda’s	history.		
In	the	case	of	Tanganyika	the	role	of	main	secondary	source	of	historical	context	
of	 Tanganyika	 was	 provided	 by	 Parsons’	 book	 (mentioned	 above)	 which	 was	
complemented	 by	 Ronald	 Aminzade’s	 Race,	 Nation	 and	 Citizenship	 in	 Post‐colonial	
Africa.54	The	Aminzade	book	is	not	a	usual	product	of	political	history	but	is	very	much	
affected	by	political	science.	Aminzade	examines	various	political	concepts	and	theories	
in	 reference	 to	 the	history	of	 independent	Tanzania.	The	book	works	with	a	 structure	
unusual	 for	 political	 historiography	 but	 succeeds	 in	 presenting	 solid	 argument	 while	
creating	 an	 equally	 good,	 if	 slightly	 disorganised	 historical	 narrative.	 2012	 work	 of	
James	Brennan55	and	Paul	Bjerk’s	unpublished	doctoral	dissertation56		and	were	also	of	
considerable	 importance	 for	 this	 research	 even	 though	 neither	 of	 them	 was	 widely	
referenced	in	the	final	thesis.					
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Research	methodology	and	thesis	structure	
This	paper	 is	 a	historical	 study	 in	 the	 field	of	political	history	of	 international	
relations.	 It	 uses	 various	 methods	 of	 historical	 research	 to	 produce	 the	 narrative	 of	
development	 of	 Czechoslovak‐East	 African	 relations	 in	 the	 period	 of	 1958	 up	 to	 and	
including	 1970.	 The	 fundamental	 research	 method	 used	 in	 this	 project	 was	 archival	
research	 complemented	 by	 the	 collection	 of	 oral	 testimonies.	 The	 resulting	
historiographic	 narrative	 is	 a	 fusion	 of	 primary	 and	 secondary	 data	 that	 were	
subsequently	 subjected	 to	 qualitative	 historical	 analysis.	 By	 applying	 a	 comparative	
qualitative	analytical	approach	on	 the	 three	presented	case	studies	 the	 thesis	supplies	
the	answers	 to	 the	research	questions	raised	 in	 this	 introduction	section	and	 it	allows	
for	 the	 primary	 hypothesis	 to	 be	 supported.	 This	 research	 fills	 in	 the	 existing	
historiographic	 gap	 caused	 by	 the	methodological	 limitations	which	 to	 a	 great	 extent	
prevented	any	earlier	attempt	of	thorough	and	complete	historical	analysis	of	this	topic.	
Archival	documents	that	represent	the	main	source	of	primary	data	for	this	research	had	
for	 a	 long	 time	 been	 inaccessible	 and	 because	 of	 the	 paucity	 of	 alternative	 historical	
sources	any	analysis	attempted	would	have	necessarily	worked	with	only	a	fragment	of	
primary	sources.	
	
The	 formation	 of	 research	 objectives	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 research	
boundaries		
The	 initial	motivation	 to	 undertake	 the	 research	 in	 the	 field	 of	 Czechoslovak‐
African	relations	arose	from	the	aforementioned	existing	historiographic	gap,	 from	the	
striking	 limitations	of	previous	research	done	 in	this	 field	and	from	the	author’s	belief	
that	proper	analysis	of	this	topic	would	allow	a		historical	narrative	to	be	produced	that	
would	establish	some	conclusion	that	will	be	relevant	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research,	
and	might	 prove	 useful	 for	 the	 general	 historical	 discourse	 of	 Czechoslovak	 Cold	War	
involvements	as	well	as	 for	an	on‐going	academic	discussion	of	 international	relations	
theories.	Until	recently	this	part	of	Czechoslovak	foreign	political	history	had	remained	
on	the	periphery	of	academic	interest.	The	only	existing	work	that	targeted	this	subject	
in	 its	 entirety	 was	 the	 book	 by	 Petr	 Zídek	 (2006),	 mentioned	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	
literature	 review	 section,	 but	 it	 was	 marked	 by	 a	 number	 of	 substantial	 limitations.	
Zídek’s	other	(2007)	work	overcame	some	of	these	limitations	and	partially	succeeded	
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in	 building	 a	 region‐specific	 and	 more	 detailed	 account	 of	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 in	
West	Africa.	However,	even	though	Zídek	worked	with	a	large	amount	of	unique	primary	
sources,	 including	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 oral	 accounts,	 he	 failed	 to	 contextualise	 his	
research	 successfully	 in	 the	 wider	 arena	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 as	 well	 as	 local	 political	
development	in	West	Africa.			
In	 the	 preliminary	 stage	 of	 this	 research	 a	 number	 of	 primary	 and	 secondary	
sources	were	consulted	and	the	research	design	as	well	as	the	subject	matter	began	to	
take	 shape.	 The	 original	 grossly	 unrealistic	 plan	 of	 undertaking	 a	 research	 project	
dealing	 with	 Czechoslovak	 relations	 with	 all	 sub‐Saharan	 countries	 throughout	 the	
entire	Cold	War	period	had	to	be	abandoned	immediately.	Initial	analysis	of	fragments	
of	 primary	 and	 secondary	 resource,	 threw	 up	 some	 reoccurring	 patterns	 of	
Czechoslovak	 proceedings	 in	 relations	 with	 sub‐Saharan	 Africa.	 Simultaneously.	 first	
questions	 began	 emerging	 concerning	 the	 causality	 of	 these	 relations,	 their	 wider	
historical	 context	 and	 their	 effects	 and	 implications	 for	 local	 African	 political	
development	as	well	 as	 for	Africa‐based	Cold‐War	rivalries.	 It	was	becoming	apparent	
that	the	most	effective	way	to	deal	with	the	topic	of	Czechoslovak‐African	relations	was	
to	 focus	on	a	 small	group	of	 countries	 characterised	by	similar	political	and	economic	
settings.	This	set‐up	would	permit	a	comparative	analysis	of	Czechoslovak	relations	with	
these	 particular	 countries	 to	 be	 undertaken,	 which	 would	 subsequently	 allow	 some	
general	conclusions	applicable	to	the	wider	spectrum	of	sub‐Saharan	African	countries	
to	be	drawn.		
Several	possible	groupings	were	considered	as	research	subjects	–	countries	of	
British	West	Africa;	Ethiopia,	Somalia	and	Sudan;	Zimbabwe,	Zambia	and	South	Africa.	
None	of	 these	groupings	proved	 ideal	 for	 the	purposes	of	 this	 research	either	because	
their	 political	 and	 economic	 characteristics	 were	 too	 distinct	 from	 each	 other	 for	 a	
satisfactory	 comparative	analysis	 to	be	attempted,	or	because	available	historical	data	
that	 would	 allow	 recreating	 the	 image	 of	 their	 relations	 with	 Czechoslovakia	 was	 in	
short	 supply.	 Eventually,	 the	 group	 of	 three	 East	 African	 states,	 the	 former	 British	
colonies	 of	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanganyika,	 were	 selected	 as	 the	 most	 appropriate	
objects	for	the	purposes	of	this	research.	These	states	have	a	history	of	similar	political	
development	 and	 they	 faced	a	number	of	 similar	political,	 economic	 and	 social	 issues.	
Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 also	 some	 important	 specific	 differences	 in	 their	 political,	
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economic,	ethnic	or	cultural	characteristics	which	determined	 their	diverse	degrees	of	
involvement	with	socialist	Czechoslovakia.	
In	the	preliminary	stage	of	this	research	its	time	scope	also	had	to	be	narrowed	
down	significantly.	 Four	decades	of	Cold	War	development	were	marked	with	 several	
political	turns	of	events	that	drastically	affected	the	execution	of	Czechoslovak	relations	
with	 African	 countries.	 The	most	 important	 of	 these	 critical	 incidents	 was	 the	 Soviet	
invasion	of	Czechoslovakia	 in	1968	which	marked	the	boundary	between	the	 first	and	
second	 period.	 Czechoslovak	 involvement	 in	 Africa	 before	 and	 after	 the	 invasion	was	
very	 different	 and	 it	 would	 have	 caused	 some	 serious	 methodological	 constraints	 in	
reaching	conclusive	results	if	two	such	distinctive	periods	were	to	be	analysed.	Instead,	
the	Soviet	invasion	of	Czechoslovakia	provided	the	approximate	upper	time	limit	for	this	
research.	 The	 lower	 limit	 was	 the	 year	 1958	 when	 the	 first	 contacts	 between	 the	
freedom	 fighters	 and	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 took	 place.	 The	 selected	 period	 of	 1958	
through	1970	represents	an	integrated	and	clearly	delineated	stage	that	allows	for	the	
thorough	and	coherent	analysis	of	the	historical	processes	that	were	taking	place.								
	
Data	collection	and	the	constraints	faced	
Once	the	subject	matter	and	the	boundaries	of	this	research	were	firmly	set	the	
plan	 for	 data	 collection	was	 established.	 Data	 collection	was	 divided	 into	 two	 phases,	
European	and	African.	In	both	these	phases	the	selected	and	applied	research	methods	
were	archival	research	and	collection	of	oral	histories.		
The	original	plan	envisaged	initial	archival	research	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	
Slovakia	 producing	 a	 substantial	 amount	 of	 documentary	 evidence	 that	 would,	 upon	
being	 examined,	 allow	 the	more	 specific	 research	 structure	 to	 be	 drafted.	 This	 initial	
research	 structure	 was	 to	 be	 later	 supplemented	 by	 the	 historical	 data	 collected	 by	
interview	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia.	 In	the	second	East	African	phase	of	data	
collection,	archival	research	was	planned	to	take	place	in	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania	
together	 with	 collecting	 more	 oral	 testimonies.	 In	 reality,	 the	 two	 phases	 of	 data	
collection	 did	 not	 produce	 all	 the	 results	 hoped	 for.	 In	 phase	 1,	 oral	 testimonies	 fell	
significantly	below	expectations,	 and	 in	phase	2	 the	 archival	 research	was	 abandoned	
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completely	for	reasons	explained	below	and	the	oral	testimony	collection	also	fell	short	
of	expectations.	
The	 first	phase	of	data	 collection	 for	 this	 research	did	 take	place	 in	 the	Czech	
and	Slovak	Republic	as	had	been	planned.	Approximately	ten	archives	of	all	kinds	were	
visited	 and	 researched,	 ranging	 from	 state	 archives,	 regional	 archives,	 archives	 of	
various	governmental	offices	and	company	archives.	All	of	the	collected	primary	sources	
however	originate	from	four	main	archives	located	in	the	Czech	Republic	–	The	Archive	
of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	Czech	Republic,	The	National	Archive,		The	Central	
Military	Archive	 and	The	Security	Services	Archive.	The	 first	 three	archives	allow	direct	
access	 to	 their	 collections	 while	 the	 Security	 Services	 Archive	 conducts	 research	
internally	 according	 to	 the	 parameters	 that	 they	 are	 provided	 with.	 Eventually	 the	
researcher	 is	 provided	 with	 the	 results	 of	 archives	 internal	 research.	 In	 case	 of	 this	
particular	 research	 project	 collecting	 archival	 data	 took	 over	 a	 year	 and	 a	 half	 and	
resulted	in	the	collection	of	an	immense	amount	of	more	than	40,000	pages	of	original	
historical	 documents,	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	which	had	 	 never	before	been	 subjected	 to	
historical	analysis.			
Once	 this	 initial	 data	 collection	 was	 completed,	 it	 was	 followed	 by	 thorough	
processing	 of	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 primary	 sources	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 properly	 indexed,	
analysed,	 and	 exposed	 to	 a	 historical	 critique	 to	 establish	 their	 historical	 value,	 their	
credibility	 and	 authenticity.	 In	 case	 of	 this	 particular	 research	 the	 bulk	 of	 primary	
resources	consisted	mainly	of	various	kinds	of	documentary	evidence	produced	by	state	
and	governmental	 institutions,	 agencies,	military,	 private	 and	 state‐owned	enterprises	
and	intelligence	services.	The	list	below	includes	all	the	forms	of	original	documents	that	
were	 collected	and	analysed	during	data	 collection.	They	are	 categorised	according	 to	
their	origin,	and	their	type.			
	
1. State,	 government	 and	 political	 parties	 –	 reports,	 orders,	 regulations,	
correspondence	 (letters,	 telegrams,	 dispatches	 etc.),	 speeches,	 declarations,	
agreements,	etc.	
2. Security	services	and	army	–	 	orders,	correspondence,	regulations,	reports,	 lists	
and	charts,	advertising,	etc.		
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3. Civil	 society	 organisations	 –	 brochures,	 bulletins,	 correspondence,	 declarations,	
reports,	etc.	
4. Trade	 –	 trade	 records,	 agreements,	 correspondence,	 lists	 and	 charts	 of	 goods,	
taxes,	duties	and	fees	forms,	bank	account	records,	marketing	materials,	etc.	
5. Private	–	diaries,	interviews,	notes,	video	and	sound	recordings,	etc.			
6. Other	–	photographs,	newspapers,	magazines,	etc.	
	
The	 immense	amount	of	 collected	documents	meant	 a	 serious	methodological	
challenge	in	itself.	All	of	the	documents	had	to	be	read,	indexed	and	grouped	according	
to	 relevance,	 topic,	 date	 and	 origin.	 The	 preliminary	 notes	 produced	 at	 this	 stage	 of	
initial	 historical	 analysis	 amounted	 to	 some	 100,000	words.	 The	 quantity	 of	material	
meant	that	it	was	not	only	a	challenge	in	keeping	it	organised,	but	it	also	put	a	strain	on	
the	 provisional	 research	 timetable,	 especially	 due	 to	 a	 significant	 six‐month	 delay	 in	
obtaining	the	results	from	the	Security	Services	Archive.					
The	 archival	 material	 that	 was	 collected	 in	 the	 Czech	 archives,	 despite	 its	
quantity,	 is	 certainly	 not	 a	 complete	 record	 of	 the	 historical	 development	 that	 is	
addressed	by	this	research.	However	it	probably	represents	a	major	portion	of	existing	
original	historical	sources	on	this	topic	and	more	importantly	it	is	more	than	adequate	
to	 reach	 the	 objectives	 set	 out	 by	 this	 research.	 Despite	 all	 the	 available	 primary	
historical	 sources,	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 historical	 data	 remains	 incomplete	 or	 missing	
altogether.	 In	such	a	situation	a	historian	is	 forced	to	formulate	 informed	assumptions	
or	 even	 outright	 speculation.	 Wherever	 that	 is	 the	 case	 in	 this	 research,	 it	 is	 clearly	
highlighted.		
While	 the	 archival	 research	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 produced	 an	 unexpectedly	
high	 amount	 of	 unique	 original	 historical	 sources,	 the	 subsequent	 collection	 of	 oral	
testimonies	in	Slovakia	and	the	Czech	Republic	was	hindered	by	unexpected	constraints.	
It	proved	to	be	almost	impossible	to	get	hold	of	direct	participants	of	Czechoslovak‐East	
African	relations	from	the	period	prior	to	the	Soviet	invasion.	The	majority	of	them	are	
deceased	and	the	few	remaining	are	either	reluctant	to	speak	or	cannot	be	traced.	This	
might	seem	surprising	given	that	 fifty	years	 is	not	such	an	extreme	period	of	 time	but	
one	 has	 to	 realise	 three	 important	 factors	 that	 are	 in	 the	 way.	 Firstly,	 Czechoslovak‐
African	 relations	 in	 the	 1960s	 were	 a	 very	 specific	 and	 quite	 narrow	 field	 of	
Czechoslovak	 state	 external	 activities.	 It	 would	 not	 directly	 concern	 or	 employ	 more	
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than	a	few	hundred	people,	mostly	politicians,	soldiers,	experts,	journalists	etc.,	over	the	
course	of	one	decade.	Secondly,	one	has	 to	realise	 that	 involvement	with	Africa	would	
have	called	for	persons	of	either	high	political	ranking	or	expert	professional	training.	In	
effect,	 it	 would	 attract	 mainly	 people	 of	 thirty‐five	 years	 of	 age	 and	 higher,	 many	 of	
whom	would	be	now	nearly	ninety.	Thirdly,	the	Soviet	invasion	of	1968	caused	a	large	
number	 of	 people	 directly	 involved	 in	 relations	 with	 East	 African	 countries	 never	 to	
want	to	return	to	Soviet‐occupied	Czechoslovakia	and	they	emigrated,	with	their	tracks	
often	being	lost	entirely.	A	combination	of	these	factors	made	the	results	of	collection	of	
oral	testimonies	in	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia	very	meagre.	
In	 phase	 2	 the	 data	 collection	moved	 to	 East	 Africa	where	 it	was	 planned	 for	
archival	 research	 to	 take	 place,	 along	 with	 more	 oral	 testimonies	 being	 collected.	
However,	 the	 original	 plans	 eventually	 had	 to	 be	 significantly	 revised	 due	 to	 serious	
problems	 faced	 during	 the	 data	 collection.	 Initial	 archival	 research	 took	 place	 in	 the	
Kenya	National	Archives	in	Nairobi,	but	failed	to	produce	any	relevant	historical	data	for	
the	period	studied.	The	only	documents	dealing	with	Czechoslovakia	were	fragments	of	
records	 from	 the	 colonial	 administration	 addressing	 trade	 issues	 in	 the	 early	 1950s.	
Archival	research	in	Uganda	was	even	less	productive	and	never	really	took	place	due	to	
the	 inaccessibility	of	state	archives	at	the	time	of	conducting	this	data	collection.	After	
this	 experience	 the	 author	 of	 this	 research	 decided	 to	 abandon	 the	 planned	 archival	
research	 in	 Tanzania	 as	well,	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 a	 distorted	methodology	 that	might	
have	 had	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 historical	 narrative	 produced.	 After	 the	 failure	 to	
conduct	 satisfactory	 archival	 research	 in	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanzania,	 the	 data	
collection	in	these	countries	was	entirely	based	on	the	collection	of	oral	testimonies.		
The	 author	 of	 this	 research	 tracked	 and	 interviewed	 approximately	 fifteen	
direct	 participants	 of	 Czechoslovak‐East	 African	 relations,	 political	 figures,	 soldiers,	
diplomats,	doctors	and	tradesmen.	However,	the	personal	testimonies	collected	did	not	
fulfil	the	high	expectations	as	a	source	of	unique	historical	data	as	they	offered	only	very	
little	specific	information	on	Czechoslovak	relations	with	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania.		
Nevertheless,	they	proved	a	valuable	source	of	background	information	on	a	number	of	
political	issues.		
Interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	 the	 same	 manner	 in	 all	 three	 countries.	 The	
interviewee	 was	 asked	 a	 set	 of	 general	 questions	 to	 establish	 his	 knowledge	 of	
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Czechoslovakia	and	that	country’s	actions	 in	East	Africa.	Once	the	 interviewee	showed	
any	 such	 knowledge,	 more	 specific	 questions	 were	 asked.	 Even	 though	 all	 the	
interviewees	 were	 selected	 as	 the	 potentially	 most	 promising	 sources	 with	 a	 good	
chance	 of	 having	 a	 deep	 specific	 knowledge	 of	 Czechoslovakia’s	 relations	 with	 East	
Africa,	only	a	minority	of	them	showed	any	real	knowledge	of	this	subject.	The	majority	
had	only	a	very	generalised	knowledge	of	Czechoslovakia	unrelated	 in	any	way	 to	 the	
specific	questions	asked.	On	the	other	hand,	all	of	 the	 interviewees	were	persons	who	
had	unique	experience	with	East	African	political	developments	in	the	period	addressed	
by	 this	 research	 and	 some	 of	 the	 interviews	 therefore	 produced	 an	 interesting	 and	
useful	 insight	 into	 a	 range	 of	 issues	 that	were	 helpful	 in	 providing	 some	 background	
information	 or	 a	 unique	 perspective	 on	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 political	 or	 economic	
development	of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania.		
The	range	of	issues	that	were	eventually	addressed	in	these	interviews	ranged	
from	 recollections	 of	 figures	 of	 political	 leadership,	 their	 actions	 and	 motivations,	
through	 the	 African	 perspective	 of	 an	 on‐going	 Cold	 War	 conflict,	 all	 the	 way	 to	
specificities	of	local	political	and	economic	development.		As	is	always	the	case,	collected	
testimonies	were	marked	by	the	intended	or	unintended	personal	bias	of	interviewees,	
and	a	few	of	them	were	substantially	hindered	by	an	interviewee’s	failing	memory.	Some	
information	collected	 in	these	 interviews	proved	wrong	or	 inaccurate,	when	examined	
against	the	hard	historical	evidence,	while	other	 information	was	far	too	specific	to	be	
verifiable.	 Nevertheless,	 once	 the	 collected	 data	was	 filtered	 by	 appropriate	 historical	
critique,	they	still	produced	some	valuable	historical	information,	a	unique	insight	into	
the	 period	 studied	 and	 in	 a	 few	 cases	 also	 a	 valuable	 perspective	 on	 Czechoslovak	
cooperation	 with	 Africa	 in	 this	 period.	 	 Details	 of	 some	 of	 the	 most	 useful	 collected	
testimonies	are	presented	in	the	introductions	of	the	relevant	chapters,	as	some	of	the	
content	is	best	understood	in	relation	to	appropriate	segments	of	text.						
As	is	usually	the	case,	an	author	is	aware	of	the	shortcomings	and	limitations	of	
his	 or	 her	 work	 even	 if	 he	 does	 not	 like	 to	 admit	 there	 are	 any.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 this	
particular	research,	the	main	limitation	related	to	the	data	collection	was	the	failure	to	
obtain	primary	sources	in	East	Africa	as	well	as	the	complete	omission	of	archival	data	
collection	 in	Russia	 and	 the	United	Kingdom.	While	 it	 is	 quite	 likely	 that	 Russian	 and	
British	 archives	 store	 original	 documents	 on	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Soviets	 and	 the	
Czechoslovaks	 in	 East	 Africa	 during	 the	 Cold	 War,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 they	 would	
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ultimately	change	the	conclusions	reached	by	this	research.	Where	they	would	be	useful	
is	 in	providing	an	alternative	perspective	of	these	historical	events.	Unfortunately,	due	
to	 constraints	 of	 time,	 there	 was	 no	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 thorough	 archival	
research	in	British	or	Russian	archives	that	this	topic	would	have	deserved.	
	
Handling,	analysing	and	interpreting	of	the	primary	sources	
Handling	 all	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 historical	 material	 produced	 by	 data	
collection	 required	 a	 very	 thorough	 organisation	 of	 analytical	 processes.	 The	 history	
researcher	working	with	primary	resources	never	previously	studied	needs	to	verify	the	
authenticity	 of	 the	 material	 and	 establish	 the	 correctness	 of	 its	 contents.	 Original	
historical	research	does	not	usually	provide	one	with	a	plethora	of	sources	on	the	same	
historical	 information	 and	 one	 thus	 has	 to	 make	 use	 of	 what	 material	 is	 available.	
Therefore	 it	 is	of	 the	utmost	 importance	to	gather	as	much	 information	as	possible	on	
the	material	 studied.	 	 All	 primary	 sources	 need	 to	 be	 correctly	 dated,	 identified	 as	 to	
point	of	origin	and	if	possible	also	authorship,	original	purpose	and	intended	audience.	
This	should	allow	the	researcher	to	apply	the	appropriate	perspective	to	each	document	
and	to	use	it	as	effectively	and	accurately	as	possible.	Whenever	doubts	arise	regarding	
the	authenticity	of	 a	document	or	 the	 truthfulness	of	 its	 content,	 this	 should	be	 taken	
into	account,	in	extreme	cases	leading	to	completely	omitting	such	a	document	from	the	
research.	These	were	 the	 fundamental	principles	of	historical	analysis	used	 to	process	
and	interpret	the	collected	material.	Most	of	the	collected	material	was	affected	by	the	
ideological	and	political	stance	of	their	authors.	That	in	itself	would	not	be	a	reason	to	
ignore	them,	but	the	appropriate	historical	critique	had	to	be	applied	when	dealing	with	
such	documents.		
A	great	deal	of	collected	archival	documents	analysed	during	this	research	was	
produced	 by	 state	 institutions	 and	 as	 such	 subject	 to	 various	 levels	 of	 confidentiality.	
This	 often	 works	 as	 an	 important	 hint	 of	 the	 authenticity	 and	 credibility	 of	 such	
material.	Even	though	it	is	not	universally	applicable,	in	general	there	is	good	reason	to	
presume	 that	 confidential	 material	 from	 different	 government	 offices	 would	 be	
authentic	 and	 unaltered,	 if	 not	 necessarily	 correct.	 Related	 to	 this	 is	 a	 long‐running	
debate	 in	post‐socialist	 countries	on	 the	authenticity	and	reliability	of	 records	of	 local	
intelligence	services.	The	majority	of	experts	agree	that	there	is	no	reason	to	doubt	the	
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records’	 authenticity	 and	 this	 approach	was	 also	 applied	 during	 this	 research	 project	
when	sources	of	this	kind	were	being	handled.		
An	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 analysing	 the	 collected	 archival	 material	 is	 the	
consideration	of	what	is	missing	from	this	collection.	Often,	the	missing	information	tells	
a	 story	 equally	 as	 important	 as	 the	 available	 documents,	 although	 it	 is	 much	 more	
difficult	to	unravel	it.	This	notion	occurred	in	connection	with	documents	from	the	vast	
collections	 from	 the	Security	Services	Archive.	The	 existing	documents	 are	 just	 a	 small	
fragment	 of	 the	 vast	 body	 of	 documents	 originally	 archived.	 Each	 folder	 from	 the	
collection	of	the	Security	Services	Archive	begins	with	the	lengthy	list	of	documents	that	
were	at	one	point	shredded.	Speculation	as	to	why	they	were	shredded	and	what	they	
contained	based	on	the	titles	of	these	documents	brings		no	satisfying	results			
The	 study	 of	 history	 expanded	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	
considerably	opening	itself	to	collaboration	with	a	number	of	other	academic	disciplines	
from	sociology	to	economics,	which	also	introduced		new	methodologies	and	analytical	
approaches.	The	qualitative	approach	 in	analysing	historical	data	had	been	repeatedly	
challenged	 and	 criticised	 in	 previous	 decades	 as	 various	 alternative	 methods	 of	
historical	research	were	gradually	introduced	to	the	study	of	history	from	the	sphere	of	
social	sciences	and	economy.	Traditional	approaches	of	historical	research	and	analysis	
were	 increasingly	 criticised	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 produce	 subjective	 historical	
narrative	without	a	clear	hypothesis,	and	the	results	are	impossible	to	measure.	At	the	
same	 time,	 however,	 a	 fervent	 group	 of	 supporters	 of	 traditional	 approaches	 to	
historical	 research	 was	 formed,	 claiming	 that	 for	 certain	 kinds	 of	 historiography	 the	
qualitative	 analysis	 of	 historical	 documentary	 evidences	 remains	 a	most	 suitable	 and	
effective	methodology.	There	 is	no	disputing	 that	 the	 	qualitative	approach	 is	 the	best	
and	sometimes	the	only	possibility	of	analysing	some	history	research	projects,	and	this	
particular	 one	 is	 among	 them.	 	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 primary	 material	 employed,	 the	
research	objectives	as	well	as	the	characteristics	of	this	research	project	prevented	the	
application	of	an	alternative	research	methodology	as	well	as	quantitative	analysis.	The	
most	 suitable	 analytical	 method	 applied	 to	 interpret	 the	 historical	 material	 collected	
during	this	research	was	thus	a	qualitative	historical	analysis.	
	
The	structure	of	this	thesis	is	quite	simple	and	follows	a	logical	division.	Besides	
the	Introduction	and	the	Conclusion,	the	main	body	of	text	is	divided	into	six	chapters.	
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Chapter	One	deals	with	the	creation	of	Czechoslovak	relations	on	the	African	continent	
before	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 acting	 as	 a	 crucial	 precursor	 of	 later	 successful	
cooperation	between	 socialist	Czechoslovakia	 and	various	African	 states.	 In	Chapter	2	
three	major	 determinants	 of	 Czechoslovak‐East	 African	 relations	 are	 presented	 –	 the	
formation	and	development	of	Soviet	relations	with	Africa;	the	causality	and	process	of	
decolonisation	of	the	British	Empire	in	Africa;	the	formation	and	development	of	foreign	
policy	 of	 socialist	 Czechoslovakia	 after	 the	 Second	World	War	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
Czechoslovak	 Africa	 Policy	 in	 the	 early	 1960s.	 While	 Chapter	 1	 works	 as	 a	 kind	 of	
historical	 introduction	for	the	main	argument	of	this	thesis,	Chapter	2	provides	it	with	
historical	background	as	well	as	with	wider	context	that	is	necessary	in	understanding	
the	historical	processes	that	marked	the	creation	and	the	development	of	Czechoslovak‐
East	 African	 relations.	 Chapters	 3,	 4	 and	 5	 each	 represent	 a	 separate	 case	 study.	
Czechoslovakia’s	 relations	 with	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanzania	 are	 recreated	 in	 these	
chapters	 in	order	 to	answer	 the	questions	set	out	by	 the	research	objectives.	A	rather	
short	Chapter	6	very	briefly	looks	into	the	effect	of	the	year	1968	and	the	Soviet	invasion	
on	 cooperation	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 East	 Africa	 and	 on	 the	 variations	 that	
marked	these	relations	in	the	aftermath	of	this	major	political	upheaval.					
	
In	 the	writing	of	 this	 thesis,	 several	seemingly	marginal	methodological	 issues	
have	arisen	 that	 the	 reader	should	be	advised	of	here.	As	 large	parts	of	 the	presented	
text	are	based	on	original	historical	material,	there	is	a	certain	level	of	confusion	when	it	
comes	 to	 nomenclature	 and	 terminology	 and	 especially	 in	 translating	 it	 from	 the	
original.	When	 speaking	 of	 governmental	 offices	 and	 civil	 servants,	 in	most	 cases	 the	
translation	of	the	Czech	terms	is	used.	For	that	reason,	the	members	of	African	cabinets	
are	 referred	 to	as	 ‘Ministers’,	 even	 though	 the	English	 term	 ‘Secretary’	might	be	more	
fitting.	When	mentioning	non‐Czechoslovak	political	parties,	international	organisations	
and	other	similar	entities,	in	most	cases	the	available	English	term	or	its	abbreviation	is	
used,	where	 commonly	known.	When	 it	 comes	 to	Czechoslovak	organisations,	 on	 first	
use	the	Czech	term	with	the	English	translation	 is	provided	with	the	abbreviation	that	
will	 be	 used	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 text.	 It	 is	made	 clear	 in	 every	 single	 case	whether	 the	
abbreviation	 refers	 to	 the	 Czech	 or	 English	 version	 of	 the	 term.	 Some	 of	 the	 best	
generally	known	and	most	widely	used	Czech	abbreviations	are	used	in	this	thesis.	(eg.	
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StB,	 Kčs).	 Should	 any	 confusion	 arise,	 alist	 of	 all	 abbreviations	 is	 available	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	thesis.	
In	this	work	there	are	a	number	of	technical	or	professional	terms,	especially	in	
relation	to	intelligence	services	and	special	material.	When	speaking	of	the	procedures	
and	 structure	used	by	Czechoslovak	 intelligence,	 the	 appropriate	English	 term	 is	used	
whenever	 possible.	 However,	 when	 there	 is	 the	 slightest	 doubt	 as	 to	 the	 respective	
meanings	of	Czech	and	English	terms,	or	if	no	English	translation	of	a	specific	Czech	term	
exists,	 	 a	 descriptive	 translation	 is	 presented	with	 the	 appropriate	 explanation	 in	 the	
footnote.	When	referring	 to	 special	material,	 the	original	name	of	 the	weapon	 is	used,	
together	with	its	mark	and	specification.		
The	subject	matter	being	Czechoslovak	activities	 in	Africa,	 an	excessive	use	of		
the	term	‘Czechoslovak’	could	not	be	avoided.	In	order	to	make	the	text	more	coherent,		
the	abbreviation	 ‘CS’	 is	used	wherever	suitable.	When	mentioning	Czechoslovakia,	 two	
sets	of		abbreviation	are	widely	used.	In	period	before	1945	it	is	the	official	abbreviation	
‘CSR’.	 To	 avoid	 confusion,	 in	 the	 period	 after	 1945	 Czechoslovakia	 is	 abbreviated	 as	
‘CSSR’	even	though	this	became	official	only	after	1960.			
In	some	of	the	chapters	a	 large	number	of	quotations	of	original	documents	of	
Czechoslovak	origin	are	used.	 In	many	cases	the	choice	was	made	to	use	the	complete	
quotes	rather	than	paraphrasing	the	original.	It	is	due	to	the	very	unusual	nature	of	the	
language	–	tightly	regulated	in	style,		official	and	ideologically‐charged	–	in	which	these	
materials	 were	 usually	 written	 that	 the	 presented	 quotes	 often	 seem	 lengthy,	
complicated	and	hard	to	understand	upon	first	reading.		
Lastly,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 referencing	 secondary	 as	 well	 as	
original	material.	All	secondary	sources	used	when	writing	this	thesis,	either	quoted	or	
paraphrased,	 follow	 the	 standard	 rules	 of	 a	 Chicago	 style	 referencing	 system57	 using	
footnotes	 and	bibliography.	Due	 to	 the	 excessive	amount	of	 foreign	 language	 citations	
used	in	this	text,	 the	original	 language	versions	were	transferred	to	Appendix	1	of	this	
thesis.	 	 Due	 to	 the	 unusually	 large	 quantity	 of	 analysed	 historical	 documents,	 it	 is	
impossible	to	include	all	of	them	in	the	attached	Bibliography.	Therefore,	only	the	list	of	
archival	 collections	 and	 folders	 with	 their	 names	 and	 numbers	 is	 included	 in	 the	
Bibliography.		
                                                            
57 York University. “Chicago referencing style.“ (accessed August 16, 2015) 
http://www.york.ac.uk/integrity/chicago.html  
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1. Czechoslovak‐African	relations	in	the	period	1918‐45	
1.1. Creation	and	pillars	of	independent	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	
1918	 to	 1939	 was	 the	 period	 of	 foundation‐laying	 for	 relations	 between	 the	
newly	 independent	Czechoslovak	republic	and	selected	African	 territories.	The	nature,	
intensity	and	quality	of	these	relations	was	determined	by	a	number	of	different	factors	
that	 were	 not	 favourable	 for	 creating	 really	 close	 and	 intense	 cooperation	 between	
Czechoslovakia	and	Africa.	At	this	point	most	of	Africa	was	still	deeply	entrenched	in	the	
colonial	empires	of	European	powers.	This	effectively	ruled	out	the	creation	of	political	
or	 diplomatic	 relations	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 African	 colonies	 that	 would	
certainly	 have	 worked	 as	 the	 vanguard	 for	 other	 forms	 of	 cooperation.	 	 Also,	 the	
Czechoslovak	 republic	 had	 only	 been	 established	 in	 the	 early	 aftermath	 of	 the	 First	
World	War	as	one	of	 the	successive	states	of	 the	Habsburg	Empire	as	 it	disintegrated.	
The	new	state’s	ability	to	survive	post‐war	chaos	and	defend	its	unity	and	sovereignty	
was	 yet	 to	 be	 proven.	 Effective	 foreign	 political	 activism	was	 one	 of	 guarantees	 of	 its	
independence	and	initially	Africa	was	certainly	not	a	territory	of	highest	priority	in	this	
respect.	Despite	all	this,	after	a	sluggish	start	around	1920	the	intensity	of	relations	with	
selected	 African	 territories	 increased	 and	 reached	 a	 surprisingly	 substantial	 level	
considering	all	the	limitations	that	existed.			
	
The	 founders	 of	 the	 republic	 built	 the	 country	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 broad	 civil	
liberties,	 social	 rights	 and	 sound	 economic	 progress.58	 The	 democratic	 basis	 of	 the	
Czechoslovak	 state,	 coupled	 with	 its	 location	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 Europe	 surrounded	 by	
dictatorships,	made	the	CSR	extremely	vulnerable	to	external	influences	–	economic,	as	
well	as	political.59	As	Edvard	Beneš,	the	then	Foreign	Minister,	put	it,	‘…	[o]ur	politics	will	
be	 influenced	 by	 international	 politics	 far	more	 than	 the	 national	 politics	 of	 any	 other	
country.’60	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	during	the	inter‐war	period	was	orchestrated	by	
Beneš,	 and	 the	 first	 president,	 Tomáš	 Garrique	 Masaryk,	 who	 both	 had	 very	 good	
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connections	with	politicians	in	the	USA,	the	UK	and	France.	Very	soon	after	its	creation	
the	core	principles	of	the	Czechoslovak	republic’s	foreign	policy	crystallised.		
The	 CSR's	 existence	 was	 defined	 in	 the	 post‐war	 Versailles	 system61,	 the	
continuance	of	which	was	viewed	as	essential	for	the	CSR’s	existence	as	a	state.62	Close	
relations	with	Britain	and	France	–	masterminds	of	the	Versailles	system	–	thus	became	
one	of	Beneš’	main	concerns.	However,	more	security	guarantees	were	also	required.	As	
a	 result,	 the	CSR	 formed	a	defence	alliance	with	Romania	and	Yugoslavia	 that	became	
known	as	the	‘Little	Entente’.	Cooperation	within	the	Little	Entente	was	viewed	as	a	vital	
condition	 to	maintaining	 peace	 in	 central	 Europe.	 For	 the	 same	 reason	 both	Masaryk	
and	Beneš	paid	a	great	deal	of	attention	to	Germany.	They	both	supported	a	steady	and	
systematic	German	economic	recovery	after	the	war	rather	than	economic	deprivation,	
which	 would	 have	 undoubtedly	 led	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 German	 radicalism.63	 The	 CSR	 was	
criticised	 for	 this	 soft	 approach	by	France	which	preferred	 to	 see	Germany	weakened	
and	paralysed	economically,	politically	and	militarily.	Development	in	the	1930s	showed	
that	 the	 Czechoslovak	 approach	 to	 Germany	 was	 much	 more	 rational	 than	 that	 of	
France.	Finally,	the	most	important	pillar	of	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	was	the	League	
of	 Nations,	 of	 which	 the	 CSR	was	 one	 of	 the	 founding	members,	 and	 one	 of	 its	 most	
active	and	vocal	supporters.		
The	League	of	Nations	was	formed	during	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	in	1920	at	
the	 instigation	 of	 US	 president	 Woodrow	 Wilson.64	 The	 main	 notion	 supporting	 the	
League	was	the	idea	that,	 in	the	unified	world	of	the	20th	century,	any	military	conflict	
anywhere	 in	 the	world	could	 lead	 to	a	new	global	war.65	 In	order	to	avoid	 this,	all	 the	
member	 states	 agreed	 to	 deal	 with	 all	 possible	 tensions	 and	 disagreements	 through	
common	 diplomatic	 resolution.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 military	 aggression,	 members	 of	 the	
League	 agreed	 to	 act	 jointly	 against	 the	 aggressor	 by	 using	 all	 possible	 economic,	
financial	 or	 even	military	means.66	All	members	of	 the	League	were	 to	have	 the	 same	
rights	and	powers,	 as	well	 as	obligations,	 regardless	of	 their	 size,	wealth	or	any	other	
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aspect.	 Beneš	 soon	 became	 one	 of	 the	 leading	 thinkers	 and	 driving	 forces	 behind	 the	
League	of	Nations.	Considering	Beneš’	 activity	 in	 the	 formation	of	 the	League	 it	 is	not	
surprising	that	some	of	the	League’s	core	principles,	 	 for	example,	 ‘All	nations,	whether	
large	or	small,	are	equal	state	and	cultural	entities	and	have	a	right	to	self‐governance.’67,	
were	strikingly	similar	to	how	Czechoslovak	leaders	viewed	the	ideological	foundations	
of	their	own	state.	As	I	explain	 later	 in	this	chapter,	 it	was	 in	relation	to	the	League	of	
Nations	that	Czechoslovakia	became	an	active	participant	of	African	political	affairs	for	
the	first	time.		
	
The	 interwar	 period	 in	 Africa	 can	 be	 viewed	 from	 today’s	 perspective	 as	 an	
inconspicuous	 beginning	 of	 the	 end	 of	 colonialism.	 At	 the	 time,	most	 of	 the	 continent	
was	controlled	by	European	colonial	powers.	For	a	while	the	only	independent	states	in	
Africa	were	US‐sponsored	Liberia	and	the	old	Abyssinian	empire.	In	the	first	half	of	the	
century	 these	were	 joined	by	 the	de	 facto	 independent	South	African	Union68	 and	 the	
former	British	protectorate	of	Egypt.69		
Colonial	 officers,	 soldiers,	 traders,	 and	 the	 various	 colonial	 authorities	 had	
dominated	 African	 society	 across	 the	 entire	 continent	 for	 decades.	 Participation	 by	
Africans	at	any	but	 the	 lowest	 levels	of	 the	governing	structure	was	rare,	as	was	 their	
involvement	 in	 external	 trade.	 Africans	were	 almost	 completely	 excluded	 from	higher	
education,	 and	 indigenous	 cultural	 practices	 were	 often	 ignored.70	 In	 fact,	 Africans	
throughout	 the	 continent	 found	 themselves	 in	 very	 similar	 situations	 to	 the	 many	
European	 nations	 who	 had	 sought	 self‐determination	 during	 the	 19th	 century.	 The	
traditional	tribal	authorities	were	too	weak	and	ineffective	to	challenge	the	bureaucratic	
machinery	of	colonial	systems	which	were	backed	by	enormous	wealth	and	power.		
The	 forward‐thinking	 indigenous	 leaders	 were	 few	 and	 far	 between	 and	
concepts	of	modern	leadership	amongst	Africans	were	only	just	emerging.	Interestingly,	
the	same	World	War	that	redrew	the	political	map	of	Europe	had,	in	the	long‐term,	very	
similar	effects	on	African	societies.	The	participation	of	thousands	of	ordinary	Africans	
on	the	Western	front	during	the	First	World	War	deeply	affected	societies	all	over	Africa.	
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The	invincibility	and	power	of	their	European	masters	was	challenged	and	shattered	by	
the	horrors	of	 the	trenches.	Their	experience	demonstrated	the	weakness	and	fragility	
of	European	society	and	their	political	systems	–	and	this	started	to	change	the	African	
soldiers'	own	individual	perceptions	of	themselves	as	Africans.71	It	was	indeed	some	of	
these	soldiers	that	were	galvanised	into	becoming	the	new	leaders	of	a	modern	political	
Africa,	and	opposed	to	European	colonialism.	However,	 for	 the	time	being,	colonialism	
seemed	invincible,	and	all	African	affairs	were	dominated	by	the	European	masters.	
	
1.2. Establishing	the	Czechoslovak	diplomatic	network	and		entry	into	
Africa	
The	 Czechoslovak	 republic	 was	 organised	 on	 the	 system	 of	 parliamentary	
democracy.	The	President	was	 the	nominal	head	of	 state,	 but	 the	Prime	Minister	held	
most	of	the	executive	powers.	The	organisation	of	the	state	bureaucratic	apparatus	was	
derived	 from	 the	 political	 systems	 of	 Austria	 and	 of	 France.	 The	 execution	 of	 official	
foreign	policy	was	the	responsibility	of	various	government	institutions:	the	office	of	the	
Prime	 Minister,	 the	 President’s	 office,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 the	 Defence	
Ministry,	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Trade	and	others.72	Unlike	some	other	institutions	(e.g.	
police	and	local	authorities),	these	organs	were	for	the	most	part	created	from	scratch	–	
they	 were	 not	 inherited	 after	 the	 monarchy.	 This	 had	 obvious	 implications	 for	 the	
republic’s	effectiveness	in	the	first	years	of	its	existence.	A	shortage	of	professional	staff	
and	the	lack	of	a	coherent	organisational	structure	in	the	first	years	of	its	existence	were	
among	 the	 reasons	why	 it	 took	 several	 years	 to	 increase	 the	 activity	 of	 Czechoslovak	
government	beyond	the	European	foreign	political	priorities.			
The	formation	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	began	in	1919.	It	was	accurately	
modelled	 on	 the	 French	 system.	 First,	 the	 central	 structures	 of	 the	 Ministry	 were	
organised	in	Prague.	The	Prague	headquarters	were	soon	followed	by	a	widening	net	of	
diplomatic	 offices	 of	 different	 types	 and	 responsibilities.	 They	 included	 embassies,	
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general	consulates,	vice	consulates,	consulates	and	the	lowest	level	diplomatic	office	of	
honorary	consulates.73	
‘In	 mid‐1921,	 when	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Czechoslovak	 diplomatic	 body	 was	
completed,	 there	 were	 23	 embassies,	 20	 general	 consulates,	 and	 29	 consulates	 and	
honorary	consulates	that	operated	around	the	world.’74	Only	one	of	the	offices	in	this	list	
was	 located	 on	 the	 African	 continent.	 It	 was	 a	 general	 consulate	 in	 Egypt,	 Cairo.	 The	
reason	why	Africa	initially	hosted	so	few	diplomatic	offices	was	the	direct	result	of	the	
logic	 behind	 developing	 the	 Czechoslovak	 diplomatic	 net.	 It	 was	 crucial	 to	 favour	
strategically	important	countries.	Thus,	there	was	a	natural	inclination	towards	Europe	
rather	than	Africa.	Additionally,	in	relation	to	Africa,	Czechoslovak	diplomacy	was	rather	
cautious	of	 trespassing	on	British	or	 French	 colonial	 interests.	 Therefore	 especially	 in	
the	initial	phase,	all	issues	concerning	the	French	and	British	African	empires	were	dealt	
with	through	the	following	link:		
Ministry	in	Prague		Czechoslovak	embassies	in	Paris	/	London		The	Foreign	
Office	in	London	/	the	French	Foreign	Office	on	the	Quai	d’Orsay.75	
	
However,	it	soon	became	obvious	that	such	communication	was	not	as	effective	
as	 it	 could	 be,	 and	 was	 ultimately	 useless	 when	 it	 came	 to	 expanding	 Czechoslovak	
activities	 in	 Africa.	 While	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 no	 favourable	 conditions	 existed	 for	
developing	 any	 substantial	 political	 relations	with	most	 of	Africa,	 economic	 and	 trade	
relations	 offered	 some	 attractive	 opportunities	 for	 the	 export‐oriented	 Czechoslovak	
economy.	 Therefore	 several	 African	 territories	 were	 included	 in	 the	 later	 stages	 of	
expansion	of	the	network	of	diplomatic	offices.	Several	African	consulates	were	included	
in	 the	 group	 of	 new	 offices	 located	 around	 the	 world.	 The	 main	 criterion	 for	 their	
establishment	 was	 typically	 linked	 with	 the	 existing	 business	 activities	 or	 business	
interests	of	Czechoslovak	traders.	Decisive	for	the	success	of	establishing	new	offices	in	
Africa	was	 an	 ability	 to	 overcome	 all	 the	 existing	practical	 and	bureaucratic	 obstacles	
that	 often	 arose.	 The	 excessive	 cost	 of	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 such	 offices,	 the	
overly	complicated	means	of	maintaining	contact	between	headquarters	and	the	office,	
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lack	of	reliable	staff,	resentment	of	 local	administration	are	some	of	the	most	common	
difficulties	that	Czechoslovak	diplomats	were	facing	in	Africa.				
The	 general	 consulate	 in	 Egypt	 was	 the	 first	 Czechoslovak	 foreign	 office	
established	on	African	soil.76	Up	until	the	Second	World	War	it	remained	one	of	the	most	
active	offices	in	Africa.	It	was	responsible	mainly	for	prosperous	and	expanding	business	
relations	 between	 the	CSR	 and	Egypt.	 In	 1925,	 the	Cairo	 consulate	was	 followed	by	 a	
similar	 office	 in	Cape	Town.	This	main	office	 received	administrative	 support	 in	1928	
through	the	creation	of	various	honorary	consulates	in	Durban	and	East	London,	and	a	
vice	consulate	in	Port	Elizabeth.	The	diplomatic	network	in	the	South	African	Union	was	
completed	 in	 1930	with	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 honorary	 consulate	 in	 Johannesburg	 –	 the	
emerging	 business	 capital	 of	 the	 SAU.	 All	 of	 these	 offices	 were	 initially	 appointed	 to	
foreigners	 and,	 even	 though	 some	 problems	 did	 occur,	 in	 general	 they	 had	 a	 positive	
influence	on	business	and	trade	relations.77	
At	approximately	the	same	time	there	was	an	unsuccessful	attempt	to	establish	
an	 honorary	 consulate	 in	 Bulawayo,	 Southern	 Rhodesia.	 Similarly	 vain	 attempts	were	
made	to	open	consulates	 in	Portuguese	East	Africa.	There	was	also	a	 failed	attempt	 to	
establish	some	 form	of	 representation	 in	Liberia.	The	disappointment	 in	 this	case	was	
largely	 due	 to	 procedural	 obstacles	 on	 the	 Czechoslovak	 side.	 Unlike	 these	 failed	
attempts,	 an	 honorary	 consulate	was	 successfully	 established	 in	 1927	 in	 Dakar,	West	
Africa.	The	Czechoslovak	sphere	of	 influence	in	Africa	at	this	point	 largely	consisted	of	
French	West	Africa.	Dakar	was	soon	followed	by	Leopoldville,	where	the	consul	for	the	
Belgian	Congo	was	established	in	1929.78	
In	Ethiopia	 (Abyssinia),	however,	one	of	 three	 independent	African	 states,	 the	
CSR	was	 constantly	 refused	 a	 permit	 to	 open	 a	 diplomatic	 office	 in	 Addis	 Ababa.	 The	
Czech	 consulate	 in	 Cairo	 repeatedly	 emphasised	 the	 need	 for	 a	 diplomatic	 office	 in	
Ethiopia;	 however,	 due	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 procedural	 reasons,	 Ethiopia	 never	 agreed.	 An	
independent	 office	 in	 Ethiopia	 was	 not	 opened	 before	 WWII,	 and	 the	 local	 French	
embassy	remained	in	charge	of	Czechoslovak	diplomatic	affairs	in	Abyssinia.	Finally,	the	
Czech	 diplomatic	 network	 in	 Africa	 was	 completed	 in	 1937	 with	 the	 opening	 of	 the	
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honorary	 consulate	 in	 Mombasa.	 It	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 Czech	 foreign	 trade	 in	 Kenya,	
Tanganyika,	Zanzibar	and	Uganda.79	
	
1.3. Business	and	trade	relations	between	Czechoslovakia	and	Africa	
During	 the	 two	 decades	 of	 its	 existence	 in	 between	 two	 world	 wars,	 the	
Czechoslovak	 republic	 quickly	 established	 itself	 as	 one	 of	 the	 strongest	 economies	 in	
Europe	and	as	a	 leading	exporter	of	various	 industrial	goods.80	External	economic	and	
trade	activities	became	the	most	common	form	of	relations	between	Czechoslovakia	and	
distant	overseas	territories	including	Africa.		
	From	the	very	beginning	Czechoslovak	policy	was	based	on	 the	 imperative	of	
ensuring	economic	prosperity.	Not	 only	did	 it	 help	 to	maintain	 stable	home	affairs	 by	
providing	 a	 system	 of	 social	 security	 and	 comparatively	 better	 living	 standards	 than	
most	 European	 countries,	 but	 it	 also	 strengthened	 the	 reputation	 and	 position	 of	 the	
state	when	confronted	by	a	hostile	external	environment.	Throughout	 the	 first	 twenty	
years	of	the	First	Republic,	the	CS	government	remained	strictly	liberal	in	terms	of	the	
free	 market	 and	 trade	 competition	 even	 though	 in	 the	 1930s	 a	 growing	 amount	 of	
government	legislation	was	passed	with	the	purpose	of	supporting	the	economy	through	
large	 infrastructural	 or	 industrial	 investments.	 These	 tactics	 were	 adopted	 for	 two	
purposes.	 It	 was	 supposed	 that	 it	 would	 boost	 the	 growth	 of	 an	 open	 and	 liberal	
Czechoslovak	 economy	which	had	been	 severely	damaged	by	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 global	
‘Great	 Depression’.	 Secondly,	 projects	 such	 as	 the	 building	 of	 defence	 lines	 along	 the	
Czechoslovak	 borders	 or	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 weapon‐producing	 plants	 were	
aimed	at	strengthening	the	state’s	defence	capacities.	
The	nature	of	 CS	 industrial	 production	was	very	much	determined	by	what	 it	
inherited	from	its	empire	days.	The	western	part	of	the	CSR	(Bohemia,	Moravia,	and	part	
of	Silesia)	had	always	been	the	industrial	heart	of	the	Habsburg	Empire,	and	during	the	
19th	century	it	was	among	the	most	industrially	developed	regions	of	the	whole	world.81	
A	 plethora	 of	 different	 industries	 located	 here	 ranged	 from	 glass	 production,	mining,	
                                                            
79 Olša Jr, “Českoslovenští diplomaté,” 92‐97. 
80  In some areas of its export‐orientated production it would be a world leader, for example in weapons 
production. (Franěk, Otakar, Zbraně pro celý svět: Zahraniční obchod se zbraněmi a municí z koncernu brněnské 
Zbrojovky mezi dvěma válkami [Arms for world] (Czechoslovakia: Blok, 1970), 10‐19.). 
81 Davies, Norman, Europe: a History. London: Harper Perennial, 1998, 750. 
51 
 
ironworks,	 light	 and	 heavy	 machinery.	 These	 industries	 employed	 one	 third	 of	 the	
national	labour	force.82	It	was	local	industrial	production	that	would	account	for	largest	
part	of	Czechoslovak	exports	around	the	whole	world	–	and,	to	a	large	extent,	to	Africa.	
There	 were	 several	 Czechoslovak	 commodities	 that	 were	 in	 great	 demand	 in	
various	parts	of	Africa.	Certain	CS	products	had	had	a	long	history	of	being	imported	to	
Africa	and	they	enjoyed	a	good	reputation,	while	some	others	were	newly	introduced	to	
African	markets	in	this	period.	Old‐established	business	links	survived	unharmed	from	
the	 Habsburg	 Empire	 and	 they	 played	 a	 vital	 role	 for	 the	 Czechoslovak	 business	
presence	 in	 Africa.	 Their	 positive	 reputation	 allowed	 the	 CSR	 to	 expand	 its	 export	
commodity	 structure	 and	 also	 further	 develop	 its	 network	 of	 partners.83	 Glass	 bead	
jewellery	 and	 glass	production,	 originating	 from	 the	 Sudetenland84	 in	 the	CSR,	 had	 an	
incredibly	 long	 history	 and	 perhaps	 the	 greatest	 social‐economic	 impact	 on	 African	
societies.	Over	the	course	of	history,	beads	had	often	been	used	as	currency	by	European	
explorers	and	traders	bartering	with	Africans.	The	ease	with	which	they	could	be	stored,	
their	 ready	 availability,	 and	 aesthetics	meant	 that	 they	were	 very	 popular	 across	 the	
continent.	As	the	colonial	administration	developed,	their	use	as	a	currency	diminished.	
However,	the	glass	and	bijoux	exports	to	Africa	remained	strong	until	the	mid‐twentieth	
century.	 Some	 of	 the	 largest	 glass	 factories	 such	 as	 Preciosa	 were	 involved	 in	 glass‐
exporting	activities	 to	Africa.	Besides	these	 large	companies,	 it	was	not	uncommon	for	
smaller	 enterprises	 or	 family	 businesses	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 trade	 as	 well.85	 This	 is	
surprising	when	one	considers	 the	obstacles	and	difficulties	posed	by	distance,	 lack	of	
infrastructure,	 problems	 in	 establishing	 a	 working	 means	 of	 communication,	 or	
uncertainty	in	obtaining	payment	reliably.		
The	 newly‐established	 CS	 diplomatic	 offices	 acquired	 a	 leading	 role	 in	
establishing	 and	 maintaining	 Czechoslovak	 business	 relations	 in	 Africa.	 These	 offices	
were	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 responsible	 for	 mediating	 the	 communication	 between	
geographically	remote	 trade	partners	who	 in	most	cases	never	had	the	opportunity	 to	
meet.86	As	 the	numerous	archival	documents	show,	 facilitation	of	 trade	was	by	 far	 the	
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86 Archival documentation records, for example, intensive mediating activities by Czechoslovak consul Mr Ivan 
H. King in South Africa. (NAA, F. 497, kt. 149, č.j. 290.) 
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most	important	activity	of	the	CS	diplomatic	service.	The	consulate	was	also	involved	in	
verifying	 the	 credentials	 of	 African	 business	 partners,	 thereby	minimising	 the	 risk	 of	
fraud.	 CS	 diplomats	 often	 worked	 in	 cooperation	 with	 their	 foreign	 colleagues.	 The	
mutual	exchange	of	background	information	on	active	merchants	was	beneficial	 for	all	
sides	and	resulted	in	flourishing	trade	and	business	relations	during	the	whole	inter‐war	
era.	 Diplomatic	 offices	were	 also	 involved	 in	 dealing	with	 any	 cases	 of	 fraud,	 delayed	
payments	 or	 other	 business	misdemeanours.	 Such	 cases	were	 not	 uncommon	 but	 the	
system	of	mutual	 information	exchange	 that	European	diplomatic	offices	developed	 in	
Africa	was	surprisingly	effective	in	their	prevention.			
Besides	glassware	another	group	of	Czechoslovak	commodities	in	high	demand	
in	Africa	were	metalwork	products.87	This	covered	a	huge	array	of	light	industrial	items	
including	things	like	paraffin	lamps	or	tableware.		There	was	also	a	growing	demand	for	
CS‐made	cars	and	motorcycles	as	well	as	other	articles	of	medium‐range	machinery.	In	
addition,	huge	CS	companies	such	as	Škoda,	Kolben	Daněk,	Sigma	and	others,	provided	
the	 equipment	 for	 heavy	 industrial	 	 and	 infrastructure	 projects	 (e.g.	 power	 plants,	
factories,	 railways),	 with	 the	 potential	 for	 establishing	 long‐term	 and	 commercially	
beneficial	 cooperation.	 	 The	 shoe‐producing	 giant,	 Bata,	 was	 also	 a	 large	 exporter	 of	
goods	 to	Africa.	 Its	penetration	of	African	markets	was	eventually	so	successful	 that	 it	
decided	to	establish	some	of	its	production	capacity	directly	in	Africa.	
Last	 but	 not	 least,	 Czechoslovak	 weapons	 manufacture	 also	 played	 a	 very	
important	part	 in	the	African	continent.88	 It	was	this	business	segment	that	eventually	
exceeded	 the	 limits	 of	 commercial	 relations	 and	 directly	 entered	 political	 affairs	 in	
Africa.	Czechoslovak	engagement	in	Africa	on	the	basis	of	weapons	trade	was	to	become	
quite	common	in	decades	to	come.	Foundations	for	this	particular	kind	of	business	link	
with	Africa	were	thus	already	laid	before	World	War	II.	This	fact	later	proved	to	be	of	the	
utmost	 importance	 as	 it	 gave	 Czechoslovakia	 a	 decisive	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 its	
ambitious	political	and	economic	involvement	with	Africa	during	the	Cold	War.	
In	 the	1930s	 the	Czechoslovak	government	was	already	aware	of	 the	growing	
tensions	and	dangers	in	international	politics	at	the	time.	It	was	therefore	seen	as	vital	
that	the	republic	be	self‐sufficient	in	weapons	production,	and	military	equipment	was	
                                                            
87 National Archive, Fund 497 ‐ Export office, cartons 149, 153. 
88 Straka, Karel, ”Nejvyšší rada obrany státu a československý zbrojní průmysl v letech 1936‐1938,” Historie a 
vojenství, roč. LV, č. 2, [2006]: 4‐6. 
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also	 produced	 for	 export.89	 The	 absence	 of	 Germany	 on	 the	 international	 weapons	
market	 allowed	 CS	 companies	 to	 become	 market	 leaders	 and	 develop	 strong	 and	
effective	business	links	with	many	parts	of	the	world.90	It	did	not	take	long	for	the	CSR	to	
become	one	of	the	largest	weapons	producers	in	the	world.	
One	faces	certain	difficulties	in	accurately	assessing	the	weapons	market	in	the	
CSR	between	the	two	world	wars.	The	nature	and	confidentiality	of	 the	business	often	
meant	a	lack	of	verifiable	documentation	in	the	archives.	The	use	of	a	complex	network	
of	 re‐sellers,	 misleading	 or	 downright	 false	 business	 documentation	 and	 absence	 of	
transport	documentation	are	all	reasons	why	the	papers	that	are	actually	available	today	
fail	 to	 provide	us	with	 a	 comprehensive	 picture	 of	 exports	 of	 Czechoslovak	weaponry	
between	 the	 wars.	 Nevertheless,	 available	 documents	 suggest	 that	 the	 import	 of	 CS	
weapons	to	Africa	was	anything	but	marginal	and	as	the	international	political	situation	
deteriorated	 it	 grew	 in	 importance.	 There	 are	 records	 which	 indicate	 that	 almost	 all	
independent	African	 countries,	 including	 the	South	African	Union,	Ethiopia	 and	Egypt,	
were	recipients	of	CS	weapons	before	WWII.	The	companies	Zbrojovka	Brno,	Škoda	Plzeň	
and	others	produced	the	majority	of	the	weapons,	which	ranged	from	pistols	and	rifles	
to	 machine	 guns,	 cannons	 and	 guns.91	 The	 weapons	 trade	 between	 CSR	 and	 Africa,	
interrupted	by	WWII,	was	able	to	re‐establish	itself	very	soon	after	the	war	and	develop	
from	the	solid	foundation	it	had	created	during	the	inter‐war	years.	
	
On	 the	 African	 side	 there	were	 two	 kinds	 of	 entity	 involved	 in	 business	with	
Czechoslovak	 exporters.	 In	 a	 handful	 of	 cases	 the	 business	 partner	was	 an	 individual	
African	state	 represented	by	 its	government.	However,	 the	majority	business	partners	
on	the	African	side	were	either	local	businessmen,	often	of	Indian	or	Arab	ethnicity,	or	
European‐owned	 firms	 re‐selling	 imported	 goods.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 independent	 African	
states	 such	 the	 South	 African	 Union,	 Ethiopia	 and	 Egypt,	 members	 of	 the	 indigenous	
population	were	involved	in	the	business	activities	on	a	more	regular	basis.		
                                                            
89 Mesároš, Oldřich, “Výroba a obchod se zbraněmi v ČSR mezi světovými válkami,” Acta Oeconomica 
Pragensia, roč.6, č.5, [1998]: 50‐53. 
90 The German army, as well as traditional German weapon‐producing companies, were greatly limited by the 
results of the Versailles treaty and did not recover until the 1930’s. This significantly strengthened the position 
of Czechoslovak companies. 
91 Woldekiros, Abadi, “Tendenční neutralita. Československý zbrojní průmysl a italsko‐habešský konflikt,” 
Soudobé dějiny, roč. X, č. 1‐2., [2003]: 12‐17. 
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Many	 of	 the	 nascent	 business	 links	 with	 African	 partners	 furthered	 an	
awareness	 among	 the	 indigenous	 population	 of	 the	 CSR	 as	 a	 source	 of	 high‐quality,	
reliable	and	relatively	cheap	goods	even	though	the	country	was	rarely	directly	involved	
in	 the	business	 itself.	This	 local	 awareness	of	Czechoslovakia	via	 its	produce	 certainly	
helped	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 after	 the	 war.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 African	 exports	 (e.g.	
bananas,	peanuts,	cocoa,	tea	and	other	exotic	produce)	brought	the	continent	closer	to	
the	CS	public.	Africa,	through	its	exports,	became	attractive	and	fashionable.	Yet	it	was	
remaining	 distant,	 exotic	 and	 quite	 unknown	 as	 the	 first‐hand	 experience	 of	
Czechoslovak	population	with	African	culture	and	people	was,	in	comparison	to	that	of	
the	cosmopolitan	societies	of	London	or	Paris,	still	at	a	very	basic	level.92		
	
Egypt	 and	 other	Maghreb	 countries,	 the	 South	 African	 Union,	 the	 Gold	 Coast,	
and	the	Congo	were	the	main	destinations	for	CS	businesses.	In	the	case	of	Egypt,	Algeria	
and	 Morocco,	 good	 trade	 relations	 were	 determined	 mainly	 by	 their	 relative	
geographical	proximity,	reasonably	developed	market	and	safe	investment	environment.	
Business	 and	 trade	with	 the	 South	African	Union	were,	 by	 contrast,	 based	on	 a	direct	
link	 with	 numerous	 CS	 expatriates	 and	 on	 the	 size	 and	 strength	 of	 the	 local	 market,	
which	was	inherently	dominated	by	white	Boers	and	British	agents,	and	boosted	by	the	
diamond	and	gold	mining	industries.	In	West	Africa	and	in	Abyssinia	CS	companies	often	
benefitted	from	close	cooperation	with	their	French	counterparts.	The	rest	of	the	African	
countries	and	 territories	were	greatly	disadvantaged	by	distance,	 lack	of	development	
and	infrastructure,	and	their	relationship	with	the	old	colonial	powers.		
1.4. Abyssinian	crisis	
In	October	1935	Fascist	Italy	attacked	the	independent	Abyssinian	Empire.	The	
attack	was	the	culmination	of	several	cross‐border	disputes	between	Abyssinia	and	the	
Italian	 colonies	 of	Eritrea	 and	 Italian	 Somalia.93	Diplomatic	 relations	between	 the	 two	
                                                            
92 Various forms of reference towards Africa were being widely used for marketing purposes by a number of 
companies (eg. Julius Meinl, Figaro). Coffee, tea, chocolate, fruit, nuts and other products were regularly 
marked as ‘African’ which equalled exotic and high quality. (Ľubomír Dobrovoda Sr, interview with the author, 
Bratislava, Slovakia, 15 May, 2010.) 
93 A major incident occurred on 5 December 1934 at Walwal, part of Ethiopian territorry of Ogaden occupied by 
Italians since 1928. Fighting cost almost 200 casualties and resulted in growing tension between Italy and 
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countries	had	already	been	steadily	declining,	despite	membership	(for	both	countries)	
of	 the	League	of	Nations,	and	despite	diplomatic	attempts	of	 this	organisation	to	avert	
Italian	 aggression.	 The	 conflict	 commenced	 on	 3	 October	 1935	 and	 had	 far‐reaching	
effects,	not	only	on	Abyssinia,	but	also	on	 the	 international	political	environment.	The	
League	of	Nations	found	its	concept	of	collective	international	security	under	threat.	For	
Czechoslovakia	 the	 involvement	 in	 the	 Abyssinian	 crisis	 represented	 its	 first	 direct	
political	 engagement	 with	 an	 African	 country.	 In	 some	 aspects	 it	 set	 the	 pattern	 for	
future	political	Czechoslovak	involvement	with	African	countries.	Positive	Czechoslovak	
involvement	in	favour	of	an	independent	African	state	facing	European	aggression	was	
certainly	 a	 strong	 contributor	 in	 winning	 it	 prestige	 amongst	 national‐liberation	
movements	across	Africa	after	the	Second	World	War.	
Czechoslovakia	did	not	have	political	 interests	in	the	region	before	the	conflict	
started	other	than	to	expand	its	business	relations	with	local	tradesmen	and	to	establish	
working	 a	 diplomatic	 representation	 in	 Abyssinia.	 Despite	 this	 lack	 of	 initial	 political	
interest,	Czechoslovakia	emerged	as	playing	an	important	role	during	the	growing	crisis	
and	the	subsequent	war.	At	the	time	of	the	conflict	diplomatic	relations	between	the	two	
countries	were	only	starting	to	form.	
As	Abyssinia	was	one	of	the	only	three	independent	African	states	at	the	time,	
the	 CSR	 naturally	 felt	 it	 was	 potential	 territory	 for	 the	 expansion	 of	 its	 business	
activities.		However,	this	potential	turned	out	to	be	limited	due	to	French	dominance	of	
Abyssinian	affairs,	in	both	the	political	and	the	commercial	sphere.	CS	diplomats	did	not	
want	 to	 be	 overly	 active	 and	 competitive	 in	 a	 region	 that	 was	 already	 viewed	 by	
Czechoslovakia’s	 crucial	 European	 allies	 as	 being	 of	 high	 interest.94	 	 The	 CSR	 was	
therefore	treading	carefully	in	establishing	political	cooperation	with	Abyssinia.	Another	
factor	 that	 had	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 CSR’s	 ability	 to	 form	 a	 working	 economic	
relationship	with	Abyssinia	was	the	state	of	the	local	economy.	The	Abyssinian	economy	
was	particularly	weak	and	restricted	in	size,	which	greatly	limited	trade	opportunities.	
As	a	result	of	 these	 two	 factors	 the	 intensity	and	quality	of	 relations	between	 the	CSR	
and	 Abyssinia	 during	 the	 1920s	 and	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 1930s	was	 nowhere	 near	
resembling	 the	 original	 hopes	 and	 plans	 devised	 by	 the	 Czechoslovak	 Ministry	 of	
Foreign	Affairs.	Diplomatic	relations	between	the	CSR	and	Abyssinia	existed	despite	the	
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Ethiopia. (Petruf, Pavol, Taliansko‐etiópska vojna v rokoch 1935‐1936 (Slovakia: Vydavateľstvo Univerzity 
Komenského, 2000), 62.). 
94 Olša, “Českoslovenští diplomaté,” 94. 
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absence	of	any	Czechoslovak	diplomatic	office	 in	Addis	Ababa,	 the	 formation	of	which	
was	repeatedly	delayed.	The	platform	for	bilateral	diplomatic	relations	of	both	countries	
turned	out	to	be	the	League	of	Nations.	Diplomatic	contacts	between	Czechoslovakia	and	
Abyssinia	intensified	mainly	after	1930	and	eventually	led	to	the	establishment	of	initial	
business	links	between	two	states.	With	the	worsening	security	situation	in	the	Horn	of	
Africa	the	commodity	most	in	demand	for	the	Abyssinian	government	was	Czechoslovak	
weaponry.	
	
After	WWI	the	African	continent	was	re‐drawn	with	an	enhancement	of	British	
and	French	colonial	acquisitions.	Italy	was	a	latecomer	to	colonial	conquest	and,	as	such,	
it	 controlled	 only	 Libya,	 Eritrea,	 and	 Italian	 Somaliland.	 The	 Italian	 leader	 Benito	
Mussolini	 had	 the	 ambition	 to	 establish	 an	 African‐Roman	 Empire	 by	 turning	
independent	 or	 undisputed	 African	 territories	 into	 colonies.	 With	 the	 already	
established	 French	 and	 British	 empires	 well	 entrenched	 on	 the	 continent,	 the	 only	
direction	 left	 for	 Mussolini’s	 expansion	 was	 to	 push	 towards	 Abyssinia.	 International	
affairs	 during	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 1930s	 were	 a	 labyrinth	 of	 alliances,	 agreements,	
competing	 interests,	 and	 ambitions	 from	 a	 number	 of	 states.	 Abyssinia’s	 destiny	 was	
affected	by	political	 affairs	 and	 interests	 that	 had	nothing	 to	 do	with	 its	 own	political	
sovereignty.	To	a	great	extent	the	fate	of	Abyssinia	was	decided	on	the	European	stage,	
in	Paris,	Rome,	London	and	Geneva.	
Beneš	 was	 nominated	 President	 of	 the	 Assembly	 of	 the	 League	 of	 Nations	 in	
September	1935,	only	weeks	before	the	Italian	attack	was	launched.	Beneš’	nomination	
came	after	several	 failures	 to	 intervene95	and	solve	 the	growing	 tension	between	 Italy	
and	 Abyssinia.	 Abyssinian	 leaders	 were	 aware	 of	 Italy’s	 colonial	 ambitions,	 and	 had	
worked	tirelessly	 to	gain	the	support	of	 the	 international	community.	They	repeatedly	
informed	 the	 League	 about	 border	 skirmishes	 and	 incidents,	 and	 complained	 through	
official	 channels	 about	 Italy’s	 actions.	 In	 1935,	 under	 joint	 pressure	 from	 France	 and	
Britain,	 Italy	 promised	 to	 enter	 into	 bilateral	 talks	 and	 international	 arbitration	 with	
Abyssinia.96		
The	relationship	between	Italy	and	France	was	a	critical	element	in	the	Italian‐
Abyssinian	dispute	and,	unfortunately	 for	Emperor	Selassie	and	his	country,	Paris	and	
                                                            
95 The League proved to be similarly ineffective in 1931 when Japan committed atrocities while attacking 
Chinese Manchuria. 
96 Petruf, Taliansko‐etiópska vojna, 75‐77. 
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Rome	were	moving	closer	together	in	1935.	This	was	marked	particularly	by	the	Danube	
Pact,	 an	 alliance	which	was	 to	 guarantee	 the	political	 status	quo	 in	 central	Europe.	 In	
exchange	 for	his	 support	 of	 the	French	political	 project	 of	 the	Danube	Pact,	Mussolini	
ultimately	received	a	‘free	hand’	in	his	quest	to	colonise	Abyssinia.97	The	French	foreign	
minister,	Laval,	not	only	opened	the	door	for	Italian	aggression,	but	also	weakened	the	
international	 community’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 invasion.98	 For	 the	 lack	 of	 French	
determination	to	stop	Italian	aggression	the	League	of	Nations	was	effectively	becoming	
a	 paper	 tiger.	 Even	 though	much	 less	 supportive	 toward	 Italy,99	 due	 to	 its	 traditional	
reluctance	 to	 interfere	 in	European	political	affairs,	Britain	also	 failed	 to	do	enough	to	
prevent	the	invasion	from	taking	place.	Another	important	international	player	with	its	
own	 interests	 vested	 in	Abyssinia	was	 Japan.100	 Again,	much	 like	 the	 French	 position,	
Japan	 gave	 Italy	 a	 ‘free	 hand’	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	 similar	 openness	 towards	 Japan's	
expansion	in	Asia.	With	all	of	this	diplomatic	manoeuvring	and	‘back	door’	agreements,	
the	international	community	on	the	floor	of	the	League	of	Nations	failed	to	put	together	
enough	political	pressure	against	Mussolini	to	divert	him	from	his	expansionist	plans.	At	
the	end	of	 the	rainy	season	 in	October	1935,	Mussolini	advanced	from	his	positions	 in	
Eritrea	and	Somaliland	into	Abyssinian	territory.	
The	CSR	was	one	of	the	countries	most	dedicated	to	supporting	the	role	of	the	
League	 in	 resolving	 and	 preventing	 international	 disputes.	 The	 CS	 Foreign	 Minister,	
Edvard	Beneš,	was	a	 leading	proponent	of	 the	 idea	of	collective	security	and	 it	was	he	
who	happened	to	head	the	League	during	Italy’s	aggressive	posturing	toward	Abyssinia.	
Edvard	 Beneš	 was	 a	 respected	 diplomat,	 representative	 of	 a	 democratic	 state	 and	 a	
successful	 international	mediator.	 In	 the	dispute	between	Italy	and	Abyssinia	he	stood	
firmly	 on	 the	 side	 of	 Abyssinia,	 but	 he	 lacked	 real	 political	 tools	 to	 exert	 decisive	
pressure	 rather	 than	 just	 disregarding	 Italy’s	 actions.	 The	 CSR	 found	 itself	 cornered,	
diplomatically,	 in	 terms	 of	 promoting	 internal	 European	 security	 by	 sticking	 to	 the	
principles	of	the	League	of	Nations,	once	Italy,	formerly	critical	of	the	League’s	respected	
position,	blatantly	decided	to	ignore	these	principles.	
                                                            
97 Klimek, Kubů, Československá, 74. 
98 Dejmek, Československo, 71‐74. 
99 Dejmek, Československo, 238‐240. 
100 Japanese goods at this time represented about 60% of total annual Abyssinian imports. (Petruf, Taliansko‐
etiópska vojna, 69‐70.) 
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The	superiority	of	 the	 Italian	army	over	the	Abyssinians	was	overwhelming	 in	
all	 respects.	 ‘The	 [Italian]	army	was	equipped	with	 the	most	modern	arms	 including	air	
force,	tanks	and	armoured	vehicles,	nay	chemical	weapons,	mainly	yperite.’101	By	contrast,	
the	Abyssinian	army	was	poorly	equipped,	often	with	only	traditional	weapons	such	as	
swords,	machetes	and	bows	and	arrows.102	Emperor	Selassie	and	his	government	were	
aware	 of	 their	 significant	 handicap	 and	 for	 several	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 invasion	 had	
worked	on	a	modernisation	process	to	transform	Abyssinia’s	medieval	army.	
A	 vital	 cooperation	 in	 this	 modernisation	 process	 came	 from	 Czechoslovakia	
and	 its	 weapons	 factories.	 The	 three	 main	 CS	 commercial	 exporters	 of	 weapons	 to	
Abyssinia	were	Škoda	Plzeň,	Zbrojovka	Brno	and	Sellier	Bellot.103	Even	though	all	of	these	
firms	 were	 of	 mixed	 ownership	 (partially	 privatised,	 partially	 state‐owned),	 their	
production	and	exporting	activities	were	under	government	scrutiny.	Particularly	in	the	
1930s	 this	 sphere	of	 industry	became	one	of	 the	 government’s	 top	priorities	 and	was	
controlled	 and	monitored	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 ministerial	 positions.104	 Therefore	 the	
decision	to	export	weapons	to	Abyssinia	was	dependent	on	both	political	and	economic	
interests	of	the	republic.	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 locate	 complete	 archival	 materials	 relating	 to	 the	 trade	 in	
weapons	that	are	both	accurate	and	authentic.	Incomplete	and	unclear	export	records	of	
weapons	to	Abyssinia	have	led	to	a	never‐ending	dispute	between	various	academics105	
over	 the	 nature,	 extent	 and	 impact	 of	 CS	 weaponry	 in	 Abyssinia.	 There	 are	 however	
reliable	 documents	 that	 record	 the	 details	 of	 several	 deliveries	 of	 various	 weapons	
material	 since	 1928.	 The	 character	 and	 size	 of	 these	 deliveries	 varied.	 The	 material	
exported	 to	 Abyssinia	 ranged	 from	 millions	 of	 small‐calibre	 bullets	 and	 hundreds	 of	
cheap,	outdated	rifles,	 to	modern,	 light	and	heavy	machine	guns,	cannons	and	guns.106	
For	 various	 reasons,	 not	 every	 transaction	was	 successfully	 completed	 –	which	 some	
critiques	 interpret	 as	 an	 ambivalent	 or	 ‘tendentious’	 approach	 of	 Czechoslovak	
government	 to	 the	 Abyssinian	 case.107	 With	 growing	 tensions	 over	 the	 Italian‐
Abyssinian	dispute,	the	position	of	the	CSR	as	a	major	Abyssinian	weapons	provider	put	
                                                            
101 Petruf, Taliansko‐etiópska vojna, 94.  
102 Petruf, Taliansko‐etiópska vojna, 96. 
103 Woldekiros, “Tendenční neutralita,“ 12. 
104 Straka, “Nejvyšší rada obrany státu,“ 4‐7. 
105 Eg. Woldekiros, “Tendenční neutralita“; Bartnicki, Andrzej, Pierwszy front II wojny światowej [First front] 
(Poland: Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1971). 
106 Woldekiros, “Tendenční neutralita,“ 12‐17. 
107 Woldekiros, “ Tendenční neutralita,“ 12‐17. 
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the	 CS	 government	 in	 a	 delicate	 position	 towards	 not	 only	 Italy	 but	 also	 France.	 The	
political	 status	 quo	 in	 Central	 Europe	 desired	 by	 the	 CS	 government	 and	 France	was	
very	much	dependent	on	Italy;	therefore,	open	dispute	with	Mussolini	would	have	had	
negative	 effects	 on	 the	 CSR.	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 Czechoslovak	 government	 initially	
hesitated	 to	 provide	 Abyssinia	 with	 arms	 openly	 once	 the	 international	 embargo	 in	
weapons	import	to	Abyssinia	was	effective.				
Archival	records	charting	the	weapons	export	activities	around	the	years	1934	
to	1936	are	 few	in	number,	misleading	and	 incomplete.	Some	documentation	suggests	
that,	during	the	spring	of	1935,	the	CS	government	unofficially	postponed	all	deliveries	
to	 Abyssinia,	 while	 others	 indicate	 that	 the	 vital	 weapons	 continued	 to	 flow	
uninterrupted	 through	 illegal,	 unofficial	 transportation	 hubs,	 accompanied	 by	 false	
paperwork	carried	by	foreign	agents.108	The	weapon	deliveries	became	open	and	official	
again	in	October	1935	after	the	beginning	of	the	conflict.	Even	though	the	exact	extent	
and	 nature	 of	 weapons	 deliveries	 will	 remain	 unclear,	 the	 fact	 is	 that	 the	 great	
technological	disadvantage	of	 the	Abyssinian	army	was	at	 least	partially	 lessened,	and	
this	 therefore	 stands	as	one	of	 the	 reasons	why	Abyssinia	managed	 to	hold	off	 Italian	
attack	for	much	longer	than	expected.109		
What	CS	support	meant	to	Abyssinia	at	the	time	is	best	illustrated	by	Emperor	
Haile	 Selassie's	 letter	 to	President	Beneš	 in	his	 exile	during	 the	 Second	World	War	 in	
London.	‘We	may	not	forget	that	Your	Excellency	sympathized	with	Abyssinia	at	the	time	
when	it	lacked	arms	and	was	attacked	by	fascist	Italy.	Even	though	it	was	quite	difficult	for	
allied	 countries	 to	provide	Abyssinia	with	weaponry,	Czechoslovakia	 ignored	 this	hurdle	
and	 helped	 the	 oppressed	 country	 with	material	 which	 was	 in	 such	 short	 supply.	 The	
position	of	Czechoslovakia	did	not	alter	despite	accusations	of	the	aggressor.’110		
Material	support	for	Abyssinia	was	only	one	aspect	of	the	CS	relationship	with	
Abyssinia.	 As	 significant	 as	 the	 CS	 weapons	 export	 was,	 its	 political	 influence	 in	 the	
League	 of	 Nations	 was	 exerted	 via	 Beneš.	 Under	 Beneš’	 presidency,	 the	 League	
responded	with	a	surprisingly	swift	and	energetic	reaction,	which	was	in	stark	contrast	
to	the	League’s	previous	clumsy	interventions.	‘By	a	unanimous	vote	The	League	Council	
on	October	7	proclaimed	Italy	an	aggressor	for	having	violated	Article	12	of	the	Covenant.	
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Two	days	later	the	Assembly	took	up	the	question	in	a	plenary	session	and	on	October	10	it	
ratified	 the	action	 of	 the	Council.’111	The	 League	 soon	 ratified	 the	 sanctions.	 However,	
they	ultimately	proved	ineffective	as	they	were	not	approved	by	several	member	states	
and	a	number	of	neutral	states,	namely	Albania,	Hungary,	Austria,	Germany	and	the	USA.	
The	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 sanctions	 was	 also	 diminished	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 did	 not	
include	a	ban	on	the	import	of	oil	and	gas	–	the	fuel	for	Italian	aggression	and	the	only	
viable	obstacle	to	sustaining	an	invasion.112		
Britain	held	a	strong	anti‐Italian	position	which	subsequently	caused	a	rift	with	
France.	As	 stated	 above,	 France’s	back‐door	diplomacy	with	 Italy	 through	 the	Danube	
Pact	granted	Mussolini	a	gateway	into	Abyssinia.	Yet,	despite	this	initial	moral	posturing,	
in	 December	 Britain	 changed	 its	 stance	 and	 joined	 France.	 Disregarding	 the	 League	
completely,	Laval	and	the	British	Foreign	Secretary,	Samuel	Hoare,	worked	on	a	plan	of	
carving	 up	 Abyssinia	 and	 appropriating	 large	 parts	 of	 the	 territory	 currently	 under	
Italian	 control.	 After	 the	 secret	 plan	was	 leaked	 to	 the	 public,	 both	 politicians	 had	 to	
resign	 and	 the	 aggression	 continued	 with	 new	 intensity.113	 In	 relation	 to	 political	
manoeuvring	by	France	and	Britain	the	unanimity	of	the	League	started	to	fracture	and	
the	 concept	 of	 a	 collective	 defence	 proved	 to	 be	 impossible	 to	 maintain	 despite	 the	
attempts	of	President	Beneš.	In	May	1936	the	Italian	armies	finally	reached	Addis	Ababa,	
after	 committing	 a	 number	 of	 atrocities,	 including	 the	 use	 of	 chemical	 warfare.	 The	
empire	 lost	 its	 independence,	 Emperor	 Haile	 Selassie	 fled	 to	 Britain	 and	 Abyssinia	
technically	became	the	first	victim	of	the	aggression	of	the	newly‐formed	Axis	powers.		
Edvard	Beneš,	Kamil	Krofta,	Jan	Masaryk	and	other	leading	CS	politicians	were	
fully	aware	of	what	the	failure	of	the	League	of	Nations	meant	for	their	own	country.	An	
inability	of	the	international	community	to	guarantee	the	independence	and	security	of	
one	of	 its	most	distant	and	weakest	members	gave	a	 foretaste	of	 the	tragedy	that	was	
about	to	follow.		
		
Even	 though	 Czechoslovak	 diplomatic	 and	 material	 support	 failed	 to	 stop	
Fascist	 Italy’s	 aggression,	 it	 represented	 one	 of	 the	 most	 positive	 engagements	 of	 a	
European	 state	 in	 Africa	 in	 this	 period.	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 Abyssinia	 established	 an	
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unlikely	 cooperation	 of	 two	 geographically	 distant	 countries	 on	 the	 basis	 of	mutually	
beneficial	relations	of	two	equal	partners.	The	Abyssinian	case	attracted	a	great	deal	of	
media	 attention	 in	 Czechoslovakia	 in	 1935	 and	 1936	 and	 public	 awareness	 of	 the	
Abyssinian	struggle	against	Italy	was	certainly	the	most	well‐known	African	affair	of	the	
inter‐war	 period.	 Czechoslovak	 involvement	 in	 the	 whole	 process	 showed	 that	
Czechoslovakia	had	the	political	and	economic	ability	to	become	a	significant	player	on	
the	African	continent.	At	the	same	time,	however,	it	became	clear	that	this	capability	had	
clear	 limits	 defined	 mainly	 by	 Czechoslovak	 economic	 and	 human	 capacities	 and	 its	
second‐rate	political	power	in	global	political	affairs.	
1.5. Czechoslovak‐African	Relations	during	WWII		
Abyssinia’s	 defeat	 marked	 a	 further	 change	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 international	
relations	 during	 the	 1930s.	 France	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 continued	 to	 practise	 a	
policy	of	appeasement,	which	subsequently	strengthened	the	position	of	Nazi	Germany	
and	fascist	Italy.	The	unpunished	invasion	of	Abyssinia	was	followed	by	the	German	re‐
occupation	 of	 the	 demilitarised	 zone	 along	 the	 river	 Rhine	 and	German	 re‐unification	
with	Austria	(the	Anschluss).	A	weakened	Entente,	a	fractured	League	of	Nations	and	a	
paralysed	system	of	collective	security	were	all	factors	which	combined	to	endanger	the	
very	existence	of	the	CSR.	
As	 a	 result,	 these	 factors	 led	 the	 government	 at	 the	 time	 into	 a	 period	 of	
international	isolation.	In	September	1938	the	CSR	followed	the	Abyssinian	example	and	
became	 yet	 another	 victim	 of	 the	 League's	 and	 Entente's	 impotence	 in	 international	
politics.	 Unable	 to	 resist	 German	 pressure,	 the	 CSR	 yielded	 to	 Nazi	 Germany	 and	 the	
Munich	conference	marked	the	beginning	of	the	end	of	the	First	Republic.	Large	parts	of	
CS	 territory	were	 carved	 away	 and	united	with	Germany	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 foreign	 and	
domestic	policy	of	the	Second	CS	Republic114	was	dominated	by	Germany.	New	leaders	
of	the	Foreign	Ministry	tried	to	implement	foreign	policy	fully	in	line	with	Germany,	in	
order	 to	 guarantee	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 endangered	 Republic.115	 Many	 of	 the	 CS	
diplomatic	 offices	 in	 Africa	 were	 undergoing	 a	 long‐expected	 transformation	 which,	
together	with	political	uncertainty,	rendered	them	ineffective	during	the	final	months	of	
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the	 then	 CS	 state.116	 The	 Second	 Republic	 lasted	 only	 until	 spring	 1939,	 when	 Hitler	
annexed	 the	 rest	 of	 the	Czech	 lands	 and	proclaimed	 them	 the	German	Protectorate	of	
Böhmen	und	Mähren,	while	Slovakia	became	a	de	 iure	 independent	state	and	an	ally	of	
Germany.	
President	 Beneš	 and	 several	members	 of	 his	 previous	 government	 formed	 an	
exile	cabinet	in	Britain,	and	remained	the	official	representatives	of	the	CSR	throughout	
the	war.	 Foreign	 political	 relations	 once	 again	 became	 the	 tool	 by	which	 to	 ensure	 at	
least	the	de	iure	survival	of	the	CS	state	for	the	future.	The	network	of	diplomatic	offices	
around	 the	world	was	 to	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 this	 plan.	 Embassies	 in	 London,	 Paris,	
Washington,	Moscow,	and	Warsaw	remained	 loyal	 to	 the	exiled	CS	government.	Other	
existing	diplomatic	offices	were	either	seized	by	Axis	powers,	carried	on	working	for	the	
German	Protectorate	of	Czech	lands	or	ceased	to	function	entirely.117		
The	 Czechoslovak	 consulates	 in	 Africa	 also	 experienced	 the	 effects	 of	 this	
political	turmoil.	The	consulate	in	Cape	Town,	for	example,	came	under	German	control	
immediately	 in	March	 1939,	when	 it	was	 voluntarily	 surrendered	by	 the	 local	 consul,	
Lavante.	A	similar	fate	was	chosen	by	diplomatic	staff	in	consulates	in	the	South	African	
Union	–	Durban,	East	London,	Port	Elizabeth,	and	Johannesburg.	The	consulate	in	Dakar,	
run	by	French	citizens	on	behalf	of	the	CS	state,	was	negatively	affected	by	the	outbreak	
of	the	war	in	Europe.	However,	with	some	improvisation	it	remained	active	and	loyal	to	
the	 exiled	 Czechoslovak	 government	 throughout	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 war.	 The	 only	
consulate	 which	 remained	 untouched	 was	 that	 of	 Mombasa,	 under	 the	 control	 of	 E.	
Lowenstein.	 Local	 consul	Lowenstein,	 besides	 representing	 the	Czechoslovak	Republic	
in	British	East	Africa,	also	took	over	the	agenda	for	Rhodesia	and	South	Africa.	One	new	
diplomatic	office	was	even	formed	and	opened	during	the	war.	The	close	relations	with	
Haile	 Selassie,	 in	 temporary	 exile	 in	 London,	 reintroduced	 the	 matter	 of	 diplomatic	
representation	for	Abyssinia,	which	finally	became	real	in	1944.118	
	
The	World	War	 II	 is,	on	 the	one	hand,	a	period	when	an	 independent	CS	state	
was	de	facto	non‐existent.	Paradoxically,	however,	it	was	a	time	when	a	large	number	of	
CS	citizens	were	able	to	experience	Africa	and	Africans	at	first‐hand.	These	citizens	were	
predominantly	young	men	who	had	fled	the	CSR	after	the	Munich	conference.	Many	of	
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these	men	were	soldiers	of	the	CS	army	who	wanted	to	carry	on	armed	struggle	against	
Germany.	They	escaped	the	CS	through	different	channels	to	France,	the	Soviet	Union	or	
to	the	Middle	East.	With	the	support	of	Britain	and	France	the	CS	was	able	to	organise	its	
exile	army	by	drawing	on	hundreds	of	the	Czechoslovak	expatriates	already	in	France,	
Britain,	the	Soviet	Union,	Africa	and	as	well	as	the	Arab	Middle	East.	This	newly‐formed	
force	was	named	Battalion	No.	11	East	and	soon	was	to	become	part	of	the	Allied	forces	
in	the	Middle	East	and	Africa.119	
Battalion	11	was	 formed	officially	 in	October	1940	 in	Palestine.	 In	 the	 Jericho	
region	 the	 battalion	 underwent	 extreme	desert	 training	 in	 order	 to	 acclimatise	 to	 the	
African	desert.		In	the	spring	of	1941	the	battalion	was	further	reinforced	and	moved	to	
Egypt	for	additional	battle	practice.	There	are	numerous	archived	materials,	consisting	
of	memoirs	and	diaries,	 that	 chart	 the	experiences	of	 these	young	men.120	On	reading,	
one	gets	a	sense	of	the	deep	culture	shock	which	affected	them	in	Africa.		
The	 highlight	 of	 the	 CS	 presence	 in	 Africa	 during	 WWII	 culminated	 in	 the	
autumn	of	1941.	As	an	attachment	to	a	Polish	Carpathian	Brigade,	Battalion	11	took	part	
in	the	defence	of	the	besieged	Libyan	city	of	Tobruk.	After	months	of	defensive	fighting	
the	 garrisoned	 Australian	 army	 was	 replaced	 by	 Polish,	 CS	 and	 British	 troops.	 The	
defence	was	ultimately	 successful	 and	 the	 international	 force	managed	 to	hold	off	 the	
German	attackers	until	the	city	was	freed	by	the	advancing	British	8th	Army	under	the	
command	 of	 Gen.	 Auchinleck	 from	 Egypt.121	 The	 battle	 of	 Tobruk	 became	 one	 of	 the	
major	 chapters	 in	 the	 CS's	 foreign	 army	 campaign	 during	 the	 Second	 World	 War.	
Ultimately,	 Battalion	 No.	 11	 remains	 only	 one	 account	 of	 a	 series	 of	 very	 successful	
military	engagements	by	Czechoslovak	exiles	during	WWII.	A	number	of	CS	men	fought	
with	 the	 armies	of	 foreign	 states.	 CS	 soldiers	 often	 joined	up	with	 the	French	Foreign	
Legion,	which	took	its	combatants	all	over	Africa.	As	members	of	various	foreign	units,	
the	 CSR	 took	 part	 in	 many	 battles	 in	 the	 North	 African	 campaign,	 including	 crucial	
clashes	such	as	those	at	Bir	Hakejm	or	Marsa	Matruh.122	The	African	campaign,	coupled	
with	the	success	of	the	1st	Czechoslovak	Army	formed	later	during	the	war	in	the	Soviet	
Union,	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	 Czechoslovak	 fighter	 pilots	 in	 the	 ranks	 of	 Royal	 Air	
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Force,	justified	the	position	as	one	of	the	Allies'	most	significant	contributors	to	the	war	
effort	 against	 the	Axis	powers,	 and	 it	 certainly	aided	 in	 resurrecting	 the	CSR	after	 the	
War.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
65 
 
2. Historical	and	international	context	of	Czechoslovak‐	East	
African	relations	after	the	Second	World	War	
2.1. Soviet	Policy	towards	Developing	Countries	and	Africa	during	the	
Cold	War		
In	the	second	half	of	the	1940s,	after	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War,	the	main	
focus	 of	 Soviet	 interest	 lay	 in	 Central	 Europe,	 the	 Mediterranean	 and	 its	 Asian	
boundaries.	Shortly	after	the	war,	the	vast	colonial	empires	began	to	disintegrate	and	it	
took	several	years	before	a	large	number	of	independent	states	emerged.	Most	analysts	
correctly	 identify	 Soviet	 foreign	 policy	 of	 this	 period	 as	 having	 been	 completely	
dominated	 by	 Stalin	 and	 his	 global	 ambitions.	 However,	 many	 of	 these	 analysts	 are	
misguided	 in	 completely	 disregarding	 Stalin’s	 interests	 in	 the	 colonial	 regions	 which	
later	became	independent	developing	Third	World	states.	While	it	is	certainly	true	that	
Soviet	involvement	in	these	regions	peaked	after	Stalin’s	death,	and	after	the	collapse	of	
colonial	empires,	there	are	several	cases	which	indicate	that	some	of	these	Third	World	
countries	 had	 been	 considered,	 if	 not	 directly	 included,	 in	 Soviet	 foreign	 policy	much	
earlier	than	that.	African	countries,	however,	were	not	amongst	them.	
In	the	first	decade	after	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	Stalin	concentrated	on	
achieving	and	maintaining	for	the	USSR	the	status	of	a	world	superpower	and	of	the	only	
challenger	to	the	USA	in	its	quest	for	global	dominance.	His	attitude	to	foreign	policy	was	
determined	 by	 his	 dual‐world	 perception	 of	 international	 politics,	 which	 as	 good	 as	
ignored	the	role	of	the	slowly	emerging	Third	World.	There	were	three	exceptions	which	
complement	 the	 duality	 concept.	 In	 that	 decade	 three	 undertakings	 considered	 to	 be	
cases	 of	 Soviet	 involvement	 in	 the	Third	World	 occurred:	 in	 Iran	 in	 1946,	 the	Korean	
peninsula	in	1950123	and,	indirectly,	in	Israel	between	1947	and	1949.	Soviet	reluctance	
to	 withdraw	 from	 Northern	 Iran	 and	 remove	 its	 support	 for	 local	 rebels	 seeking	
independence	from	Tehran,	as	well	as,	later,	its	broad	support	of	Kim	Ir	Sen’s	aggressive	
actions	 against	 South	 Korea,	 defined	 and	 determined	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Cold	War.	
Both	 these	 episodes	 follow	 the	 logic	 of	 Stalin’s	 interest	 in	 the	 Third	World	 countries,	
restricted	 as	 it	 was	 to	 security	 issues.	 It	 is	 this	 very	 same	 logic	 that	 resulted	 in	 `the	
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architects	of	Soviet	 foreign	policy	being	 interested	 in	 the	geostrategic	positions	of	Libya,	
Somalia	and	Eritrea…	Soviet	diplomacy	 showed	remarkable	persistence	and	 flexibility	 in	
trying	 to	 achieve	 a	 Soviet	 presence	 in	 the	Mediterranean	 –	 the	 traditional	 priority	 for	
Russian	geopolitical	aspirations.	`124	Both	these	episodes	share	another	characteristic.	It	
was	the	Soviet	habit	to	cooperate	only	with	local	communist	or	workers’	parties	which	
could	be	directly	controlled	from	Moscow.125	
Long‐lasting	Soviet	attempts	to	gain	direct	access	to	the	Mediterranean	can	
partially	explain	its	indirect	support	of	Israel	through	the	CSSR.	Besides	this	motivation,	
Soviet	involvement	in	the	state	of	Israel	can	be	perceived	as	an	attempt	to	establish	itself	
in	the	new	region,	which	promised	to	be	an	important	theatre	in	the	new	period	of	
global	politics.	The	vision	of	controlling	socialist	Israel	and	using	it	as	a	base	for	
extensive	export	of	socialism	to	the	region	was	certainly	an	attractive	one	for	Stalin.	The	
failure	of	this	plan	not	only	deeply	affected	traditionally	strong	Jewish	members	of	
European	communist	parties	who	incurred	Stalin’s	disfavour,	but	de	facto	determined	
Soviet	policy	towards	the	whole	of	the	Middle	East	for	the	next	four	decades.	Intensive	
and	long‐term	support	from	Moscow	of	Israel’s	Arab	neighbours	and	its	satellites	
shaped	the	political	map	of	North	Africa	and	the	Middle	East	and	significantly	affected	
global	affairs.		
Security	 aspects	 and	 the	 need	 permanently	 to	 safeguard	 every	 corner	 of	 the	
huge	 Soviet	 territory	 defined	 Soviet	 foreign	 policy‐making.	 Plus,	 the	 non‐existence	 of	
communist	 parties	 meant	 that	 the	 Africa	 south	 of	 Sahara	 was	 not	 in	 the	 spotlight	 of	
Stalin’s	 interests.	 African	 colonial	 territories	 were,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 not	 considered	
promising	 for	 the	 future	export	of	communist	 ideology,	 the	secondary	 theme	of	Soviet	
foreign	policy.	Local	African	politicians	who	had	recently	started	to	establish	themselves	
as	the	leaders	of	the	vanguard	nationalist	movement	were	largely	looked	down	upon	by	
the	 Soviets,	 who	 considered	 them	 `mere	 pawns	 of	 the	Western	 colonial	 powers,	which	
were	manipulating	them	into	accepting	a	fake	independence.`126								
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2.1.1. Soviet	entry	into	Africa	1953‐1965	
It	 was	 not	 before	 the	 mid‐1950s	 that	 the	 Soviets	 established	 substantial	
relations	with	Third	World	 countries.	 This	 period	 begins	with	 the	 death	 of	 Stalin	 and	
ends	in	the	mid‐1960s,	when	initial	results	of	Soviet	involvement	in	the	Third	World	had	
to	be	revised	for	the	first	time.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	dates	more	or	less	echo	those	
of	Nikita	Khrushchev’s	 time	 in	power.	 It	was	his	radical	split	 from	Stalin’s	politics	and	
the	heritage	it	 left	behind	that	gave	the	new	impulse	to	Soviet	foreign	policy,	 including	
that	towards	Third	World	countries.	The	change	of	guard	in	the	Kremlin	coincided	with	
a	 surge	 in	 declarations	 of	 independence	 throughout	 the	 collapsing	 colonial	 empires.	
Those	responsible	were	mainly	the	African	national	leaders,	who	were	quickly	catching	
up	with	some	of	the	Asian	forerunners.	Events	in	India,	the	Middle	East	and	South	East	
Asia	served	to	inspire	African	nationalists	and	they	certainly	had	a	great	influence	on	the	
political	 imagination	across	 the	African	colonies.	The	wave	of	nationalism	 in	the	Third	
World	countries	was	very	strong	from	the	late	1940s	and	the	countries	involved	in	the	
anti‐colonial	 struggle	 communicated	 and	 cooperated	 with	 each	 other.	 The	 United	
Nations	became	the	main	forum	for	regular	anti‐colonial	criticism	voiced	by	numerous	
members	of	the	Third	World,	by	socialist	countries	and	occasionally	by	the	US.	Criticism	
was	always	loudest	at	times	of	crisis	for	the	British,	the	French	or	other	colonial	powers.	
This	was	particularly	true	with	the	Mau	Mau	rebellion,	 the	Suez	crisis	or	events	 in	the	
Congo.	All	these	affairs	steadily	weakened	the	position	of	European	colonial	nations,	and	
forced	them	eventually	to	decide	to	break	official	political	ties	with	their	colonies.		
	
The	conference	of	unaligned	states	of	Asia	and	Africa	in	Bandung,	Indonesia	in	
1955	 is	 usually	 identified	 as	 the	 major	 starting	 point	 of	 Soviet	 engagement	 with	 the	
newly‐independent	countries.127	The	political	gesture	of	participation	was	immediately	
followed	 by	 a	 very	 practical	 step	 as	 arms	 deals	 with	 Egypt	 were	 carried	 out	 with	
substantial	 CSSR	 assistance.	 In	 February	 1956	 engagement	 with	 the	 Third	 World	
countries	was	officially	outlined	at	 the	20th	Congress	of	 the	Communist	Party	of	Soviet	
Union.	There	follow	the	three	principles	of	Soviet	policy	in	the	Third	World:	
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1. The	 choice	 of	 a	 `peaceful	 coexistence`	 policy	 justified	 by	 the	 irreversible	
reinforcement	 of	 the	 socialist	 camp	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 broad	 ‘peace	
zone’	in	the	new,	liberated	countries;	
2. The	 willingness	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 to	 offer	 support	 for	 the	 economic	
development	of	these	new	states;	
3. The	 recognition	 by	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 of	 the	 ‘national	 bourgeoisie’	 as	 the	
principal	vector	in	the	anti‐imperialist	struggle.	`128	
	
Points	 2	 and	 3	 in	 particular	 later	 became	 vital	 characteristics	 of	 Soviet	
involvement	in	Africa	under	Khrushchev’s	leadership.		
	
Khrushchev’s	 attitude	 towards	 the	 emerging	African	political	 elites,	which	 the	
Soviets	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘national	 bourgeoisie’,	was	 in	 total	 contradiction	 to	 Stalin’s.	
The	absence	of	workers’	or	communist	parties	in	Africa	made	it	inevitable	that	he	would	
try	 to	establish	 contacts	with	nationalist	African	 leaders	 in	order	 to	 stand	a	 chance	of	
obtaining	political	 influence	 there.	The	 social	 structure	 in	Africa	 at	 this	 time	was	very	
different	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 traditional	 vehicle	 for	
revolutionary	 ideas,	 namely	 the	proletariat,	was	 almost	 completely	 absent.	 This	 could	
not	be	 ignored	by	 the	Soviets	and	 it	was	clear	 that	 ideological	goals	would	have	 to	be	
postponed	for	the	sake	of	acquiring	immediate	political	influence.		
Soviet	 relations	 with	 Africa	 in	 the	 1950s	 suffered	 greatly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
insufficiently	 skilled	 cadres	 (due	 to	 their	 previously	 limited	 involvement	 in	 African	
affairs.)129	While	 this	 was	 a	 tremendous	 practical	 disadvantage	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	
English,	 French	 or	 even	 Americans,	 especially	 in	 the	 initial	 stages	 of	 establishing	
contacts,	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 colonial	 past	 was	 something	 that	 helped	 the	 Soviet	 image	
throughout	 the	 continent.	 The	 existing	 network	 of	 Soviet	 diplomatic	 offices	 was	
generally	 understaffed	 and	 positions	 were	 occupied	 by	 some	 of	 the	 lowest	 calibre	
cadres.	A	 lack	of	previous	relations	and	skilled	staff	was	why	well‐established	CS	 links	
with	 African	 countries,	 though	 weakened	 by	 political	 persecution	 of	 highly‐qualified	
cadres,	 were	 so	 important	 to	 the	 Soviets	 at	 this	 stage.	 Soviet	 penetration	 strategy	
depended	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 position,	 after	 independence,	 of	 the	 former	 colonial	
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power	in	each	case.	The	weaker	the	position,	the	more	attractive	the	prospect	became	to	
the	 Soviets.	 That	 is	 why,	 while	 contacts	 with	 former	 British	 colonies	 were	 more	
widespread,	 the	 Soviets	 initiated	 contacts	 in	 francophone	 Africa	 only	 with	 Mali	 and	
Guinea.		
	Whether	 or	 not	 Khruschev	 had	 any	 set	 conceptualised	 policy	 of	 the	 Soviet	
involvement	in	Africa	has	never	been	established.		One	can	only	trace	the	main	steps	and	
procedures	 that	 took	 place	 in	 practice.	 The	 political	 influence	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 in	
Africa	 was	 to	 be	 acquired	 through	 constant	 propaganda,	 economic	 support,	 technical	
assistance	and	the	indoctrination	of	future	African	elites	while	studying	in	Moscow.	The	
ultimate	goal	was	to	limit	the	influence	of	former	colonial	rulers,	but	also	that	of	the	USA	
which,	 in	 the	 late	 1950s,	 also	 realised	 the	 risks	 and	 challenges	 posed	 by	 the	 power	
vacuum	in	Africa.	
In	 their	 propaganda	 the	 Soviets	 considered	 African	 broadcasts	 by	 Radio	
Moscow	 to	 be	 an	 important	 tool.	 High	 Soviet	 expectations	 for	 this	 project	 were,	
however,	 never	 really	 fulfilled,	 as	 the	broadcasts	 suffered	 a	number	of	 setbacks.	Once	
again,	 a	 lack	 of	 Africa	 experts	 hampered	 Soviet	 ambitions;	 inappropriate	 programme	
content,	unappealing	to	African	listeners,	further	limited	the	effectiveness	of	the	Soviet	
Union’s	propagandistic	goals.130		
Printed	media	and	publishing	were	also	used	for	propaganda	purposes.	Unlike	
Radio	 Moscow,	 oriented	 entirely	 towards	 an	 African	 audience,	 regular	 newspaper	
reports,	mainly	from	Guinea	and	Ghana,	helped	to	raise	awareness	of	Africa	within	the	
Soviet	Union.	Newspapers	and	journals,	mainly	of	an	ideological	nature,	streamed	in	the	
opposite	direction	by	the	thousand.131	The	effect	of	such	propaganda	on	large	masses	of	
illiterate	 Africans	 could	 not	 have	 been	 great.	 The	 system	 of	 scholarships	 for	 African	
students	at	universities	 in	Soviet	Union,	however,	proved	a	great	deal	more	significant	
for	 future	 Soviet‐African	 relations	 and	 for	 the	 development	 of	 independent	 African	
states.		
As	regards	the	success	of	Soviet	engagement	in	sub‐Saharan	Africa	four	groups	
of	 countries	 can	 be	 distinguished:	 those	 countries	 where,	 at	 least	 temporarily,	 the	
Soviets	successfully	participated	in	political	and	economic	relations	and	influenced	local	
affairs;	countries	where	their	attempts	would	fail	due	to	opposition	from	the	Americans,	
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the	British	or	the	French;	countries	considered	potentially	viable	for	Soviet	engagement	
in	 the	 near	 future;	 lastly,	 countries	which	were,	 for	 different	 reasons,	 not	 considered	
suitable	for	Soviet	interest.	
Countries	which	were	of	the	highest	interest	for	the	Soviets	in	this	period	were	
Mali,	 Guinea	 and	Ghana.	 Guinea,	 for	 example,	 ‘was	believed	 to	have	become	not	only	a	
model	of	 socialist	orientation	but	also	a	 showcase	 for	Soviet	policy	 in	Africa.’132	Political	
involvement	of	 these	 three	countries	with	the	Soviets	quickly	bore	 fruit	 in	 the	 form	of	
economic	loans,	weapon	deliveries,	and	technical	assistance	from	numerous	Soviet	and	
other	 eastern	 bloc	 experts.	 `Between	1959	and	1964,	Guinea,	Ghana	and	Mali	 received	
nearly	half	(44.5%)	of	the	Soviet	aid	commitment	to	black	Africa…	This	Soviet	aid	naturally	
encouraged	 its	beneficiaries	 to	 increase	 imports	of	Soviet	goods.’133	On	 the	other	 side	of	
the	mutually	profitable	cooperation,	`each	of	these	countries	had	adopted	a	radical	pan‐
African,	anti‐Western	posture.’134	The	Soviets	naturally	supported	these	three	countries	
politically.	After	the	fragmentation	of	Africa’s	continental	politics,	which	resulted	in	the	
formation	 of	 the	 Brazzaville	 group135,	 the	 Casablanca	 group136	 and	 the	 Monrovia	
group,137	 the	 Soviets	 praised	 the	Casablanca	 group	 for	 achieving	 `important	 success	 in	
the	struggle	for	economic	 independence	and	 in	strengthening	national	sovereignty’	while	
denouncing	the	Brazzaville	group	for	cooperating	with	imperialists.138			
Soviet	involvement	in	the	affairs	of	Congo‐Leopoldville	and	Somalia	caused	the	
two	major	failures	of	Soviet	action	in	this	period.	In	each	case	they	were	subjected	to	US	
opposition	which,	 in	the	first	case,	stopped	the	penetration	of	Soviet	 influence	into	the	
newly	independent	country	and,	in	the	second	case,	managed	to	considerably	postpone	
it.	 The	 complicated	 and	 highly‐charged	 situation	 regarding	 the	 former	 Belgian	 colony	
became	the	theatre	for	the	first	powerful	clash	between	Soviet	and	American	ambitions	
in	 Africa.	 The	 vast	 size	 of	 the	 country,	 the	 abundance	 of	 its	 natural	 resources	 and	 its	
strategically	 important	position	at	 the	centre	of	 the	continent	were	all	 reasons	 for	 the	
Congo’s	playing	such	an	important	role	for	both	superpowers.		
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`In	 July	 1960,	 after	Katanga’s	 secession	 from	 Congo‐Leopoldville,	 the	 Lumumba	
government	requested	Soviet	military	aid	in	addition	to	its	prior	request	for	UN	help.	The	
Soviets	responded	by	first	arranging	an	airlift	of	Ghanaian	troops	and	supplies	[…],[and]	in	
August	began	sending	in	additional	Soviet	aircraft	and	equipment.	In	September,	however,	
when	the	Mobutu‐Kasavubu	faction	ousted	Lumumba,	Congo’s	airports	were	closed	to	the	
Soviets,	 diplomatic	 relations	were	 broken,	 and	 the	 initial	 Soviet	military	 intervention	 in	
sub‐Saharan	Africa	ended	in	a	setback.’139	The	later	assassination	of	Lumumba,	the	vital	
figure	 for	 Soviet	 intentions	 in	 Congo,	 effectively	 put	 an	 end	 to	 their	 aspirations.	 The	
Americans	 backed	 Mobutu,	 who	 became	 President	 and	 enjoyed	 permanent	 western	
support;	as	a	result,	he	ruled	as	dictator	for	almost	four	decades.		
Those	 countries	 considered	 by	 Soviet	 strategists	 suitable	 for	 future	 Soviet	
involvement	 were	 mainly	 British	 colonies	 in	 East	 Africa,	 Kenya	 and	 Uganda.	 African	
political	parties	had	already	enjoyed	a	certain	amount	of	support	from	the	USSR	before	
independence.	Nevertheless,	 the	strong	position	of	 the	British,	especially	 in	Kenya,	did	
not	 herald	 great	 prospects	 for	 exerting	 Soviet	 influence	 in	 the	 future.	 Countries	 that	
were	 considered	 altogether	 inappropriate	 for	 building	 closer	 relations	with	 the	 USSR	
were	 those	 of	 the	 Casablanca	 group,	 South	 Africa,	 Rhodesia,	 as	 well	 as	 Angola	 and	
Mozambique,	which	remained	solidly	part	of	the	intact	colonial	empire.	
By	the	end	of	the	Khrushchev	era	the	Soviet	Union	was	established	in	Africa	to	a	
degree	hardly	imaginable	ten	years	previously.	It	became	a	strategic	partner	for	several	
independent	 states,	 successfully	 forming	 new	 economic	 links	 and	 significantly	
weakening	 the	position	of	 the	 former	colonial	powers	 in	 several	 cases.	Even	 though	 it	
was	far	from	reaching	some	of	the	overly	ambitious	targets	envisaged	by	certain	Soviet	
politicians	 in	the	euphoria	of	1960,	 the	Soviet	Union	became	a	major	player	 in	African	
affairs	and,	despite	its	defeat	in	the	Congo,	successfully	challenged	the	USA.	In	the	Soviet	
Union	itself,	however,	these	advances	were	perceived	as	 insufficient	and	unstable.	 It	 is	
true	 that	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 links	 the	 Soviets	 established	with	most	 countries	
were	 fragile	 and	 often	 linked	 to	 a	 particular	 politician.	 Khrushchev’s	 critics	 viewed	
Soviet	 success	 in	Africa	 as	woefully	 inadequate	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 effort,	 financial	 and	
human	capital	invested.	
Soviet	involvement	in	the	Third	World	in	the	mid‐1960s	hit	the	limits	of	Soviet	
capacities	 –	 both	 economic	 and	 political.	 The	 Soviets	 were	 competing	 with	 the	
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Americans	 in	arming	their	vast	military	and,	at	 the	same	time,	 they	were	struggling	to	
support	their	underdeveloped	satellites	economically.	The	Soviet	economy,	organised	on	
central	planning	and	built	on	heavy	machinery	production	and	mining,	began	to	feel	its	
growing	disadvantage	compared	to	western	rivals.	The	Soviets	were	also	unable	to	keep	
up	the	full	scale	of	previous	engagement	in	Africa.	In	the	late	1960s	they	had	to	abandon	
their	 positions	 in	 sub‐Saharan	 Africa	while	 concentrating	 on	 affairs	 in	 Europe	 and	 in	
south‐east	Asia.	This	provisional	 retreat	was	used	by	Soviet	 strategists	 for	a	 complete	
re‐evaluation	of	their	involvement	in	Africa.	
The	 period	 between	 the	 mid‐1960s	 and	 the	 mid‐1970s	 in	 Soviet‐African	
relations	 is	 characterised	 as	 a	 period	 of	 temporary	 retreat	 from	 previous	 activism	 in	
Africa	 and	 of	 reassessment	 of	 future	 plans.	 Strategy	 re‐appraisal	 in	 the	 early	 1970s	
eventually	led	to	the	re‐engagement	of	the	Soviets	in	Africa	based	on	a	new	theoretical	
approach,	using	different	means	and	targeting	different	countries.			
When	Nikita	Khrushchev	was	challenged	for	his	leading	role	as	head	of	the	CPSU	
and	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 criticisms	 raised	 against	 him	 concerned	 his	
politics	 towards	 Third	World	 countries.	 The	 Soviet	 strategy	 of	 supporting	what	were	
now	 termed	bourgeois	nationalist	movements	 in	Africa,	 in	 the	hope	of	 their	 eventually	
embracing	socialism,	was,	according	to	his	detractors,	unsatisfactory	in	the	long	term,	as	
several	regimes	generously	sponsored	by	the	Soviets	were	either	overthrown	or	proved	
unreliable	 and	 uncooperative	 regarding	 Soviet	 aims.140	 African	 leaders	 soon	 became	
aware	of	the	possibilities	they	possessed	for	manoeuvre	thanks	to	competition	between	
the	Soviets	and	the	Americans	for	dominance	in	Africa.	A	wavering	allegiance	to	either	
superpower	guaranteed	much‐needed	economic	support,	often	decisive	for	their	hold	on	
power.		
The	 failure	of	 the	previous	Soviet	 strategy	 in	Africa	 resulted	 in	 the	need	 for	a	
complete	 revision	 of	 future	 involvement	 in	 Africa.	 `In	 the	 late	 1960s	 and	 early	 1970s	
Soviet	 theorists	began	developing	a	 twofold	 solution	 to	 the	weaknesses	 that	 came	 to	be	
closely	 associated	with	 the	 late	Brezhnev	 period.	The	 first	 aspect	was	 the	 promotion	 of	
parties	 or	 national	 liberation	 movements	 that	 explicitly	 based	 themselves	 on	 Marxist‐
Leninist	 ideology;	 the	 second	 was	 the	 encouragement	 of	 these	 groups	 to	 transform	
themselves	into	formal	vanguard	parties	once	in	power.’141	Toppling	some	of	their	former	
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African	favourites	by	military	coups	weakened	the	Soviet	position,	and	emphasised	the	
provisional	 removal	 of	 the	 African	 agenda	 from	 the	 prime	 interest	 of	 the	 Soviets	 in	
favour	 of	 the	 Arab	 countries	 and	 nations	 in	 Asia.	 The	 fragility	 of	 the	 allied	 African	
regimes	motivated	the	Soviets	to	embark	on	establishing	long‐term	structural	ties	with	
specific	African	countries	mainly	 through	establishing	 tight	economic	relations.	Partial	
success	in	this	sphere	was	achieved	with	some	North	African	countries,	namely	Algeria	
and	 Egypt.	 Economic	 ties	were	 enhanced,	 in	 several	 cases,	 through	 close	 cooperation	
between	political	parties	in	power.142	
Frustration	over	the	results	of	previous	cooperation	with	national	democrats	in	
liberated	African	countries	resulted	in	the	introduction	of	a	firmer	ideological	approach	
to	African	states.	A	certain	level	of	ideological	revision	had	already	emerged	during	the	
late	 Khrushchev	 era	 by	 means	 of	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 providing	 assistance	 to	
`progressive’	 rulers	 who	 declared	 a	 genuine	 intention	 to	 build	 socialism	 in	 their	
countries.143	Later,	ideological	orientation	towards	progressive	leaders	became	the	core	
characteristic	of	Soviet	theoretical	and	practical	approaches	in	the	Third	World	for	the	
next	decade	and	a	half.	Exceptions	did	occur	over	time,	usually	justified	by	the	political	
or	 economic	 importance	 of	 the	 country.	 In	Africa,	 the	main	 exception	 to	 the	 rule	was	
represented	 by	 Nigeria,	 which	 enjoyed	 vital	 Soviet	 support	 during	 the	 civil	 war	 with	
Biafra	between	1967	and	1970,	despite	its	non‐socialist	orientation.144	
	
2.2. The	Demise	of	British	Colonial	Rule	in	Africa	after	World	War	II	
From	today’s	perspective	the	collapse	of	the	British	colonial	empire	seems	more	
or	 less	 inevitable,	 but	 in	 1945	 hardly	 anybody	 could	 have	 predicted	 how	 sudden	 and	
buoyant	the	development	across	the	empire	would	be.	Britain’s	status	after	six	years	of	
global	 conflict	was	 completely	different	 from	 the	position	 in	1939.	 Some	 indication	of	
stagnation	 and	 the	 problems	 of	maintaining	 this	 vast	 colonial	 entity	 had	 been	 slowly	
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becoming	 evident	 even	 before	 the	 war.	 Despite	 these	 factors,	 no	 British	 politician	
imagined	the	course	of	development	the	empire	was	about	to	go	through.		
In	short,	the	processes	that	took	place	across	countries	overseas	dominated	by	
Britain	–	colonies,	dominions	or	protectorates	–	could	be	described	as	a	surprising,	to	a	
certain	extent	controlled,	largely	inevitable	and	irreversible	official	political	retreat	from	
power.	 The	 perfect	 definition	 describes	 decolonisation	 `as	 a	 partial	 retraction,	
redeployment	and	redistribution	of	British	and	European	 influences	 in	 the	regions	of	 the	
extra‐European	world	whose	economic,	political	and	 cultural	 life	had	previously	 seemed	
destined	to	flow	into	Western	moulds.’145	The	British	decolonisation	process	started	in	the	
Middle	East	in	Palestine,	South	East	Asia	and	in	the	Indian	subcontinent	as	early	as	1947,	
but	 the	 development	 leading	 to	 it	 had	 been	 taking	 place	 for	 years,	 even	 decades.	 It	
continued	in	Sudan	and	West	Africa	from	the	mid	to	late‐1950s	and	peaked	in	the	rest	of	
the	African	continent	during	the	1960s.	During	these	two	decades	Britain	was	forced	by	
numerous	objective	factors	to	reconsider	all	direct	political	involvement	in	its	overseas	
colonies	 while	 trying	 to	 sustain	 most	 of	 the	 existing	 economic	 ties	 and	 to	 create	 an	
effective	network	of	unofficial	political	influence	in	the	newly	independent	territories.		
Four	 main	 approaches	 are	 generally	 accepted	 as	 valid	 perspectives	 on	 the	
British	 colonial	 retreat.	 Each	 view	 is	 characterised	by	 the	 factor	 or	 group	of	 factors	 it	
identifies	as	being	decisive	for	the	fall	of	the	British	Empire.	These	perspectives	include	
nationalist,	 neo‐colonialist,	 planned	 decolonisation	 and	 international	 pressure	 factors.	
Convincing	arguments	have	been	presented	in	favour	of	all	these	theories.	Nevertheless,	
one	still	gets	the	most	accurate	account	of	British	decolonisation,	in	Africa	in	particular,	
by	 accepting	 a	 mixture	 of	 all	 of	 the	 above.	 In	 a	 very	 simplified	 explanation,	 the	
nationalist	perspective	views	the	rise	of	nationalist	tendencies	and	political	movements	
across	 colonies	 as	 the	 prime	 force	 behind	 the	 collapse	 of	 British	 rule.146	 Neo‐
colonialist147	and	planned	decolonisation	theories148	are	somewhat	similar	as	they	both	
identify	 the	 colonial	 side	of	 the	 relationship	as	 the	origin	of	activities	 leading	 towards	
the	 end	 of	 colonial	 rule.	 The	 level	 of	 acceptance	 in	 academia	 is	 very	 different,	 as	 the	
planned	 decolonisation	 theory	 was	 repeatedly	 found	 inadequate,	 while	 the	 neo‐
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colonialist	perspective	 is	 still	popular	with	many.	The	perspective	which	 identifies	 the	
numerous	 international	 pressures	 as	 the	main	determinants	 of	 the	decolonisation	has	
been	gaining	in	importance	in	recent	years.149	
	
The	major	 factor	affecting	British	post‐war	 involvement	 in	 its	colonies	was	 its	
own	 unhealthy	 economic	 situation	 and	 the	 heavy	 indebtedness	 affecting	 all	 levels	 of	
British	society	in	numerous	ways.	Another	factor,	vital	for	the	future	of	the	colonies,	was	
the	 political	 will	 and	 decision‐making	 of	 several	 post‐war	 UK	 cabinets.	 Lastly,	 the	
changing	 aspirations	 and	 expectations	 of	 the	 wider	 British	 public,	 together	 with	 its	
notion	 of	 the	 future	 of	 the	 British	 Empire,	 helped	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 fast	 and	 definite	
rupture	from	its	colonial	past.		
The	main	shortcomings	on	the	British	part	were	the	inability	to	regain	control	of	
development	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 initiative.	 In	 most	 cases	 the	 British	 cabinet	 and	 British	
authorities	in	Africa	were	purely	reacting	to	incidents	and	events	beyond	their	control.	
For	most	of	the	post‐war	period	British	politicians	lacked	the	absolutely	vital	 initiative	
needed	in	order	to	sustain	their	African	colonial	empire.	Attempted	reform	policies	and	
other	approved	political	and	economic	decisions	were,	in	most	cases,	late,	ineffective	or	
inadequate.		
The	 majority	 of	 available	 literature	 agrees	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 neither	 the	 British	
public	nor	the	British	government	had	expected	such	a	sudden	and	rapid	disintegration	
of	the	Empire	in	1945.	The	circumstances	in	which	Britain	found	itself	after	a	victorious,	
yet	 devastating,	 world	 conflict	 quickly	 made	 it	 a	 necessity	 to	 deal	 with	 a	 range	 of	
problems.	 First	 of	 all,	 Britain	was	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 economic	 bankruptcy,	 carrying	 the	
burden	 of	 the	 huge	 war	 debt	 to	 the	 USA	 and	 requesting	 further	 necessary	 loans.150	
America	had,	amongst	the	Western	allies,	been	the	state	to	profit	most	highly	from	the	
war.	
The	Americans	were	 ruthless	 towards	 their	 closest	 ally	when	 they	 stated	 that	
their	 condition	 for	providing	Britain	with	 financial	 assistance	was	 the	 liberalisation	of	
the	 Sterling	 area.	 Such	 a	 condition	 opened	 up	 a	 previously	 inaccessible	 trading	 area,	
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dominated	completely	by	British	Sterling	currency,	to	American	dollar	competition,	and	
very	soon	endangered	Sterling’s	stability	and	value.151		
The	US	was	 cautious	at	 first	 in	 its	 criticism	of	 the	British	 colonial	 empire,	 but	
once	 the	 momentum	 of	 decolonisation	 started	 in	 Asia,	 the	 States	 became	 ever	 more	
articulate	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 no	 place	 for	 colonialism	 in	 the	 new	 era.	
`Washington	itself	was	keen	to	gain	greater	access	to	Africa	and	realised	that	this	would	be	
easier	to	achieve	if	it	could	deal	directly	with	the	Africans	rather	than	with	their	colonial	
masters	in	Europe.	Moreover,	Washington	feared	that	any	postponement	of	decolonisation	
would	 play	 into	 the	 Soviet	 Union’s	 hands.’152	 Some	 academics,	 however,	 argue	 that,	
especially	in	the	first	decade	after	the	war,	the	USA	was	still	quite	sympathetic	to	British	
colonial	 interests	 and	 thus	 did	 not	 exert	 any	 great	 pressure	 on	 London	 to	 disengage	
from	its	colonies.	The	fact	that	it	took	a	decade	and	half	for	Britain	to	finally	reconsider	
its	colonial	future	is	the	supporting	evidence	for	this	thesis.153	Unlike	the	case	of	South‐
East	Asia,	India	or	the	Middle	East,	until	the	1960s	the	USA	had	never	viewed	Africa	as	
its	 prime	 interest	 and	 British	 actions	 here	 were	 thus	 pretty	 much	 free	 of	 American	
influence.154		In	the	later	stages,	American	anti‐colonial	activities	had	to	be	circumspect	
and	they	were	subject	to	the	wider	Cold	War	strategy	of	not	undermining	the	balance	of	
power.155		
	
Post‐war	Britain	was	 committed	 to	 extensive	 rebuilding	 projects,	while	 social	
welfare	and	health	system	reforms	also	had	to	be	implemented.	Spending	all‐too	scarce	
funds	in	distant	colonies,	necessary	to	empower	British	positions	there,	would	be	highly	
unpopular	 with	 the	 British	 public	 and	 the	 government	 simply	 could	 not	 afford	 it	
financially.	 Thus,	 the	 British	 economy	 abandoned	 the	 system	 in	 which	 Britain	 was	 a	
creditor	 and	 its	 colonies	 enjoyed	 financial	 support.	 The	wartime	 economy	 turned	 this	
relationship	upside	down	when	African	colonies	strongly	supported	a	struggling	London	
and	 made	 up	 for	 the	 recently	 loss	 of	 produce	 from	 some	 of	 the	 surrendered	 Asian	
colonies.	 In	 post‐war	 years	 production	 from	African	 colonies,	 now	more	 accessible	 to	
American	trade,	provided	a	significant	volume	of	trade	exchange.	The	core	of	emerging	
                                                            
151 White, Nicholas J., Decolonisation: the British experience since 1945 (London: Longman, 1999), 5. 
152 Van Der Veen, Roel, What Went Wrong with Africa?: a Contemporary History (Amsterdam: KFT Publishers, 
2004) 27. 
153 Darwin, Britain, 24‐25. 
154Darwin, Britain, 169‐171. 
155 White, Decolonisation, 72‐73. 
77 
 
problems	 linked	 to	 growing	 African	 discontent	 lay	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 `the	 sterling	
equivalents	 were	 not	 returned	 to	 the	 African	 colonies,	 but	 were	 banked	 in	 the	
metropolis.’156		
While	 economic	 interests	 had	 a	 decisive	 influence	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	
British	Empire,	 it	was	always	 the	nation’s	prestige	 that	swayed	every	British	post‐war	
cabinet,	whether	Labour	or	Conservative,	on	decisions	concerning	the	Empire.	The	first	
British	 cabinet	 after	 the	 war	 was	 formed	 by	 Labour’s	 Clement	 Attlee,	 with	 the	
participation	of	some	strong	politicians	such	as	Foreign	Secretary	Ernest	Bevin,	and,	a	
powerful	 figure	on	the	economic	 front,	Herbert	Morrison.	 `None	of	them	regarded	with	
distaste	the	continuation	of	Britain’s	colonial	empire	or	objected	to	Britain’s	pursuit	of	an	
independent	 great	 power	 position	 based	 on	 her	 pre‐war	 spheres	 of	 influence	 outside	
Europe.’157	 A	 severe	 economic	 situation	 was,	 however,	 to	 force	 British	 leaders	 to	
reassess	 or	 completely	 revoke	 several	 strategically	 important	 overseas	 commitments	
during	 the	period	1945‐1948.	 It	was	 thanks	 to	American	 loans	 that	Britain	did	not,	 at	
that	point,	yet	have	to	completely	surrender	its	overseas	aspirations.158	However,	it	was	
becoming	clear	to	the	whole	world	that	Britain	had	lost	its	status	as	a	first	global	power.	
At	the	culmination	of	the	Cold	War	it	was	not	economically	feasible	for	Britain	to	sustain	
the	remains	of	its	vast	empire	while	attempting	to	compete	with	the	USA	and	the	Soviet	
Union	for	global	influence	and	keeping	up	with	them	in	the	arms	race.	
The	news	reaching	the	UK	from	Africa	was	full	of	growing	discontent,	civil	riots	
and	 strikes.	 London’s	 response	 to	 the	 changed	 situation	 and	 charged	 atmosphere	 in	
Africa	was	 three‐fold.	 	 Britain	 promised	 its	 African	 colonies	 a	 gradual	 introduction	 of	
self‐government,	 British	 disengagement	 from	 African	 affairs	 and	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	
flourishing	 economic	 development.	 These	were	meant	 as	 responses	 to	 the	most	 often	
articulated	 African	 complaints	 concerning	 economic	 hardship	 and	 lack	 of	 political	
representation.		
The	 concept	 of	 introducing	 self‐government	 to	 African	 colonies	 was	 first	
proposed	in	1947	in	connection	with	the	Gold	Coast,	a	West	African	colony	which	was,	
according	to	the	British,	one	of	the	most	politically	advanced	and	which	was	to	be	used	
as	a	sample	case.	`British	leaders	claimed	that	their	policy	had	long	been	to	bring	colonial	
subjects	first	into	local	government	and	then	slowly,	as	they	proved	worthy,	into	territorial	
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self‐government	within	 the	 Commonwealth.’159	 In	 practice,	 it	 meant	 a	 slow,	 controlled	
incorporation	of	 regional	 councils	 and	other	bodies	of	 local	 government	and	educated	
elites	into	more	autonomous	regional	internal	self‐government.	Elections	were	the	new	
concept	introduced	to	African	colonies.			
The	 idea	 of	 self‐government	 very	 soon	 proved	 to	 be	 insufficient	 to	 appease	
African	 demands	 for	 three	 reasons.	 It	 did	 not	 take	 long	 before	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 the	
British	plan	was	careful	selection	of	the	local	politicians	and	elites	to	be	responsible	for	
self‐governance.	 In	 that	 way	 the	 British	 believed	 they	 could	 keep	 their	 informal	 but	
decisive	influence	on	local	affairs,	further	enhanced	by	the	suggested	invitation	for	each	
self‐governed	colony	to	 join	the	British	Commonwealth.	Another	problem	was	that	the	
British	were	 quite	 open	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 did	 not	 expect	 self‐governance	 to	 be	
accomplished	in	the	near	future;	an	estimation	of	one	complete	generation	was	the	most	
common	view	held.160	Lastly,	the	self‐governance	concept	was	not	universally	applicable	
across	 British	 Africa.	 Rather,	 it	 was	 intended	mainly	 for	West	 African	 colonies,	 while	
East	and	Central	Africa,	with	a	large	minority	of	white	settlers,	were	to	be	omitted.161	All	
of	these	factors	became	the	main	limitations	of	the	self‐governance	concept	and,	hence,	
it	proved	ineffective.	African	political	aspirations	and	demands	very	quickly	outgrew	it.		
The	second	pillar	of	consolidation	of	British	power	across	African	colonies	after	
the	 war	 was	 economic	 development.	 The	 British	 government	 believed	 that,	 by	
improving	their	African	subjects’	well‐being,	their	political	demands	would	be	blunted.	
Several	large	investment	projects	were	introduced,	most	of	which	had	little	success.	The	
famous	groundnut	scheme	failure	from	Tanzania	best	illustrates	the	limitations	many	of	
these	 initiatives	had.	Due	 to	 the	 lack	of	high‐quality	planning,	proposed	projects,	 even	
though	aimed	at	improving	the	livelihood	of	 local	populations,	often	met	with	conflicts	
with	 the	 very	 same	 locals	 they	were	 supposed	 to	 help.	 Environmental	 issues,	 cultural	
and	 religious	 conflicts	 linked	 to	 land	 ownership,	 the	 system	 of	 beliefs	 and	 the	 value	
structures	of	the	indigenous	people,	were	the	most	common	reasons	for	the	failures	of	
large	 developmental	 projects.162	 Even	 though	 some	were	 successful	 and	 a	 number	 of	
African	 colonies	 were	 undergoing	 a	 period	 of	 rapid	 industrialisation	 and	 relative	
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prosperity,	the	economic	profit	to	the	wider	public	was	insufficient	to	appease	political	
demands.		
British	civil	 servants	were	slow	to	realise	 the	deep	structural	changes	 in	 their	
colonies	that	African	society	had	undergone	during	the	war	years.	They	were	unable	to	
address	 all	 the	 African	 grievances	 and	 demands	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 British	 grasp	 on	
these	colonies	slowly	started	to	loosen.	Initial	post‐war	attempts	to	address	all	the	new	
issues	proved	to	be	too	little,	too	late.	Inevitably,	the	British	approach	to	African	colonies	
had	to	change	to	reflect	reality.	The	intended	slow,	controlled	transfer	of	power	into	the	
hands	 of	 carefully	 chosen	members	 of	 African	 autonomous	 administrations	 had	 to	 be	
reconsidered.	 From	 the	 late	 1950s	 it	 was	 becoming	 clear	 that	 full	 independence	 for	
African	 colonies	would	 be	 the	 only	 development	 to	 appease	 the	populace.	 Conducting	
the	 transfer	 of	 power	 across	 the	 range	 of	 colonies	 with	 different	 levels	 of	 political	
development,	 economic	 performance,	 social	 structure	 or	 proportion	 of	 non‐African	
minorities	became	the	new	challenge	for	the	British	government.		
	
	
2.2.1. The	roots	of	African	nationalism	
While	 British	 society	 and	 politics	 did	 not	 fundamentally	 change	 during	 the	
World	 War,	 African	 society	 was	 transformed	 to	 an	 unprecedented	 extent.	 Some	
tendencies	 towards	 political,	 economic	 or	 social	 change	 might	 already	 have	 been	
occurring	before	the	war,	while	others	were	completely	new.	Some	changes	were	similar	
to	 or	 even	 directly	 linked	 to	 events	 and	 developments	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 British	
Empire	while	others	were	unique	to	Africa.	A	combination	of	all	of	these	events,	together	
with	 the	 above‐mentioned	developments	 in	Britain	 itself	 and	 changes	 in	 international	
affairs,	 resulted	 in	 the	 rapid	 dissolution	 of	 British	 rule	 across	 Africa.	 Many	 identify	
wartime	 and	 post‐war	 development	 in	 Africa	 as	 the	 prime	 reason	 for	 the	 fall	 of	 the	
British	colonial	system.	I	tend	to	believe	that	they	are	right,	as	long	as	the	change	in	the	
global	political	system	with	its	huge	impact	is	taken	into	consideration	as	well.	
Thousands	of	African	soldiers	were	conscripted	to	fight	in	the	colonial	army	in	
Africa,	Asia	or	even	Europe.163	African	soldiers	witnessed	the	defeats	the	British	suffered	
and	became	aware	of	how	the	fragility	of	the	vast	empire	was	tested	by	the	Japanese	in	
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India	and	South‐East	Asia.	Britain	itself,	hanging	on	the	verge	of	defeat	in	1940,	with	a	
bloody	victory	at	the	last	line	of	defence	in	Egypt,	and	the	urgent	need	to	defend	its	Horn	
of	 Africa	 colonies	 against	 aggressors	 –	 all	 these	were	 the	 images	 placing	 the	 colonial	
masters	 into	 a	 new	 corner	 and	 the	 previously	 unquestioned	 concept	 of	 British	
superiority	was	now	being	challenged.	The	fundamental	idea	of	the	moral	legitimacy	of	
colonial	dominance	was	called	into	question	by	the	war.	While	arguing	for	the	morally	
superior	cause	behind	the	British	campaign	against	Nazi	Germany,	it	was	very	hard	for	
British	politicians	to	justify	the	racial	inequality	found	all	across	British	Empire.164	It	was	
not	 only	 Africans	 who	 were	 starting	 to	 question	 the	 morality	 of	 colonialism,	 but	
members	of	the	British	public	as	well.		
Traditional	 African	 society	 had	 already	 started	 to	 change	 before	 the	war.	 The	
main	 reason	 for	 this	was	 the	 new	means	 of	 economic	 production.	 Greater	mobility	 of	
Africans	travelling	in	order	to	find	work	caused	more	inter‐regional	migration,	the	root	
of	 future	 tensions	 between	 different	 tribes.	 The	 traditional	 bond	 between	 people	 and	
land	 was	 endangered	 and	 the	 effects	 were	 far‐reaching.	 Similarly,	 the	 old	 economic	
system	 was	 being	 affected	 as	 wage	 labourers	 suddenly	 had	 access	 to	 resources.	 By	
acquiring	these	resources,	they	could	ignore	and	avoid	traditional	forms	of	earning	their	
keep	and	 they	became	more	 independent	of	 their	 leaders	 and	 chieftains.	Even	 though	
British	colonial	servants	used	and	supported	the	traditional	system	of	rule,	this	was	now	
being	tested.		
Rising	demand	for	African	agricultural	products	such	as	cocoa,	coffee	or	tea	was	
met	mainly	by	white	farmers	using	modern	methods,	including	mechanisation.	Colonial	
production	 on	 these	 plantations,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 ports	 and	 in	 the	 new	 mines	 and	
factories,	 demanded	 a	 high	 concentration	 of	 the	 labour	 force	 –	 mainly	 young	 men.	
Despite	attempts	to	isolate	the	men,	the	women	soon	started	to	follow.165	Settlements	in	
these	 locations	 were	 growing	 and	 some	 large	 cities	 started	 to	 evolve.166	 The	
phenomenon	of	urbanisation	occurred	in	large	parts	of	sub‐Saharan	African	for	the	first	
time	 and	 it	was	 to	 change	African	 society	 for	 ever.	 In	 these	 growing	 cities	 traditional	
ways	faded	into	the	background	and	modern	society	dominated.	Urbanisation	was	soon	
followed	by	a	population	explosion	which,	in	less	than	a	generation,	deepened	tensions	
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and	 frustrations	 in	 society,	 which	 was	 failing	 in	 so	 many	 ways	 to	 provide	 for	 an	
expanding	population.	
Thousands	 of	 labourers	 working	 together	 had	 begun	 organising	 unions	 long	
before	 the	war.	 Trade	 unions	 became	 the	 first	 of	 the	modern	 kind	 of	African	political	
organisation,	and,	in	turn,	they	gave	rise	to	the	first	modern	political	parties.	During	the	
war,	African	production	had	been	 vital	 for	British	 success.	 Trade	unions	 thus	 grew	 to	
new	prominence.	Poor	wages,	bad	working	conditions,	and	political	 ignorance	became	
the	sparks	for	a	number	of	strikes,	hitting	almost	every	British	colony	in	Africa.	Leaders	
of	these	strikes	were	to	become	the	first	African	politicians	who	eventually	led	Africa	to	
independence.	 In	 the	 beginning,	 trade	 unions	 were	 common	 only	 amongst	 railway	
workers,	 public	 servants	 and	 dockyard	workers	 in	 East	 Africa.	 Only	 after	 the	war	 did	
other	 industrial	and	agricultural	 labourers,	 including	miners,	begin	to	 form	substantial	
trade	unions.167	
Trade	unions	had	yet	another	important	role	in	the	newly‐emerging	politics	of	
Africa.	Trade	unions	from	different	parts	of	the	continent	communicated	and	cooperated	
successfully	with	each	other.	Pan‐Africanism	was	a	commonly	shared	principle	and	very	
popular	 during	 this	 period.	 However,	 communication	 between	 trade	 unions	 was	 not	
limited	 to	 Africa.	 They	 `worked	within	 international	 trade	union	organisations,	notably	
the	leftist	World	Federation	of	Trade	Unions,	to	link	their	demands	for	equal	wages,	for	the	
end	of	oppressive	colonialist	legislation,	and	for	fuller	recognition	of	collective	bargaining	
to	a	world‐wide	movement.’168	Contacts	with	Eastern	bloc	countries	on	the	basis	of	trade	
unions	 were	 viewed	 with	 great	 concern	 in	 Britain	 and	 this	 perception	 was	 not	
completely	irrational.	In	the	Soviet	Union,	as	well	as	in	the	CSSR,	contacts	with	African	
trade	 unionists	were	 seen	 as	 an	 immensely	 important	 entry	 point	 into	 African	 affairs	
and	an	opportunity	to	undermine	British	rule.	These	tactics	were	certainly	sound	and,	to	
a	limited	extent,	successful,	as	indicated	by	the	reactions	caused.	‘Anti‐communist	trade	
unionists	in	the	United	States	and	Great	Britain	felt	obliged	to	counter	this	form	of	labour	
internationalism	 by	 promoting	 their	 own	 trade	 union	 organisations	 in	 Africa	 and	
elsewhere,	 the	 International	 Confederation	 of	 Free	 Trade	 Unions,	 and	 African	 activists	
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found	 this	 organisation,	 too,	 would	 support	 them	 in	 clashes	 with	 colonial	
administration.’169					
Due	 to	 the	swift	modern	development	of	African	societies	 in	 towns	and	cities,	
the	 contrast	 between	 urban	 dwellings	 and	 traditional,	 conservative	 rural	 areas	 was	
increasing.	Originally	traditional	political	and	social	structures	and	the	village	economy	
came	 less	often	 into	conflict	with	colonial	masters.	Up	to	this	point,	conflicts	had	been	
more	common,	occurring	when	it	was	felt	traditional	ways	were	being	endangered.	This	
was	 the	 case	 of	 large	 agricultural	 or	 infrastructural	 projects	 after	 the	war,	when	new	
practices	 imposed	on	 farmers	were	met	with	great	opposition,	 such	as	 in	Tanganyika.	
Similar	opposition	occurred	when	traditional	land	ownership	was	contested	by	colonial	
authorities.170	 The	 result	was	 a	 rural	mobilisation	 in	which	 traditional	 rulers	 tried	 to	
adapt	to	modern	ways,	to	cooperate	regionally	and	to	oppose	the	colonial	order.	Another	
form	of	mobilisation	of	the	rural	population	was	linked	to	local	farmers	joining	forces	in	
their	attempts	to	receive	higher	prices	for	their	produce	and	thus	to	compete	with	the	
large	white‐owned	plantations.171		
Most	of	 the	characteristics	 typical	 for	post‐war	development	 in	British	African	
colonies	are	best	illustrated	by	the	Gold	Coast	example.	The	Gold	Coast,	as	a	colony,	had	
seen	 its	 economy	 perform	 very	 well	 due	 to	 the	 booming	 demand	 for	 its	 main	
commodity,	cocoa.	Adequate	financial	resources	made	it	possible	to	implement	some	of	
the	 new	 British	 ideas.	 The	 British	 administration	 also	 judged	 recent	 political	
developments	 in	 the	 Gold	 Coast	 had	 made	 it	 the	 most	 evolved	 of	 all	 the	 colonies.	
However,	a	wave	of	strikes	hit	the	country	and	this,	for	the	colonial	authorities,	was	an	
indication	that	 it	was	time	to	instigate	political	reform.	The	original	political	party,	the	
United	 Gold	 Coast	 Convention,	 as	 approved	 by	 the	 British	 and	 expected	 to	 lead	 the	
colony	 in	 a	 convenient	 direction,	 was	 very	 quickly	 challenged	 by	 the	 more	 radical	
Convention	 People’s	 Party	 led	 by	 ex‐UGCC	 member	 and	 Western‐educated	 pan‐
Africanist	Kwame	Nkrumah.172	
Nkrumah’s	views	were	far	too	radical	for	the	British	administration,	but	it	was	
exactly	the	kind	of	demand	the	masses	in	Africa	shared.	Nkrumah’s	imprisonment	only	
strengthened	 his	 position	 and	 his	 persuasive	 election	 victory	 put	 the	 British	 into	 a	
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corner.	 Nkrumah	 was	 released,	 formed	 his	 government	 and	 effectively	 steered	 the	
colony	 towards	 its	 independence	 in	 1956.	 His	 autocratic	 style	 and	 lack	 of	 political	
experience,	 however,	 soon	 lost	 him	 his	 universal	 popularity.173	 British	 attempts	 to	
award	more	autonomy	 to	 its	model	 colony	and	 lead	 it	 steadily	 to	 self‐governance	and	
away	from	British	rule	went	completely	wrong,	and	another	of	the	colonial	 jewels	was	
lost	from	Britain’s	crown.174		
British	plans	elsewhere	in	Africa	were	quite	different,	namely	in	the	east	and	the	
centre	 of	 the	 continent.	 British	 politicians	 did	 not	 believe	 ‘that	 the	 remaining	African	
colonies	 were	 ready	 for	 independence.	 Most	 were	 economically	 weak;	 all	 were	
inadequately	 prepared.’175	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 due	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 significant	
minorities	 of	 white	 settlers,	 the	 idea	 of	 Kenyan	 or	 Rhodesian	 independence	 was	
contemplated	with	much	 greater	 caution.	 The	 future	 of	 the	 colonies	was	 discussed	 in	
depth	with	the	representatives	of	these	settlers,	but	the	final	arrangement	was	in	both	
cases	very	different	from	the	British	plans.		
In	 East	 Africa,	 namely	 Kenya,	 the	 post‐war	 decade	 was	 marked	 by	 an	
unprecedented	 wave	 of	 violence.	 The	 conflict	 arose	 from	 the	 discontent	 of	 the	
indigenous	 people	 of	 Kikuyu	 who	 were	 struggling	 for	 land	 ownership	 after	 white	
settlers	expelled	them	from	Kenya’s	most	fertile	lands,	traditionally	held	by	the	Kikuyu.	
Frustrated	 young	 men,	 with	 no	 access	 to	 the	 land	 ownership	 which	 conventionally	
would	mark	 their	coming	of	age	and	 their	status	within	society,	began	 to	attack	white	
settlements.	Conflict	quickly	 grew	 in	 intensity	 and	 the	wave	of	violence,	 the	 results	of	
which	 included	 dozens	 of	 white	 farmers	 and	 thousands	 of	 Africans	 being	 killed,	
paralysed	 Kenya.	 The	 reaction	 of	 the	 colonial	 British	 administration	 was	 harsh	 and	
resolute.	Thousands	of	convicted	or	suspected	Mau	Mau	 fighters	were	killed	or	 locked	
up	in	concentration	camps.	The	insurgency	was	eventually	suppressed,	but	there	were	
many	lessons	to	be	learnt.176		
The	 British	 colonial	 administration	 showed	 its	 willingness	 to	 accept	 that	
emerging	African	political	initiatives	had	their	limits,	and	movements	as	radical	as	Mau	
Mau	would	be	met	with	strong	opposition.	On	the	other	hand	the	British	realised	how	
fragile	the	balance	of	power	was	in	their	colonies	and	they	certainly	wanted	to	prevent	
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the	 spread	 of	Mau	Mau	 insurgency	 in	 Africa.	With	 the	 African	 population	 continually	
growing	 in	 size	 and	 frustration,	 any	 similar	 insurgencies	 occurring	 elsewhere	 in	 the	
continent	 would	 be	 very	 costly	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 lives	 and	 resources	 and	 might	
irreversibly	harm	future	British	economic	interests	should	the	African	colonies	become	
independent.		
The	Mau	Mau	rebellion	attracted	much	attention	globally	and	news	of	some	of	
the	methods	used	by	the	British	to	suppress	 it	gave	rise	 to	considerable	criticism.	The	
revolt	was	certainly	one	of	the	major	factors	behind	the	British	decision	to	expedite	all	
arrangements	for	a	peaceful	transfer	of	power	and	a	colonial	departure	from	Africa.	This	
decision	 was	 met	 with	 much	 criticism	 amongst	 white	 settlers,	 who	 felt	 London	 had	
abandoned	them.	It	is	certainly	true	that	any	white‐settler	hopes	of	being	able	to	rule	an	
independent	 Kenya	were	more	 or	 less	 totally	 destroyed	 by	 the	manner	 of	 the	 British	
departure;	 nevertheless,	 this	was	 the	 only	 feasible	way	 to	 avoid	 a	 resurrection	 of	 the	
conflict,	 this	 time	 with	 new	 intensity	 and	 without	 any	 British	 support	 for	 the	 white	
population	 of	 Kenya.	 It	was	 the	will	 of	 the	white	 settler	 population	 to	 unite	 different	
territories	into	federations.	However,	with	the	lack	of	support	from	London,	the	Central	
African	Federation	and	East	African	Federation	projects	were	destined	to	fail.177	
The	 experience	 learnt	 from	 the	 Gold	 Coast,	 Tanganyika,	 Kenya	 or	 Nigeria,	
international	and	domestic	pressure	and	economic	interests,	all	occurring	during	the	ten	
years	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 war,	 resulted	 in	 colonial	 administrations	 realising	 the	
inevitability	of	the	African	route	towards	independence.	‘French	and	British	governments	
on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 African	movements	 and	 leaders	 on	 the	 other	 struggled	with	 and	
occasionally	fought	each	other,	and	ended	up	defining	a	certain	kind	of	decolonisation,	one	
which	 opened	 up	 some	 political	 possibilities	 and	 shut	 down	 the	 others.	 Supra‐national	
possibilities	–	federations	of	more	than	one	territory,	and	Pan‐Africanist	imaginings	–	were	
excluded	 from	 the	political	map.	And	as	British	and	French	governments	came	 to	realise	
that	 hanging	 on	 to	 power	 would	 be	 too	 painful	 and	 costly,	 they	made	 clear	 that	 the	
responsibility	 for	 the	 consequences	 of	 these	 decolonisations	 would	 fall	 on	 African	
shoulders.`178	
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2.3. Foreign	policy	of	socialist	Czechoslovakia	after	the	Second	World	War	
	
2.3.1. War	origins	of	Czechoslovak	convergence	towards	the	Soviet	Union	
Once	 the	 war	 was	 over	 in	 Europe	 the	 Czechoslovak	 state	 was	 swiftly	
resurrected	within	its	former	boundaries179	but	in	a	very	different	political	climate,	both	
domestic	and	international.	The	leaders	of	the	main	allied	powers	split	their	spheres	of	
influence180,	with	Czechoslovakia	 falling	 firmly	 into	 the	Soviet	 zone,	mainly	due	 to	 the	
fact	that	the	greater	part	of	its	territory	had	been	liberated	by	the	Soviet	and	Romanian	
armies	during	the	spring	of	1945.	The	far‐reaching	implications	of	this	arrangement	in	
regards	 to	 its	 democratic	 nature	 were	 not	 fully	 appreciated	 by	 leading	 Czechoslovak	
politicians	at	the	time.	The	leader	of	the	CS	exiled	government	in	London,	last	president	
of	the	First	Czechoslovak	Republic	and	first	post‐war	head	of	state,	Edvard	Beneš,	also	
welcomed	 the	 decision	 and	 ‘was	greatly	 content	 that	Czechoslovakia	was	 incorporated	
into	 Soviet	 sphere	 of	 operations.’181	 As	 on	 so	 many	 other	 occasions,	 Beneš’	 ability	 to	
predict	the	political	development	proved	woefully	inadequate.		
Early	 developments	 in	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 resurrected	 CSR	were	mostly	 in	 the	
hands	of	the	returning	exiled	CS	political	elites	from	both	the	Soviet	Union	and	from	the	
United	Kingdom	(UK).	During	 the	war	 there	had	been	 two	main	groups	of	CS	political	
representation:	 in	London	and	in	Moscow.	Similarly,	 two	initially	 independent	CS	exile	
armed	forces	were	created.	In	London	political	leadership	was	formed	around	the	figure	
of	the	last	pre‐war	CS	president,	Beneš.182	While	Beneš	spent	six	war	years	mainly	in	the	
UK,	 Klement	 Gottwald,	 for	 many	 years	 a	 chairman	 of	 the	 Communist	 party	 of	
                                                            
179 With the exception of the easternmost region of Trans‐Carpathian Ukraine that was now incorporated into 
the Soviet Union. 
180 The destiny of small European states was agreed by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt long before the end of 
the war at conferences  in Tehran in November 1943 and in Yalta  in February 1945. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and all of  the Balkans were to be  incorporated  into the Soviet sphere of  influence, while Greece and 
Italy would remain with the West. 
181 Kalvoda, Role, 175. 
182 In the first years of the war, Beneš and his National Council struggled for recognition by Allied governments. 
Despite  previous  frequent  criticism  by  both  French  and  British  governments  Beneš  became  the  leading 
personality of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government. Eventually, this body was recognised by Allies as the 
main  and  legitimate  political  representation  of  the  people.  Unlike  the  exile  governments  of  Yugoslavia  and 
Poland, Beneš  soon became very positive  towards  cooperation with  the Soviets.  This  caused a great deal of 
criticism  in Beneš’ own  team, and Beneš’  lack of  cooperation and arrogance  towards other exiled politicians 
gave him the aura of a dictator. 
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Czechoslovakia	 (Komunistická	 strana	 Československa,	 KSČ)	 formed	 another	 CS	 exile	
group	in	Moscow.		
During	 the	 war	 Beneš	 was	 unaware	 of	 any	 existing	 Soviet	 strategy	 for	
communist	 dominance	 in	 Central	 Europe,	 in	 which	 the	 CSSR	 played	 a	 vital	 role.	 His	
unexpected	 tolerance	 was	 surprising,	 even	 for	 the	 Soviets,	 who	 did	 not	 hesitate	 to	
include	him	 in	 their	post‐war	plans.183	 In	1943	Beneš	was	 invited	 to	Moscow	 to	meet	
with	 Stalin	 and	 Gottwald.	 The	 visit	 was	 used	 by	 Stalin	 to	 propose	 the	 new	 treaty	
between	 the	 Soviets	 and	 the	 Czechoslovak	 government.	 ‘Signing	 of	 a	 Treaty	 of	
Friendship,	 mutual	 assistance	 and	 post‐war	 cooperation	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	
Soviet	Union	on	12th	December	1943,	which	was	 in	effect	 for	20	years,	had	 far‐reaching	
consequences	 not	 only	 for	 Czechoslovakia,	 but	 also	 for	 whole	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	
Europe.’184	 The	 treaty	 legitimised,	 to	 a	 great	 extent,	 Stalin’s	 interference	 in	
Czechoslovakia	 and	 weakened	 the	 democratic	 opposition	 parties	 to	 the	 point	 where	
democracy	 in	 Czechoslovakia	 could	 not	 survive.	 The	 Soviet	 political	 strategy	 in	
Czechoslovakia	 proved	 to	 be	 correct	 as	 Beneš’	 role	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 decisive	 factor	
leading	to	the	communist	victory	which	determined	the	fate	of	the	CSSR	for	decades.		
Gottwald’s	 Communists	 enjoyed	wide	 public	 support	 in	 Czechoslovakia	 in	 the	
post‐	war	years.	The	combination	of	popular	encouragement,	the	structural	weaknesses	
of	 democratic	 principles	 in	 the	 CS	 political	 system,	 strong	 Soviet	 support	 and	 Soviet‐
inspired	 ruthlessness	 in	 conducting	 politics	 brought	 Gottwald	 quickly	 to	 power.	 This	
favourable	set	of	conditions	allowed	Gottwald	to	dominate	the	democratic	system	in	the	
CSSR	in	less	than	three	years.	Once	power	was	firmly	in	hands	of	the	KSČ,	dismantling	of	
democratic	principles	of	the	Czechoslovak	political	system	was	accomplished	in	a	matter	
of	weeks.		
	
In	 years	 to	 follow	 the	 political	 struggle	 between	 East	 and	West	 took	 over	 all	
aspects	and	spheres	of	European	political	affairs.	Czechoslovakia,	once	the	object	of	this	
unfolding	rivalry	between	East	and	West,	soon	became	an	active	agent	of	the	Cold	War	
and	an	important	ally	of	the	USSR	in	Central	Europe.	The	significance	of	Czechoslovakia	
in	 Soviet	 expansionist	 aspirations	 was	 based	 on	 several	 crucial	 facts.	 The	 country	 is	
located	in	the	strategically	important	position	at	the	very	centre	of	the	continent,	critical	
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in	 the	 case	 of	 armed	 conflict	 in	 this	 region.	 Czechoslovakia	 possessed	 the	 most	
developed	and	least	damaged	industrial	economy	of	all	socialist	countries.	Control	over	
CS	 resources	was	 vital	 if	 Stalin	 realistically	wanted	 to	 compete	 economically	with	 the	
West.	 ‘Czechoslovakia,	as	 the	most	 industrially	developed	country	of	 the	Soviet	bloc,	was	
charged	with	over‐dimensioned	production	tasks:	on	the	one	hand,	Czechoslovak	industry	
greatly	participated	in	the	industrialisation	of	other	economically	less	developed	Comecon	
countries,	while	on	 the	other	hand	rapidly	 increasing	 the	volume	of	 its	arms	production.	
Czechoslovakia	became	 the	 object	 of	pressure	 from	 Soviet	Union	and	 other	 countries	 to	
maximise	the	rate	of	growth	of	strategically	important	production.’185		
In	 an	 attempt	 to	 prepare	 the	 socialist	 bloc	 for	 universally	 expected	 western	
aggression,	large	areas	of	CS	industry	were	given	over	to	arms	production	and	the	whole	
arms	industry	was	programmed	to	work	as	if	in	a	‘war	time	regime’.	In	January	1951	a	
‘plan	 for	 maximum	 arms	 production’	 was	 introduced.	 Its	 goal	 was	 to	 ‘equip	 the	
Czechoslovak	 army	 so	 that	 it	 would,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 1953,	 be	 ready	 to	 conduct	 active	
defence.’186	 In	 1952	 armaments	 manufacture	 represented	 more	 than	 a	 quarter	 of	 all	
engineering	 production.187	 Czechoslovakia	 was	 by	 this	 point	 supplying	 most	 of	 its	
partners	 from	 the	Warsaw	 Pact,	 but	 it	 still	 had	 large	 supplies	 of	 arms	 and	weaponry	
available	for	exports	to	other	countries.	As	it	was	becoming	clearer	that	no	open	armed	
conflict	 with	West	 was	 on	 the	 horizon,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 National	 Defence	 was	 able	 to	
release	 more	 of	 its	 supplies	 for	 export.	 In	 the	 years	 to	 follow,	 Czechoslovak	 weapon	
deliveries	 became	more	 and	more	 common	all	 over	 the	world.	Arms	 and	 ammunition	
from	 Czechoslovakia	 were	 provided	 in	 line	 with	 newly	 formed	 ideological	 terms	
formulated	 in	 Moscow:	 providing	 support	 world‐wide	 to	 ‘friendly’	 regimes.	 Most	
recipients	 of	 this	 ‘special’	 support	 were	 the	 economically	 less	 developed	 countries	 in	
South	and	South‐East	Asia,	North	Africa	and	the	Middle	East,	soon	to	be	joined	by	freshly	
independent	states	in	sub‐Saharan	Africa.		
	
1945	was	the	year	the	world	entered	the	nuclear	age.	The	Soviets	were	at	this	
point	 lagging	 behind	 the	 USA	 with	 their	 own	 nuclear	 programme.	 While	 the	
technological	 delay	was	partially	 compensated	 for	by	 the	 capture	of	 results	 and	 some	
leading	 scientists	 of	Hitler’s	 nuclear	 programme,	 the	necessary	 raw	materials	 had	not	
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yet	 been	 located	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 by	 1945.	 Therefore	 the	 inter‐governmental	
agreement	between	the	CSR	and	the	USSR,	signed	as	early	as	23	November	1945,	was	of	
the	 utmost	 significance.	 This	 secret	 agreement	 dealt	 with	 the	 mining	 of	 uranium	
bearings	around	the	town	of	Jáchymov.	By	signing	the	agreement,	the	Soviets	were	able	
to	 get	 hold	 of	 the	 uranium	 and	 radium	 necessary	 for	 the	 development	 of	 their	 own	
atomic	bomb.	The	agreement	was	already	 in	place	before	the	communist	 take‐over	as,	
for	 the	Soviets,	 unobstructed	 control	 over	uranium	mines	was	of	 the	highest	 strategic	
importance.	The	status	quo	within	the	world’s	balance	of	power	was	maintained	largely	
due	to	the	fact	that	Soviets	were	able	to	get	effective	control	over	Czechoslovak	uranium.		
The	final	reason	for	Soviet	interest	in	the	CSSR,	and	no	less	important	than	the	
others,	 involved	the	ideological	and	propaganda	values.	The	CSSR	was	an	example	of	a	
country	 where	 communists	 prevailed	 in	 a	 reasonably	 non‐violent	 or	 downright	
democratic	 manner.	 CS	 experience	 was	 to	 be	 used	 in	 the	 future	 in	 `the	 export	 of	
revolution`	around	the	world.	Some	characteristics	of	the	CS	communist	coup	were	later	
applied	 during	 the	 Cuban	 revolution	 led	 by	 Fidel	 Castro.188	 Czechoslovak	 economic	
successes	were	also	important	tools	for	the	Soviet	bloc’s	global	propaganda	machinery.	
The	technological	achievements	of	the	highly	developed	Czechoslovak	industry	and	the	
improvements	 brought	 by	 collectivised	 agriculture	were	 powerful	 images	 giving	 hard	
supporting	 evidence	 to	 the	 ideological	 message	 of	 triumphant	 socialist	 revolution.	 In	
decades	to	come,	African	countries	received	a	fair	share	of	this	propaganda.		
	
	
2.3.2. Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	and	trade	after	the	World	War	II	and		the	
communist	take‐over		
The	 steady	 convergence	 towards	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	
communist	victory	in	1948	had	far‐reaching	implications	for	the	political	and	economic	
landscape	of	post‐war	Czechoslovakia.	The	three	years	between	the	end	of	the	war	and	
the	 communist	 coup	 d’état	witnessed	 a	 complete	 turnaround	 in	 Czechoslovak	 foreign	
policy.	 In	 1945	 the	 CS	 government	 outlined	 its	 foreign	 political	 orientation	within	 its	
first	peace	programme	as	follows.	‘The	foundation	of	our	foreign	politics	was	already	laid	
during	the	previous	war.	The	alliance	with	the	Soviet	Union,	as	declared	 in	the	Treaty	of	
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1943,	 remains	 the	 crucial	 principle	 of	 our	 foreign	 politics	 also	 in	 time	 of	 peace,	 as	we	
understand	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 is	 the	 most	 reliable	 guarantee	 of	 our	 freedom	 and	
independence	 […]	 In	order	 to	express	 the	 	 immense	gratitude	 to	 the	Soviet	Union	of	 the	
Czech	 and	 Slovak	 nation,	 the	 government	 shall	 consider	 the	 closest	 alliance	 with	 the	
victorious	Slavonic	superpower	in	the	East	to	be	an	unwavering	principle	of	Czechoslovak	
foreign	 policy.	 The	 treaty	 […]	 of	mutual	 help,	 friendship	 and	 post‐war	 cooperation	will	
forevermore	determine	our	state’s	foreign	politics	position.’189	Principles	on	which	foreign	
politics	were	 to	be	based	were	 clearly	defined	and	 the	orientation	 towards	 the	Soviet	
Union	could	not	have	been	stressed	more	strongly.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	position	and	
prestige	of	western	Allies	remained	high	among	the	population	and	most	of	 the	active	
political	 parties	 and	 this	 fact	was	 reflected	 in	 the	 government’s	 programme	as	 strong	
links	of	friendly	nature	to	western	Allies	were	highly	regarded.			
The	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	was	run	in	the	post‐war	period	by	Jan	Masaryk,	
the	 son	 of	 the	 first	 president	 and	 a	 respected	 and	 highly‐educated	Western‐oriented	
diplomat.	 In	 March	 1946,	 in	 one	 of	 his	 speeches,	 he	 outlined	 the	 position	 in	 which	
Czechoslovakia	 was	 trying	 to	 place	 itself	 in	 the	 international	 context.	 He	 said	 that	
‘Czechoslovakia	 is	bound	 to	 the	USSR	with	a	permanent,	 sincere	and	 consistent	alliance	
which	shall	never	become	the	matter	of	parties’	quarrels.	However	at	the	same	time	we	are	
interested	 in	 fostering	 friendly	 relations	with	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 USA	 and	 France.’190	
Similarly,	 but	 in	 greater	 detail,	 the	 CS’s	 foreign	 politics	 were	 outlined	 by	 Klement	
Gottwald	after	the	elections	of	1946	in	an	approved	government	programme.	The	main	
emphasis	 was	 once	 again	 on	 relations	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 but	 prospects	 of	 an	
intensification	of	relations,	both	political	and	economic,	with	the	UK	and	the	USA	were	
also	 highlighted.	 Good	 relations	 with	 France,	 a	 cautious	 attitude	 towards	 Germany,	
friendly	 bonds	with	 Yugoslavia,	 Poland,	 Bulgaria,	 Austria	 and	 Romania	were	 amongst	
other	 listed	 principles	 of	 Czechoslovak	 foreign	 policy	 at	 this	 point.	 In	 international	
organisations,	 the	 CS	 government	 promised	 to	 work	 towards	 the	 reconstruction	 of	
world	peace.191	The	ambition	of	President	Beneš	to	become	the	bridge	between	East	and	
West,	which	he	often	mentioned,	was	however	never	fulfilled.		
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The	CSSR	became	very	active	 in	 the	post‐war	years	on	the	 international	scene	
and	 participated	 in	 a	 number	 of	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 proceedings.	 It	 became	 a	
founding	 member	 of	 the	 United	 Nations,	 joined	 the	 Breton	 Woods	 agreement,	
participated	 in	 the	 creation	of	 the	World	Health	Organization	and	signed	a	number	of	
technical	international	agreements.192	The	Czechoslovak	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	also	
took	part	 in	 the	1946	Paris	war	 reparations	 talks.	A	number	of	 loan	agreements	were	
signed	 with	 the	 USA,	 New	 Zealand,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 other	 countries.193	 The	 CS	
population	benefited	to	a	great	extent	from	the	United	Nations	Relief	and	Rehabilitation	
Administration	 (UNRRA).	A	number	of	 trade	agreements	were	 signed,	mainly	with	 the	
countries	of	South	America.194			
In	practice,	Czechoslovakia’s	official	external	political	relations	were	conducted	
at	 three	main	 levels	 –	 the	 lowest	 level	 of	 contacts	 between	 political	 parties	 and	 civil	
organisations,	at	 the	middle	 level	of	bilateral	contacts	with	other	countries,	and	at	 the	
highest	level	between	different	international	organisations.	However,	the	lowest	level	of	
contacts	did	not	necessarily	mean	they	were	of	the	lowest	significance.	Also,	the	contacts	
within	one	level	varied	greatly	according	to	the	partner.	For	example,	the	importance	of	
contacts	between	the	KSČ	and	the	Communist	party	of	the	Soviet	Union	(CPSU)	had	over	
time	gained	much	more	significance	 than,	 for	example,	CS	activities	at	UNESCO,	which	
fell	 technically	 into	 the	highest	 category.	The	 actual	 importance	of	 the	different	 levels	
and	forms	of	contact	could	be	estimated	by	the	respective	influence	on	political	decision‐
making	in	the	CSSR.	For	example,	while	consultations	between	trade	union	leaders	from	
the	CSSR	and	 the	USSR	would	regularly	result	 in	government	 legislation	and	decision‐
making	 after	 being	 approved	by	 the	Central	 Committee	 of	 the	KSČ,	 declarations	 of	 CS	
representatives	 in	UNESCO	would	often	have	only	declaratory	 importance	and	did	not	
affect	real	politics.		
Soon	after	the	war,	and	by	the	order	of	Minister	Masaryk,	the	CSSR	started	with	
the	reconstruction	of	its	network	of	diplomatic	offices.	While	the	CSR	in	1938	had	been	
running	 85	 proper	 and	 138	 honorary	 diplomatic	 offices,	 by	 1947	 it	 had	 64	 proper	
diplomatic	offices	and	43	honorary	consulates.195	Addis	Ababa	was	one	of	 the	planned	
                                                            
192 Eg. European Central Inland Transport Organisation (ECITO), Consultative Committee on International Radio 
(CCIR) etc. 
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offices	 in	 1947.	 No	 sudden	 decolonisation	 of	 Africa	 was	 expected	 and	 therefore	 no	
ambitious	 foreign	 political	 objectives	 were	 formulated	 for	 Czechoslovak	 engagement	
south	 of	 the	 Sahara.	 In	 striking	 similarity	 to	 the	 situation	 after	 the	 First	World	War,	
Africa	 was	 once	 again	 on	 the	 periphery	 of	 interest	 in	 this	 initial	 stage	 of	 building	
diplomacy	contacts.	This	was	owed	to	a	great	extent	to	the	fact	that	colonial	dominance	
over	Africa	was	 still	 intact	 and	 the	 continent	 lacked	 the	 anti‐colonial	momentum	 that	
was	already	driving	political	change	in	Asia.		
One	 can	 identify	 several	main	affairs	 in	 the	CS	 foreign	policy	of	 this	 time	 that	
indicated	 the	CSSR’s	 firm	course	of	approach	 to	 the	Soviet	Union.	The	most	 important	
was	the	affair	over	participation	in	the	European	Recovery	Program,	notoriously	known	
as	 the	Marshall	Plan.	 The	CS	 government	was	 officially	 invited	 to	 join	 the	ERP	 in	 July	
1947,	 and	 it	 welcomed	 this	 development.	 Stalin’s	 harsh	 reaction	 was	 immediate	 and	
Gottwald’s	 government	 was	 quickly	 forced	 to	 withdraw	 from	 talks	 and	 from	
participating	in	the	Marshall	Plan	in	the	CSSR.	Western	diplomats	perceived	this	act	as	a	
final	CS	step	into	the	Soviet	Union	sphere	of	influence.	
	
The	 Communist’s	 Victorious	 February	 of	 1948	 marked	 the	 beginning	 of	 four	
decades	of	complete	KSČ	dominance	of	all	aspects	of	 the	Czechoslovak	state,	economy	
and	society.	The	huge	Soviet‐inspired	structural	changes	of	 the	Czechoslovak	economy	
included	land	reform,	collectivisation	in	agriculture,	 further	 industrialisation,	complete	
nationalisation	 of	 all	 sectors	 of	 economy,	 and	 monetary	 reform.	 They	 were	 all	
implemented	 in	 the	 new	 conditions	 of	 central	 planning	 of	 state	 and	 had	 an	 immense	
effect	on	Czechoslovak	society.	 In	 the	 foreign	policy	sphere	bilateral	relations	with	the	
Soviets	 grew	 to	 paramount	 importance	 while	 relations	 with	 western	 countries	 were	
limited	to	the	most	basic	necessary	contacts.	Czechoslovakia	became	an	active	member	
of	the	Soviet	bloc	international	organisations	serving	as	a	platform	for	cooperation	with	
other	 socialist	 countries.	 For	 economic	 cooperation	 the	 CSR	 joined	 Comecon,	 for	 the	
purposes	 of	 shared	 security	 it	 signed	 a	Warsaw	pact	 treaty	 and	 for	 official	 talks	with	
communist	parties	in	power	it	participated	in	the	Informbyro.	The	general	consensus	at	
the	 Informbyro	 in	 1948	 was	 that	 ‘imperialists’	 were	 getting	 ready	 for	 war	 and	 the	
outburst	of	conflict	was	expected	no	later	than	1953.196	The	western	border	of	the	CSSR	
                                                            
196 Průcha, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny, 269. 
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was	 thus	 seen	 as	 likely	 to	 become	 the	 battlefront,	 and	 the	whole	 of	 the	 country	was	
crucial	as	a	strategic	base	for	Eastern	bloc	countries.		
The	 Informbyro	 of	 Communist	 and	 Workers’	 Parties,	 founded	 in	 September	
1947,	 immediately	became	a	new	platform	 for	 effective	 Soviet	 control	 over	 the	 ruling	
communist	 or	 workers’	 parties	 in	 the	 region.	 Suggestions	 and	 declarations	 from	 the	
Soviet	 representative	 Zdanov	were	 binding	 for	 the	 representatives	 of	 other	 countries.	
Therefore	 once	 Zdanov	 declared	 that	 the	 world	 was	 divided	 into	 an	 ‘imperialist	 and	
antidemocratic	 camp	 led	 by	 the	 USA,	 and	 a	 camp	 of	 democracy	 and	 peace	 led	 by	 the	
USSR’	 this	 perception	 of	 global	 political	 affairs	 had	 to	 be	 adopted	 by	 all	 the	member	
countries.	 Participation	 of	 important	 CS	 representatives	 at	 Informbyro	 was	 in	 itself	 a	
clear	 indication	 which	 camp	 the	 CSSR	 itself	 felt	 to	 be	 part	 of.	 From	 then	 on	 strong	
political	 links	 with	 Eastern	 bloc	 countries	 were	 further	 enhanced	 in	 the	 economic	
sphere	through	a	number	of	new	trade	agreements	with	Bulgaria,	Poland,	Soviet	Union	
and	Yugoslavia.	
	
	
2.3.3. The	 chain	 of	 command	 in	 socialist	 Czechoslovakia’s	 official	 foreign	
political	relations		
Political	 and	 diplomatic	 relations	 of	 socialist	 Czechoslovakia	 are	 described	
below.	 External	 political	 relations	 were	 being	 implemented	 on	 four	 main	 levels.	 The	
order	given	here	is	not	intended	in	any	way	to	reflect	the	significance	of	the	respective	
level	of	relations.	
	
1. Official	 state	 relations	 in	 the	 field	 of	 various	 international	 organisations	 –	
United	 Nations	 (UNESCO,	 UNICEF	 etc.),	 COMECON,	 Organisation	 of	 African	
Unity,	 Non‐aligned	 movement,	 etc.	 Participating	 CS	 personnel	 were	 most	
often	recruited	 from	the	ministries,	 the	Communist	Party,	or	else	 they	were	
experts	employed	by	various	Foreign	Trade	Enterprises	(FTEs).				
2. Inter‐state	relations	at	the	level	of	presidents,	governments,	single	ministries,	
national	legislative	bodies,	armed	forces,	intelligence	services,	police,	etc.	The	
most	 highly	 visible	 but	 not	 necessarily	 the	most	 crucial	 sphere	 and	 level	 of	
external	relations.	
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3. International	relations	at	the	 level	of	political	parties	–	this	was	the	decisive	
and	most	significant	level	and	sphere	of	external	political	relations	during	the	
Cold	War.	The	KSČ	had	tight	control	of	all	CS	participators,	and	a	similar	hold	
was	often	in	force	concerning	autocratic	African	regimes.	
4. Diplomatic	 relations.	 Embassies,	 consulates	 –	 officially	 standard	 diplomatic	
duties.	 In	 practice,	 the	majority	 of	 diplomatic	 staff	 were	 recruited	 by	 State	
Security.	 In	 Africa	 some	 of	 the	 consulates	 (Leopoldville,	 Pretoria)	 were	 of	
huge	significance	for	socialist	penetration	into	Africa.	
	
At	all	four	levels	cited	above,	the	Communist	Party	(KSČ)	was	the	mastermind,	if	
not	 always	 the	 performer,	 of	 external	 relations.	 The	 KSČ	 was	 the	 only	 institution	
possessing	 absolute	 power	 in	 the	CS	political	 system.	To	understand	 the	 strategy	 and	
practice	 of	 CS	 external	 political	 relations,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 be	 familiar	with	 the	 internal	
structure	of	the	KSČ	`chain	of	command’.		
The	 central	 governing	body	 of	 the	KSČ	was	 the	Central	Committee	of	 the	KSČ,	
consisting	 of	 150	 members	 and	 50	 “candidates”	 (members	 in	 reserve).	 These	 were	
elected	in	the	national	congress	of	the	KSČ,	which	took	place	irregularly	every	couple	of	
years.	The	Central	Committee	of	the	KSČ	was	organised	both	horizontally	and	vertically.	
The	head	of	the	Central	Committee	was	the	First	(or	General)	Secretary,	leading	both	the	
Presidency	 (the	highest‐level	 cabinet	 of	 the	party)	 and	 the	Secretariat	of	 the	KSČ.	 The	
First	Secretary	of	the	KSČ	was	the	most	powerful	person	in	the	country,	and	his	status	
was	eventually	institutionalised	via	the	automatic	assumption	of	the	post	of	President	of	
the	 Republic.	 One	 level	 below	 the	 First	 Secretary	 were	 the	 different	 specialised	
departments	(e.g.	International	Relations	Office)	of	the	Central	Committee.		
Meetings	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 took	 place	 three	 or	 four	 times	 every	 year,	
where	 issues	 related	 to	organisation,	activities	and	cadres	of	KSČ	were	addressed	and	
the	 candidates	 for	 the	 party’s	 Secretariat	 and	Presidency	 were	 elected.	 The	 governing	
body	of	 the	Central	Committee	was	 the	Presidency	 (also	known	as	 the	Politbyro)	of	 the	
Central	 Committee	 of	 the	 KSČ.	 The	 Presidency	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 usually	 had	
around	 12	 members	 who	 were	 delegated	 by	 the	 Central	 Committee,	 which	 also	
appointed	 secretaries	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	 KSC	 and	 the	 First	 (or	 General)	
Secretary	of	the	Presidency	of	the	KSČ.	The	second	highest	governing	body	of	the	Central	
Committee,	the	Secretariat,	had	up	to	13	members,	who	were	Secretaries	of	the	KSČ	and	
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several	other	high‐ranking	party	members.	The	internal	rules	of	delegation	and	election	
of	members	 for	 the	 leading	bodies	of	 the	KSČ	were	not	always	clearly	 formulated	and	
thus	 were	 easily	 manipulated.	 The	 nomination	 of	 candidates	 was	 often	 decided	 in	
Moscow	and	the	vote,	not	unusually	unanimous,	was	a	formality.		
The	 Presidency	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	 KSČ	 was	 the	 organ	 which	
governed	 the	 CSSR	 from	 1948	 through	 to	 1989	 and	 was	 where	 all	 vital	 political	
decisions	were	made.	Meetings	 of	 the	Presidency	 took	 place	 at	 least	 once	 a	week	 and	
commonly	 dealt	 with	 the	 material	 provided	 by	 the	 ministries,	 army,	 and	 national	
companies,	and	represented	the	agenda	typically	dealt	with	by	the	cabinet.	The	material	
presented	 to	 the	 Presidency	 was	 usually	 already	 analysed	 and	 approved	 by	 the	
appropriate	 Secretariat	 and	 by	 the	 other	 ministries	 that	 might	 have	 been	 concerned	
with	it.		‘Available	documents	do	not	enable	exact	interpretation	of	the	Presidency	[…].	It	is	
not	quite	clear	how	 individual	decisions	were	adopted	[…]	or	whether	the	concrete	 issues	
were	subject	to	being	voted	for	or	whether	they	were	approved	unanimously.’197	The	First	
Secretary	had	a	decisive	influence	on	the	actions	of	the	Presidency	for	two	reasons.	Not	
only	 did	 he	 decide	 what	 the	 Presidency	 would	 be	 dealing	 with,	 but	 he	 also	 had	 full	
control	over	Presidency	declarations	and	decisions.	Even	though	the	First	Secretary	was	
nominally	elected	by	the	KSČ	Congress,	his	real	power	stemmed	from	the	approval	of	the	
Soviets.	 The	 Soviets	 unofficially	 chose	 and	 approved	 every	 man	 who	 acquired	 this	
highest	 rank	 in	 the	KSČ,	and	 they	naturally	always	picked	 the	candidate	who	could	be	
easily	 controlled	 by	 them	 and	 who	 could	 be	 relied	 upon	 to	 stay	 in	 line	 with	 Soviet	
politics.	 Once	 a	 First	 Secretary	 lost	 Soviet	 backing	 it	 did	 not	 take	 long	 before	 he	was	
replaced,	as	was	the	case	of	both	Antonín	Novotný	and	Alexander	Dubček.		
All	 crucial	 decisions	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 external	 relations	were	 reserved	 for	 the	
Presidency	 and,	 thus,	 for	 the	personal	approval	of	 the	First	Secretary	of	 the	KSČ.	Here,	
individual	 decisions	 as	 well	 as	 long‐term	 strategies	 formed	 by	 the	 Ministries	 were	
amended,	 approved	 and	 sent	 back	 for	 implementation.	 Compatibility	 with	 Soviet	
activities	had	to	be	checked	at	the	highest	places.	The	Presidency	also	held	the	power	to	
appoint	 high	 diplomatic	 officials	 –	 ambassadors	 and	 chargés	 d’affaires	 –	 to	 the	 CS	
network	 of	 diplomatic	 offices	 abroad.198	With	 these	wide‐ranging	 powers	 and	 regular	
                                                            
197 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 22‐23.  
198 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 23. 
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implementation	of	approved	strategies	the	Presidency	kept	tight	control	over	CS	foreign	
policy.		
There	is	no	doubt	that	a	certain	level	of	autonomy	in	the	execution	of	approved	
strategies	 still	 existed	 and	 that	 practical	 implementation	 by	 ministry	 employees,	
diplomats,	 foreign	trade	representatives,	technicians	and	other	participating	personnel	
often	 differed	 significantly	 from	 the	 official	 line.	 This	 was	 caused	 by	 concurrent	
developments	in	the	sphere	of	external	relations,	the	pace	of	which	at	times	was	too	fast	
to	 be	 reacted	 upon	 at	 the	 highest	 level.	 Another	 reason	was	 that	 often	 Presidency	 or	
ministry	 directives	 were	 too	 ideologically	 dogmatic,	 lacking	 an	 expert	 overview,	 thus	
rendering	them	unrealistic	and	impractical.	One	can	only	speculate	as	to	what	extent	the	
members	 of	 the	 Presidency	 were	 aware	 of	 this	 disparity	 between	 officially	 approved	
policies	and	those	that	were	actually	carried	out.	It	would	not	be	surprising	if	a	certain	
level	 of	 manipulation	 of	 the	 directives	 was	more	 or	 less	 taken	 as	 read	 and,	 perhaps,	
welcomed,	even	by	actual	members	of	the	Presidency.	
Less	 important	 aspects	 of	 external	 politics	 fell	 within	 the	 structures	 of	 the	
Central	Committee	 in	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	 Secretariat	 and	 at	 the	Department	 of	External	
Relations.	The	Secretariat	was	in	charge	of	more	practical	issues	than	the	responsibilities	
of	 the	 Presidency.199	 ‘The	 Secretariat	 occupied	 itself	 mainly	 with	 personnel	 issues:	
amongst	 other	 things,	 it	 appointed	 low	 rank	 diplomats.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Secretariat	
intervened	 in	 foreign	 politics	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 granting	 travel	 permits	 to	 journalists,	
scientists	and	persons	involved	in	cultural	affairs,	and	it	also	periodically	received	reports	
from	 various	 organisations	 involved	 in	 international	 relations.’200	 The	 Secretariat	 of	
External	Relations	was,	meanwhile,	responsible	mostly	for	the	external	relations	of	the	
KSČ	itself.	It	usually	dealt	with	the	KSČ’s	foreign	visitors	and	foreign	trips	organised	for	
members	of	the	General	Committee	of	the	KSČ.	Besides	that,	they	had	an	influence	on	the	
cadre	structure	and	activities	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,		managed	relations	with	
international	 organisations	 located	 in	 the	 CSSR	 and,	 eventually,	 went	 on	 to	 supervise	
international	student	programmes	in	the	CSSR.201						
	
Universal	state	control	imposed	on	all	production	after	1948	meant	that	also	the	
authorities	 responsible	 for	 foreign	 trade	 had	 to	 be	 completely	 reorganised.	 Officially,	
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200 Zídek, Československo a francouzská Afrika, 23.  
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‘foreign	 trade	 was	 declared	 a	 state	monopoly	 having	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Trade	 as	 its	
supreme	body.	In	a	wider	context	the	arrangement	signified	state	monopoly	over	external	
economic	 relations.’202	 The	 bodies	 directly	 responsible	 for	 executing	 the	 foreign	 trade	
transactions	were	 initially	 licensed	 enterprises	 for	 foreign	 trade,	 organised	 like	 a	 joint	
stock	company,	and	later	transformed	into	foreign	trade	enterprises	which	were	active	in	
specialised	 fields	 of	 production.203	 The	 state’s	 philosophy	 on	 its	 monopoly	 in	 foreign	
trade	 stressed	 several	 advantages	 this	 organisation	 provided:	 ‘ensuring	 economic	
independence	 from	capitalist	states,	protecting	the	domestic	market	 from	 fluctuations	on	
world	markets,	 facilitating	 cooperation	with	 socialist	 countries,	 incorporating	 centrally	
regulated	trade	into	the	system	of	national	economy	planning	and	uniting	management	of	
export	and	 import	 in	unison	with	 trade	policy	and	 internal	public‐wide	 interests.’204	The	
character	of	the	CS	economy	predetermined	the	commodities	exported.	Consumer	goods	
production	made	up	a	significant	proportion	of	total	exports.	The	most	popular	exports	
in	 this	 sphere	were	 textiles,	 leather	products	and	glassware.	Production	and	export	of	
machines,	 transport	vehicles	and	 industrial	machinery	were	 favoured	by	 the	state	and	
heavily	 subsidised.	 This	 included	 complete	 investment	 units,	 power	 plants,	 electric	
motors,	vehicles	of	all	kinds	and	weapons.205		
	
	
2.3.4. The	position	of	StB	in	Czechoslovak	government	structure		
After	the	coup	of	1948	the	KSČ	party	structure	existed	in	parallel	to	traditional	
state	legislative	and	executive	bodies	in	the	CSSR.	The	national	government,	members	of	
which	were	 nominated	 by	 the	 KSČ‘s	 Presidency,	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 execution	 of	
directives	issued	by	the	Presidency	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	KSČ.	Cabinet	ministers	
were	bound	to	follow	the	directives	and	strategies	approved	by	the	Presidency	of	the	KSČ	
and	they	were	officially	supervised	by	different	party	organs,	but	still	enjoyed	a	certain	
level	of	autonomy	in	the	execution	of	approved	policies.	The	ministries	most	relevant	for	
this	thesis	are	mainly	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Trade,	the	
Ministry	of	National	Defence	and	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior.			
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The	 organisational	 structure	 of	 the	 government	 changed	 several	 times	 as	
different	ministries	were	created	or	dissolved.	The	change	in	the	system	of	government	
most	 significant	 for	 this	 research	 took	 place	 in	 1956	 when	 the	 1st	Directorate	 of	 the	
National	Security	Corps	 –	or,	as	 it	was	generally	known,	StB	(Státní	bezpečnost	–	State	
Security	Services)	–	became	an	 independent	 institution	within	 the	government.	Before	
this	date	the	StB	had	previously	been	subject	to	the	Interior	Ministry	and	with	the	new	
arrangement,	 its	 powers	 and	 independence	 increased	 considerably.	 In	 relation	 to	 all	
three	 East	 African	 case	 studies	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 StB	 represented	 a	 huge	 and	
important	part	of	CS	external	relations	with	these	countries.	
StB	 activities	 have	 only	 recently	 begun	 to	 be	 thoroughly	 studied	 as	 older	
collections	 of	 governmental	 archives	 are	 being	 progressively	 made	 accessible.	 Much	
specific	information	still	remains	unclear	about	the	internal	structure	of	the	service,	as	
well	as	 its	modus	operandi.	 206	Available	documents,	however,	allow	one	to	reconstruct	
East	African	activities	of	the	StB	in	the	1960s	to	an	extent	sufficient	for	the	purposes	of	
this	research.		
CSSR	 intelligence	 services,	 though	 commonly	 known	 as	 the	 StB,	 consisted	 of	
several	 fairly	 independent	 agencies	 with	 various	 responsibilities	 not	 differing	 greatly	
much	 from	 the	 Western	 counterparts.	 Their	 main	 fields	 of	 activities	 were	 domestic	
espionage,	domestic	counter‐espionage	and	foreign	espionage.	In	relation	to	East	Africa,	
StB	responsibilities	involved	technical	cooperation	in	Czechoslovakia	as	well	as	in	Africa,	
the	execution	of	Active	Measures	that	mostly	took	place	in	Africa,	the	gathering	of	case‐
relevant	 intelligence	 in	 Czechoslovakia	 as	 well	 as	 in	 Africa,	 surveillance	 of	 enemy	
persons,	 surveillance	 and,	 where	 appropriate,	 also	 recruitment	 of	 potential	
collaborators.		
Those	StB	activities	concerning	East	Africa	 taking	place	within	Czechoslovakia	
included	mainly	analytical	work,	management	and	execution	of	technical	assistance	and	
working	 with	 foreign	 nationals	 from	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanzania.	When	 it	 comes	 to	
foreign	nationals	located	in	the	CSSR,	StB	activities	were	mostly	of	a	dual	nature;	these	
persons	 were	 watched	 to	 ensure	 their	 activities	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 risk	 to	 national	
security	and/or	they	were	being	assessed	for	use	by	the	StB	itself.	StB	agents	maintained	
daily	surveillance	and	detailed	analyses	of	persons	thought	potentially	relevant	for	the	
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operational	 objectives	 of	 the	 StB	 or	 for	 intelligence	 purposes.	 Such	 persons	 were	
commonly	referred	to	as	types.		
There	 were	 several	 stages	 of	 operational	 procedures	 in	 the	 development	 of	
working	contact	with	types.	Initially,	StB	operatives	would	try	to	estimate	their	general	
potential	 for	 StB	 purposes,	 and	 in	 later	 stages	 they	were	 evaluated	 for	 use	 in	 specific	
actions.	If	considered	relevant	in	any	respect,	the	type	was	discreetly	approached	by	an	
StB	 operative	 or	 agent,	 who	 further	 analysed	 the	 type’s	 inclination	 for	 willing	
cooperation	 or,	 at	 least,	 for	 unwittingly	 providing	 the	 StB	 with	 	 various	 items	 of	
intelligence	 –	 such	 a	procedure	would	have	been	known	as	mining.	 In	 the	majority	 of	
cases,	people	became	the	source	of	intelligence	for	the	StB	without	ever	being	aware	of	
it.	 In	 those	 cases	 where	 a	 type	 was	 considered	 suitable	 and	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	
cooperation,	 the	 StB	 operative	 would	 offer	 the	 person	 some	 kind	 of	 working	
arrangement	 to	 fulfil	 the	 objectives.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 mutual	 consent,	 specifics	 of	
cooperation	were	agreed	upon,	such	as	reward,	communication	routine,	objectives,	etc.,	
and	 the	 type	would	 at	 this	 point	 become	 known	 as	 a	 contact	while	 the	 particular	 StB	
agent	that	approached	him	would	become	its	managing	organ.		
Cooperation	between	the	contact	and	the	managing	organ	could	be	established	
at	 varying	 levels	 of	 commitment.	 The	 StB	 in	 general	 recognised	 several	 categories	 of	
cooperating	contacts	–	a	confidant,	an	associate,	an	agent.	All	would	be	used	for	routine	
intelligence	 work,	 the	 objectives	 and	 particular	 arrangements	 of	 which	 differed	 from	
case	 to	 case.	 Usually,	 regular	 meetings,	 briefings,	 instruction	 sessions	 or	 simply	
information	exchange	were	arranged	between	the	managing	organ	and	the	contact.	Such	
cooperation	remained	in	place	as	 long	as	was	considered	beneficial	by	StB	analysts,	as	
long	as	the	contact	was	willing	to	cooperate,	and	as	long	as	conditions	made	it	feasible.	
Only	a	small	proportion	of	all	types	under	consideration	were	ever	successfully	brought	
to	the	contact	stage.	In	most	cases,	types	proved	to	be	either	of	no	interest	for	the	StB	or	
there	 was	 no	 potential	 for	 willing	 consent	 to	 cooperation.	 Among	 successfully	
established	contacts,	once	again	only	a	fragment	proved	to	be	of	high	importance	to	the	
StB.	Most	contacts	were	dismissed	after	several	years	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	most	often	
for	low	usefulness	of	provided	intelligence.		
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2.4. Czechoslovak‐African	relations	after	1945	and	the	creation	of	the	
Africa	policy	
	
2.4.1. Foreign	policy	towards	Africa	resurrected		
The	 lack	 of	 promising	 economic	 opportunities	 and	 complicated	 access	 via	 the	
colonial	centres	meant	that	the	African	continent	was	de	facto	proclaimed	by	the	post‐
war	CS	 government	 to	 be	 of	 little	 interest	 to	 them	and	 it	was	 largely	 ignored	 in	 their	
plans.	Due	to	constant	budget	constraints	that	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	had	to	deal	
with,	openings	of	new	embassies	 in	Africa	were	not	 included	 in	 immediate	short‐term	
planning.	The	only	exception	was	the	CS	embassy	in	Ethiopia,	which	had	been	planned	
since	 the	mid‐1930s,	 but	 the	 outbreak	 of	war	 had	 postponed	 it	 indefinitely.	 The	 only	
active	regular	office	 in	 independent	Africa	 that	CS	diplomacy	possessed	 in	1946	was	a	
general	 consulate	 in	 Cape	 Town	 in	 the	 South	 African	 Union.	 The	 number	 of	 CS	 ex‐
patriots	 living	 in	 the	 South	 African	 Union	 was	 significant	 and	 members	 of	 this	
community	 had	 intensive	 contact	 –	 cultural	 and	 economic	 –	 with	 their	 homeland.	
Besides	serving	the	ex‐pat	community,	the	consulate	was	mainly	concerned	with	trade.	
Numerous	South	African	companies	cooperated	with	CS	exporters	in	a	range	of	spheres,	
from	 glass	 production	 to	 machinery.207	 Two	 CS	 honorary	 consulates	 were	 up	 and	
running	 in	 Dakar	 and	 Nairobi,	 but	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 in	 1950	 closed	 all	
offices	 of	 this	 kind	 around	 the	 world.208	 Attempts	 to	 establish	 regular	 consulates	 in	
colonial	 lands,	 in	Southern	Rhodesia	 in	1956	and	Nigeria	 in	1958,209	were	 rejected	by	
local	colonial	authorities.210	
In	 the	 turbulent	 days	 of	 February	 1948,	 the	 consulate	 in	 Leopoldville	 in	 the	
Belgian	 Congo	 was	 established	 as	 one	 of	 the	 last	 foreign	 policy	 decisions	 of	 the	
democratic	regime	in	the	CSR.	Paradoxically,	it	was	this	very	office	that	proved	so	useful	
for	the	Soviet	bloc	during	the	Congolese	independence	struggle	against	the	Belgians.211	
No	 other	 Eastern	 bloc	 diplomatic	 office	was	 accredited	 in	 the	 Belgian	 Congo	 prior	 to	
independence,	and	 thus	 Jan	Virius’	 consulate	was	 the	only	channel	of	 contact	with	 the	
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Soviets	 and	 their	 allies	 for	 independence	 movements.212	 After	 Congo	 received	
independence,	the	CS	diplomatic	office	remained	active	as	a	prolonged	arm	of	the	USSR	
in	the	region	and	also	cooperated	with	Angolan	freedom	fighters	from	here.213	In	1961,	
for	example,	the	consul’s	office	helped	to	organise	the	special	material	delivery	for	3000	
soldiers,	which	was	approved	by	the	Politbyro,	but	delayed	due	to	logistical	problems.214	
	
	
2.4.2. The	formation	of	a	Czechoslovak	Africa	policy	and	its	implications	for	
various	forms	of	CS	involvement	in	African	affairs	
The	second	half	of	the	1950s	saw	the	beginning	of	a	new	era	in	formal	political	
Czechoslovak‐African	 relations.	 This	 period	 was	 marked	 by	 growing	 activism	 in	 CS	
foreign	policy,	especially	 in	the	relation	to	the	Third	World	countries215	–	or,	 then	also	
commonly	 called	economically	 less	developed	countries	 (hereafter	ELDCs)	–	 including	
Africa.	In	numerous	historical	documents	the	term	‘Bandung	atmosphere’	is	repeatedly	
used.	This	term	refers	to	the	Conference	of	African	and	Asian	nations	 that	took	place	in	
1955	 in	 Indonesia	 and	 at	which	 participating	 countries	 expressed	 their	 opposition	 to	
any	form	of	imperialism,	regardless	of	whether	it	came	from	West	or	East,	a	formulation	
that	 predestined	 the	 future	 creation	 of	 a	 non‐aligned	 countries	 movement.	 The	
conference	was	a	reaction	to	decolonisation	processes	already	taking	place	in	Asia,	the	
Middle	East	and	North	Africa	and	it	certainly	had	its	share	of	influence	on	the	spread	of	
decolonisation	south	of	the	Sahara	in	subsequent	years.		
In	 what	 was	 called	 the	 ‘post‐Bandung	 atmosphere’,	 official	 CS	 foreign	 policy	
activities,	conducted	mainly	by	the	MFA	and	the	KSČ	Foreign	Office	grew	exponentially	
as	 not	 only	 the	 number	 of	 potential	 partners	 for	 bilateral	 relations,	 but	 also	 that	 of	
international	 organisations	 multiplied.	 A	 turning	 point	 in	 Czechoslovak	 activities	
towards	 Africa	 can	 be	 seen	 during	 the	 years	 1955‐56,	 when	 more	 and	 more	 critical	
                                                            
212 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 3357, 1.9.1959, 2‐3, l. 4‐5. The CS consul was in contact with the ABAKO NLM as well 
as the MNC of Patrice Lumumba. Representatives of ABAKO approached the consul with requests for training 
of officers and future technical assistance. The consul recommended the MFA provide such assistance 
disguised as courses for Guinean soldiers. 
213 MZV F. IV/6, 10, č.j. 026.620/64‐10, 27.6.1964, 18. 
214 VUA MNO 1961, č.j. 30/2, 28.7.1961, 3.   
215 In the historical material of Czechoslovak origin, African, Arab and Asian countries before but mainly after 
independence are referred to variously depending on their geographical locations, political allegiance and/or 
economic performance. Amongst the commonest terms were: Third World countries, colonial and dependant 
lands, economically less‐developed countries, unaligned countries, eastern countries etc. 
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voices	from	the	highest‐ranking	CS	officials	and	members	of	the	Politbyro	regarding	the	
lack	 of	 activism	 and	 poor	 performance	 in	 past	 years,	 especially	 before	 1955,	 were	
directed	 towards	 the	 Third	 World	 countries.	 Previous	 passivity	 and	 merely	 sporadic	
action	was	to	be	changed	to	full‐scale	commitment	in	all	forms	of	possible	cooperation	
fully	in	line	with	Soviet	Third	World	engagement	under	Khrushchev.	
The	rapidly	changing	international	situation	with	new	states	and	organisations	
emerging	 seemingly	 uncontrollably	 demanded	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 framework	 for	 the	
practice	of	 foreign	policy	 in	 these	new	circumstances.	 In	 the	sphere	of	official	political	
relations	between	the	CSSR	and	an	Africa	seeking	liberation	the	first	formalised	foreign	
policy	concept	 for	Africa	became	created	as	 just	such	a	 framework.216	However,	 it	was	
not	until	1961	that	 this	concept	was	officially	completed	by	 the	MFA.	Until	 then,	ever‐
intensifying	relations	with	Africa	were	being	executed	mostly	on	an	ad	hoc	basis	in	line	
with	 the	orders	 from	 the	Politbyro.	The	 first	document,	 a	practical	predecessor	of	 the	
concept	 dealing	with	Africa	 as	 a	 single	 subject	within	CS	 foreign	policy,	 dates	 back	 to	
September	1959	and	bears	the	title	‘Further	development	of	relations	with	African	states’.	
In	unprecedented	detail	and	specificity,	 the	Politbyro	delegated	various	offices	of	state	
apparatus	with	three	following	sets	of	instructions:	
A. Further	development	of	political	relations	with	African	countries.	
B. Establishing	and	further	development	of	economic	relations.	
C. Initiation	and	development	of	cultural	cooperation.		
	
In	 sphere	 ‘A',	 political	 and	 diplomatic	 relations,	 two	 streams	 of	 suggested	
operations	included	the	following	practical	actions:	
I. Initiation	 of	 diplomatic	 relations	 and	 establishing	 Czechoslovak	
diplomatic	offices	in	African	countries		
 immediate	 setting	 up	 of	 embassies	 in	 Morocco,	 Tunisia,	 and	
Ghana;	
 continuing	negotiating	and	setting	up	of	an	embassy	in	Libya;		
 reconsideration	of	the	diplomatic	office	in	Liberia;		
 preparation	 for	 offices	 in	Nigeria,	 Somalia,	 Cameroon,	 Togo,	 and	
the	Central	African	Federation;		
                                                            
216 MZV F. IV/4, č.j. 026.261/61‐10, 19.6.1961. 
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 reconsideration	 of	 consulates	 in	 French	 autonomous	 republics	
such	as	Mali.	
	
II. Activation	of	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	towards	African	countries		
 Use	 all	 opportunities	 for	 visits	 of	 high‐ranking	 CS	 officials	 in	
countries	of	Africa	
 Use	 every	 appropriate	 opportunity	 to	 invite	 leading	 officials	 of	
African	countries	to	the	CSSR	for	both	official	and	unofficial	visits	
(e.g.	Sékou	Touré,	Kwame	N’krumah,	Mohamed	V.,	Habib	Burgiba,	
Tom	Mboya	etc.)	
 Besides	 bilateral	 issues,	 use	 visits	 to	 discuss	 European	 and	
international	 affairs	 (eg.	 Ban	 on	 nuclear	 tests)	 and	 attempt	 to	
formulate	joint	political	declarations	
 Attempt	 to	 formalise	 the	 bilateral	 relations	 by	 two‐sided	
agreements,	 including	 an	 agreement	 on	 friendship	 and	
cooperation.	 (Ethiopia	 and	 Guinea	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 1960;	
Morocco,	Tunisia,	Sudan	and	others	later.)	
 At	 all	 opportunities,	 refer	 to	 the	 Czechoslovak	 Resolution	 on	
peaceful	 co‐existence	 approved	 by	 the	 XIII	 UN	General	 Assembly	
(supported	 by	 Ghana,	 Liberia,	 Ethiopia,	 South	Africa	 and	 Sudan)	
and	 emphasise	 CS	 support	 of	 Bandung	 principles,	 as	well	 as	 the	
1958	Accra	conference	resolution		
 Use	 the	 arena	 of	 international	 organisations	 to	 deepen	 relations	
with	African	delegations	and	seek	support	for	CS	suggestions	
 For	the	same	purposes,	especially	in	the	UN	Economic	Commission	
for	Africa,	send	an	observer	and	attempt	to	become	a	member	of	
the	commission’s	secretariat	
 Closely	 follow	 all	 pan‐African	 conferences,	 attend	 them,	 ensure	
media	coverage	for	these	conferences	
 Fully	 encourage	 and	 support	 relations	 of	 civil	 society	
organisations	 (unions,	 youth	 and	 student	 movements,	 women’s	
organisations,	Red	Cross,	etc.)	with	their	African	counterparts	
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 Seek	 new	 forms	 of	 cooperation	 to	 benefit	 both	 sides	 and	 thus	
contribute	 to	 the	 national	 liberation	 struggle	 against	
imperialism.217	
	
Zídek	 refers	 to	 Africa	 Policy	 as	 a	 single	 document.218	 However,	 in	 reality	 it	
represented	 the	 set	 of	 papers	 put	 together	 by	 different	ministries	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	
dealing	 with	 different	 spheres	 of	 Czechoslovak	 relations	 with	 Africa	 ranging	 from	
foreign	policy	through	trade,	economic	support,	all	the	way	to	educational	and	cultural	
relations.	 The	 core	 document	 of	 this	 set	was	 compiled	 by	 the	MFA	 in	 the	 summer	 of	
1961	and	was	entitled	‘Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	towards	African	countries’.	It	evolves	
in	many	ways	 from	 the	1959	document	 ‘Further	development	of	 relations	with	African	
states’	mentioned	above.	The	central	MFA	Africa	policy,	as	it	was	commonly	known,	was	
devised	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 by	 order	 of	 the	 Politbyro	 of	 the	 Central	
Committee	of	the	Communist	Party	in	Summer	1961.	In	some	detail	it	analyses	past	and	
existing	 relations	 between	 the	 CSSR	 and	 Africa,	 African	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	
development	 since	 the	 Second	World	War	 and	 drafts	 the	 set	 of	 objectives	 for	 future	
activity	 in	 four	main	spheres	–	politics,	 the	economy,	culture	and	propaganda,	and	the	
relations	 of	 civil	 society	 organisations.	 Among	 the	 core	 objectives	 and	 principles	 of	
execution	for	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	were	the	following	points.	
 Continue	 supporting	 countries	 of	 high	 interest	 (Ghana,	 Guinea,	 Mali,	
Nigeria)	in	all	spheres	that	will	strengthen	democratic	and	progressive	
orientation	 in	 these	 countries	 (assistance	 in	 industry,	 infrastructure	
development,	technical	assistance	etc.);	
 Fully	support	the	legal	government	of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	
in	its	attempts	to	preserve	the	independence	and	unity	of	its	country;	
 Attempt	 to	 develop	 political	 and	 economic	 relations	 with	 other	
independent	African	countries;		
 Unmask	imperialist	and	neo‐colonial	tendencies	of	Western	states	and	
support	an	anti‐imperial	stance	by	African	countries;	
 Continue	 in	 cooperation	 with	 African	 countries	 within	 international	
organisations;	
                                                            
217 NAA F. 1261/0/11 č.j. 3576/14, 25.9.1999, 1‐11, l. 1‐12. 
218 Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 14. 
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 Improve	coordination	with	other	socialist	states;	
 Provide	all	possible	economic	assistance	to	specific	African	countries;	
 Contribute	to	attempts	in	African	countries	to	improve	industrialisation	
and	agricultural	production	differentiation;	
 Develop	 foreign	 trade	exchange	with	African	countries	on	 the	basis	of	
mutually	beneficial	relations;	
 Continue	providing	experts	and	other	forms	of	technical	assistance;	
 Continue	providing	and	further	increase	educational	assistance	;	
 Improve	the	effectivity	of	CS	propaganda	across	Africa;			
 Seek	relations	with	trade	unions,	youth	and	student	organisations	and	
with	cooperatives.219			
	
The	core	document	was	put	together	by	the	Africa	department	of	the	Ministry	of	
Foreign	 Affairs,	 which	 had	 the	 benefit	 of	 previous,	 but	 in	 no	 way	 incredibly	 rich,	
encounters	with	Africa	since	 the	war,	and	of	 some	analytical	material	provided	by	 the	
Soviets.	 After	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 corrections	 by	 all	 the	 CS	 government	 offices	
involved,	 the	 paper	 was	 eventually	 approved	 by	 the	 KSČ	 Politbyro.	 The	 purpose	 of	
creating	the	Africa	policy	was	to	react	effectively	to	turbulent	and	often	unclear	political	
developments	across	Africa.		
From	today’s	perspective,	a	number	of	 limitations,	 inaccuracies	and	unfulfilled	
objectives	 of	 the	 presented	 Policy	 can	 be	 pointed	 out	 straight	 away,	 but	 one	 has	 to	
remember	 that	 the	 processes	 that	were	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 1960s	were	 impossible	 to	
predict,	 very	 difficult	 to	 follow	 and	 even	 harder	 to	 analyse	 correctly	 with	 the	 scant	
information	available.	The	political	landscape	of	the	collapsing	colonial	period	in	Africa	
was	 as	 fluid,	 complex	 and	 unpredictable	 as	 a	 set	 of	 historical	 events	 can	 possibly	 be.	
Policymakers,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 CSSR,	 were	 also	 facing	 a	 number	 of	 objective	
methodological	problems.	Political	developments	were	rapid,	but	information	travelled	
much	slower	than	today,	causing	reaction	to	be	much	less	effective	and	more	prone	to	
error.	Also,	MFA	analysts	had	very	little	expert	knowledge	of	most	African	countries	and	
even	the	little	they	knew	was	quickly	becoming	useless	as	Africa	went	through	such	far‐
reaching	 change.	 Nevertheless,	 despite	 all	 possible	 limitations	 that	 the	 Africa	 policy	
might	 have	 had,	 it	 proved	 useful	 enough	 as	 a	complex	 theoretical	 guideline	 for	
                                                            
219 MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 026.261/61‐10, 19.6.1961., 25‐36. 
105 
 
implementing	purposeful	relations	with	African	countries,	with	clearly	stated	objectives.	
For	 research	 purposes	 the	 1961	 Africa	 policy	 works	 as	 an	 official	 ideological	 and	
theoretical	framework,	an	entry	point	and	a	guideline	for	orientation	in	the	complex	web	
of	Czechoslovak‐African	relations.	
	
When	examining	Czechoslovak	relations	to	East	Africa,	 the	same,	 if	not	higher,	
importance	 regarding	 the	 core	 Africa	 policy	 must	 be	 accorded	 to	 yet	 another	 official	
document.	In	1961,	separately	from	the	core	MFA	Africa	policy,	another	document	was	
formulated	and	approved	by	the	Politbyro	–	The	Concept	of	Czechoslovak	 foreign	policy	
towards	colonial	lands	in	Africa.220	This	document	concentrates	mainly	on	two	forms	of	
activities	 that	 could	 prove	 decisive	 in	 a	 still	 on‐going	 African	 liberation	 movement.	
These	were	an	outspoken	diplomatic	support	of	the	UN	General	Assembly,	attacking	the	
very	 principles	 of	 the	 colonial	 system	 and	 focussing	 on	 providing	 direct	 assistance	 to	
various	 national‐liberating	movements	 in	 different	 countries,	mainly	 in	 British	 Africa.	
Other	 forms	of	 support	 and	potential	post‐independence	 cooperation	were	granted	 to	
these	regions	without	too	many	specifics.	The	crucial	points	for	future	cooperation,	later	
working	as	an	outline	for	all	subsequent	documents	on	this	topic,	were	the	following:	
 Closely	 follow	 the	 processes	 of	 political	 differentiation	 in	 these	
countries,	especially	in	respect	of		imperialist	activities		
 Seek	 trade	 relations	 and	 their	 further	 development	 even	 before	 the	
ultimate	success	of	the	national‐liberation	struggle	
 Seek	 relations	 with	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 especially	 unions	 and	
agricultural	cooperatives	
 Intensify	supporting	activities	in	international	organisations,	especially	
the	UN	
 Send	delegations	to	independence	declarations	
 Establish	diplomatic	contacts	
 After	 independence,	 provide	 assistance	 in	 the	 cultural	 and	 science	
sphere	with	special	attention	to	agriculture.221	
	
                                                            
220 MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 033.557/61‐10, 18.12.1961. 
221 MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 033.096/60, 10.12.1960, 7‐8. 
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Despite	 all	 their	 limitations,	 the	 MFA	 Africa	 policy	 and	 related	 documents	
represented	the	first	coherent	attempt	amongst	socialist	states	to	address	African	affairs	
and	 it	 met	 with	 approval	 when	 presented	 at	 the	 Soviet	 MID.222	 Soviet	 officials,	
specifically	 the	 head	 of	 MID’s	 Africa	 department,	 Schvedov,	 agreed	 with	 all	 the	
presented	 conclusions	 and	 recommendations	 and	 announced	 Soviet	 plans	 to	 put	
together	 a	 similar	 framework	 for	 their	 own	 activities	 in	 Africa.223	 These	 facts	 are	 the	
best	evidence	there	 is	of	 the	CSSR’s	 frontrunner	role	 in	relation	to	post‐colonial	Africa	
engagement	within	the	Soviet	bloc.				
	
A	 more	 organised	 and	 conceptualised	 approach	 towards	 Africa	 was	 not	 only	
visible	 on	 the	 national	 level,	 but	 became	 an	 important	 part	 of	 socialist	 state	 joint	
activities.	Bilateral	and	multilateral	meetings	of	mainly	European	socialist	countries	 in	
regards	to	deepening	their	engagement	with	Africa	became	quite	common	in	this	period.	
The	 April	 1964	 Prague	 conference	 can	 be	 mentioned	 as	 a	 typical	 example	 of	 such	
cooperation.	 The	 conference	 brought	 together	 the	 foreign	 policymakers	 from	
international	departments	of	governing	political	parties	from	the	USSR,	the	GDR,	Poland,	
Hungary,	Romania	and	Bulgaria.	The	main	result	of	the	week‐long	conference	was	a	joint	
declaration	 stating	 that	a	 significant	 improvement	had	 to	be	achieved	 in	 respect	of	 all	
forms	of	cooperation	between	socialist	countries	and	at	all	levels	of	relations	with	Africa.	
The	 most	 crucial	 concrete	 and	 practical	 recommendations	 from	 the	 conference	 that	
were	to	be	reflected	in	foreign	political	practice	of	socialist	states	are	listed	below:	
 Improve	and	deepen	contacts	with	communist	parties	and	also	national	
democratic	 parties	 of	 African	 states	 and	 with	 local	 civil‐society	
organisations	
 Improve	 cooperation	 of	 socialist	 states’	 representatives	 with	 their	
African	colleagues		within	international	organisations		
 Cooperate	in	delivering	support	to	African	press	offices	and	other	mass	
media	
 Systematically	 concentrate	 on	 qualitative	 improvement	 in	 trade	
relations	with	Africa	
 Boost	technical	assistance	in	education	
                                                            
222 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 010027/62‐SM, 6.1.1962.   
223 F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 010027/62‐SM, 6.1.1962, 2. 
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 Concentrate	on	generating	native	African	technical	cadres		
 Consider	 effectiveness	 of	 joint	 export	 of	 large	 industrial	 complexes	 to	
Africa	
 Improve	conditions	for	providing	loans		
 Closer	cooperation	when	sending	out	technical	specialists	
 Closer	 cooperation	 in	 publishing	 activities	 (propaganda	 material	 and	
science	publications)	
 Consider	 possible	 forms	 of	 a	 joint	 economic	 and	 political	 boycott	 of	
South	Africa.224	
	
	
The	United	Nations	General	Assembly	in	this	period	was	indeed	the	main	forum	
for	 the	 rival	 political	 ideologies	 of	 East	 and	West.	 Until	 the	 1950s	 CS	 diplomats	were	
very	 critical	 of	 the	 UN’s	 role	 and	 position	 in	 the	 bipolar	 world.	 They	 temporarily	
boycotted	the	UN	and	often	criticised	it	and	its	agencies	as	active	agents	of	imperialism,	
working	 in	 favour	 of	 colonial	 powers	 and	 undermining	 the	 position	 of	 former	
colonies.225	 Soon,	 however,	 CS	 officials	 realised	 the	 potential	 that	 General	 Assembly	
meetings,	as	well	as	other,	regional	and	sub‐regional	organisations,	had	to	offer	for	their	
ideological	 battle	 against	 colonialism.	 With	 the	 growing	 number	 of	 independent	 ex‐
colonies,	it	was	also	possible	to	acquire	increased	support	for	CSSR	activities	in	the	UN.	
The	legislative	quest	of	the	USSR	and	its	allies	against	colonialism	succeeded	in	1960	at	
the	15th	meeting	of	the	UN	General	Assembly,	which	resulted	in	the	‘Declaration	on	the	
Granting	of	Independence	to	Colonial	Countries	and	Peoples’226	despite	strong	opposition	
by	colonial	powers.	Several	subsequent	meetings	of	the	General	Assembly	dealt	with	the	
practical	 execution	 of	 this	 declaration	 and	 kept	 the	 issue	 high	 on	 the	 list	 of	 the	 UN’s	
priorities.227	
From	 the	 beginning	 MFA	 experts	 kept	 a	 close	 eye	 also	 on	 the	 pan‐African	
tendencies	of	several	African	leaders	which	eventually	resulted	in	a	unifying	process	on	
a	regional	scale,	such	as	the	African	and	Malagasy	Union	(so‐called	Brazzaville	group)	and	
                                                            
224 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j 3629, 9.6.1964, 9‐13. 
225 NAA F. 1261/0/43 č.j. 8348/8, 5.6.1961, 9. 
226 United Nations, “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” accessed 
on September 7, 2013. http://daccess‐dds‐y.un.org/doc/ RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/152/88/ 
IMG/NR015288.pdf?OpenElement  
227 PK 84, č.j. 026.403/63‐10, 27.6.1963, 5‐6. 
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the	 Casablanca	 group.	While	 the	 pro‐French	 activities	 of	 the	Brazzaville	 group	 states	
were	viewed	critically	as	a	neo‐colonial	construct,	the	activities	and	declarations	of	the	
Casablanca	group,	denouncing	colonialism	and	seeking	neutrality,	met	with	CS	approval.	
The	establishment	of	the	Organisation	of	African	Unity	was	perceived	by	CS	officials	to	be	
a	step	of	primary	importance	in	African	political	development	away	from	post‐colonial	
political	 dependency.	 The	 OAU	 became	 the	 main	 African	 political	 platform	 for	
multilateral	 diplomatic	 dialogue,	 and	 CS	 diplomats	 never	 missed	 an	 opportunity	 to	
propagate	 CS	 support	 for	 African	 independence	 and	 their	 dedication	 to	 the	 on‐going	
national‐liberation	struggle.		
	
	
2.4.3. Loans,	barter	and	 technical	assistance	 in	 tropical	Africa	–	presenting	
an	alternative	to	the	capitalist	way	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 core	MFA	Africa	policy,	 another	 document	 dealing	with	 the	
economic	sphere	of	external	relations	with	Africa	was	put	together	in	the	early	1960s.228	
This	document	was	 called	 ‘A	Concept	 for	Economic	Cooperation	with	Economically	Less	
Developed	 Countries’	 and	 was	 compiled	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Trade	 in	 1961.	
Besides	giving	a	short‐term	perspective,	it	tried	to	predict	the	development	of	economic	
ties	between	the	CSSR	and	Africa	until	the	1980s	–	an	impossible	task	indeed.229		
The	 authors	 of	 the	 document	 characterise	 the	 economies	 of	 ELDCs	 as	 of	 high	
global	 importance	 due	 to	 their	 large	 share	 of	 global	 agricultural	 production,	 but	
especially	due	 to	 the	abundance	of	natural	 resources.	As	 the	main	 limitations	of	 these	
economies,	 they	 correctly	 identify	 their	 common	mono‐commodity	 orientation,	 rather	
low	 levels	 of	 industrialisation,	 insufficient	 financial	 resources	 and	 dependency	 on	
foreign	 capital,	 know‐how	 and	 technical	 infrastructure.	 As	 the	 primary	 conditions	 for	
the	future	growth	of	local	economies,	the	authors	consider	an	increase	in	ELDC	exports	
and	 the	offer	of	 fair	monetary	 loans.	Unsurprisingly,	 it	was	 thought	 that	 the	only	way	
                                                            
228 From available archival documents it remains unclear whether all the partial policy guidelines put together 
by other ministries (eg. Conception of educational and cultural relations between the CSSR and African states, 
Conception of Economic Cooperation with Economically Less‐Developed Countries) that in some way regulated 
contacts with Africa represented a coherent part of the MFA’s Africa policy, whether they were loosely based 
on it, or whether they were completely independent from it. It seems likely that they represented a loosely 
connected set of documents for which MFA’s Africa policy was an entry point. 
229 NAA F. 1261/0/11, č.j. 00/1509/61, June 1961. 
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towards	 a	 brighter	 economic	 future	was	 the	 coming	 together	 of	 socialist	 countries.230	
‘The	monopoly	on	economic	relations	of	imperialist	states	with	ELDCs	was	disrupted	by	the	
rise	of	the	universal	socialist	system	of	states,	which,	due	to	the	development	of	economic	
relations	with	 these	 countries	 on	 the	basis	 of	 equality,	mutual	profitability	and	without	
interference	 in	 their	 internal	 affairs,	 actively	 influences	 the	 character	 of	 international	
economic	 relations	 between	 capitalist	 countries.’231	 By	 this	 rather	 vague	 and	 clumsy	
formal	 statement,	 economists	 from	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	Trade	 expressed	 the	most	
significant	truth	of	the	trade	exchange	between	the	socialist	camp	and	ELDCs	in	general,	
and	 that	 of	 the	 CSSR	 and	 Africa	 in	 particular.	 This	 truth	 can	 be	 simplified	 as	 follows:	
regardless	 of	 the	 actual	 scale	 of	 on‐going	 trade	 relations,	 the	 mere	 existence	 of	 an	
alternative	trade	partner	–	 in	this	case,	the	CSSR	–	has	a	significant	effect	on	the	much	
more	 substantial	 trade	 relations	 between	 African	 states	 and	 their	 capitalist	 partners,	
often	the	former	colonial	masters.	More	importantly,	this	fact	is	also	valid	for	most	of	the	
other	forms	of	relations	between	the	CSSR	and	Africa.	Czechoslovakia	in	the	late	1950s	
was	the	second	 largest	 trade	partner	of	African	countries,	representing	almost	19%	of	
the	total	trade	exchange	of	socialist	countries	with	Africa,	surpassing	even	China.232		
In	comparison	with	the	previous	period	of	relations,	economic	loans	became	an	
important	tool	 in	boosting	trade	relations	with	ELDCs.	Short‐term	and	long‐term	loans	
were	used	to	overcome	the	lack	of	financial	resources	on	the	side	of	the	ELDCs.	In	1962,	
the	 total	 amount	 of	 CS	 loans	 provided	 to	 African	 countries	 amounted	 to	 some	 531	
million	Kčs,	with	a	substantial	amount	of	389	million	being	provided	in	a	single	year	in	
1961.233	Such	a	rapid	increase	in	loans	was	not	an	entirely	altruistic	step,	as	most	of	the	
loans	 were	 tightly	 bound	 to	 CS	 export	 goods	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 large	 industrial	
complexes	as	a	part	of	technical	assistance.		
	
	
2.4.4. Special	assistance		
In	 1951	 the	 CS	Ministry	 of	 National	 Defence	 began	 to	 adopt	 a	 programme	 of	
massive	 expansion	 of	 the	 weapons	 industry	 followed	 by	 the	 complete	 reorganisation	
and	 reconstruction	 of	 its	 armed	 forces.	 While	 the	 main	 goals	 were	 to	 create	 an	
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infrastructure	 that	 could	 provide	 weaponry	 for	 its	 socialist	 partners,	 including	 the	
Soviet	 Union,	 and	 thus	 create	 another	 effective	 Soviet‐bloc	 armed	 force,	 the	welcome	
side	effect	was	the	release	of	older	weaponry	for	export.	The	MND	had	in	its	possession	
large	stocks	of	special	material	ranging	from	personal	weapons,	automatic	guns,	vehicles	
and	 tanks,	 all	 the	 way	 to	 aeroplanes.	 The	 first	 substantial	 part	 of	 these	 stores	 was	
provided	to	Nasser’s	Egypt.	It	was	done	directly,	or	through	the	Soviets,	just	before	the	
Suez	Crisis.	The	MND	later	described	this	operation	as	follows:	‘Thanks	to	success	in	the	
development	of	our	weapons‐producing	industry	it	was	possible	in	years	1955	and	1956	to	
provide	 significant	help	 to	Egypt	and	 several	other	economically	poorly‐developed	 states	
which	 had	 freed	 themselves	 from	 the	 colonial	 yoke.	 The	 political	 significance	 of	 these	
deliveries,	 in	 which	 Czechoslovakia	 participated	 alongside	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 was	
extraordinary.	Hence	 the	Suez	Crisis	and	 the	 failure	of	Anglo‐French	aggression.’234	 The	
newly‐acquired	 and	 strongly‐accentuated	 CS	 stance	 against	 the	 colonial	 yoke	 and	
western	aggression	was	to	become	the	motif	of	its	foreign	political	activities	for	years	to	
come.		
The	CS	delivery	of	arms	and	ammunition	to	Egypt	in	the	mid‐1950s	is	one	of	the	
first	examples	of	activity	that	was	to	become	one	the	main	forms	of	CS	involvement,	not	
only	 with	 Africa	 but	 with	 the	 Third	 World	 countries	 around	 the	 globe.	 In	 archival	
material,	this	activity	is	usually	referred	to	as	technical	assistance	or	special	assistance,	
depending	on	whether	it	is	executed	in	civil	or	military	form.	Special	assistance,	besides	
the	 weapons	 and	 other	 military	 material	 deliveries,	 commonly	 designated	 special	
material,	 also	 included	 capacity	building	assistance,	provision	of	 training	 to	personnel	
and,	 occasionally,	 secret	 direct	 involvement	 of	 CS	 personnel	 in	 military	 operations	
abroad.	Civil	 technical	assistance	was,	on	 the	other	hand,	practised	 in	spheres	with	no	
direct	military	connection,	even	though	the	profits	resulting	from	such	assistance	might	
have	 benefitted	 the	 military	 indirectly.	 That	 is	 why	 it	 is	 sometimes	 quite	 difficult	 to	
distinguish	between	the	two.	Such	distinction	was	 further	complicated	by	the	 fact	 that	
civil	 technical	 assistance	 was	 often	 officially	 used	 as	 cover	 for	 special	 activities	 of	
various	kinds.		
Cooperation	 with	 Egypt	 was	 a	 milestone	 in	 the	 activities	 and	 international	
importance	 of	 Czechoslovakia.	 Shortly	 after	 the	 special	 cooperation	 agreement	 was	
signed,	 the	 CS	 embassy	 in	 London	 was	 approached	 by	 the	 Sudanese	 government	
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representative	to	discuss	technical	assistance	between	the	two	countries.235	In	the	case	
of	Egypt,	the	CSSR	attempted	for	the	first	time	effectively	to	deliver	large‐scale	technical	
assistance	to	a	country	in	Africa.	It	successfully	established	itself	as	a	‘go	to’	partner	for	
governments	 of	 the	 Third	 World,	 recently	 independent	 countries	 seeking	 greater	
practical	 independence	 from	 their	 former	 colonial	masters.	 In	 the	 years	 following	 the	
Suez	 crisis,	 an	 undisputed	 Soviet	 Union	 foreign	 policy	 victory	 –	 a	 significant	 part	 of	
which	was	due	to	CS	weapons	–	rich	cooperation	with	countries	such	as	Syria,	Indonesia,	
Afghanistan,	 Cuba	 and	 others	 ensued.	 In	 Africa,	 countries	 that	 would	 benefit	 from	
cooperation	with	the	CSSR	included	Mali,	Guinea,	the	Sudan,	Ethiopia,	Somalia,	Uganda,	
Kenya,	Tanzania	and	others.		
The	MND’s	programme	of	technical	assistance	was	perhaps	the	best	organised	
and	most	effective	form	of	technical	assistance	amongst	all	CS	agencies.236	To	satisfy	all	
foreign	 requests,	 it	 managed	 to	 train	 almost	 1,800	 experts	 acting	 as	 tutors	 and	
commanders	 of	 foreign	 course	 participants.	 The	MND	 cooperated	 effectively	with	 the	
Soviet	 army	 in	 drafting	 the	 courses	 and	 in	 sharing	 experience.	 To	 maximise	 the	
effectiveness	of	its	foreign	courses	the	MND	managed,	between	1960	and	1962,	to	build	
three	air	force	training	centres	and	several	infantry	training	camps.	In	strict	secrecy,	 it	
also	 successfully	 established	 the	 Foreign	 faculty	 at	 the	 Military	 Academy	 of	 Antonín	
Zápotocký.237	 Altogether,	 between	 1955	 and	 1960,	 the	 MND	 sent	 some	 450	 experts	
abroad	and	provided	training	for	1,012	foreign	personnel.238	
In	 1965	 the	 MFT	 published	 a	 document	 evaluating	 recent	 developments	 in	
relation	with	ELDCs	in	the	sphere	of	trade	and	technical	assistance,	including	the	special	
sphere.	The	authors	of	the	document	assess	past	practices	of	technical	assistance	quite	
positively	 with	 minor	 suggested	 corrections	 for	 the	 future.	 In	 the	 subsequent	 years	
technical	 assistance	was	 still	 to	 be	 ‘provided	 especially	 in	 fields	 crucial	 for	 tackling	 the	
main	issues	of	developing	countries	and	in	such	places	from	where	not	only	the	direction	of	
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internal	 development	 could	 be	 affected	 in	 a	 positive	 and	 peaceful	 manner,	 but	 also	
relations	of	these	states	with	the	CSSR	and	other	socialist	states.’239	
Competition	 from	 capitalist	 states	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 providing	 technical	
assistance	was	 identified	 as	 a	 newly	 identified	major	 obstacle	 to	 reaching	 the	 highest	
economic,	but	especially	propaganda	effectiveness.	 	 ‘[W]e	need	to	attempt,	especially	 in	
the	 progressive	 countries,	 to	 replace	 advisors	 from	 imperialist	 states	 positioned	 in	
important	bodies	 such	as	 state	organs,	armed	 forces,	 economy,	 culture	and	propaganda	
with	our	own	experts.’240	For	the	future,	the	strategy	of	training	local	experts	directly	in	
the	recipient	country	was	widely	recommended.		
	
	
2.4.5. Theory	 and	 practice	 of	 cooperation	 in	 the	 spheres	 of	 education,	
culture,	 propaganda,	 science	 and	 civil	 society	 organisation	 –	
presenting	everyday	life	in	socialism		
A	 typical	 trend	 of	 this	 period	 –	 a	 formal	 conceptualisation	 of	 all	 forms	 of	
relations	–	did	not	bypass	 spheres	of	education,	 culture,	propaganda,	 science	and	civil	
society	 relation,	 either.	 In	 March	 1961	 the	 cooperation	 between	 the	 CS	 Ministry	 of	
Education	and	Culture	and	the	10th	(Africa)	Department	of	the	MFA	resulted	in	drafting	
and	eventually	getting	approved	the	first	formalised	‘Concept	of	educational	and	cultural	
relations	 between	 the	 CSSR	 and	 African	 states’,	 one	 of	 the	 documents	 that	 together	
formed	the	complex	Africa	policy.	An	approved	document	was	to	be	put	into	practice	by	
both	 Ministries	 in	 joint	 cooperation	 and	 was	 sent	 to	 all	 CS	 diplomatic	 offices	 across	
Africa.241	
Quoting	only	parts	of	this	lengthy	document,	 it	 is	especially	interesting	to	note	
from	what	political	and	ideological	background	it	originated	and	what	 its	authors’	real	
objectives	 were.	 As	 expressed	 in	 the	 preface,	 by	 creating	 this	 document	 the	 MFA	 is	
reacting	 to	 ‘the	 declaration	 of	 the	Workers	 and	 Communist	 parties’	 gathering	 held	 in	
Moscow	 in	1960	[…]	stating	 ‘that	the	utter	failure	of	colonialism	 is	 inevitable.	Collapse	of	
the	colonial	 slavery	 system	under	 the	pressure	of	national‐liberation	movements	 is	 in	 its	
historical	significance	the	second	most	important	occurrence	after	the	rise	of	the	universal	
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socialist	system’.’242	The	vital	importance	of	the	CSSR	in	this	mission	was	clear,	as	were	
the	means	to	reach	the	stated	objectives.	‘Due	to	its	high	level	of	industrial	development,	
education	and	culture,	our	republic	is	in	a	favourable	position	effectively	to	assist	the	self‐
emancipating	nations	of	Africa	 in	 their	 economic	and	 cultural	development.’243	Without	
intention	to	do	so	the	authors	of	the	document	very	accurately	described	the	difference	
between	the	declared	noble	objective	of	their	actions	and	the	real,	more	cynical	political	
reasoning	behind	them.	–	‘the	aim	of	our	cultural	and	educational	cooperation	is	promptly	
to	help	newly‐liberated	African	nations	to	eliminate	any	detrimental	impact	of	colonialism	
on	the	education	of	African	people,	to	build	and	develop	all	levels	of	an	African	educational	
system,	 to	 battle	 technical	 backwardness,	 to	 help	 establish	 and	 develop	 science	 and	 to	
contribute	 to	 the	 flourishing	 of	 art’244	 –	 and	 the	 higher,	 more	 selfish	 purpose	 –	 ‘the	
purpose	 of	 our	 cultural‐propagandistic	 activities	 in	 Africa	 is	 soundly	 to	 present	 the	
immense	 successes	of	building	a	 socialist	Czechoslovakia,	 to	acquaint	 the	African	public,	
through	 popular	 and	 accessible	 means,	 with	 the	 highly	 humanistic	 and	 democratic	
principles	 of	 existence	 rooted	 in	 our	 republic’s	 socialist	 Constitution,	 to	 spread	 the	
knowledge	of	 successes	of	Czechoslovak	engineering,	 science	and	culture,	 to	get	Africans	
acquainted	 with	 high	 standard	 of	 living,	 social	 benefits	 and	 the	 results	 of	 work	 the	
Czechoslovak	people	enjoy	in	general.		Along	with	that	we	need	to	destroy,	especially	in	the	
countries	of	North	Africa,	false	images	of	European	capitalist	states’	superiority	and	their	
indispensability	for	the	development	of	African	economy	and	culture.’245		
Authors	 of	 this	 document	 were	 aware	 of	 the	 social‐economic	 structure	 of	
African	nations	 and	of	 the	 transformation	processes	 that	were	 occurring	 there	 at	 this	
point.	 They	 quite	 correctly	 decided	 to	 concentrate	 their	 activities	 on	 students	 and	
youths	 in	general,	as	they	 ‘are	more	receptive	to	our	 ideas	than	the	old	generation,	who	
were	formed	by	the	feudal	system	and	the	ideology	of	colonisers.’246	The	above	statement	
became	the	core	principle	in	the	execution	and	organisation	of	CS	support	to	the	African	
educational	 system.	 A	 detailed	 outline	 of	 this	 aid	was	 put	 together	 at	 the	Ministry	 of	
Education;	 it	 counted	on	 increasing	 the	number	of	 students	 from	all	Economically	 less	
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developed	countries	(ELDCs)	studying	in	the	CS	educational	system	from	1,216	students	
in	1960/61247	to	somewhere	between	4,500	and	6,000	students	in	1965.		
	
The	 most	 successful	 agents	 in	 the	 propaganda	 and	 cultural	 relations	 sphere	
proved	 to	 be	 the	 Czechoslovak	 Broadcasting	 Service	 and	 Czechoslovak	 Press	 Agency	
(ČTK).	 The	 Czechoslovak	 broadcasting	 service	 established	 regular	 programmes	 for	
Africa.	 A	 significant	 pitfall	 in	 broadcasting	 for	 Africa	 was	 its	 unavailability	 in	 native	
languages,	which	prevented	its	effective	reach	to	the	uneducated	masses	of	Africans.	The	
CS	press	agency,	meanwhile,	established	vital	contacts	with	newly‐established	national	
press	agencies	in	Mali,	Guinea,	Ghana	and	in	North	Africa	and	played	an	important	role	
in	delivering	technical	assistance	to	these	countries	in	this	sphere.	Technical	assistance	
in	propaganda	and	the	media	sphere	was	given	full	attention	by	the	MFA,	and	plentiful	
material	support,	as	well	as	the	training	of	professional	staff,	and	was	amongst	the	first	
assistance	delivered	to	African	countries.248	Technicians	from	Mali,	Guinea	and	Algeria	
were	 trained	 directly	 in	 the	 CSSR	 and	 some	 practical	 educational	 courses	 were	 later	
organised	directly	in	Mali.249		
	
A	totally	unprecedented	oddity	in	this	sphere	of	relations,	which	never	made	it	
to	the	stage	of	practical	execution,	was	a	Soviet	recommendation	to	CS	officials	to	pursue	
cooperation	 with	 Africa	 through	 church	 contacts.	 As	 they	 put	 it,	 ‘establishing	 and	
developing	 our	 relations	 along	 religious	 links	 represents	 another	 idle	 capacity	 of	 our	
relations	with	African	countries.	Religious	influence	in	Africa	is	strong	and	imperialists	use	
it	 as	 a	 very	 effective	 tool	 for	maintaining	 their	 exploitative	 interests.	 In	 this	 sphere	 the	
CSSR	has	greater	opportunities	than	the	USSR	and	in	this	area	it	would	be	appropriate	to	
make	 the	biggest	 effort	possible.’250	 It	 is	 interesting	 evidence	 of	 how	 eager	 the	 Soviets	
were	to	use	all	the	possible	ways	to	reach	their	political	objectives	in	Africa.		
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3. Czechoslovakia	and	Kenya	between	1945	and	1968	
In	 Chapters	 3,	 4	 and	 5	 of	 this	 thesis	 I	 present	 the	 case	 studies	 of	 three	 East	
African	countries	–	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania.	In	these	examples	I	want	to	illustrate	
the	forms	Czechoslovak	involvement	took	in	Africa	at	different	periods.	I	show	how	the	
theoretical	 principles	 of	 the	 Czechoslovak	Africa	policy	 formulated	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	
were	executed	in	political	relief	in	East	Africa	and	how	much	of	the	stated	objectives	was	
actually	achieved.	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanzania	are	the	three	cases	that	allow	a	thorough	
analysis	of	the	implementation	of	the	CS	Africa	policy	as	they	all	were,	at	different	times,	
considered	 a	 priority	 for	 CS	 Africa	 policymakers.	 Besides	 that,	 CS	 activities	 in	 these	
countries	 can	 be	 used	 to	 illustrate	 the	whole	 range	 of	 relations	 typical	 for	 CS	 politics	
throughout	 Africa.	 In	 each	 presented	 case	 study	 I	 try	 to	 portray	 the	 effect	 that	 CS	
activities	may	have	had	on	political	development	in	these	countries.		
	
Relations	with	Kenya	are	amongst	the	oldest‐established	Czechoslovak	ones	in	
the	African	 continent.	 In	previous	 chapters	 I	 give	various	 instances	of	CS	 involvement	
with	Kenya.	Whether	it	was	trade	relations	before	WWII,	Kenyan	colonial	administrative	
assistance	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 CS	 foreign	 army	 in	 the	 Middle	 East,	 or	 the	 trade	
conflict	of	the	1950s,	relations	between	the	CS	and	Kenya	always	had	the	potential	 for	
mutually	 beneficial	 cooperation.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1950s,	 relations	 between	 the	 CSSR	
and	British	Kenya	aiming	for	independence	entered	a	whole	new	era	of	cooperation	that	
had	far‐reaching	effects,	especially	on	political	developments	in	this	British	colony.		
The	analysis	of	CS	 relations	with	Kenya	 I	present	here	 is	based	mainly	on	 the	
archives	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 in	 Prague,	 the	 Central	Military	 Archive	 in	
Prague,		the	Czech	National	Archive	and	the	recently	opened	resources	of	the	Archive	of	
Security	Forces	 in	Prague,	which	proved	especially	useful.	Of	significant	 importance	for	
this	particular	case	study	were	the	personal	testimonies	of	those	directly	involved	who	I	
was	 able	 to	 meet	 and	 interview	 in	 Kenya.	 Among	 the	 people	 I	 interviewed,	 three	
personalities	 stand	 out	 as	 providing	me	 with	 a	 particularly	 valuable	 insight	 into	 this	
topic,	namely	Mr	Odhiambo	Okello,	Mzee	Ezekiel	Barngatuny	and	Mr	Oburu	Odinga.		
Mr	 Okello	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 activists	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 national‐
liberation	 movement	 in	 the	 late	 1950s.	 He	 was	 a	 colleague	 of	 Oginga	 Odinga	 before	
independence	 and	 his	 activities	 were	 vital	 for	 promoting	 the	 Kenyan	 case	 abroad.	 In	
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1959	he	opened	and	managed	the	Kenyan	national‐liberation	movement	office	based	in	
Cairo	that	sought	political,	material	and	technical	support	for	the	Kenyan	independence	
struggle.	 Once	 Kenya	 declared	 independence,	 Odhiambo	 Okello	 joined	 the	 diplomatic	
services	of	his	country,	where	he	worked	for	several	decades.	Mr	Okello	proved	to	be	an	
invaluable	source	of	information	on	the	cooperation	between	the	CSSR	and	the	Kenyans	
before	independence,	as	he	himself	was	not	only	affected	but	had	been	active	in	setting	
up	this	relationship.	The	interview	with	Honorary	Mzee	Ezekiel	Barngatuny	was	another	
source	of	interesting	information	that	allowed	me	to	analyse	from	a	Kenyan	perspective	
some	information	gathered	in	archives	in	the	Czech	Republic.	As	a	former	high‐ranking	
member	 of	 KADU	 and	 colleague	 of	 Oginga	 Odinga,	 he	 eventually	 joined	 KANU	 and	
progressively	climbed	the	 internal	structure	of	 the	party.	After	acquiring	various	high‐
ranking	 posts	 in	 the	 independent	 Kenyan	 administration,	 including	 Member	 of	
Parliament	 or	Minister,	Mzee	Barngatuny	 became	 one	 of	 the	most	 influential	 political	
figures	 in	 Kenya	 during	 the	 presidency	 of	 Daniel	 arap	 Moi,	 when	 he	 acted	 as	 the	
principal	advisor	to	the	President.	Even	now,	Mzee	Barngatuny	remains	in	close	contact	
with	the	highest	 levels	of	Kenyan	politics	and,	until	recently,	he	acted	as	an	advisor	to	
President	Kibaki.	The	interview	with	Mzee	Barngatuny	provided	me	with	a	wide	range	
of	 information	on	political	developments	 in	Kenya,	 from	the	Mau	Mau	revolt	 in	Kenya	
during	the	1950s,	through	early	post‐independence	political	developments	in	Kenya,	all	
the	 way	 to	 the	 reasoning	 behind	 Kenya’s	 foreign	 policy	 under	 President	 Moi.	 The	
interview	 with	 Mzee	 became	 the	 crucial	 source	 of	 information	 on	 the	 formation	 of	
modern	 political	 parties	 in	 Kenya	 and	 also	 on	 President	 Moi’s	 period	 of	 office.	 My	
attempted	 interview	with	 President	 Moi	 to	 investigate	 why	 in	 the	 1970s	 all	 contacts	
with	 socialist	 countries	 including	 (Czechoslovakia)	 might	 have	 been	 abandoned	 was	
repeatedly	refused	on	the	basis	of	previous	negative	experiences	with	Czechoslovaks.	
The	third	 invaluable	source	of	 information	on	political	developments	 in	Kenya	
was	 the	 interview	 with	 Honorary	 Oburu	 Odinga.	 Mr	 Odinga	 was	 not	 only	 Assistant	
Minister	 in	 the	Cabinet	of	President	Kibaki	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 interview,	but	he	 is	 also	
Oginga	 Odinga’s	 son.	 Mr	 Oburu	 Odinga	 had	 personal	 experience	 of	 the	 cooperation	
between	Kenya	and	socialist	countries	before	Kenyan	independence.	Mr	Odinga	was,	in	
the	early	1960s,	one	of	thousands	of	African	students	who	were	awarded	scholarships	in	
the	 Soviet	 Union	 or	 the	 CSSR.	 These	 CS	 scholarships	were	 a	welcome	 solution	 to	 the	
problem	of	the	Britain’s	refusal,	prior	to	Independence,	to	provide	technical	courses	for	
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Kenyan	students.	Mr	Odinga	not	only	has	a	unique	insight	into	the	practical	cooperation	
between	Kenya	and	socialist	countries,	but,	as	the	son	of	Oginga	Odinga,	he	was	able	to	
observe	 from	 the	 front	 line	 the	 formation	 of	 Kenyan	 politics	 and	 their	 subsequent	
development.	 In	 the	 interview	 he	 gave	 me	 some	 interesting	 information	 on	 how	
personal	 preferences,	 animosities	 and	 interpersonal	 relations	 determined	 the	political	
orientation	of	Kenya.		
These	 three	major	 interviews	became	prime	 sources	of	 information	about	 the	
early	development	of	Kenyan	politics.	 In	addition	 I	 collected	several	other	 testimonies	
that	 provided	 me	 with	 some	 background	 knowledge	 on	 the	 political	 developments	
before	and	after	 independence,	and	several	 life	stories	of	Kenyan	students	who	gained	
their	education	behind	the	Iron	Curtain.	While	only	fragments	from	these	interviews	are	
directly	paraphrased	in	this	thesis,	they	still	influence	my	personal	perspective	on	some	
of	the	issues	linked	to	this	research.	They	helped	to	recreate	the	image	of	Kenya	before	
and	 early	 after	 independence,	 the	 period	 when	 the	 future	 of	 the	 country	 was	 being	
decided	 in	 so	 many	 different	 spheres	 –	 its	 foreign	 political	 orientation	 was	 being	
decided,	 its	domestic	political	rivalries	were	being	 formed,	 its	 future	elites	were	being	
trained	and	roots	for	future	ethnic	tensions	and	grievance	were	being	put	down.		
	
3.1. Czechoslovakia	and	KANU’s	quest	for	national	liberation	
During	the	1950s	Kenya	struggled	as	the	strong	opposition	to	colonial	rule	and	
white	 dominance	 led	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Mau	 Mau	 movement.	 This	 bloody	 anti‐
colonial	uprising	was	the	first	of	its	kind	in	Africa	for	several	decades	and	had	a	decisive	
effect	 on	 the	 anti‐colonial	 movement,	 and	 not	 only	 in	 Africa.	 According	 to	 the	
testimonies	 of	 some	 direct	 participants	 of	 the	 uprising,	Mau	Mau	 resistance	 inspired,	
amongst	 others,	 the	 national	 liberation	 activities	 of	 Nelson	 Mandela	 and	 his	 South	
African	ANC,	as	well	as	the	civil	unrest	in	Algeria	that	eventually	led	to	the	fall	of	colonial	
rule	 in	 this	North	African	 département	 of	 France.251	 Even	 though	 the	Mau	Mau	 revolt	
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was	eventually	supressed	and	defeated	by	colonial	authorities,	and	many	of	its	 leaders	
were	executed	or	imprisoned,	its	contribution	to	Kenyan	independence	was	vital.		
The	political	national	liberation	movement	in	Kenya	did	not	directly	evolve	from	
the	Mau	Mau	movement;	 rather,	 they	 came	 into	 being	 and	 existed	 in	 parallel.	 This	 is	
true,	 despite	 the	 accusations	 of	 colonial	 authorities	 that	 Jomo	 Kenyatta,	 the	 main	
personality	of	 the	Kenyan	political	campaign	for	 independence,	was	a	 leading	figure	of	
Mau	Mau.	Jomo	Kenyatta,	Oginga	Odinga	and	Tom	Mboya	became	the	main	protagonists	
of	the	National	Liberation	Movement,	a	grouping	active	in	the	late	1950s,	and	bore	two	
important	 distinctions	 from	 the	 Mau	 Mau	 –	 its	 members	 sought	 full	 political	
independence	for	Kenya	rather	than	 just	the	return	of	 land	occupied	by	white	settlers,	
and	they	preferred	a	political	rather	than	a	military	solution	of	the	situation.	
	After	 the	Mau	Mau	 insurgency	was	defeated	 in	Kenya,	 the	national	 liberation	
movement	became	dominated	by	the	first	nationalist	parties.	In	1960	the	original	Kenya	
African	Union	(KAU)	party	founded	in	1944	split	into	two	independent	political	parties	
that	quickly	became	strong	rivals	–	 the	Kenya	African	National	Union	 (KANU)	and	 the	
Kenya	African	Democratic	Union	(KADU).	In	the	very	beginning	of	their	existence	both	
KANU	 and	 KADU	were	 able	 to	 attract	 support	 from	 any	 tribe	 and	 in	most	 regions	 of	
Kenya.252	However,	 it	 took	only	a	 couple	of	years	 for	 the	 traditional	 ethnic	division	of	
Kenya’s	 population	 to	 begin	 to	 be	 reflected	 as	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 each	 party’s	
emerging	political	identity.	Meanwhile	however,	between	1960	and	1962,	the	aspect	of	
ethnicity	was	still	set	aside	for	the	higher	common	objective	of	achieving	independence	
from	the	British.	‘The	issue	of	independence	was	at	that	moment	uppermost,	and	the	man	
who	could	state	this	demand	most	simply	and	effectively	held	the	greatest	advantage.’253			
From	 late	 1961	 first	 signs	 of	 growing	 inter‐ethnic	 political	 rivalry	 were	
occurring.	Together	with	the	ethnic	split	there	were	other	divisions	among	Kenyans	as	
well	 –	 the	 economic	 one,	 related	 mainly	 to	 land	 ownership,	 and	 then	 the	 issue	 of	
acceptance	of	British	rule,	where	radicals	and	loyalists	were	at	odds.	After	1960	Kenyans	
were	 growing	 increasingly	 concerned	 over	 arrangements	 for	 impending	 political	
change.	The	competing	 interests,	hopes	and	ambitions	of	 the	various	ethnic	and	social	
groups	were	 soon	projected	onto	 the	political	make‐up	of	Kenya’s	 two	 largest	African	
parties.	The	main	ideological	rift	between	KANU	and	KADU	appeared	around	1961	and	it	
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concerned	the	future	system	of	government.	Most	of	the	minor	tribes	supporting	KADU	
advocated	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 federalist	 system	 of	 government	 that	 would	 ensure	
adequate	representation	for	themselves.		
KANU	 politicians	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 were	 mostly	 recruited	 from	 the	 largest	
ethnic	groups	of	Kikuyu	and	Luo.	‘KANU	and	Odinga	envisaged	the	infant	nation‐state	as	
dominated	 by	 a	 centralised	 government	 responsible	 for	 implementing	 development	
policy.’254	They	were	not	overly	fond	of	federalism	and	they	did	eventually	accept	it	only	
for	 the	 short	 transitional	 period	 of	 power‐sharing	 between	 KANU	 and	 KADU.	 Once	
KANU	consolidated	its	grip	on	power,	the	federalist	system	of	government	was	quickly	
abandoned.255	Unfortunately,	the	dispute	over	federalism,	or	majimboism,	concerned	not	
only	 the	 system	of	 exerting	political	 rule	 over	Kenya.	 It	was	 also	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	
politically	very	 risky	and	highly	 charged	question	of	 land	 redistribution	which	 in	 turn	
had	 a	 direct	 link	 to	 control	 of	 the	means	 of	 economic	 production.256	 Very	 soon	 after	
independence	land	redistribution	became	an	issue	which	played	a	significant	role	in	the	
quarrel	between	Kenyatta	and	Odinga.									
In	1959,	the	KANU	opened	its	foreign	office	in	Cairo,	which	was	made	possible	
by	the	support	of	the	anti‐colonial	campaign	of	Egyptian	President	Nasser,	who	backed	
anti‐colonial	 movements	 politically	 but	 also	 supported	 the	 NLM	 offices	 in	 Cairo	
financially.	Nasser’s	regime	was	at	 this	point	a	recipient	of	generous	support	 from	the	
USSR	and	the	CSSR	that	had	begun	just	three	years	earlier.	In	this	period	Egypt	became	
both	a	gateway	and	a	middleman	for	Czechoslovak	involvement	in	East‐African	affairs.	
The	 Cairo	 office	 had	 approximately	 five	workers	 and	was	 led	 by	 Odhiambo	 Okello,	 a	
fellow	 Luo,	 and	 close	 colleague	 of	 Oginga	 Odinga’s,	 educated	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Khartoum.	 A	 similar	 KANU	 office	 was	 also	 soon	 established	 in	 Addis	 Ababa.	 	 The	
objective	of	the	Cairo	office	was	to	obtain	political,	financial	and	material	support	for	the	
Kenyan	NLM	cause.	Kenyan	leaders	considered	political	support	to	be	the	most	crucial	
precondition	for	the	success	of	 their	demands,	but	 financial	and	technical	support	was	
also	necessary	as	the	colonial	authorities’	effective	anti‐NLM	strategies	were	depriving	
them	of	material	 and	 financial	 resources.	 Soon	after	 the	office	was	established,	Okello	
approached	the	CS	diplomats	in	Cairo	in	Odinga’s	name	with	a	request	for	support.	As	he	
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himself	 put	 it,	 ‘the	 Czechoslovak	 anti‐colonial	 stance	 was	 widely	 known,	 as	 was	 its	
willingness	to	support	the	freedom	fighters.’257						
The	demands	of	the	KANU	were	dealt	with	in	the	CSSR	at	the	highest	levels	and	
they	were	 given	 full	 priority	 by	 the	 Politbyro.	 CS	 officials	were	well	 aware	 of	 Kenyan	
political	 and	 economic	potential	 in	 the	 region.	Not	 long	before	 this,	MFA	analysts	had	
been	 sceptical	 about	 any	 likelihood	 of	 the	 East	 African	 colonial	 system’s	 going	 into	 a	
decline;	 	the	unexpected	rise	in	organised	political	opposition	to	British	and	white	rule	
in	Kenya	was	warmly	welcomed	behind	 the	 Iron	Curtain.	 Supporting	Kenyan	 freedom	
fighters	was	not	only	fully	in	line	with	the	CS	ideological	and	political	strategy,	but	it	was	
hoped	that	it	would	seriously	harm	its	Main	Enemy.258		
After	 the	 Czechoslovak	 MFA	 was	 approached	 by	 the	 KANU	 office	 in	 Cairo,	 it	
hastily	 tried	 to	collect	and	analyse	all	available	 information	about	 the	Kenyan	political	
scene.	Based	on	the	analysis	of	mainly	Soviet	information,	the	CS	administration	decided	
to	orientate	all	its	support	to	Oginga	Odinga	and	his	political	wing	within	KANU.	It	was	
believed	 he	 would	 be	 able	 to	 set	 Kenya	 on	 the	 socialist	 track.	 Unlike	 KANU	 general	
secretary	Tom	Mboya,	 viewed	as	America’s	man,	 and	KANU	chairman	 	 James	Gichuru,		
believed	 to	 be	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 West	 Germans,	 Odinga	 was	 viewed	 as	 the	
Eastern	bloc’s	favourite.	In	one	of	the	available	documents	MFA	experts	describe	Odinga	
as	 follows:	 ‘party	 leader	Oginga	Odinga	 is	a	 strict	 supporter	of	anti‐imperialist	 struggle	
and	promotes	cooperation	with	socialist	bloc	countries.	Odinga	has	the	support	of	most	of	
the	party	and	 enjoys	great	popularity	among	 its	members.	For	 some	 time	 the	CSSR	has	
maintained	relations	with	the	left	wing	of	KANU,	whose	leader,		Odinga,	visited	the	CSSR	in	
summer	1960.’259	Another	document	states,	 ‘Odinga	 is	popular	with	young	people,	under	
pressure	from	whom	the	request	for	“planned	economy”	was	incorporated	into	the	party’s	
program.’260		
Such	 a	 portrayal	 of	Odinga	was	 common,	 not	 only	 in	 the	CSSR	 and	 the	 Soviet	
Union,	but	also	shared	by	the	colonial	administration,	who	were	well	aware	of	Odinga’s	
foreign	contacts	and	activities.	While	Tom	Mboya’s	contacts	with	the	USA	were	tolerated	
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and	the	student	exchange	programme	to	US	universities	was	taking	place	without	major	
obstacles,261	similar	activities	by	Odinga	and	his	colleagues	in	the	Cairo	office	in	relation	
to	socialist	countries	were	viewed	more	critically.	
As	 ethnic	 fragmentation	 became	 ever	 more	 apparent	 with	 the	 approach	 of	
Independence,	 the	 main	 rivalry	 eventually	 came	 to	 a	 head	 between	 the	 two	 most	
numerous	 tribes	 of	 Kenya,	 the	 Kikuyu	 and	 the	 Luo.	 Both	 of	 these	 ethnicities	 had	 the	
benefit	 of	 high	 	 numbers	 and	 of	 sophisticated	 	 political	 leadership.	 Kikuyu	 had	 their	
unchallenged	 leader	 in	 the	 figure	of	 Jomo	Kenyatta,	universally	accepted	 ,	 even	by	 the	
British,	after	his	release	 from	British	detention	 in	1961	for	his	alleged	role	 in	 the	Mau	
Mau	 rebellion,	 as	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 emerging	 Kenyan	 nation.	 Another	 advantage	 that	
predestined	the	Kikuyu	people	a	leading	role	in	Kenya’s	NLM	was	the	fact	that	they	were	
the	best	integrated	in	Kenya’s	British‐dominated	economy	of	Kenya,	the	heart	of	which	
was	located	at	White	Highlands	in	the		Kikuyu	homeland.	Kikuyus	were	also	responsible	
for	 the	 Mau	Mau	 uprising,	 thus	 	 determining	 their	 general	 acceptance	 as	 the	 leading	
freedom	fighters.262		
The	Luo	people	also	had	influential	and	skilful	political	leaders	in	Oginga	Odinga	
and	 Tom	Mboya,	who	 led	 KANU	 during	 Kenyatta’s	 absence,	 but	 unfortunately	 for	 the	
Luos	their	leaders’	personal	antipathy	to	each	other	rendered	the	unity	of	Luo	political	
leadership	 a	 mere	 dream	 from	 the	 very	 beginning.	 Mboya	 represented	 a	 young	
generation	of	Kenyan	nationalists	and	he	started	his	swift	rise	 to	the	highest	circles	of	
Kenyan	politics	via	his	fervent	trade	union	activism.	Odinga,	on	the	other	hand,	was	not	
only	a	modern	politician,	but	also	a	traditional	Luo	chief	and	in	this	period	he	was	very	
close	 to	 Jomo	Kenyatta.	He	was	perhaps	not	 as	 charismatic	 as	Mboya	 and	he	 suffered	
from	a	lack	of	diplomatic	skills.	Very	soon	after	independence	Odinga	got	into	ideological	
conflict	with	the	rest	of	KANU’s	leadership	over	some	principal	policies	mainly	linked	to	
economy	 and	 proportional	 ethnic	 representation	 in	 redistributing	 the	 means	 of	
economic	 production	 once	 colonialism	 in	 Kenya	 ended,	 which	 in	 effect	 cost	 him	 his	
political	career.263				
	Odinga	was,	as	early	as	1960,	accused	in	the	Kenyan	Parliament	by	one	of	the	
white	MPs	of	being	a	Soviet	agent.264	Odinga	repeatedly	refuted	these	accusations,	as	his	
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closest	colleagues	and	his	family	members	still	do	today.265	They	unanimously	claim	that	
his	 intentions	were	never	to	seek	 full	 incorporation	of	Kenya	 into	the	Soviet	sphere	of	
influence	 and	 that	 colonial	 accusations,	 and	 later	 those	 of	 his	 political	 rivals	 in	 the	
Kenyan	 government,	 were	 based	 on	 deliberate	 misinterpretation	 of	 his	 political	
activities.	Both	Oburu	Odinga	and	Odiango	Okello	claim	that	Oginga,	while	cooperating	
closely	with	 socialist	 countries,	 ignored	 the	 ideological	 aspect	 of	 this	 cooperation	 and	
pursued	only	 its	beneficial	effects	 for	 the	Kenyan	economy.	Nevertheless,	a	number	of	
documents	 from	 CS	 archives	 indicate	 that	 the	 accusations	 against	 Odinga,	 of	 close	
cooperation	with	 socialist	 countries,	were	not	 completely	unjustified,	 especially	 in	 the	
years	after	independence.		
	
Communication	between	 the	Cairo	office	and	CS	officials	was	already	starting,	
by	1960,	 to	contribute	 to	 the	Kenyan	NLM.	 	During	his	visit	 to	Prague	 in	1960	Odinga	
approached	 Czechoslovaks	 in	 person	with	 a	 request	 for	 assistance.266	 At	 that	 time	 he	
asked	 CS	 officials	 for	 material	 and	 financial	 support,	 scholarships	 for	 students	 and	
unspecified	forms	of	special	assistance.267	The	Politbyro	swiftly	responded	and	approved	
the	initial	financial	help	for	KANU,	as	well	as	organising	tailor‐made	security	courses	for	
Kenyans.	Financial	help	was	to	reach,	 in	the	first	stage,	671	000	Kčs,	out	of	which	sum	
the	equivalent	of	95	000	Kčs	was	provided	in	foreign	currency.268		
In	the	years	to	come	more	financial	and	material	help	for	KANU	was	approved	
and	 provided	 by	 the	 Politbyro,	 while	 special	 assistance	 began	 with	 the	 direct	
involvement	of	the	Interior	Ministry	and	the	secret	service	StB.	Despite	recent	claims	of	
KANU	 officials	 that	 no	 cooperation	 in	 the	 special	 sphere	 occurred,269	 the	 available	
archive	 documents	 speak	 otherwise.	 The	 CS	 government	 organised	 several	 special	
courses	 for	KANU,	 of	 both	 a	military	 and	 a	 security	 nature,	 before	 independence,	 and	
vital	cooperation	in	this	sphere	continued	after	1964.		
In	July	1961	the	MFA	approached	the	MND	and	the	Politbyro	with	a	request	to	
organise	a	one‐year	army	and	militia	course	for	five	candidates	selected	by	KANU.270	The	
CS	government	was	to	pay	for	the	full	expenses.	The	request	was	eventually	approved	by	
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the	Defence	Minister,271	but	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	course	ever	took	place.	It	is	also	
not	 clear	 whether	 the	 matter	 was	 an	 independent	 activity	 of	 the	 MFA’s	 African	
department	staff,	or	if	it	was	raised	in	response	to	a	request	from	KANU.		
In	 February	 1962	 the	 second	 round	 of	 Lancaster	 House	 talks	 took	 place	 in	
Britain	between	British	representatives	and	Kenyan	nationalist	African	politicians.	Until	
1961	Kenya	was	 ruled	by	KADU	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	1961	elections	were	won	by	
KANU.	 This	was	 because	KANU	 refused	 to	 join	 the	 government	 before	 Jomo	Kenyatta	
was	released	from	detention.	To	make	the	government	of	Kenya	more	representative	of	
Kenyan	popular	support,	Britain	invited	both	KANU	and	KADU	to	be	present	at	the	talks.	
The	purpose	of	the	meeting	was	to	find	and	prepare	a	suitable	political	arrangement	to	
bring	Kenya	slowly	 towards	 independence.	Negotiations	were	marked	by	 the	 fact	 that	
while	 British	 preferred	 Ronald	 Ngala	 and	 his	 KADU,	 it	 was	 KANU	 and	 Kenyatta	 who	
could	claim	wide‐spread	popular	support	amongst	the	Kenyan	population.	Kenyatta	had	
only	 been	 released	 from	 detention	 the	 previous	 year	 by	 the	 very	 same	 British	
government	that	was	now	hosting	the	talks,	and	this	fact	did	not	make	proceedings	any	
easier.	However,	 the	British	 considered	 it	 vital	 to	organise	 these	negotiations	because	
‘they	 were	 increasingly	 concerned	 that	 the	 political	 impasse	 and	 weak	 KADU‐led	
government	 would	 drive	 KANU	 left	 into	 the	 arms	 of	 Odinga,	 the	 Eastern	 bloc	 and	
communism.’272		
The	 Constitution	 that	 had	 emerged	 from	 the	 Lancaster	 House	 talks	 was	 to	 a	
great	extent	a	 considerable	compromise	on	 the	part	of	KANU	who	 from	the	beginning	
accepted	it	with	misgivings.	The	Constitution’s	main	purpose	was	to	provide	the	British	
with	the	legal	framework	for	a	political	transition	of	Kenya	to	independence	that	would	
maximise	 the	 chance	 that	 the	 interests	 of	 white	 settlers	 as	 well	 as	 those	 of	 British	
government	 would	 be	 safeguarded.	 In	 effect,	 the	 Constitution	 ‘institutionalized	 and	
entrenched	 the	 colonial	 political	 legacy	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 imposing	 on	 the	 new	
central	 government	 severe	 limitations	 on	 its	 exercise	 of	 the	 powers	 inherited	under	 the	
administrative	 legacy.’273	 The	 most	 prominent	 compromise	 agreed	 upon	 at	 the	
negotiations	was	the	introduction	of	a	federalist	system	of	government.	This	was	viewed	
as	a	victory	for	KADU	and	it	was	the	arrangement	the	British	preferred	as	well.	However,	
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on	the	other	hand,	another	highly	contested	issue	of	land	redistribution	was	adopted	in	
the	 form	 preferred	 by	 KANU.	 ‘A	million	acres	of	mixed	 farms	 (half	 the	 total)	would	be	
taken	over	and	used	to	settle	Africans.	This	would	be	 funded	by	British	and	 international	
loans,	and	executed	through	private	land	purchase.’274				
Besides	 drafting	 the	 legal	 framework	 for	 Kenya’s	 move	 to	 Independence,	 the	
British	 government	 also	 hoped	 the	 negotiations	 would	 provide	 them	 with	 an	
opportunity	to	disrupt	the	unity	of	KANU	by	attracting	some	of	its	young	and	less	radical	
leaders	 such	 as	 Tom	Mboya	 to	 join	 forces	 with	 Ngala’s	 KADU,	 which	 was	 a	 party	 of	
loyalists	much	more	acceptable	to	the	British.	The	KANU	leadership,	especially	Kenyatta	
and	 Odinga,	 was	 perceived	 as	 radical	 and	 a	 threat	 to	 British	 interests	 in	 Kenya	 after	
independence.	 British	 hopes	 and	 plans	 in	 this	 respect	 failed	 because	 KANU	 remained	
intact	and	it	was	becoming	clear	that	in	the	agreed	coalition	government,	KANU	would	
clearly	dominate	KADU.	The	only	concession	the	British	managed	to	get	from	Kenyatta	
was	 the	exclusion	of	Odinga	 from	 the	new	coalition	 cabinet,	 due	 to	his	 close	 relations	
with	 socialist	 countries.275	 Odinga	 accepted	 his	 fate	 for	 the	 time	 being,	 but	 he	 was	
frustrated	by	Kenyatta’s	decision	to	comply	with	the	British	stipulation,276	and	this	was	
perhaps	the	first	rift	in	their	collaboration.					
In	March	1962	the	Czechoslovak	MFA277	received	a	letter	directly	from	Kenyatta	
in	which	 he	 requested	 substantial	 help,	 as	 his	 delegation	 had	 found	 itself	 in	 a	 critical	
financial	 situation	 while	 negotiating	 political	 independence	 in	 London.	 Alongside	 the	
required	 finances,	 material	 support,	 especially	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 propaganda	 and	
publishing	facilities	for	KANU	foreign	offices,	was	also	requested.	KANU	had	received	a	
tape	recorder,	a	copier	and	an	amplifier	for	their	Cairo	office	from	the	CSSR	in	1960,	but	
more	professional	 equipment	was	 requested	now.	A	printing	machine	was	 considered	
crucial	 for	 the	 success	 of	 KANU’s	 campaign	 in	 the	 upcoming	Kenyan	 elections.	 Lastly,	
Kenyatta	and	Odinga	asked	for	security	training	for	ten	persons,	military	training	for	25	
Kenyan	 students	 and	 admission	 for	 up	 to	 30	 Kenyans	 to	 CS	 factories	 for	 practical	
training.278	In	order	to	acquire	political	support	for	KANU’s	request,	Odinga	emphasised	
the	 ideological	 and	political	 importance	of	 such	assistance.	According	 to	MFA	 records,	
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Odinga	 said,	 ‘KANU	 is	 in	 acute	 need	 of	 immediate	 help.	 The	 pre‐election	 campaign	 in	
Kenya,	crucial	for	the	future	position	of	progressive	forces	in	the	country,	is	underway.	The	
USA	and	the	UK	keep	sending	large	sums	of	money	to	Kenya,	in	order	to	maintain	their	own	
positions	 in	 the	 region	by	means	 of	 corruption.	A	hundred‐man	bureaucratic	apparatus	
based	 in	 the	 American	 consulate	 in	 Nairobi	 contributes	 to	 this	 policy.	 […]	 this	 period	
decides	the	immediate	future	of	Kenya	and	[…]	progressive	forces	rely	only	on	countries	of	
the	 socialist	block,	especially	 the	USSR	and	 the	CSSR.	 […]	 If	 the	CSSR	wants	 to	help,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	provide	help	now,	in	order	not	to	repeat	the	case	of	Congo.’279	In	addition	to	
requests	for	a	Kenyan	delegation	in	London,	the	MFA	was	also	visited,	in	March	1962,	by	
Okello,	requesting	technical	training	for	journalists.280			
The	Politbyro	and	the	MFA	gave	KANU’s	request	the	highest	priority.	Kenyatta’s	
personal	 involvement	 in	 this	 matter	 was	 of	 the	 utmost	 strategic	 importance	 for	 CS	
officials,	as	they	were	aware	of	his	unrivalled	dominance	in	Kenyan	politics.	Fulfilling	a	
personal	 request	 from	 Kenyatta	 would,	 it	 was	 believed,	 help	 to	 buy	 his	 allegiance	 in	
future.	 As	 there	 was	 a	 shortage	 of	 available	 funds,	 the	 MFA	 decided	 to	 transfer	 all	
financial	 resources	 originally	 approved	 for	 the	 NLMs	 of	 Zanzibar	 and	 Rhodesia	 to	
KANU’s	account,	a	move	which	clearly	shows	that	Kenya	was,	at	this	point,	perceived	to	
be	the	area	of	highest	priority	for	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy.		
	
	Despite	 a	 transfer	 of	 Zanzibari	 and	 Rhodesian	 funds	 to	 Kenya,	 not	 all	 of	
Kenyatta’s	 and	Odinga’s	 requests	 could	 be	met,	 but	 a	 substantial	 part	was	dealt	with.	
KANU	received	713	000	Kčs	 in	 financial	assistance	(the	equivalent	of	106	600	Kčs	was	
provided	 in	 foreign	 currency),	 the	 greater	 part	 of	which	was	used	 to	 cover	 the	KANU	
delegation	expenses	during	the	Lancaster	House	talks.	The	MFA	also	decided	to	provide	
KANU	with	a	professional	printing	press	for	its	upcoming	campaign.	In	cooperation	with	
the	 MND	 and	 the	 Interior	 Ministry,	 the	 MFA	 also	 approved	 and	 prepared	 an	 expert	
security	course	for	six	persons,	a	military	course	for	four,	basic	military	training	for	ten	
and	practical	internship	at	CS	factories	for	eight	Kenyan	nationals.281	The	ČTK	journalist	
course	for	six	KANU	members	was	approved	independently	from	these	activities.282		
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The	specifics	of	the	planned	special	courses	were	agreed	with	Okello	and	Odinga	
during	 their	 visit	 to	Prague	 in	 July	1962.	The	 special	military	 course	 for	Kenyans	was	
nicknamed	 ‘Action	 137’	 and	was	 approved	 by	 the	 Politbyro	 to	 commence	 during	 the	
summer	of	1962.	The	objective	of	 the	course	was	 to	 train	 four	military	experts	and	to	
organise	 summer	 vacation	 military	 training	 by	 the	 MND	 for	 ten	 Kenyan	 students.	
Despite	the	agreement,	for	undisclosed	reasons	the	Kenyan	students	never	enrolled	for	
the	 summer	 military	 training.	 Whether	 the	 expert	 military	 training	 ever	 took	 place	
remains	 unclear	 because	 available	 archive	 documents	 contain	 no	 mention	 of	 the	
matter.283	However,	detailed	records	of	most	other	special	courses	that	took	place	in	this	
period	are	available	 in	Czechoslovak	archives	and	these	often	include	personal	data	of	
participants,	reports	on	the	course	proceedings	and	evaluation	of	results.	The	absence	of	
any	such	records	in	this	case	may	indicate	that	Action	137	probably	did	not	take	place.		
While	not	 furnishing	much	detail,	StB	 internal	records	state	 that,	 in	1962,	 two	
personal	bodyguards	 for	KANU	 leaders	were	 trained	and,	 in	1963,	a	 six‐month	course	
for	 counter‐espionage	 was	 completed	 by	 six	 Kenyans.284	 These	 two	 courses	 set	 the	
pattern	for	the	future	special	cooperation	that	became	the	focus	of	CS‐Kenyan	relations	
after	 independence.	 CS	 officials	 viewed	 their	 special	 technical	 assistance	 as	 a	 very	
promising	sphere	for	 future	cooperation,	especially	after	the	1963	visit	 to	the	CSSR	by	
the	Kenyan	Minister	for	Panafrican	Affairs,	Koinange,	a	close	collaborator	of	Kenyatta’s.	
According	to	Koinange,	during	one	of	the	recent	meetings	of	the	Kenyan	cabinet,	 Jomo	
Kenyatta	presented	 the	 following	 strategy:	 ‘In	 the	course	of	military	and	other	 types	of	
confidential	 cooperation	 Kenya	 will,	 after	 the	 declaration	 of	 independence,	 direct	 its	
attention	 to	 socialist	 camp	 countries,	 while	 it	 will	 naturally	 not	 refuse	 economic	
cooperation	with	 the	West,	potential	economic	help	 from	 the	USA	and	 the	 International	
development	bank.’285		
	
In	1962	contact	with	the	CSSR	entered	yet	another	sphere.	From	the	position	of	
explicit	political	support	for	Kenyan	anticolonial	activities,	the	CS	became	unexpectedly	
directly	involved	in	the	intra‐KANU	political	rivalry	between	Mboya	on	the	one	side	and	
Kenyatta	 and	 Odinga	 on	 the	 other.	 During	 the	 second	 round	 of	 the	 Lancaster	 House	
negotiations	 for	 Kenyan	 independence,	 Kenyatta	 himself	 contacted	 the	 CS	 embassy	 in	
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London.	According	to	the	embassy’s	report,	several	members	of	the	Kenyan	delegation	
were	repeatedly	approached	by	American,	Israeli	and	West	German	diplomats,	provided	
with	 finances	 and	 invited	 for	 visits.	 The	 report	 states	 that	 Kenyatta	 was	 deeply	
concerned	 by	 this,	 as	 most	 of	 these	 KANU	 delegates	 were	members	 of	 Tom	Mboya’s	
wing.	Kenyatta	perceived	this	as	a	danger	to	his	leading	position	in	the	party.		
In	order	 to	 counter‐balance	actions	of	Western	diplomats,	Kenyatta	 asked	 the	
CSSR	 to	 receive	 the	 delegation	 of	 twelve	 members	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 parliament	 and	
delegates	of	Kenyatta’s	Lancaster	House	mission.	The	MFA	gave	the	matter	the	highest	
political	 priority	 and,	 based	 on	 its	 recommendation,	 the	 CSSR	 National	 Assembly	
officially	invited	the	Kenyan	delegation	for	a	state	visit	to	take	place	in	March	1962.	This	
episode	represents	an	important	political	gesture	by	Kenyatta	to	the	West.	His	allegiance	
was	not	yet	guaranteed	 in	the	bipolar	world,	and	Kenyatta	was	trying	to	show	that	he	
had	the	means	of	defence	against	overweening	Western	intervention	in	Kenyan	politics.	
At	the	same	time,	Kenyatta’s	contacts	with	CSSR	diplomacy	proved	a	very	effective	tool	
for	buying	their	future	support.	This	proved	to	be	decisive	not	only	for	Kenya	itself,	but	
especially	 for	 the	 dominance	 of	 Kenyan	 politics	 by	 KANU,	 Kenyatta	 and	 the	 Kikuyu.	
From	today’s	perspective	the	success	of	Kenyatta’s	tactics	of	balancing	between	East	and	
West	 is	 undeniable.	 Kenyatta	 received	 rich	 financial	 and	 also	 technical	 support	 from	
both	camps.	Hundreds	of	Kenyans	received	training	 in	the	USA,	the	UK,	 Israel	but	also	
the	USSR,	Czechoslovakia,	and	Poland,	and	through	this	vital	educational	enrichment	the	
economics	of	independent	Kenya	was	much	strengthened.	
This	case	also	represents	the	first	indirect	clash	between	Mboya	and	CS	officials.	
The	activities	of	Tom	Mboya	were,	for	years	to	come,	observed	with	the	greatest	concern	
by	all	Czechoslovak	institutions	involved	with	Kenya.	Mboya	was	regarded	up	until	his	
death	as	 the	greatest	 threat	 to	 socialist	 countries’	 interests	 in	 the	 region.	 In	 the	years	
after	Kenyan	independence,	Tom	Mboya	became	the	target	of	numerous	CS	intelligence	
activities.				
In	 the	 period	 just	 before	 and	 soon	 after	 independence,	 Kenyatta	 had	 much	
closer	relations	with	Odinga	than	with	Mboya.	Kenyatta	at	this	point	considered	Odinga	
his	most	important	collaborator	and	their	good	personal	relationship	was	crucial	for	the	
Western	Kenyan	Luo	people’s	of	acceptance	of	KANU.	Kenyatta	was	always	suspicious	of	
Tom	Mboya,	who	had	politically	matured	 in	 the	 trade	union	movement;	Kenyatta	was	
not	entirely	comfortable	with	this.	 ‘Kenyatta's	dislike	of	Mboya	apparently	arose	 from	a	
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belief	that	Mboya	had	colluded	with	the	British	over	Kenyatta's	detention	so	that	the	Luo	
union	 leader	 could	 become	 the	 foremost	 nationalist	 leader.	The	 old	man	mistrusted	 his	
young	 lieutenant's	 evident	ambitions	and	 talents.	Hence	until	 the	 end	of	1964	Kenyatta	
tended	 to	 favour	Odinga	 in	 the	Mboya‐Odinga	 rivalry	 for	 pre‐eminence	 and	 to	 support	
attempts	to	undermine	Mboya's	trade	union	base.’286	Mboya	derived	the	major	part	of	his	
political	 influence	 from	 the	 trade	 unions	 and	 he	 did	 not	 hesitate	 to	make	 use	 of	 this	
political	 capital.	 A	 further	 source	 of	Mboya’s	 political	 power	was	 the	 group	 of	 radical	
Youth	Wingers,	mostly	Luos,	who	supported	him	and	on	several	occasions	clashed	with	
Kikuyu	youths.	
In	the	summer	of	1962	a	conflict	had	arisen	within	KANU	between	Mboya	and	
Kenyatta.	 Kenyatta	 organised	 a	 rally	 in	 Mboya’s	 Nairobi	 district	 without	 Mboya’s	
consent	 while	 he	 was	 abroad;	 this	 was	 considered	 trespassing	 on	 a	 politician’s	 own	
special	territory.	During	his	speech	at	the	rally	Kenyatta	criticised	politicians	who	were	
receiving	money	from	the	imperialists,	which	was	most	clearly	aimed	at	Mboya	who	had	
frequent	contacts	with	Western	countries.	Upon	his	return	Mboya	denounced	Kenyatta’s	
anti‐democratic	tendencies	as	the	leader	of	KANU	and	‘threatened	to	leave	KANU	and	use	
the	 Kenya	 Federation	 of	 Labour	 as	 the	 organizational	 basis	 for	 a	 new	 party.’287	
Considering	the	political	support	that	Mboya	was	able	to	attract	should	he	really	decide	
to	establish	his	own	party,	Kenyatta	pulled	back	and	retracted	some	previous	criticism.	
Even	 though	 the	 imminent	 crisis	 was	 prevented,	 Kenyatta	 and	 his	 collaborators	
subsequently	tried	to	limit	the	political	power	of	Mboya’s	Kenya	Federation	of	Labour.	
Up	 until	 1965	 the	 alternative	 trade	 union	 movement	 sponsored	 by	 Odinga	 was	
preferred	by	 the	Kenyan	government.288	This	obviously	 changed	when	Odinga	 fell	 out	
with	Kenyatta.					
	
	
Perhaps	 the	most	 significant	 form	of	 assistance	 that	 the	CSSR	provided	KANU	
with	 in	 this	period	were	 the	 free	university	 scholarships	 for	 young	Kenyans.	The	 first	
Kenyan	 student,	 according	 to	 available	documents,	was	 admitted	 to	 a	CS	university	 in	
1959,	and	as	of	1960	many	others	followed.	In	1961	82	new	Kenyan	students	enrolled	at	
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CS	universities.289	Based	on	 the	 incomplete	 records,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 estimate	 the	 total	
number	 of	 Kenyans	 studying	 at	 CS	 universities	 between	 1960	 and	 1964	 to	 be	 in	 the	
region	of	150‐200.		
Education	 cooperation	 became	 one	 of	 the	 main	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 KANU	
Cairo	office	prior	to	independence.	From	the	beginning,	the	office	was	 in	 full	charge	of	
sending	 Kenyan	 students	 to	 socialist	 countries,	 particularly	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	
Czechoslovakia,	Bulgaria	and	East	Germany.	In	comparison	to	Mboya’s	student	exchange	
programme	with	 the	USA,	 the	admission	of	Kenyans	 to	socialist	countries’	universities	
was	much	more	 problematic	mainly	 due	 to	 legal	 and	 logistical	 obstacles.	Most	 of	 the	
suitable	young	Kenyans	did	not	possess	passports	and	colonial	authorities	did	all	 they	
could	to	prevent	them	from	leaving	East	Africa.	Kenyans	who	were	offered	scholarships	
behind	 the	 Iron	Curtain	 had	 to	 undertake	 complicated	 and	 risky	 journeys	 to	Cairo	 on	
their	 own.	 After	 illegally	 leaving	 Kenya,	 they	 crossed	 to	 Uganda	 and	 then	 to	 Sudan.	
Okello	 and	 his	 colleagues	 from	 the	 Cairo	 office	 arranged	 for	 Sudanese	 officials	 not	 to	
impede	 Kenyans	 travelling	 without	 documents.	 Once	 the	 would‐be	 students	 reached	
Egypt,	 the	KANU	office	provided	them	with	 fake	passports	and	arranged	their	onward	
travel.290		
Students	who	were	admitted	 to	universities	 in	Czechoslovakia	often	 struggled	
to	 cope	 with	 insufficient	 funds,	 unsuitable	 clothing	 and	 the	 completely	 alien	
environment.	 They	 usually	 had	 one	 year	 to	 master	 the	 language	 before	 commencing	
their	technical	studies.	With	the	growing	numbers	of	African	students	there	were	some	
cases	of	racism	and	hostility	from	the	locals	who	had	never	come	across	black	Africans	
before.	 Occasional	 conflicts	 with	 the	 local	 population,	 combined	 with	 stress,	 led	 to	
repeated	complaints	 to	both	KANU	and	the	CS	Ministry	of	Education	and	Culture	 from	
unhappy	 African	 students.	 In	 order	 to	 minimise	 the	 negative	 experiences	 of	 foreign	
students,	which	was	making	for	unwelcome	propaganda,	the	CS	government	tried	where	
possible	 to	 accommodate	 them	 close	 together.	 This	 measure	 proved	 successful	 in	
respect	of	the	local	population,	but	it	did	not	prevent	conflicts	amongst	the	African	and	
Arab	students,	and	there	were	frequent	outbursts	of	ethnic	and	tribal	rivalries.		
In	our	interviews,	all	Kenyan	alumni	of	CS	universities,	as	well	as	officials	who	
helped	 to	 arrange	 this	 educational	 exchange	 programme	 unanimously	 agreed	 on	 the	
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great	 significance	 that	 the	 system	 of	 CS	 scholarships	 for	 Kenyans	 had	 on	 the	
development	 of	 an	 independent	 Kenya.291	 The	 CSSR,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 other	 socialist	
states,	provided	Kenyans	with	education	mainly	 in	what	 they	called	 technical	 subjects	
such	 as	 economics,	 engineering,	 agriculture,	 forestry	 or	 medicine.	 Prior	 to	 1960	 the	
British	colonial	administration	had	not	allowed	black	Kenyans	to	study	these	subjects	in	
Africa	 and,	 therefore,	 a	 country	 aiming	 for	 independence	 was	 in	 desperate	 need	 of	
technical	 cadres292.	 This	was	 especially	 so	 if	 the	 independent	 Kenya	was	 to	 aspire	 to	
become	 truly	 economically	 independent	 of	 its	 white	 settler	 population	 as	 well	 as	 of	
Britain.	While	it	is	true	that	more	scholarships	for	Kenyans	were	provided	by	the	USA	in	
programmes	managed	by	Tom	Mboya,	the	fact	that	most	students	there	studied	Arts	and	
Humanities	 meant	 that	 the	 doctors,	 engineers	 and	 economists	 trained	 in	 the	 Soviet	
Union,	 the	 CSSR	 and	 East	 Germany,	 played	 a	much	more	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 early	
economic	development	of	Kenya	after	 independence.293	This	statement	 is	valid	despite	
the	fact	that	many	of	the	alumni	from	socialist	countries	faced	some	form	of	repression	
from	 the	 Kenyan	 government,	 especially	 after	 1966	 during	 the	 anti‐communist	
campaign	and	later	during	the	rule	of	President	Moi.294			
In	 the	 early	 1960s	 the	 number	 of	 students	 from	Economically	 Less	Developed	
Countries	receiving	their	university	training	in	Czechoslovakia	reached	significant	levels.	
In	1961,	the	total	number	of	African	students	in	the	CSSR	reached	more	than	a	thousand	
and	 Kenyans	 represented	 one	 of	 the	 fastest‐growing	 groups.	 Kenyan	 students	 in	 the	
CSSR	were	politically	active295	which	caused	some	tensions	especially	between	the	rival	
Luo	 and	 Kikuyu	 tribes.296	 Political	 organisations	 of	 foreign	 students	 as	 well	 as	
individuals	were	attracting	the	attention	of	both	CS	and	foreign	intelligence	services.	
The	StB	saw	great	potential	in	establishing	a	working	relationship	with	African	
and	 Arab	 students,	 as	 they	were	 expected	 to	 become	 the	 future	 ruling	 elite	 of	 newly	
independent	countries	and	it	was	assumed	many	of	them	would	acquire	high	positions	
in	 state	 administrations	 after	 their	 return	 from	 their	 studies.297	 StB	 archives	 include	a	
                                                            
291 Odinga, interview; Okello, interview. 
292 Okello, interview. 
293 Odinga, interview; Okello, interview. 
294 Dr Jela O., interview with the author, Nairobi, Kenya, June 7, 2011. 
295 MZV F. III/5 Keňa, č.j. 127.312/64‐10, 10.12.1964, 1. 
296 Okello, interview. According to Odhiambo Okello conflict that occurred between Luo and Kikuyu students in 
Czechoslovakia in 1962 was artificially provoked by black loyalists supporting the colonial administration. 
297 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 003.950/61, 1961, 8. 
131 
 
number	of	reports	of	operational	activities	intended	to	recruit	these	foreign	students	for	
intelligence	purposes.298		
Meanwhile,	Western	countries,	concerned	at	the	newly‐established	cooperation	
between	Africa	and	the	socialist	camp,	were	eager	to	portray	the	on‐going	cooperation	
to	its	own	public	in	the	darkest	possible	colours.	Colonial	administrators	as	well	as	pro‐
Western	 politicians	within	 KANU	were	 concerned	 at	 the	well‐functioning	 cooperation	
between	 Odinga’s	 wing	 and	 socialist	 countries.	 Students	 returning	 from	 Iron	 Curtain	
countries	 were	 viewed	 as	 carriers	 of	 revolutionary	 thought,	 who,	 given	 their	 expert	
training	 and	 political	 ambitions,	 might	 attempt	 a	 pro‐communist	 coup.	 In	 order	 to	
prevent	this,	a	negative	propaganda	campaign	was	started.	Several	conflicts	amongst	the	
African	students	in	Czechoslovakia,	or	between	the	local	population	and	Africans,	were	
believed	 by	 the	 Cairo	 office	 as	 well	 as	 the	 CS	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 to	 have	 been	
provoked	by	pro‐Western	Africans	who	allegedly	penetrated	student	organisations	 for	
the	 very	 purpose	 of	 causing	 conflict	 and	 unrest.299	 Today,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 judge	 to	
what	extent	this	explanation	was	just	an	excuse	or	whether	it	was	based	on	substantial	
evidence.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 were	 some	 cases	 that	 prove	 how	 desperate	 Western	
governments	were	to	ignore	and	effectively	undermine	the	on‐going	cooperation.		
In	 December	 1961	 there	 was	 a	 well‐publicised	 case	 of	 two	 Kenyan	 students	
being	 contacted	 by	 the	 British	 embassy	 in	 Prague.	 Both	 students	 were	 forced	 to	
interrupt	their	studies	in	Prague	and	fly	to	London.	Here,	they	were	interrogated	by	the	
British	 Ministry	 for	 Colonies	 and	 by	 the	 British	 Council.	 They	 were	 both	 offered	
substantial	sums	of	money	to	write	and	publish	an	article	on	their	negative	experiences	
in	 Czechoslovakia.300	 The	 whole	 issue	 was	 eventually	 dealt	 with	 by	 the	 CS	 MFA	 who	
issued	a	 serious	diplomatic	warning	 to	 the	British	embassy	 in	Prague,	on	 the	grounds	
that	it	had	‘exerted	hostile	activities,	encouraged	students	to	leave	the	CSSR	and	to	spread	
rumours	 and	 malign	 statements	 after	 leaving	 our	 territory.’301	 The	 Western	 media’s	
negative	 propaganda	 soon	 proved	 to	 have	 only	 a	 minor	 effect	 on	 the	 cooperation	
between	Africa	and	socialist	camp	countries.		
                                                            
298 Eg.  ABS 11451_311, I správa MV, 47.O. A‐0084/75‐47‐85. 
299 NAA F. 1261/0/43, č.j. 1416/9, 1966, 1. Example of such conflict occurred at the IV Congress of European 
Federation of African Students that took place in December 1966 between two delegations of African students 
from the CSSR that each claimed to be the only rightful representative of Africans  at CS universities.   
300 NAA F. 1261/0/44, č.j.  010.021/62‐SM‐6, 7.2.1962, 1‐3. 
301 NAA F. 1261/0/44, č.j.  010.021/62‐SM‐6, 7.2.1962, 2. 
132 
 
	StB	 activities	 with	 regard	 to	 foreign	 students	 were	 rather	 common.	 The	 StB	
managed	to	create	an	effective	net	of	 loyal	agents	amongst	people	with	direct	dealings	
with	the	foreign	students	–	teachers,	university	staff	members,	family	members	of	fellow	
CS	 students,	 members	 of	 youth	 and	 student	 organisations	 and	 others.302	 In	 multiple	
cases,	 students	 were	 specially	 selected	 for	 cooperation	 and	 some	 eventually	 became	
contacts.			
	
During	1963	Kenya	was	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 acquiring	 independence	 and	political	
competition	within	KANU	was	becoming	ever	more	tense.	Experts	from	the	MFA	stayed	
in	 close	 contact	with	Odinga	 and	Okello	 and	were	 informed	 in	detail	 about	 intraparty	
rivalry.	 According	 to	 the	MFA’s	 analytical	 report	 based	 on	 the	meeting	with	Okello	 in	
June	1963,	competition	was	peaking	between	the	Mboya	right	wing	and	the		Odinga	left	
wing		for	seats	in	the	future	government.	Kenyatta	placed	himself	in	the	middle	between	
the	 competing	 factions,	 which	 allowed	 him	 to	 balance	 strategically	 between	 the	 two	
camps.		
Kenyan	 foreign	 political	 orientation	 was	 very	 much	 predetermined	 by	 its	
previous	relations	with	Britain	and	the	fact	that	Britain	maintained	a	strong	position	in	
Kenya	after	independence.	At	first	in	1962	Kenyatta	was	not	overly	fond	of	the	British,	
but	he	had	 to	accept	 their	economic	significance	 for	 the	 sake	of	Kenya’s	development.	
Another	determinant	of	Kenya’s	 foreign	policy	was	the	Cold	War	rivalry	that	was	very	
much	 present	 in	 East	 Africa	 in	 this	 period.	 East	 and	West	were	 already	 competing	 to	
establish	 efficient	 relations	with	 Kenya	 even	 before	 Independence.	 The	 USA	 provided	
Tom	Mboya	with	some	technical	and	educational	assistance,	but	otherwise	they	treated	
Kenya	 as	 being	 in	 Britain’s	 sphere	 of	 influence	 and	 did	 not	 choose	 to	 seek	 full‐scale	
economic	 and	 political	 engagement	 there.	 The	 USA	 continued	 to	 provide	 Kenya	 with	
educational	and	technical	assistance	after	independence,	but	their	intentions	did	not	go	
much	beyond	this.	On	the	other	hand,	socialist	countries	also	established	relations	with	
Kenya	 and	 their	 ambitions	 were	 stronger.	 They	 believed	 that	 by	 providing	 generous	
technical	assistance	 they	would	be	able	 to	attract	Kenya’s	allegiance	and	eventually	 to	
implant	 socialism	 in	 Kenya.	 Nevertheless	 it	 was	 Britain	who	 had	 the	 best	 position	 in	
Kenya	both	pre‐	and	post‐independence.	‘The	British,	meanwhile,	still	controlled	much	of	
                                                            
302  For  example  Dr  Pavel  T.  the  chairman  of  Commission  for  Foreign  Students´  Affairs  at  Vysoká  Škola 
Ekonomická was registered as a contact and up until 1968 regularly informed his managing organ. 
133 
 
the	 civil	 service,	and	worked	quietly	 to	ensure	 that	Kenya	 started	on	a	path	of	 stability,	
bureaucratic	 efficiency	 and	 economic	 growth.	 Since	 they	 believed	 this	 could	 only	 be	
achieved	under	a	non‐communist	system,	they	 ‘educated’	the	new	government	in	the	need	
for	moderation.’303			
Officially,	Kenya	declared	its	external	relations	to	be	based	on	the	notion	of	non‐
alignment.	 In	 reality,	 and	 in	 comparison	 with	 Tanganyikan	 commitment	 to	 the	 non‐
aligned	movement,	 this	 never	 fully	 translated	 into	 practical	 actions.	 British	 retained	 a	
substantial	 influence	 not	 only	 in	 the	 economy,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 security	 and	 military	
spheres.	As	in	the	case	of	Tanganyika’s	President	Nyerere,	 in	Kenya	it	was	the	nation’s	
leader’s	 personal	 interest	 and	 preference	 that	more	 or	 less	 determined	 the	 country’s	
foreign	political	orientation.	After	a	slow	and	chilly	start,	relations	between	the	British	
and	Kenyatta	gradually	improved.	Between	1962	and	1964	‘Kenyatta’s	personal	relations	
with	the	British	deepened,	and	their	commonality	of	 interest	became	clearer.	The	elderly	
leader	was	surrounded	by	ambitious	 lieutenants	who	owed	him	 little,	and	who	had	close	
ties	with	the	leading	actors	in	the	Cold	War	drama.’304	 	In	these	circumstances	Kenyatta	
made	 sure	 that	 the	British	 position	 and	 interests	 in	Kenya	were	 safeguarded,	 and	 the	
British	in	return	provided	the	country	with	military	assistance,	technical	assistance	and	
development	aid.	Kenya	occasionally	clashed	with	both	Britain	and	the	USA	over	 their	
actions	in	other	parts	of	Africa.	Most	notable	in	this	respect	was	the	Congo	crisis	and	the	
dealings	with	Southern	Rhodesia.	
.						
	
At	this	point,	Odinga	enjoyed	a	strong	position	within	KANU	due	to	his	strength	
in	 the	 Luo	 region	 but	 also	 thanks	 to	 his	 contacts	 with	 socialist	 countries.	 Before	 and	
immediately	 after	 independence	 his	 role	 in	 this	 respect	 was	 valued	 and	 welcome	 by	
Kenyatta,	 but	 soon	 the	 situation	 changed.	 Kenyatta	 decided	 to	 position	 himself	 in	
between	 the	 two	 rival	 fractions,	 not	 only	 within	 KANU,	 but	 he	 hoped	 to	 manoeuvre	
Kenya	after	independence	into	a	similar	position	in	between	two	global	political	camps,	
at	 least	 for	 the	 time	 being.	 While	 good	 contacts	 with	 the	 USA	 and	 the	 UK	 were	
guaranteed	through	Kenyatta	himself	and	through	Mboya’s	connections	in	the	American	
government,	 good	 relations	with	 the	 socialist	 camp	were	 the	 responsibility	 of	 Odinga	
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and	his	wing.305	However,	Kenyatta’s	 flirt	with	 socialist	 countries	was	 to	 be	 over	 very	
soon.	After	independence	Odinga’s	and	Kenyatta’s	opinions	on	Kenyan	external	policies	
drifted	 far	 apart.	 Odinga	 advocated	 Kenya’s	 pursuing	 a	 more	 subtle	 neutral	 foreign	
policy	close	to	the	non‐aligned	movement	as	 it	was	becoming	apparent	that	 links	with	
Britain	 and	 the	West	 far	 outweighed	 those	 with	 the	 East.	 Kenyatta	 meanwhile,	 after	
initial	manoeuvring,	 set	 the	 foreign	political	 orientation	 of	Kenya	 very	 firmly	 towards	
the	 West.	 Internal	 ideological	 conflict	 between	 Mboya’s	 conservatives	 and	 Odinga’s	
radicals	increasingly	affected	relations	with	socialist	countries.		
	
3.2. Czechoslovakia	and	independent	Kenya	‐	from	high	hopes	to	
marginalisation	
Soon	 after	 independence	 KANU	 became	 an	 undisputed	 leading	 political	 force,	
after	 members	 of	 the	 rival	 KADU,	 such	 as	 Daniel	 arap	 Moi	 or	 Ezekiel	 Barngatuny,	
dissolved	their	organisation	and	joined	KANU.306	KADU	was	in	a	rather	difficult	position	
right	 from	 the	 start	 as	 it	 had	 in	 KANU	 a	 very	 strong	 and	 capable	 rival	 for	 political	
dominance	in	Kenya.	In	the	1961	elections	KANU	emerged	clearly	victorious	and	it	was	
only	due	to	British	pressure	that	the	grand	coalition	government	was	formed	in	1962	to	
lead	Kenya	towards	the	1963	elections	and	later	towards	independence.	The	May	1963	
elections	decided	political	power	 in	Kenya	after	 the	 imminent	 independence	would	be	
clearly	 dominated	 by	 the	 KANU.	 KADU’s	 reaction	 was	 untypical	 for	 African	 political	
practice	 in	 this	 period,	 when	 most	 states	 were	 experiencing	 growing	 competition	
between	ruling	and	opposition	parties	leading	eventually	in	many	cases	to	the	growth	of	
executive’s	authoritarianism	and	later	to	the	introduction	of	a	one‐party	system.	KADU	
leaders	 opted	 for	 a	 different	 future.	 ‘Partly	 enticed	 by	 offers	 of	 co‐optation	 and	 partly	
threatened	by	what	might	happen	to	members	of	a	disloyal	opposition,	KADU	members	of	
Parliament	 soon	 began	 to	 cross	 the	 floor.	 On	 the	 first	 anniversary	 of	 independence	 in	
December	1964	 the	opposition	dissolved	 itself	and	 its	 remaining	members	 joined	KANU,	
creating	a	de	 facto	single‐party	state.’307	Meanwhile	the	KANU	government	had	already	
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eliminated	 all	 the	 federalism	 notions	 that	 the	 British	 had	 insisted	 on	 having	
incorporated	 in	 Kenya’s	 pre‐independence	 Constitution.	 During	 1964	 the	 KANU	
leadership	 introduced	 far‐reaching	 legislative	 changes	 that	 cancelled	 most	 local	
government	power	and	centralised	executive	power	in	the	hands	of	the	national	cabinet.			
KANU’s	government	faced	first	crisis	just	one	month	after	the	independence.	On	
21	 January	1964	 the	 first	 of	 the	East	African	 army	mutinies	 started	 in	Dar	 es	 Salaam.	
Tanganyika,	 Uganda	 and	 Kenya	 all	 inherited	military	 forces,	 previously	 known	 as	 the	
King’s	African	Rifles	(KAR),	from	the	colonial	administration,	and	with	them	the	source	
of	potential	disruption	due	to	a	number	of	grievances	the	soldiers	had.	The	first	mutiny	
broke	out	in	Tanganyika,	and	it	encouraged	the	Ugandan	soldiery	to	follow	suit.		Kenya	
had	received	its	independence	only	three	weeks	earlier	and	the	political	situation	in	the	
country	was	thus	quite	volatile.	Kenyatta	was	aware	that	the	mutinies	in	Tanganyika	and	
Uganda	 would	 most	 likely	 inspire	 Kenyan	 soldiers	 and	 he	 took	 the	 necessary	
precautions	 by	 asking	 British	 to	 provide	 him	 with	 military	 assistance	 should	 such	 a	
development	 take	 place.	 Kenyatta	 was	 correct	 to	 anticipate	 this,	 because	 the	 Kenyan	
forces’	 complaints	 over	 low	 pay	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 example	 set	 by	 others	 did	
eventually	result	in	attempted	mutiny.		
Mutiny	 broke	 out	 on	 24	 January	 with	 soldiers	 refusing	 to	 follow	 orders.	
Mutineers	took	control	of	the	camp,	arrested	their	commanding	officer	and	demanded	a	
pay	 rise.	 The	 whole	 affair	 was	 	 fairly	 disorganised	 and	 poorly	 managed.	 The	 British	
reaction	 to	 the	mutiny	was	 swift	 and	 effective.	A	British	unit	 stationed	nearby	moved	
towards	the	occupied	camp	and,	after	a	short	clash	and	two	casualties	on	the	mutineers’	
side,	 gained	 control.308	 Other	 British	 units	 meanwhile	 spread	 around	 the	 capital	 and	
took	control	of	strategically	 important	posts.	 In	 the	course	of	 the	next	 few	months	the	
perpetrators	 of	 the	mutiny	were	 tried	 and	 sentenced	 to	 between	 11	 and	 15	 years	 of	
imprisonment.		
Kenya’s	response	to	the	1964	mutiny	and	subsequent	military	development	was	
notably	different	 from	 that	of	Tanzania	 and	Uganda.	Uganda	 reacted	 to	 the	mutiny	by	
speeding	up	process	of	Africanisation	whereby	all	of	the	remaining	British	officers	were	
quickly	 dismissed.	 In	 the	 years	 that	 followed,	 the	Ugandan	 President	Obote	 sought	 to	
develop	the	Ugandan	army	by	intense	special	cooperation	with	foreign	countries	such	as	
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Israel	or	Czechoslovakia,	but	he	also	retained	many	aspects	of	traditional	British	military	
organisation.	Meanwhile,	a	similar	mutiny	in	Tanganyika	meant	an	ultimate	break	with	
British	 military	 tradition.	 Tanganyika	 reacted	 to	 the	 mutiny	 which	 had	 seriously	
challenged	 the	 country’s	political	 stability,	 by	dissolving	 the	national	 army	 completely	
and	 rebuilding	 it	 on	 a	 very	 different	 basis	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 political	 militia.	 Also,	 in	
Tanganyika’s	 case	 external	 military	 aid,	 in	 this	 case	 mostly	 provided	 by	 Canada	 and	
China,	was	needed	to	accomplish	military	reform.		
On	the	question	of	military	reform	Kenya’s	reaction	to	mutiny	was	the	mildest	
response	of	 the	three,	perhaps	because	the	mutiny	had	never	had	a	chance	to	escalate	
fully	 and	 thus	 did	 not	 seriously	 challenge	 the	 political	 stability	 of	 the	 country.	 The	
Kenyan	government	did	not	 choose	 to	 go	 for	 any	 far‐reaching	 structural	 reform	of	 its	
army	 following	 the	 mutiny,	 except	 for	 trying	 to	 change	 the	 ethnic	 structure	 of	 the	
service.	While	before	the	mutiny	the	army	was	dominated	by	the	warrior	 tribes	of	 the	
Kalenjin	and	the	Kamba,	in	the	following	years	the	government	encouraged	an	influx	of	
Kikuyu	 recruits.309	 Kenya	 retained	 the	 British	 influence	 in	 its	 army	 fully,	 310	 despite	
signals	 extended	 towards	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 that	 clearly	 indicated	 otherwise.	 The	
Kenyan	 army	 retained	 its	 British	 commanding	 officer	 until	 1966	when	 he	was	 finally	
replaced	by	a	Kenyan,	but	a	number	of	British	officers	still	remained	in	post	even	after	
this.		
Even	though	the	Kenyan	army	mutiny	never	escalated	into	a	full‐blown	crisis	or	
attempted	coup	d’état,	 it	 still	had	surprisingly	 far‐reaching	effects	on	 the	country.	The	
news	of	the	army	mutiny	in	Kenya	had	a	negative,	but	luckily	only	a	temporary	impact	
on	 the	 country’s	 tourist	 industry.	 ‘A	more	 far‐reaching	 result	was	 the	 effect	 upon	 the	
government’s	attitude	to	real	or	 imagined	subversion.’311	In	the	aftermath	of	the	mutiny	
Kenyatta	became	increasingly	worried	about	a	Communist	plot	against	the	government.	
Odinga	blamed	this	fear	on	‘highly	imaginative	and	slanted	intelligence	reports	delivered	
daily	 to	 Prime	 Minister	 by	 British,	 British‐trained	 or	 British‐influenced	 intelligence	
officers.’312	 This	 newly	 acquired	 fear	 of	 hostile	 foreign	 intervention	 resulted	 in	 the	
government’s	decision	 to	 limit	 the	number	of	 staff	 at	 foreign	embassies	 in	Kenya.	Not	
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only	the	Kenyan	and	British	governments	but	also	a	number	of	East	African	as	well	as	
Western	 media	 at	 the	 time	 saw	 the	 mutinies	 as	 the	 results	 of	 Communist	 countries’	
plotting.313	No	direct	link	in	any	of	the	East	African	countries	between	the	mutineers	and	
socialist	countries’	was,	however,	ever	established	and	from	today’s	perspective	it	seems	
unlikely.		
Internal	political	development	was	greatly	affected	by	the	mutiny.	‘In	the	months	
following	 the	 mutiny,	 [Kenyan]	 politics	 were	 conducted	 in	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 what	
appeared	to	be	a	drawn‐out	crisis.	This	could	not	be	attributed	only	to	the	revolt	because	
there	were	other	important	influences	such	as	the	continuing	Somali	threat	on	the	north‐
western	border	and	reports	of	renewed	Mau‐Mau	oath‐taking	ceremonies	in	the	bush.	But	
the	mutiny	was	 certainly	 significant.	 The	 years	 1964	 and	 1965	were	 years	 of	 growing	
conservatism	 in	 Kenya,	 leading	 to	 the	 final	 isolation	 of	 Odinga	 and	 the	 radicalism	 he	
personified.’314	The	mutiny	 certainly	added	a	new	 factor	of	distrust	 to	 the	 relationship	
between	Kenyatta	and	his	second‐in‐command	Odinga,	who	was	known	to	have	strong	
ties	with	socialist	countries.	Kenyatta	considered	these	links	useful	initially,	but	with	his	
growing	fears	of	conspiracies	against	the	government,	he	viewed	Odinga’s	socialist	links	
with	increasing	suspicion.		
It	is	difficult	to	explain	what	purpose	Kenyatta	was	pursuing	when	he	met	with	
Odinga	to	discuss	in	some	detail	the	arrangements	for	military	technical	assistance	to	be	
provided	 by	 Czechoslovakia,	 (particulars	 of	 which	 are	 provided	 in	 the	 following	
paragraphs)	 only	 weeks	 after	 the	 mutiny.	 Did	 Kenyatta	 seriously	 contemplate	 an	
alternative	course	of	development	for	Kenya’s	military	in	the	aftermath	of	the	mutiny?	Is	
it	 possible	 that	 his	 aim	 in	 retaining	 British	 officers	 and	 upholding	 British	 military	
tradition	 was	 not	 always	 as	 definite	 as	 it	 might	 seem	 from	 today’s	 perspective?	 It	 is	
probably	 impossible	 to	 establish	 whether	 Kenyatta’s	 interest	 in	 special	 military	
cooperation	 with	 Czechoslovakia	 was	 genuine,	 or	 whether	 he	 merely	 saw	 it	 as	 an	
opportunity	to	get	hold	of	cheap	or	free	special	material	while	not	making	any	political	
concessions.		
	
After	 independence,	 relations	 between	 Kenya	 and	 the	 CSSR	 continued	 to	
develop	 in	 several	 spheres	 –	 standard	 political	 relations,	 trade	 relations,	 cultural	
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exchange,	 technical	 and	 educational	 assistance.	 Their	 importance	 was,	 however,	
surpassed	by	the	special	cooperation	which	interlinked	with	all	these	other	forms,	and	
eventually	became	the	main	formative	power	of	relations	between	Kenya	and	the	CSSR.	
Via	its	support	of	Oginga	Odinga’s	wing	Czechoslovakia	aspired	to	limit	British	influence	
in	Kenya,	to	defeat	the	pro‐western	faction	in	the	Kenya	government	and	to	incorporate	
this	most	important	East	African	country	tightly	into	the	socialist	camp.		
The	 declaration	 of	 independence	 represented	 a	 beginning	 of	 a	 new	 era	 in	
cooperation	between	Czechoslovakia	and	Kenya.	A	positive	CS	 contribution	 to	 success	
for	 the	 KANU	 NLM	 cause	 was	 a	 good	 starting	 point	 for	 cooperation	 with	 the	 newly	
independent	Kenya.	The	CS	MFA	also	participated	directly	 in	 the	glorious	event	of	 the	
declaration	of	independence,	by	providing	KANU	with	material	and	financial	support	to	
organise	it.315	The	MFA	also	sent	out	a	diplomatic	delegation	to	the	celebrations.	Without	
delay,	the	CS	administration	began	activities	towards	establishing	a	CS	diplomatic	office	
in	Nairobi	 in	February	1964.	With	 the	assistance	of	CS	diplomats	 from	the	embassy	 in	
Dar	Es	Salaam	and	 in	cooperation	with	members	of	 the	official	ČTK	mission,	who	had	
arrived	in	Nairobi	some	time	previously,	MFA	officials	managed	to	open	a	CS	embassy	in	
Nairobi	in	a	matter	of	weeks.			
The	 newly‐opened	 embassy	 became	 the	 main	 official	 channel	 of	 contact	
between	 the	 two	countries	and	members	of	 this	diplomatic	office	became	vital	 for	 the	
further	 development	 of	 official	 political	 relations.	 The	 Kenya	 embassy	 became	 the	
crucial	office	for	the	success	of	Czechoslovak	penetration	into	the	high	political	game	of	
independent	 East	 Africa.	 The	 diplomatic	 duties	 at	 this	 mission	 exceeded	 the	 usual	
agenda	of	an	embassy	in	many	respects.	The	office	was	approached,	on	a	regular	basis,	
by	various	Kenyan	politicians	with	unofficial	 requests	 for	scholarships	 for	 their	 family	
members,316	as	a	university	degree	from	the	CSSR	was	at	this	point	still	perceived	as	the	
guarantee	of	a	successful	professional	career.	To	buy	the	allegiance	of	these	politicians,	
the	CS	administration	did	all	 it	could	 to	accede	 to	 their	requests.	The	CS	embassy	also	
processed	 most	 of	 the	 communications	 between	 the	 various	 cultural	 or	 civil	 society	
organisations	such	as	trade	unions,	youth	organisations	or	agricultural	cooperatives.317		
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The	classified	objectives	of	several	members	of	this	diplomatic	office	became	at	
least	 as	 important	 as	 the	 official	 activities.	 As	 was	 often	 the	 case	 in	 this	 period	 of	
Czechoslovak	activism	across	Africa,	diplomatic	posts	were	used	as	an	effective	cover	for	
intelligence	 officers.	 The	 Nairobi	 embassy	 became	 the	 base	 for	 the	 StB	 operatives’	
Residency	 very	 soon	 after	 its	 formation.	 For	 some	 years	 the	 unofficial	 activities	 of	
embassy	staff	were	of	much	greater	importance	than	their	official	diplomatic	duties.	In	
many	 cases	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 activities	 of	 StB	 operatives,	
disguised	as	diplomats,	were	being	carried	out	as	part	of	their	diplomatic	mission	or	as	a	
part	of	their	special	activities.				
The	 Nairobi	 embassy	 became	 the	 main	 point	 of	 contact	 for	 Odinga	 and	 his	
colleagues	 with	 their	 main	 foreign	 ally.	 All	 further	 cooperation	 and	 strategy	 was	
discussed	 and	 agreed	upon	via	 this	 office.	While	Odinga’s	 own	 contacts	with	 embassy	
officials,	in	most	cases,	fell	under	the	category	of	official	political	relations	and	were	not	
of	a	particularly	classified	nature,	contacts	with	some	of	his	closest	colleagues	were	of	a	
far	 more	 unorthodox	 nature.	 As	 most	 of	 these	 people	 had	 recently	 received	 high	
positions	 in	 the	 Kenyan	 administration,	 meetings	 with	 them	 were	 prime	 sources	 of	
information	from	the	highest	levels	of	Kenyan	government	and	reports	of	such	meetings	
were	regularly	delivered	to	the	Czechoslovak	MFA,	the	Interior	Ministry	and	the	StB	for	
analysis	and	strategic	planning.		
The	 first	 meetings	 with	 Odinga	 in	 his	 position	 as	 Minister	 were	 held	 by	 the	
provisional	 chargé	 d’affaires	 of	 the	 CS	 embassy,	 Mr	 Veselý,	 in	 Spring	 1964.	 Veselý,	
reported	 every	meeting	with	 Odinga	 in	 detail	 to	 the	MFA	 in	 Prague.	 Headquarters	 in	
Prague	perceived	the	maintenance	of	close	political	cooperation	with	Minister	Odinga	as	
a	main	condition	for	an	effective	means	for	intervening	in	Kenya’s	political	development.	
At	 this	point	Odinga	was	 the	second	highest	Kenyan	official	with	real	 influence	on	 the	
country’s	 policy‐making,	 both	 in	 domestic	 matters	 as	 well	 as	 abroad.	 In	 1964	 MFA	
strategists’	 confidence	 in	 Odinga’s	 devotion	 to	 turning	 Kenya	 towards	 socialism	 was	
very	 high.	 In	 his	 regular	 contacts	 with	 CS	 embassy	 staff	 Odinga	 was	 reported	 as	
believing	that	Kenya	intended	to	cooperate	closely	with	the	countries	of	socialist	camp.	
‘He	said	that	he	was	counting	on	our	help.	He	also	said	that	Kenya	intended	to	use	the	good	
experiences	of	socialist	countries	when	building	a	politically	and	economically	independent	
Kenya.	He	also	declared	 that	we	 should	not	be	mistaken,	when	nowadays	 it	 is	 spoken	of	
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African	socialism	in	Africa,	as	the	main	principles	of	socialism	are	the	same	throughout	the	
whole	world.’318	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Odinga’s	 contacts	 with	 the	 East	 were	 soon	 to	 be	 used	
against	 him,	 his	 activities	 in	 this	 respect	 during	 1964	 and	 1965	 were	 in	 line	 with	
Kenyatta’s	early	foreign	policy	after	independence.	Kenyatta’s	strategy	at	this	point	was	
to	position	Kenya	 in	between	both	 camps	and	 to	 strengthen	 the	 country’s	position	by	
receiving	 support	 from	 both	 blocs.	 While	 the	 dense	 net	 of	 relations	 linked	 Kenya	 to	
Britain,	 the	US	and	other	western	 countries,	 the	quality	and	 intensity	of	 contacts	with	
the	East	was	much	 lower.	Odinga	 represented	 the	only	 vital	 link	between	 the	Kenyan	
state	 and	 socialist	 bloc	 countries	 and	 he	 enjoyed	 the	 trust	 of	 both	 the	 USSR	 and	
Czechoslovakia.	 In	 this	 respect	 for	 Kenyatta	 and	 Kenyan	 politics	 Odinga	 was	 of	 the	
greatest	importance	as	his	links	with	East	allowed	Kenyatta	to	exert	the	pressure	on	the	
West	by	 implying	that	the	real	alternative	 for	Kenya	 lay	east	of	 the	Berlin	wall.	 In	 this	
sense	Odinga	 fully	 satisfied	 the	political	needs	of	 the	Kenyan	 state.	To	what	 extent	he	
maintained	 contacts	 with	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 with	 a	 view	 to	 furthering	 his	 own	
personal	 political	 ambition	 is	 difficult	 to	 assess.	 No	 hard	 evidence	 is	 traceable	 in	 CS	
archives	 that	would	 justify	 accusations	made	 against	Odinga	 in	1966	 that	 some	of	 his	
activities	 were	 aimed	 against	 Kenyatta	 as	 the	 head	 of	 KANU	 and	 against	 the	 Kenyan	
state	 itself.	Some	documents	 from	late	1965	and	from	1966,	 the	 time	when	the	strong	
anti‐socialist	campaign	aimed	at	Odinga	peaked,	indicated	that	his	contacts	with	the	CS	
embassy	 did	 not	 lack	 personal	 political	 ambitions	 and	 that	 Odinga	 was	 growing	
increasingly	discontent	with	his	position	in	the	government	as	well	as	in	KANU.		
In	 his	 capacity	 as	 Interior	 Minister,	 and	 from	 December	 1964	 as	 a	 vice‐
president,	 Odinga	 maintained	 intensive	 official	 contacts	 with	 the	 CSSR,	 which	 was	 a	
more	 acceptable	 partner	 than	 the	 feared	 Soviets.	 In	 1964	Odinga	 did	 indeed	 visit	 the	
Soviet	Union,	where	he	negotiated	a	loan	of	40	million	roubles	and	credit	for	purchasing	
Soviet	commodities	to	the	tune	of	another	13	million	roubles,	but	the	execution	of	this	
plan	was	halted	by	the	Kenyan	government.	According	to	the	economic	agreement,	both	
parties	signed	up	for	several	large	investment	projects,	including	a	textile	factory,	a	fish‐
processing	plant,	an	irrigation	project,	a	large	hospital	and	some	others.319	Most	of	these	
plans	remained	on	paper	as	economic	cooperation	with	the	East	was	put	under	immense	
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pressure	 by	 Britain,	 which	 retained	 tight	 control	 over	 large	 segments	 of	 the	 Kenyan	
economy.320	Once	the	Soviets	urged	implementation	of	the	agreement,	Tom	Mboya	was	
delegated	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 issue,	 a	 clear	 sign	 that	 Kenyatta	 did	 not	 really	 want	
cooperation	with	the	Soviets	to	develop,	and	Mboya’s	manoeuvring	during	the	Moscow	
meeting	 led	 to	 the	 abandonment	 of	 the	 agreed	 cooperation.	 This	 strategy	 clearly	
indicates	that	at	this	point	planning	of	economic	and	political	cooperation	with	the	East	
lacked	 Kenyatta’s	 real	 political	 support.	 It	 was	 becoming	 obvious	 that	 despite	
declarations	of	wanting	 to	build	African	socialism,	Kenya	was	set	clearly	on	 its	way	to	
the	western	bloc.	This	fact	had	clear	implications	for	Odinga	and	his	position	within	the	
Kenyan	government.	A	bleak	future	for	Odinga	meant	no	bright	future	for	Czechoslovak	
plans	in	Kenya	either.								
Odinga	was	undoubtedly	a	crucial	man	for	CS	plans	for	Kenya,	but	MFA	experts	
were	aware	of	certain	limitations	linked	to	his	person	even	before	his	eventual	fall	from	
power.	As	there	was	virtually	no	alternative	he	was	however	the	only	choice	available.	
An	analytical	paper	from	Czechoslovak	MFA’s	on	Odinga’s	role	in	Kenyan	government	in	
1966	states	that	 ‘[t]he	disadvantage	of	cooperation	with	Odinga	and	his	group	is	that	he	
himself	and	all	of	his	co‐workers	come	from	the	Luo	tribe,	therefore	our	cooperation	with	
this	 group	 could	 be	 used	 as	 a	 pretext	 for	 action	 against	 us.’321	 	 With	 the	 growing	
dominance	 of	 Kikuyu	 people	 from	 around	 President	 Kenyatta,	 Odinga’s	 position	 was	
becoming	steadily	weaker.	CS	strategists	were	aware	of	the	risk	that	Odinga’s	potential	
fall	would	leave	them	isolated	from	top	politics	in	Kenya.		
In	cooperation	with	intelligence	the	MFA	tried	to	widen	the	spectrum	of	CS	co‐
operators	 in	 the	 country	 as	 early	 as	 in	 1964	 but	 with	 limited	 success.	 The	 internal	
directive	 from	1964	 set	 a	 clear	 objective.	 ‘It	will	be	necessary	 to	 seek	 tighter	 relations	
with	people	around	Kenyatta	himself	and	those	who	represent	the	most	powerful	tribe	of	
Kikuyu	in	the	administration.	Even	though	this	issue	might	seem	marginal,	it	must	not	be	
overlooked.	Tribal	 rivalries	 that	were	backtracked	during	 the	 struggle	 for	 independence	
reached	the	new	intensity	after	independence	was	granted,	especially	when	the	seats	in	the	
emerging	 state	apparatus	were	awarded,	and	 it	 is	necessary	 to	be	aware	of	 this	 fact.’322	
Fully	in	line	with	the	above	statement,	CS	diplomats	in	Kenya	tried	to	maintain	regular	
contact	with	Kenyatta	himself	and,	 in	 the	 first	 few	years,	 they	were	successful.	Chargé	
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d’affaires	 Veselý	 had	 already	 had	 two	meetings	with	 Kenyatta	 in	March	 1964,	 during	
which	Kenyatta	 expressed	a	willingness	 to	 cooperate	 further	with	 the	CSSR.	 ‘Kenyatta	
[…]	proclaimed,	that	he	welcomes	our	presence	 in	Kenya	and	he	promised	us	 full	support	
during	 all	 our	 operations/activities	 in	Kenya.	 […]	Kenyatta	 expressed	 his	willingness	 to	
cooperate	with	us	closely	 in	diverse	 spheres	and	asked	us	 for	 specific	help	 in	 the	 field	of	
country’s	defence	since	the	British	military	troops	will	depart	from	Kenya	at	the	end	of	the	
year.’323	
In	 the	 first	 months	 of	 his	 diplomatic	 mission	 Mr	 Veselý	 met	 almost	 all	 the	
members	 of	 Kenyatta’s	 cabinet	 and	 he	 was	 surprised	 by	 the	 warm	welcome	 and	 the	
willingness	to	cooperate	that	he	met	with	at	most	of	the	Ministries.	Among	the	priorities	
of	official	bilateral	 cooperation	he	 recommended	contact	with	Kenyan	Health	Minister	
Dr	Njoroge	Mungai	along	with	the	agreed	technical	assistance.	Minister	Mungai	had,	at	
the	first	meeting	presented	several	suggestions	for	cooperation.	As	Kenya	was	willing	to	
cover	 the	 greater	 part	 of	 the	 costs	 for	 the	 suggested	 hospital‐building	 projects,	 Mr	
Veselý	 saw	 the	 proposed	 cooperation	 as	 economically	 feasible	 and	 he	 recommended	
inviting	Dr	Mungai	to	the	CSSR	at	the	first	opportunity.324	The	most	surprising	and,	in	the	
given	 circumstances,	 somewhat	 suspicious	 aspect	 was	 the	meeting	 with	 Tom	Mboya,	
recently	appointed	Minister	of	Justice.	Veselý	reported	on	this	meeting	as	follows:	‘[He]	
declared	that	he	was	always	in	favour	of	close	cooperation	with	us,	and	that	in	government	
he	will	personally	support	every	suggestion	to	cooperate	with	the	CSSR.	This	statement	of	
his	 is	even	more	peculiar,	as	 it	 is	publicly	known	that	he	 is	a	pro‐American	exponent.	[…]	
Minister	T.	Mboya	himself	is	very	active	in	a	whole	range	of	other	issues	and	expresses	his	
opinion	 on	 problems	 of	 women,	 African	 unity,	 South	 Africa	 and	 many	 others.	 All	 his	
speeches	 are	 prepared	 by	 a	 group	 of	 five	 American	 experts,	 specialists	 on	 different	
economic	 and	 political	 matters.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 his	 declarations	 about	
cooperation	with	us	are	more	or	 less	hypocritical	and	were	 intended	to	cover	up	his	true	
orientation.’	325		
The	 above	 report	 of	Mboya’s	 unusual	 attitude	 towards	 CS	 officials	 is	 in	 clear	
conflict	with	his	political	orientation	and	all	his	political	activities.	In	the	given	historical	
circumstances,	 however,	 it	 can	 be	 used	 to	 interpret	 the	 strategy	 that	 the	 Kenyan	
government	was	using	 in	relation	to	the	CSSR.	This	strategy,	most	 likely	prescribed	by	
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Kenyatta	himself,	was	very	 similar	 to	 the	 affair	 (previously	discussed)	 that	 took	place	
during	the	second	round	of	Lancaster	House	negotiations	 in	1962,	when	contacts	with	
the	CS	government	helped	Kenyans	to	exert	pressure	on	the	Western	countries.	In	1964,	
cooperation	with	the	CSSR	and	a	hinted‐at	cooperation	with	the	USSR	were	more	or	less	
feasible	 economic	 and	 political	 alternatives	 to	 Kenyan	 relations	with	 the	West.	 Or,	 at	
least,	that	was	the	message	being	directed	to	the	UK	and	US	policymakers.	It	had	to	be	
made	 clear	 to	 the	 British,	 in	 control	 of	 large	 parts	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 economy,	 that	 the	
opportunity	to	cooperate	economically	with	the	Soviet	camp	was	a	valid	option,	and	that	
technical	cooperation	with	 the	CSSR	 in	 the	special	sphere,	could	help	Kenya	overcome	
the	departure	of	British	police	and	military	experts.	This	is	the	only	explanation	for	the	
sudden	 desire,	 in	 even	 the	 most	 unexpected	 Kenyan	 politicians,	 to	 seek	 close	
cooperation	with	the	CSSR.	Cautiousness	and	suspicion	regarding	this	development	can	
be	traced	in	the	reports	of	CS	diplomats	in	Kenya.	Nevertheless,	the	slow	realisation	that	
Kenyatta,	Mboya	and	other	right‐wing	politicians	were	playing	the	socialist	card	only	to	
improve	their	bargaining	position	with	the	West	was	becoming	ever	more	apparent	as	
from	late	1965.		
In	 the	 first	months	 of	 his	mission	 in	Nairobi,	 chargé	d’affaires	 Veselý	was	not	
only	 busy	 with	 official	 protocol	 meetings,	 but	 aiming	 to	 establish	 the	 system	 for	 a	
working	 cooperation	 with	 the	 left‐wing	 KANU,	 who	 were	 repeatedly	 approaching	 CS	
officials	with	requests	for	assistance,	especially	in	providing	training	for	their	cadres.	In	
relation	to	civil	technical	assistance,	Veselý	received	the	following	instructions:		
‐ Begin	negotiations	with	Minister	Odinga	about	help	for	the	left	wing	of	
KANU	
‐ Negotiations	about	the	air	route	Prague‐Nairobi	
‐ Negotiations	about	cultural	agreements	
‐ Enquire	if	Kenya	still	interested	in	the	CS	planning	experts’	mission.326	
	
The	 activities	 of	 Veselý	 and	 his	 provisional	 team	 prepared	 the	 ground	 for	
several	 expert	 missions	 while	 some	 others	 took	 place	 without	 the	 Nairobi	 embassy.	
Already	by	March	1964	the	trade	delegation	had	managed	to	secure	the	trade	agreement	
and	 the	 scientific‐technological	 cooperation	 agreement	 with	 the	 Kenyan	 government.	
The	MFA	considered	the	trade	agreement	a	core	document	for	effective	future	relations	
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with	 Kenya	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 trade	 exchange	 with	 Kenya,	 despite	 the	 past	 obstacles,	
reached	10	million	Kčs	in	1965	excluding	any	loans	or	technical	help.327	The	shortcoming	
of	 the	 agreed	 covenant	was	 the	 condition	 of	 balanced	 payments	 that	was	 limiting	 CS	
exports	to	Kenya.	
Official	 political	 relations	 between	 CS	 ambassador	Mr	 Roškot,	who	 eventually	
replaced	Veselý,	 and	members	of	 the	Kenyan	cabinet,	 continued	 throughout	1965	and	
several	 suggestions	 for	 ministerial	 visits	 were	 raised	 by	 both	 sides.	 For	 a	 variety	 of	
reasons	none	of	these	plans	materialised	and	neither	did	any	negotiations	for	the	long‐
planned	 cultural	 agreement.	 Despite	 strong	 competition	 from	well‐established	 British	
and	American	companies,	 as	well	as	 from	the	Chinese	government,	a	positive	 trend	 in	
trade	exchange	between	the	CSSR	and	Kenya	was	visible	throughout	the	1960s.	In	1965	
trade	amounted	to	some	17	million	KČS	and	Kenya	was	one	of	the	few	African	countries	
to	enjoy	a	positive	balance	of	trade	with	the	CSSR.	Limited	successes	were	also	recorded	
in	 the	 sphere	 of	 civil	 technical	 assistance,	which	 officially	 started	 after	 the	 inter‐state	
agreement	was	signed	in	1964.328	Cooperation	with	Kenyan	broadcasters	and	journalists	
was	also	proving	promising	and	fruitful.329		
From	 the	 beginning	 of	 1965	 the	 reports	 from	 the	 CS	 embassy	 concerning	 the	
internal	 political	 situation	 in	 Kenya	 start	 to	 show	 a	 sceptical	 view	 of	 the	 position	 of	
Odinga’s	wing	 in	 the	government.	There	 is	also	more	obvious	desperation	 in	meetings	
with	Odinga	himself	and	his	colleagues,	who	were	slowly	getting	ousted	 from	decisive	
positions	within	 the	administration.	 	Growing	discontent	was	especially	 related	 to	 the	
isolation	of	 alumni	 of	 special	 courses	 as	well	 as	 civil	 courses	 from	 the	CSSR,	who	had	
hoped	 to	 receive	 high	 posts	 within	 the	 Kenyan	 administration,	 security	 and	 army.	
Instead,	 in	many	 cases,	 Kenyan	 graduates	 from	 the	 CSSR	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 suspicion,	
limited	 access	 to	 important	 posts	 and	 poor	 career	 prospects.330	 Despite	 all	 this,	 MFA	
analysts	still	believed	that	Odinga’s	strong	position	amongst	the	thousands	of	ordinary	
members	of	KANU,	as	well	as	his	ethnic	ties	to	West	Kenya,	gave	some	hope	for	political	
change	in	his	favour,	especially	as	the	right	wing	of	KANU	was	fragmented	into	several	
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rival	 fractions,	 and	 the	 highly	 feared	 Tom	 Mboya	 also	 failed	 to	 acquire	 a	 decisive	
position	in	the	administration.	As	Odinga	and	his	collaborators	slowly	began	to	lose	their	
leading	positions	 in	 the	state	apparatus,	 cooperation	between	 them	and	 the	CSSR	was	
becoming	 ever	 more	 problematic,	 even	 though	 nominally	 Odinga’s	 post	 was	 that	 of	
second	man	in	the	state.		
Odinga	 did	 not	 share	 Kenyatta’s	 political	 opinions	 on	 a	 number	 of	 crucial	
political	 aspects	 that	 were	 to	 determine	 Kenya’s	 political,	 social	 and	 economic	
development.	Before	 independence	these	 ideological	differences	were	to	a	large	extent	
muted	for	the	greater	good	of	the	anti‐colonial	cause	and	perhaps	on	the	basis	of	long‐
standing	good	personal	relations	between	Kenyatta	and	the	leader	of	Luo	people.	After	
independence,	 however,	 Kenyatta	 increasingly	 consolidated	 most	 of	 the	 executive	
power	in	his	own	hands	and	his	fellow	Kikuyu	collaborators	began	to	dominate	KANU.	
Odinga	and	some	other	KANU	leaders	such	as	Bildad	Kaggia,	a	former	Mau	Mau	activist,	
found	 themselves	 slowly	 becoming	 an	 intra‐party	 opposition	 regarded	 as	 radical	 and	
alien	to	KANU’s	political	principles	by	the	party’s	establishment	around	Kenyatta.	This	
intraparty	 division	 became	more	 apparent	 after	 the	 former	 KADU	members,	 most	 of	
whom	were	politically	moderate,	 joined	 the	party	 and	 tilted	 the	power	equilibrium	 in	
favour	of	Kenyatta’s	group	favour.331	The	period	of	1964	to	1966	saw	a	widening	intra‐
KANU	gulf	between	right‐wing	conservatives	around	Kenyatta	and	Mboya,	and	a	radical	
left‐oriented	group	of	which	Odinga	and	Kaggia	were	the	main	representatives.	Kenyatta	
at	 first	 tried	 to	 stay	 out	 of	 this	 growing	 rivalry,	 but	 he	 began	 to	 lean	more	 and	more	
towards	the	former	group.		
Both	 Odinga	 and	 Kaggia	 clashed	with	 Kenyatta	mainly	 over	 the	 issue	 of	 land	
redistribution.	 ‘Much	of	the	criticism	was	directed	at	specific	aspects	of	settlement	policy:	
the	 squatter	 problem,	 the	 future	 of	 labourers	 evicted	 from	 former	 European	 farms,	 the	
organization	of	 the	Ministry	of	Settlement,	 the	behaviour	of	 settlement	officers,	 [etc.]’332	
Even	 though	 this	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	 prove	 reliably,	 Odinga	 supposedly	 rejected	
Kenyatta’s	offer	to	acquire	large	portions	of	abandoned	land	and	instead	demanded	its	
distribution	 to	 minor	 local	 farmers.	 Kenyatta	 allegedly	 took	 Odinga’s	 rejection	 very	
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badly	 and	 their	 personal	 as	 well	 as	 professional	 relationship	 was	 marked	 by	 this	
disagreement	for	years	to	come.333	
Another	issue	which	polarised	KANU	was	the	nationalisation	of	foreign‐owned	
enterprises	which	would	have	been	a	harsh	blow	to	Britain’s	economic	interests	in	the	
country.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 KANU	 politicians	 as	 well	 as	 many	
ordinary	Kenyans	found	it	difficult	to	follow	government	policies	that	were,	as	they	saw	
it,	benefitting	the	former	colonial	power.	The	matter	was	further	politicised	by	the	fact	
that	Kenya	declared	itself	a	socialist	country,	even	though	in	reality	very	little	progress	
was	achieved	to	make	such	a	claim	valid.	Nevertheless,	partial	or	full	nationalisation	of	
large	enterprises	was	one	of	the	fundamental	pillars	of	the	socialist	system,	and	it	was	
only	 logical	 that	 some	 politicians	would	 call	 for	 its	 implementation.	 Since	 as	 early	 as	
1964,	however,	Kenyatta	himself	had	been	opposed	to	nationalisation.334	Lastly,	another	
source	 of	 ideological	 conflict	 within	 TANU	 was	 linked	 to	 already‐mentioned	
contradictory	 opinions	 of	 two	 newly‐formed	 factions	 concerning	 the	 foreign	 political	
orientation	that	Kenya	should	seek.		
During	1964	and	1965	rivalry	between	conservatives	and	radicals	began	to	affect	
cabinet	ministers’	ability	to	work	together	and	eventually	also	penetrated	the	National	
Assembly.	 After	 Independence,	 Odinga	 held	 the	 highly	 influential	 post	 of	 Interior	
Minister,	but	once	 the	Presidential	system	was	established	he	became	Kenyatta’s	vice‐
president.	 In	 some	 respects	 this	 position	 was	 perceived	 as	 less	 influential	 on	 the	
everyday	 execution	 of	 power	 in	 the	 security	 sphere,335	 but	 Odinga	 was	 formally	 and	
practically	still	the	second‐highest‐ranking	official	in	the	presidential	system.	Therefore	
Odinga’s	actions,	speeches	and	political	gestures	all	carried	substantial	political	weight	
and	were	 closely	 scrutinised.	 In	 this	period	Odinga	did	not	 refrain	 from	making	 some	
rather	 radical	 public	 statements	 in	 relation	 to	 land	 reform	 and	 the	 building	 of	
socialism.336	These	activities	of	Odinga’s	were	noted	with	increasing	discontent	by	Tom	
Mboya,	 KANU’s	 general	 secretary,	 and	 he	 challenged	 Odinga	 and	 the	 radicals	 on	 the	
grounds	 of	 their	 having	 abandoned	 official	 KANU	 policy.	 Mboya	 was	 responsible	 for	
drafting	 legislation	 on	 African	 Socialism	 and	 he	 refused	 to	 accept	 the	 radicals’	
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interpretations	of	 this	policy.	 In	 the	 following	months	Mboya	and	Odinga	became	arch	
rivals	within	KANU	and	their	conflict	was	to	determine	the	party’s	future	orientation.		
African	socialism	–	the	new	government	programme	Kenya	announced	in	1965	–	
brought	 great	 disappointment	 and	 the	 hint	 of	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 rejection	 of	 socialist	
countries.	The	nature	and	objectives	of	 this	programme	were	explained	in	a	document	
called	 ‘African	 socialism	 and	 its	 application	 in	 Kenyan	 planning’.	 Thoughts	 and	 plans	
presented	 in	 this	 document	were	 critical	 of	 the	Marxist	 version	 of	 socialism	 that	 had	
supposedly	failed.	The	paper	also	refused	to	contemplate	Kenya’s	being	a	satellite	of	any	
country	 or	 group	 of	 countries,	 and	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 maintaining	 the	
traditional	 stratification	 of	 Kenyan	 society	 which	 was	 very	 different	 from	 socialist	
perceptions	of	the	class	system.	Private	ownership	was	welcomed	and	nationalisation	of	
private	property	was	only	allowed	with	 full	 compensation.	Much	more	 subtle	was	 the	
criticism	of	capitalism	and,	even	though	the	programme’s	authors	tried	to	place	Kenya	
theoretically	in	between	the	two	systems,	the	manifesto	of	African	socialism	represented	
the	first	open	rejection	of	socialism	by	Kenyan	leaders.337		
As	 the	 conflict	 between	 Odinga	 and	 Mboya	 progressed,	 Odinga	 found	 himself	
facing	 frequent	 criticism	 about	 his	 links	 to	 socialist	 countries.	 These	 links	 certainly	
existed	and	Odinga	himself	was	open	about	them.	In	his	position	as	minister	and	later	as	
vice‐president	 Odinga	 was	 responsible	 for	 maintaining	 the	 country’s	 relations	 with	
socialist	 countries,	 most	 notably	 China	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 and	 this	 he	 did	 with	
Kenyatta’s	 approval.	 However,	 at	 later	 stages	 these	 relations	 seemed	 to	 justify	 claims	
that	Odinga	and	his	wing	were	Communist.	The	British	government,	 the	Kenyan	press	
and	Mboya’s	supporters	certainly	played	a	major	part	in	creating	an	image	of	Odinga	as	
a	 Communist	 agent;	 rumours	were	 spread	 of	 a	 coup	 d’état338	 being	 prepared	 to	 take	
place	under	Odinga’s	lead.339					
	Eventually,	 it	was	 Odinga’s	 connection	with	 Czechoslovakia	 that	was	 used	 to	
discredit	 him.	 In	 November	 1964	 several	 British	 newspapers	 printed	 the	 story	 of	
suspicious	 deliveries	 of	 special	material	 carried	 out	 by	 socialist	 Czechoslovakia	 to	 the	
Interior	Ministry,	then	used	by	Odinga.	Besides	the	deliveries	of	special	material	for	the	
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Ministry,	an	affair	of	an	unscheduled	plane	carrying	Kenyan	students	returning	secretly	
from	Czechoslovakia	also	came	to	light.	Allegedly	the	students	were	allowed	by	Odinga	
himself	to	enter	Kenya	secretly.		Six	months	later	in	April	1965	more	unexpected	special	
material	 deliveries	were	 thought	 to	 have	 taken	 place.	 The	 countries	 of	 origin,	 (in	 this	
second	case,	the	Soviet	Union)	maintained	in	both	instances	that	these	actions	had	been	
agreed	with	 the	 Kenyan	 government	 and	 that	 one	 of	 the	 shipments	was	 intended	 for	
Uganda.340		
In	 all	 cases	 the	 important	 role	of	disclosing	 ‘suspicious’	 events	 to	newspapers	
and	 to	 Kenyatta	 was	 played	 by	 security	 officers	 attached	 to	 the	 Headquarters	 of	 the	
British	 Land	Forces	Kenya.	 ‘Encouraged	by	Western	diplomats	and	 intelligence	officers,	
Kenyatta’s	 advisors	 warned	 that	 Odinga	 was	 planning	 a	 military	 coup.	 […]	 Malcolm	
Macdonald,	who	had	become	the	British	High	Commissioner	 in	Nairobi,	believed	that	the	
arms	 shipments	 were	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 plot	 to	 destabilize	 Kenyatta’s	 government	 by	
weakening	British	influence	in	the	armed	forces	and	provoking	unrest	among	the	landless	
and	unemployed.’341	In	these	turbulent	months	Odinga’s	close	collaborator	MP	Pio	Gama	
Pinto	was	assassinated.	His	death	was	used	as	an	explanation	why	the	plot	to	overthrow	
the	government	failed.			
This	 campaign	 lasted	 for	 over	 six	 months	 and	 it	 bore	 fruit	 for	 Odinga’s	
opponents.	Kenyatta	became	increasingly	suspicious	of	Odinga	and	he	decided	to	break	
his	 influence	 on	 security	 matters	 by	 already	mentioned	 ‘promoting’	 Odinga	 from	 the	
Interior	Ministry	to	the	office	of	vice‐president	in	December	1964.	Odinga’s	public	image	
was	certainly	harmed	too,	regardless	of	the	truth	of	the	matter,	because	plotting	against	
the	government	in	this	period	when	nationalist	governments	around	Africa	were	being	
swept	by	a	series	of	coups	d’état	was	received	very	sensitively	by	the	public.		
Odinga	 repeatedly	 claimed	 that	 the	 special	 deliveries	 had	 been	 approved	 by	
Kenyatta	 and	 that	 other	ministers	 had	 been	 aware	 of	 them	 too,	 but	 to	 little	 avail.	 342		
Available	 documents	 from	 the	 Czechoslovak	 archives	 plainly	 indicate	 that	 the	
accusations	against	Odinga	were	clearly	wrong.	If	Odinga	did	indeed	plan	a	coup	d’état	it	
had	nothing	to	do	with	the	‘secret’	arrival	of	Kenyan	students	from	Czechoslovakia,	nor	
was	 it	 linked	 to	 any	 of	 the	 disclosed	 special	 deliveries.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 available	
documents	 clearly	 testify	 that	Kenyatta	was	not	 only	 informed	 about	 these	deliveries,	
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but	also	that	he	met	with	Czechoslovak	officials	and	discussed	in	person	other	matters	of	
special	military	cooperation	with	Czechoslovakia,	 including	training	for	military	cadets	
and	organising	more	deliveries	to	take	place	in	1965.	
The	 decisive	 blow	 to	 Odinga’s	 political	 aspirations	 came	 when	 he	 challenged	
British	 influence	 in	 the	 Kenyan	 administration.	 In	 his	 capacity	 as	 Interior	 Minister,	
Odinga	instigated	the	process	of	fast	Africanisation	of	the	Kenyan	administration343	and	
he	tried	to	limit	the	powers	of	the	British	staff	within	his	Ministry	by	transferring	these	
people	 to	 less	 influential	 posts.	He	 continued	 in	 this	 activity	 as	 vice‐president.	Odinga	
hoped	 to	 bring	 all	 the	 organs	 of	Kenyan	 intelligence	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 Interior	
Ministry,	but	he	 failed	 in	this.344	Odinga’s	powers	became	quite	 limited	especially	after	
British	pressure	stripped	him	of	his	responsibilities,	particularly	for	the	Africanisation	of	
the	administration,	which	was	transferred	directly	to	the	President’s	office.	
One	 of	 the	 conditions	 for	 granting	 independence	was	 that	 initially,	 high	posts	
would	be	retained	for	British	staff	in	the	Kenyan	administration,	and	Odinga’s	activities	
were	perceived	by	the	British	as	a	major	threat	to	their	position	in	Kenya.	After	Odinga’s	
departure	 from	the	 Interior	Ministry,	 the	network	of	British	advisors	and	officers	was	
present	in	all	crucial	Kenyan	administration	offices	–	three	advisors	in	the	new	Interior	
Minister	Mungai’s	 secretariat,	 two	Britons	 in	 leading	positions	 at	Police	headquarters,	
and	British	 staff	 as	 the	 chiefs	 of	 Kenyan	 army,	 navy	 and	 air	 force	 headquarters.345	 All	
these	influential	posts,	in	combination	with	a	tight	British	grip	on	the	Kenyan	economy,	
meant	 that	 they	were	 able	 to	 exert	 very	 strong	 pressure	 on	Kenyatta	 if	 any	 threat	 to	
their	dominance	appeared,	such	as	was	the	case	of	Odinga.	They	also	possessed	all	the	
means	necessary	 to	discredit	Odinga	and	destroy	his	close	relationship	with	Kenyatta,	
and	this	is	most	likely	what	happened	in	the	spring	of	1965.		
Growing	 tensions	within	KANU	escalated	 in	 the	 summer	months	of	1965.	The	
anti‐communist	 campaign	 that	was	 taking	place	 from	 the	 spring	months	of	 1965	was,	
according	to	Soviet	and	Czechoslovak	intelligence,	driven	by	the	British	and	eventually	
turned	 Kenyatta	 against	 Odinga.346	 While	 the	 position	 of	 the	 left	 in	 the	 Kenyan	
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government	 was	 already	 weak,	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 in	 the	 Kenyan	 parliament	 was	
much	 more	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 left.	 Repeated	 criticism	 of	 left‐oriented	 MPs	 provoked	
Kenyatta	into	threatening	them	with	the	dissolution	of	Parliament.	In	order	to	deal	with	
this	 situation	 the	KANU	right	wing,	despite	 internal	 fragmentation,	 stripped	Odinga	of	
his	 leading	position	 in	KANU’s	Parliament	Commission	with	Kenyatta’s	 approval.	 	 The	
new	Commission	was	immediately	staffed	with	members	of	the	right	wing.	According	to	
CS	 intelligence,	 ‘it	 was	 proved	 that	 both	 the	 British	 and	 Americans	 have	 an	 eminent	
interest	in	unity	and	cooperation	of	the	three	right	wing	groups’347	and	that	pressure	was	
being	exerted	to	force	rivals	Mboya	and	Gichuru	to	cooperate.	Meanwhile,	the	group	of	
left‐wing	 representatives	 of	 12	 regional	 offices	 of	 KANU	 independently	 organised	 a	
KANU	conference	and	elected	a	new	party	leadership	under	Kenyatta	and	Odinga.	Their	
demand	 for	dissolution	of	 the	 current	KANU	 leadership	was	 followed	by	police	 action	
and	27	delegates	of	 this	unofficial	 conference	were	 imprisoned.348	Odinga	hesitated	 to	
express	his	support	of	these	young	left‐oriented	delegates	for	fear	of	further	weakening	
his	own	position	within	the	party.	Joint	pressure	against	Odinga	was	successful	and	the	
right	wing	of	KANU	was	significantly	strengthened.	Odinga’s	position	within	KANU	was	
becoming	untenable.		
	
With	Odinga’s	retreat	from	power	CS	aspirations	and	objectives	were	destined	
to	fail.	In	January	1966	the	CS	ambassador	to	Kenya	sent	the	MFA	a	lengthy	account	of	
past	relations	between	Kenya	and	the	CSSR,	in	which	he	tried	to	explain	the	reasons	for	
the	 initial	 failure	 of	 the	 ambitious	 plans	 from	 1964	 and	 in	 which	 he	 recommended	
adapting	CS	political	objectives	in	Kenya	to	the	new	circumstances.	Regarding	the	initial	
failure	of	CS	plans,	he	blames	the	MFA	strategy	 for	not	 fully	appreciating	 ‘the	extent	of	
[Kenya’s]	 	 economic	 and	 political	 and	 military	 dependency	 on	 Great	 Britain	 and	 her	
position	 in	 the	 administration	 and	 economy	 […]	 [whilst]	 being	 the	 country	 that	 [Great	
Britain]	 also	 considers		 crucial	 in	 the	 East	 African	 region.	 […]	 In	 order	 to	 prevent	 an	
upheaval	in	the	domestic	as	well	as	external	politics	of	Kenya,	Great	Britain	has	been	using	
Kenyan	economic	and	military	dependency	to	exert	more	pressure	on	right‐wing	members	
of	government.	Loans	from	western	countries	have	played	a	vital	role.’349		
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Britain	 is	 thus	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 main	 factor	 in	 the	 failure	 of	 socialist	
countries’	 objectives.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 blame	 was	 aimed	 at	 the	 left	 itself,	 who,	 having	
overestimated	 their	 powers,	 failed	 to	 create	 effective	 united	 political	 leadership	 and	
remained	 poorly	 organised.	 Despite	 this	 criticism	 the	 CS	 ambassador	 recommended	
providing	 help	 for	 the	 left	 in	 all	 requested	 forms.350	 The	 original	 objectives	 of	 1964,	
which	demanded	the	seeking	and	developing	of	cooperation	with	Kenyan	governments	
on	 all	 levels	 and	 in	 all	 spheres,	were	 not	 revised	 despite	 the	 failures	 of	 the	 past	 two	
years.	 As	 the	 ambassador	 put	 it,	 ‘Kenya	 remains	 an	 important	 African	 country	 for	
prospects	of	cooperation	with	the	CSSR	as	well	as	 for	prospects	of	 increasing	progressive	
political	 forces.	Besides	that,	 its	significance	did	not	decrease,	either	 in	East	African	or	 in	
continental	affairs.’351	These	remnants	of	CS	optimism	about	future	cooperation	with	the	
Kenyan	government	were	to	be	swept	away	in	less	than	two	months.	
	
	
3.2.1. Special	military	cooperation		
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 discussed	 the	 unique	 role	 that	 special	
assistance	of	various	kinds	played	within	Czechoslovak‐Kenyan	relations.	The	basis	for	
cooperation	 in	 this	 sphere	had	already	been	prepared	before	 independence	and,	 from	
1964,	it	continued	uninterrupted.	Special	technical	assistance	was	to	be	delivered	in	two	
spheres,	 namely	 military	 and	 security,	 and	 it	 was	 to	 involve	 a	 range	 of	 different	
activities.	 Abundant	 archival	 records	 allow	 us	 to	 reconstruct	 how	 this	 special	
cooperation	started,	developed	and,	in	just	a	couple	of	years,	was	eventually	abandoned	
on	account	of	not	delivering	the	hoped‐for	effects.	It	is	possible	to	reconstruct	how	this	
special	cooperation	was	planned	and	eventually	 implemented	by	presenting	the	major	
events	 and	 organisations	 involved	 in	 it.	 Analysing	 and	 interpreting	 the	 effects	 of	 this	
special	 cooperation	 is,	 however,	 a	 difficult,	 not	 to	 say	 impossible	 task.	 Plans	 and	
aspirations	that	motivated	this	special	cooperation	on	the	CS	side	are	well	recorded	in	
the	archival	material	and	they	are	fully	in	line	with	CS	strategy	elsewhere	in	Africa.	Much	
more	problematic	is	the	analysis	of	the	motivation	and	expectations	behind	the	interests	
of	 Kenyan	 politicians	 in	 seeking	 this	 cooperation	 with	 the	 CSSR	 and	 why	 these	
aspirations	changed	so	suddenly.	In	the	following	section	I	discuss	the	nature	and	course	
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of	the	development	of	special	technical	cooperation	between	the	CSSR	and	Kenya	in	the	
military	and	security	spheres.	A	major	part	of	this	development,	also	examined	here	in	
more	 detail,	 is	 represented	 by	 the	 activities	 and	 objectives	 of	 the	 StB	 Residency	 in	
Nairobi	between	the	years	1964	and	1972.		
	
Special	cooperation	in	the	military	sphere	had	been	established	before	Kenyan	
independence	 and	 the	 positive	 experience	 from	 this	 cooperation	 promised	 well	 for	
future	 prospects.	On	 the	Czechoslovak	 side,	 this	 kind	 of	 special	 assistance	was	 on	 the	
MND	agenda.	On	the	Kenyan	side,	the	responsibilities	for	negotiating	special	assistance	
remained	with	 Odinga	 and	 his	 closest	 colleagues.	 Odinga’s	 position	 in	 negotiating	 the	
specifics	of	this	special	cooperation	was	supported	by	Kenyatta	himself,	as,	especially	in	
the	 early	 stage	 of	 cooperation	 in	 1964	 and	 the	 first	 half	 of	 1965,	 he	 was	 personally	
involved	in	the	talks	and	showed	great	interest	in	them.		
Odinga	appointed	his	close	colleague	Othieno	Othiego,	former	head	of	the	KANU	
office	 in	 London,	 to	 lead	 the	 team	 negotiating	 special	military	 assistance	with	 the	 CS	
MND.	 Othiego	 approached	 CS	 officials	 with	 Odinga’s	 request	 for	 special	 technical	
assistance	shortly	before	independence.	‘He	requested	training	for	at	least	twenty	Kenyan	
army	officers	 in	one‐year	or	 two‐year	courses	and	a	 six‐month	course	 for	 thirty	 security	
officers.	According	 to	Othieno,	officers	 trained	 in	 the	CSSR	were	gradually	 to	 replace	 the	
British	 experts.	KANU’s	 left	wing	also	 intends	 to	purchase	weapons	 from	 the	CSSR	after	
independence	 and	 to	 retrain	 selected	 officers	 currently	 being	 trained	 in	 the	 UK,	 in	 the	
CSSR.’352	In	addition	to	this,	he	interpreted	Odinga’s	demand	for	‘help	in	reorganising	and	
expanding	 a	 new	 security	 apparatus.	 This	mainly	 includes	 training	 the	 required	 cadres	
personnel	in	the	CSSR	and	eventually	sending	out	CS	experts	to	develop	organization	and	
management	methods	of	 this	organ.’353	The	CS	government	accorded	Odinga’s	 requests	
the	 highest	 priority.	 	 The	 issue	 of	military	 training	was	 dealt	with	 by	 the	MND,	while	
Odinga’s	 second	 demand,	 related	 to	 security	 and	 intelligence	work,	was	 forwarded	 to	
the	Interior	Ministry	and	the	StB.	
Following	the	required	approval	of	the	CS	Politbyro,	the	CS	Ministry	of	National	
Defence	organised	and	 instigated	 two	military	courses	 for	Kenyans	 in	1963	and	1964.	
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However,	organising	 the	courses	and	providing	 training	 for	Kenyan	soldiers	was	 to	be	
only	one	part	of	the	developing	cooperation.			
In	March	1964,	shortly	after	the	mutiny	of	Kenyan	army	took	place	experts	from	
MND	 visited	 Kenya	 and	 led	 long	 discussions	with	 Kenyatta	 and	 Odinga	 about	 further	
cooperation	in	the	special	sphere.	During	several	meetings,	both	sides	discussed	a	range	
of	crucial	issues	of	existing	as	well	as	planned	cooperation.	Kenyatta	displayed	very	little	
knowledge	of	the	matters	under	discussion	and	gave	CS	experts	a	free	hand	on	several	
issues.	CS	experts	were	to	suggest	the	organisation	of	the	newly‐created	Kenyan	armed	
forces	and	especially	the	placing	of	graduates	of	CS	courses	within	its	structure.	For	the	
future,	Kenyatta	 suggested	courses	 should	 take	place	primarily	 in	Kenya	due	 to	 lower	
costs	and	easier	organisation.	This	suggestion	met	with	a	positive	response	from	the	CS	
delegation,	who	 internally	 noted	 that	 ‘unless	 there	 is	 a	 sudden	 political	 change	 during	
1964,	a	small	group	of	military	experts	could	be	sent	 to	Kenya	at	 the	beginning	of	1965,	
assuming	 that	 British	 troops	 will	 leave	 Kenya	 by	 12	 December	 1964	 (as	 agreed).’354	
Kenyatta	 also	 informed	 the	 CS	 delegation	 that	 the	 recruitment	 of	 thousands	 of	 new	
soldiers	 amongst	 KANU	 youth	 was	 underway	 and	 that,	 after	 the	 departure	 of	 British	
troops,	 there	 would	 be	 a	 lack	 of	 military	 material	 and	 weaponry.	 For	 that	 matter,	
Kenyatta	 asked	 CS	 officials	 to	 provide	 sets	 of	 complete	 equipment	 for	 thousands	 of	
soldiers.	Lastly,	Kenyatta	expressed	interest	in	obtaining	training	for	pilots	and	airfield	
personnel.355		
Kenyatta’s	 demands	were	 considered	 a	 great	 opportunity	 for	 CS	 political	 and	
economic	 objectives	 in	 East	 Africa.	 However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 if	 they	 were	 to	 be	
provided	 for	 free,	 then	 they	would	 be	 too	 large	 an	 expense	 for	 the	 CS	 government	 to	
handle.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 training	 of	 a	 1000‐strong	 military	 unit	 made	 up	 of	 KANU	
youth,	 loyal	 to	 Odinga’s	 left	 wing	 and	 quite	 revolutionary‐oriented,	 was	 considered	 a	
vital	step	in	Odinga’s	competition	within	the	party	as	he	would	acquire	the	‘muscles’	that	
he	still	lacked.356	The	presence	of	Kenyatta	at	these	negotiations,	and	his	silent	consent	
to	measures	which	were	 considered	 as	 a	 strengthening	of	 the	 left	within	KANU,	were	
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welcomed	by	CS	analysts	at	the	MFA	as	evidence	of	Kenyatta’s	 inclination	towards	the	
left.		
There	are	detailed	MND	reports	on	courses	137	and	137a	 that	 commenced	 in	
the	CSSR	in	1963	and	1964	respectively.	The	objective	of	the	courses	was	the	training	of	
platoon	 or	 battalion	 commanders	 in	 three	 specialisations	 –	 infantry,	 artillery	 and	
armoured	battalion.	A	noteworthy	fact	in	relation	to	courses	137	and	137a	is	that	they	
were	 the	 first	 special	 technical	 assistance	 courses	 that	 were	 provided	 on	 a	 non‐
commercial	 basis,357	which	meant	 that	 the	 CS	 administration	 covered	 all	 the	 costs	 for	
their	organisation.	This	indicates	how	important	Kenya	was	for	the	CS	officials	and	how	
strong	 the	 negotiating	 position	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 government	was.	 It	was	 believed	 there	
would	 be	 several	 benefits	 from	 organising	 such	 courses.	 Besides	 having	 a	 direct	
influence	 on	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 military	 and	 	 providing	 an	 open	 channel	 of	
communication	 to	 its	 high‐ranked	 officers,	 CS	 generals	 expected	 these	 courses	would	
increase	demand	for	CS	special	material	deliveries.358		
	A	 CS	 MND	 delegation	 visited	 Kenya	 In	 March	 1965,	 after	 the	 successful	
completion	of	course	137a	and	met	with	Kenyan	Internal	Security	and	Defence	Minister,	
Dr	 Njoroge	 Mungai,	 who	 replaced	 Odinga	 once	 the	 latter	 had	 been	 appointed	 vice‐
president.	Dr	Mungai,	being	one	of	the	right‐wing	KANU	politicians,	showed	no	specific	
interest	 in	an	 increased	number	of	 special	 courses	being	organised	 in	Czechoslovakia,	
but	 agreed	 to	 a	 demonstration	 of	 CS	 weapons	 for	 potential	 import	 to	 Kenya.	 The	
weaponry	 presented	 at	 this	 pre‐purchase	 display	 included	 submachine	 gun	 Mk.58,	
machine	gun	Mk.59,	machine	pistol	Mk.61,	and	self‐loading	rifle	Mk.52/57.	The	second	
part	 of	 the	 presentation	was	 to	 take	 place	 in	 the	 CSSR	 and	 included	 L‐29	 jet	 training	
aircraft,	 armoured	 carriers	 OT	 62	 TOPAS	 and	 SKOT,	 T	 54A	 tank,	 120mm	mortar	 and	
82mm	recoilless	gun,359	but	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	delivery	ever	took	place.	Despite	
Dr	 Mungai’s	 consent	 to	 the	 weapons	 presentation,	 CS	 MND	 experts	 were	 becoming	
sceptical	about	Kenyan	interest	in	completing	the	transaction.	The	MND	delegation	was	
surprised	by	the	fact	that	the	command	positions	in	the	Kenyan	army,	three	battalions	
strong,	 were	 still	 being	 retained	 by	 English	 officers,	 in	 clear	 contrast	 to	 Kenyatta’s	
promise	 the	 previous	 year.	 They	 reported	 home	 that	 ‘taking	 into	 consideration	 the	
situation	as	described	it	is	assumed	that	Kenya	will	be	circumspect	about	obtaining	special	
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material	 from	 socialist	 bloc	 countries,	 in	 order	 not	 to	 provoke	 retaliatory	 economic	
sanctions	by	England.’360	Clues	that	the	future	of	special	cooperation	with	Kenya	would	
not	be	as	bright	as	once	hoped	were	becoming	ever	more	difficult	to	ignore.	
Spring	1965	was	a	time	of	a	gradual	deterioration	of	political	relations	between	
Kenya	and	the	socialist	countries.	A	new,	cold	attitude	towards	the	Soviet	bloc	was	also	
reflected	 in	 the	 special	 military	 cooperation	 between	 Kenya	 and	 the	 CSSR.	 Despite	
Kenyatta’s	 initial	personal	 involvement	 in	 the	organising	of	courses	137	and	137a,	 the	
course	leaders	reported	Kenyan	officials	showed	only	limited	interest	in	the	progression	
and	 results	 of	 both	 courses	 towards	 their	 conclusion	 in	 early	 1965.	 Also,	 Minister	
Mungai’s	 indifference	 in	this	matter	 indicated	the	Kenyan	government	had	changed	its	
approach.	 The	 CS	 government	 was	 forced	 to	 reconsider	 its	 plans	 and	 ambitions	 in	
relation	to	continuing	special	military	cooperation	in	the	immediate	future.	The	original	
hopes	of	MFA,	MND	and	Odinga	proved	grossly	overambitious	and,	in	the	new	political	
circumstances,	highly	unrealistic.	Odinga’s	hopes	that	the	newly‐formed	Kenyan	armed	
forces,	 backed	 by	 the	 CSSR,	 would	 become	 a	 decisive	 force	 within	 Kenya’s	 security	
apparatus	were	failing.		
Unlike	 in	 neighbouring	Uganda,	 the	Kenyan	 army	played	 only	 a	 symbolic	 and	
strictly	apolitical	role	in	the	first	years	of	its	existence.361	The	political	turnabout	that	the	
MND	 experts	 had	 so	 feared,	 did	 indeed	 occur	 and,	 what	 was	 more	 important,	 the	
departure	 of	 British	 military	 units	 planned	 for	 December	 1964	 was	 delayed.	 British	
officers	remained	in	command	of	the	Kenyan	army,	and	the	ambitions	of	Odinga	and	CS	
officials	 of	 replacing	 the	 departing	British	with	 loyal	 graduates	 of	 CS	 security	 courses	
were	thwarted.	Not	only	were	the	police	together	with	the	General	Service	Units	(which	
also	 retained	 close	 ties	with	 the	British)	 still	 the	most	powerful	 coercive	organ	 in	 the	
Kenyan	security	system,	but,	with	the	command	of	 the	military	being	out	of	reach	too,	
there	was	no	hope	for	turning	this	balance	of	power	in	favour	of	Odinga’s	left.362				
The	Special	Branch	of	the	Kenyan	police	was	a	force	inherited	from	the	British	
colonial	administration	which	together	with	the	newly	established	General	Service	Unit	
aimed	to	defeat	the	Mau	Mau	uprising.	Administration	and	structure	of	both	police	and	
security	 forces	were	 important	 topics	 during	 the	 1962	 Lancaster	 House	 negotiations,	
together	with	 the	 position	 of	 the	King’s	 Africa	Rifles	 units	 that	were	 to	 form	 the	 new	
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Kenyan	military.	After	independence,	the	GSU	became	an	alternative	army	that	Kenyatta	
developed	 into	 the	 loyal	 Kikuyu‐dominated	 two	 thousand‐strong	 force	 to	
counterbalance	the	official	Kenyan	army	which	had	already	proved	unreliable	and	which	
was	 traditionally	 dominated	 by	 Kalenjins,	 not	 Kikuyu.	 The	 GSU	 developed	 into	 a	
disciplined,	 well‐equipped	 and	 highly	 mobile	 force	 that	 would	 eventually	 be	 able	 to	
provide	 the	 government	with	 some	 degree	 of	 coercive	 power	 should	 segments	 of	 the	
Kenyan	 army	become	 restive.	 In	 effect	while	 the	Kenyan	 army	was	 remaining	 strictly	
apolitical,	the	GSU	became	‘a	political	force,	the	regime’s	coercive	arm	against	its	internal	
enemies.’363		
	
	
3.2.2. Special	assistance	in	the	security	sphere	
The	 Czechoslovak	 intelligence	 service,	 the	 StB,	 played	 a	 unique	 role,	 in	
cooperation	 with	 the	 CS	 Interior	 Ministry,	 in	 relations	 between	 Kenya	 and	
Czechoslovakia.	Their	activities	can	be	divided	into	two	categories	–	activities	of	the	StB	
Residency	in	Nairobi,	and	special	missions	executed	under	direct	headquarters	control.	
While	it	is	true	that	the	presence	of	CS	intelligence	agents	was	common	in	this	period	in	
other	 states	 of	 Africa	 too,	 the	 extent	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 its	 activities,	 as	 well	 as	 its	
unusually	daring	aspirations,	made	the	StB’s	role	within	CS‐Kenyan	relations	unique.	
The	Interior	Ministry	and	the	StB	proclaimed	Kenya	to	be	its	top	priority	in	East	
Africa	in	1963.364	The	role	of	StB	agents	located	directly	in	Kenya,	as	well	as	those	who	
were	sent	to	Kenya	for	special	missions	by	headquarters,	was	to	use	all	means	available	
to	bring	Kenya	closer	to	the	socialist	camp	and	limit	the	influence	of	the	Main	Enemy,	in	
this	case,	Britain.	The	activities	of	the	Nairobi	Residency	affected	virtually	all	aspects	of	
relations	between	the	two	countries,	while	some	spheres	of	cooperation	between	Kenya	
and	the	CSSR	were	completely	controlled	and	even	carried	out	by	the	StB	Resident	and	
his	officers.	This	was	especially	true	for	cooperation	with	Odinga	and	his	political	wing	
and	 for	 the	 special	 technical	 assistance	 provided	 by	 the	 CS	 Interior	 Ministry	 to	 the	
Kenyan	government.	The	 agents	 of	 the	Nairobi	Residency	were	authorised	 to	work	 in	
Kenya	as	employees	of	 the	CS	MFA,	 and	 they	effectively	used	 their	 cover	 to	penetrate	
political,	diplomatic	and	business	circles.		Agents	arriving	in	Kenya	for	special	missions	
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as	 security	 advisors,	 technical	 staff	 or	 in	 the	 roles	 of	 technical	 experts	 of	 the	 ČTK	 or	
other	 state	 agencies	were	 nominally	 independent	 of,	 but	worked	 in	 full	 collaboration	
with	the	Residency	.		
The	 intensity	of	 the	StB’s	activities	 in	Kenya	peaked	 in	1964	and	1965.	 In	 this	
period,	 StB	 agents	were	 in	 close	 contact	 not	 only	with	Odinga	 and	 his	wing,	 but	with	
Kenyatta	 himself.	 The	matter	 of	 special	 security	 cooperation	was	 raised	 by	 the	 direct	
order	 of	 President	 Kenyatta.	 The	 CS	 government	 saw	 the	 Kenyan	 request	 as	 a	 good	
opportunity	to	enhance	 its	 influence	on	Kenyan	politics	and	to	get	direct	access	to	 the	
newly‐formed	 Kenyan	 police	 and	 intelligence	 services.	 Kenyatta’s	 extremely	 positive	
attitude	can	be	illustrated	in	a	number	of	Resident	reports.	This	is	somewhat	surprising	
and	 perhaps	 suspicious,	 especially	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 unexpected	 deterioration	 of	
relations	 between	 Kenya	 and	 socialist	 countries	 from	 the	 summer	 of	 1965	 onwards.	
Nevertheless,	it	was	Kenyatta	and	his	interest	in	cooperating	with	the	CSSR	on	security	
matters	that	provoked	one	of	the	most	ambitious	StB	operations		anywhere	in	Africa.		
	
	
3.2.3. The	StB	Residency	in	Kenya	and	its	operations		
The	 amount	 of	 original	 material	 available	 in	 the	 Prague	 archives	 on	 the	
activities	 of	 the	 StB	 in	 Kenya	 is	 immense	 and	 it	 would	 suffice	 for	 a	 whole	 new	
independent	research	project.	Here,	I	attempt	only	to	give	the	basic	outline	of	how	the	
StB	Residency	in	Nairobi	functioned	and	how	it	contributed	to	relations	between	Kenya	
and	the	CSSR.	In	no	way	do	I	attempt	to	present	a	complete	list	of	Residency	activities,	or	
to	mention	all	of	its	contacts,	missions	or	the	agents	who	worked	for	this	office.	There	is	
no	 room,	 either,	 to	 explain	 all	 the	 political	 as	 well	 as	 internal	 twists	 and	 turns	 that	
occurred	 during	 the	 approximately	 eight	 years	 of	 the	Nairobi	 Residency,	 as	would	 be	
necessary	 in	order	to	tell	 its	 full	story	correctly.	The	boundaries	of	 this	research	allow	
me	to	present	only	very	basic	information	related	to	the	Nairobi	StB	Residency,	such	as	
the	main	 principles	 of	 its	 organisation	 and	 functioning,	 the	 objectives	 of	 its	 activities,	
some	of	 the	main	contacts	and	a	 few	examples	of	 the	active	measures	 it	 took	over	 the	
years.		
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Establishing	 an	 StB	Residency	 at	 the	CS	 embassy	 in	Nairobi	 had	 already	been	
agreed	with	the	MFA	in	1963365	and,	in	1964	the	plan	was	swiftly	implemented.	Within	
the	 total	 allowance	 of	 diplomatic	 staff	 approved	 by	 Kenya,	 the	 MFA	 set	 aside	 three	
embassy	posts	 for	 StB	operatives.	The	 first	 one	 to	 arrive	was	 Jaroslav	 S.,	 officially	 the	
embassy’s	Second	Secretary,	and	two	colleagues	soon	joined	him.	The	Resident	and	his	
officers	 immediately	 renewed	 contacts	with	 some	 of	 Odinga’s	 closest	 colleagues	 from	
before	independence	and	started	to	carry	out	instructions	from	headquarters.		
Officers	 of	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency	 were	 responsible	 for	 two	 main	 forms	 of	
activities	–liaison	work	for	acquiring	intelligence,	and	planning	and	execution	of	active	
measures.	These	actions	were	aimed	to	misinform,	discredit	or	otherwise	harm	the	Main	
Enemy.	 The	most	 common	 activity	 of	 the	 Resident	 and	 other	 StB	 officers	 was	 liaison	
work	executed	in	most	cases	undercover	by	diplomatic	staff.	Diplomatic	cover	allowed	
StB	operatives	legally,	and	without	raising	excessive	suspicion,	to	maintain	contacts	with	
local	political	circles,	members	of	diplomatic	corps,	business	elite	and	any	other	persons	
that	might	be	of	any	use	in	acquiring	intelligence.	An	intricate	web	of	contacts	provided	
agents	with	a	surprisingly	rich	and	substantial	bank	of	knowledge	useful	for	the	agency’s	
objectives	 without	 any	 high	 risk	 of	 exposure.	 In	 the	 first	 months	 of	 the	 Residency’s	
activities	in	Kenya,	this	was	also	partially	the	case,	even	though	using	diplomatic	cover	
for	intelligence	operations	was	a	widely	known	procedure	used	by	most	countries,	and	
members	of	diplomatic	corps	were	always	treated	with	caution.	Once	the	good	relations	
between	 Kenyan	 officials	 and	 closet	 StB	 operatives	 were	 over,	 the	 diplomatic	 cover	
quickly	 became	 useless	 and	 the	 Kenyan	 government	 tended	 to	 ignore	 StB	 operatives’	
diplomatic	immunity.	Constant	surveillance,	psychological	pressure	and	later	expulsion	
followed	the	loss	of	diplomatic	status.366			
The	 main	 objectives	 of	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency’s	 work,	 as	 formulated	 at	
headquarters,	were	initially	vague	and	included	the	following	points:		
	
‐ work	 against	 the	Main	 Enemy	 –	 Great	 Britain	 –	 unravel	 its	 influence	
mechanism	in	Kenya	and	undermine	it	by	using	active	measures	
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‐ maintain	 contact	 with	 the	 left‐wing	 powers	 in	 Kenya,	 and,	 through	
espionage,	 support	 them	 in	 their	 struggle	 for	 winning	 the	 decisive	
influence	in	the	country	
‐ as	 part	 of	 its	 assistance	 to	 the	 left‐wing,	 train	 the	 security	 specialists	
and,	with	the	help	of	CS	advisors,	develop	a	parallel	security	force	that	
would	 eventually	 take	 over	 the	 responsibilities	 currently	 held	 by	 the	
British‐	controlled	Special	branch,.367	
	
Over	 a	 period	 of	 several	 months,	 these	 objectives	 were	 reviewed	 and	 made	
more	 specific	 as	 the	 Residency’s	 officers	 became	 acquainted	 with	 the	 operational	
situation	 in	Kenya.	 In	 cooperation	with	 the	Prague	headquarters,	 the	 specific	 primary	
and	 secondary	 objectives	 for	 the	 agency’s	 activities	 in	 Kenya	 were	 laid	 down.	 The	
primary	 set	 of	 objectives	 related	 to	 actions	 against	 the	 British	 and	 the	 right	 wing	 in	
KANU,	 and	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency	 was	 to	 play	 the	 most	 important	 part	 in	 their	
implementation.	The	secondary	objective	was	effective	support,	especially	on	a	material	
basis,	 for	Odinga	and	his	wing.	The	Nairobi	Residency	was	 responsible	 for	negotiating	
the	specifics	of	this	assistance	and	maintaining	everyday	communication	with	Odinga’s	
people;	 but	 the	 assistance	 itself	 was	 mainly	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 Prague	 StB	
headquarters	in	cooperation	with	the	HTS368	of	the	MFT.369	
The	 general	 strategy	 for	 reaching	 the	 primary	 set	 of	 objectives	 and	
responsibilities	 for	 the	Nairobi	 Residency	was	 outlined	 in	 the	 20	October	 1964	 letter	
from	 the	 Prague	 headquarters.	 ‘The	 Residency	 is	 expected	 continuously	 to	 forward	 all	
obtained	official	materials	and	intelligence	agency	findings	concerning	all	UK	institutions	
and	offices	 	 in	Kenya,	all	British	nationals	working	 in	Kenyan	administration	and	other	
persons	that	have	direct	relation	to	the	objects	(including	persons)	of	the	Main	Enemy.’370	
Residents	were	also	instructed	to	extend	their	network	of	contacts	for	the	purposes	of	
obtaining	 intelligence	 and	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 successful	 active	 measures.	
Headquarters	 were	 quite	 reserved	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 existing	 established	
Kenyan	contacts,	as	they	were	for	the	most	part	Odinga’s	close	collaborators	with	only	
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limited	 access	 to	 the	 intelligence	 that	 StB	 was	 after.	 ‘By	 the	 holidays	 in	 1965	
Headquarters	expect	the	Residency	to	find	at	least	six	appropriate	persons	with	relation	to	
the	Main	Enemy,	two	of	whom	will	be	ready	to	be	approached	for	recruitment.’371			
Towards	 the	 end	 of	 1964	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency	 already	 operated	 in	 the	
standard	regime:	its	members	were	in	regular	contact	with	Headquarters,	were	sending	
out	 the	 gathered	 intelligence,	 and	 were	 successfully	 extending	 the	 network	 of	 local	
contacts.	 The	 Residency	 had	 extensive	 correspondence	 with	 Headquarters	 and	 the	
gathered	intelligence	was	analysed	and	forwarded	to	Prague	to	be	used	directly	by	the	
Interior	Ministry,	or	by	other	governmental	offices,	for	political	or	economic	purposes.	A	
large	part	of	the	gathered	intelligence	was	also	forwarded	to	the	Soviets.372	The	political	
situation	in	this	period	was	still	favourable	to	socialist	countries	and,	with	Odinga	high	
in	KANU’s	hierarchy,	the	special	cooperation	was	developing	according	to	CS	plans.		
During	 the	 first	 year	 of	 activity,	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency	 successfully	 created	 a	
small	 network	 of	 highly‐valued	 associates,	 most	 of	 whom	 fell	 under	 the	 category	 of	
‘confidential	 contacts’.373	 	 Operatives	 also	 regularly	 ‘mined’	 numerous	 other	 persons,	
especially	 members	 of	 other	 diplomatic	 missions,	 local	 businessmen	 and	 others.	
Amongst	the	valued	confidential	contacts	were,	in	the	first	years,	OLEANDER,	KONOPO,	
OMOLO,	LASKOT,	KOTLAN	and,	most	 importantly,	DRUH.374	Available	documents	 from	
the	Prague	archive	allow	us	to	unravel	the	real	people	hidden	behind	these	pseudonyms,	
but	I	decided	to	keep	the	exact	identity	of	most	of	these	persons	undisclosed	as	some	of	
them	are	still	 alive	and	 I	was	not	able	 to	get	 their	 consent	 to	 reveal	 their	 cooperation	
with	CS	 intelligence.	For	an	 illustration	of	 the	StB’s	penetration	of	Kenyan	politics,	 the	
case	 of	 confidential	 contact	 KONOPO	 can	 be	 mentioned.	 The	 name,	 according	 to	
available	material,	was	 a	 designation	 for	 one	 of	 the	most	 outspoken	 left‐wing	MPs	 in	
Kenya,	 Pio	 Gama	 Pinto,	 who	 was	 eventually	 murdered	 in	 February	 1965	 and	 whose	
death	coincides	with	the	beginning	of	open	rivalry	between	the	left	and	right	in	KANU.375	
Pinto	was	one	of	 the	CS	StB‘s	Kenyan	MP	contacts,	which	 the	StB	was	 trying	 to	use	 to	
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place	parliamentary	questions	and	for	obtaining	first‐hand	information	from	Parliament.	
Headquarters	viewed	the	establishment	of	contacts	in	the	Kenyan	Parliament	as	a	great	
Nairobi	Residency	success	story,	and	 the	opportunity	 for	 indirect	 influence	on	Kenyan	
parliamentary	proceedings	by	the	use	of	questions	raised	by	loyal	MPs	was	perceived	as	
a	very	effective	way	of	contributing	to	activities	of	the	left.		Most	of	the	StB’s	confidential	
contacts	were	high	KANU	officials	from	Odinga’s	wing,	some	others	were	graduates	of	CS	
universities	 or	 expert	 courses,	 Kenyan	 journalists,	 or	 diplomats	 from	 other	 African	
countries,	and	 the	rest	were	CS	nationals	active	 in	Kenya	 in	expert	positions.376	 It	was	
not	 uncommon	 for	 confidential	 contacts	 to	 receive	 gifts	 or	 money	 for	 their	 services,	
indicating	that	they	must	have	been	aware	or	at	least	suspicious	of	the	identity	of	their	
CS	acquaintances.	Most	of	these	contacts	were	used	only	for	a	limited	period	of	time	and,	
once	they	lost	access	to	information	of	any	interest	for	the	StB,	or	they	became	afraid	to	
continue	 their	 collaboration,	 further	 contact	 was	 abandoned	 and	 after	 several	 years	
their	files	were	archived.	
In	January	1965	Headquarters	evaluated	the	activities	of	the	Nairobi	Residency	
in	 the	 previous	 year.	 Despite	 some	 beginners’	 mistakes	 being	 pointed	 out,	 they	
particularly	 praised	 the	 on‐going	 cooperation	 with	 Odinga’s	 group.	 The	 primary	
objective,	penetrating	the	Main	Enemy’s	institutions,	achieved	only	very	limited	success	
but,	 as	 this	 was	 viewed	 as	 the	 long‐term	 aim,	 no	 consequences	 arose	 from	 this.	 The	
intelligence	 and	 analytical	 work	 was	 of	 fluctuating	 quality,	 but	 in	 general	 there	 was	
satisfaction	with	this	part	of	the	Residency’s	work.377	
Active	measures	 (hereafter	AMs)	were	 the	sphere	 for	which	 the	Nairobi	office	
was	 repeatedly	 criticised	 by	 Headquarters.378	 Despite	 this	 criticism,	 the	 Residency’s	
officers	 successfully	 planned	 and	 executed	 approximately	 30	 AMs	 between	 1964	 and	
1969.	 In	 order	 to	 illustrate	 the	 Residency’s	 activity	 in	 this	 sphere,	 I	 present	 short	
characteristics	 of	 some	 of	 the	 executed	 actions,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 results	 of	 the	 most	
successful	ones.	The	most	common	targets	over	the	years	were	the	USA	and	the	UK	and	
their	activities	in	Kenya,	white	settlers’	links	to	the	British	and	the	figure	of	Tom	Mboya.	
As	a	pattern	 for	 future	planning	and	 implementing	of	AMs	the	Residency	used	
the	document	from	6	September	1965	written	in	cooperation	with	Headquarters.	A	few	
days	before	this	document	was	compiled,	the	Residency	got	hold	of	secret	agreements	of	
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financial	and	military	cooperation	between	Kenya	and	the	UK,	and	it		was	recommended		
they	use	these	agreements	as	the	first	AM.		The	leaked	document	was	to	be	used	in	such	
a	way	that	it	would	‘reveal	UK	neo‐colonial	methods	of	penetrating	Kenya	and	unmask	the	
right	wing	agents	 of	KANU	as	 instruments	of	British	politics	 in	Kenya.’379	 In	 practice,	 it	
meant	using	 the	document	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 it	would	provoke	anti‐British	pressures	
from	the	public	as	well	as	 from	other	African	 leaders	and	would	harm	the	established	
Anglo‐Kenyan	 cooperation.380	 Other	 suggested	 AMs	 in	 this	 document	 included	 the	
following	actions:	
‐ discrediting	Tom	Mboya	and	his	American	advisors	
‐ destruction	of	British‐owned	objects		
‐ public	attacks	against	Gichuru	
‐ launching		the	rumour	of	American	support	to	Kenya‐based	Somalis	in	
their	attempts	to	reclaim	lost	homelands	
‐ dissemination	 of	 threatening	 pamphlets	 to	 British	 nationals	 across	
Kenya	
‐ provoking	competition	between	the	USA	and	the	UK381	
	
Several	examples	of	executed,	or	at	least	suggested,	AMs	that	took	place	in	the	
following	years	are	as	follows:	
Action	 RASIST	 –	 creating	 and	 spreading	 fake	 letter	 of	 support	 allegedly	
written	 by	 British	 settlers	 in	 Kenya	 expressing	 concern,	 support	 and	
sympathy	 for	 the	 situation	 of	 white	 settlers	 in	 Rhodesia	 after	 their	
declaration	of	independence.	
Action	TELEX	–	using	acquired	intelligence	to	discredit	US	activities	in	Kenya	
as	 imperialist,	 and	 forwarding	 selected	 information	 to	 progressive	
African	politicians	prior	to	the	upcoming	OAU	conference.	
Action	 AMI	 –	 creating	 and	 distributing	 pamphlets	 accusing	 Tom	 Mboya	 of	
misappropriating	KANU	funds,	of	secret	contacts	with	some	politicians	
arrested	 in	Uganda,	 of	 being	under	 direct	US	 control	 and	working	 for	
their	secret	military	objectives	in	Kenya,	etc.	
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Action	DOBRODINEC	–	one	of	the	most	successful	Nairobi	Residency	actions;	
the	Residency	collected	available	 intelligence	data	about	CIA	activities	
in	Kenya,	manipulated	 it	 in	 its	 own	 favour	 and	 anonymously	 sent	 the	
documents	to	Odinga,	who	made	the	material	public;	publication	of	this	
material	provoked	a	number	of	critical	speeches	by	Kenyan	politicians	
and	allegedly	led	to	the	expulsion	of	an	American	diplomat;	this	action	
was	highly	regarded	by	the	Soviets.	
Action	MOCHOMURKA	–	distributing	a	critical	pamphlet	about	American	war	
crimes	in	Vietnam;	this	plan	was	probably	not	carried	out.	
Action	 HABARI	 –	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency	 acquired	 intelligence	 of	 American	
plans	 to	 create	 a	 pro‐American	 military	 alliance	 in	 East	 and	 Central	
Africa	 through	 close	 cooperation	with	Kenya,	Congo	and	Ethiopia;	 the	
Residency	 disclosed	 information	 about	 American	 plans	 to	 President	
Obote	 before	 the	 regional	 conference,	 whose	 actions	 caused	 the	
American	plans	mediated	by	the	Congo	to	be	rejected;	considered	one	
of	the	most	successful	actions.	
Action	LISKA	–	by	using	available	intelligence,	the	Residency	decided	to	start	
the	 pamphlet	 campaign	 about	 CIA	 penetration	 in	 most	 American	
organisations	 in	 Kenya	 and	 their	 corrupting	 activities	 in	 respect	 to	
Kenyan	administration;	the	action	was	to	create	the	impression	of	being	
of	British	origin	and	thus	cause	a	rift	between	the	UK	and	the	USA.	
Action	 USEDLIK	 –	 the	 Residency	 decided	 to	 distribute	 leaflets	 to	 white	
settlers;	the	intention	was	to	criticise	an	increase	in	criminality	against	
the	 community	 and	 to	 call	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 vigilante	 groups	
independent	 of	 the	 Kenyan	 police;	 the	 objective	 of	 the	 action	 was	 to	
cause	tension	between	the	settlers	and	the	Kenyan	government.382	
	
The	Residency	did	not	 stop	organising	AMs	even	after	being	paralysed	by	 the	
expulsion	of	two	of	their	operatives	in	1966.	On	the	contrary,	the	period	between	1966	
and	1969	was	the	most	fertile	in	respect	of	the	number	of	AMs	fully	or	partially	executed	
by	the	Residency.	Many	of	these	AMs	were	aimed	at	Tom	Mboya,	who	was	considered	–	
and	not	only	by	Odinga’s	group	–	the	main	political	enemy	,	but	was	becoming	ever	more	
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feared	by	Kenyatta	and	Moi	who,	once	again,	improved	their	relations	with	the	CSSR	in	
1968.	 Among	 AMs	 that	 targeted	 Tom	 Mboya	 in	 this	 period	 were	 those	 designated		
FUSER,	KAKTUS	and	MELOUCH.	Their	main	objective	was	to	reveal	and	pillory	Mboya’s	
links	to	the	USA	–	to	the	effect	that	he	was	receiving	orders	from	the	CIA	and	corruptly	
using	American	money.		
The	last	action	of	the	Nairobi	Residency	against	Mboya	started	only	a	few	weeks	
before	his	murder.	Action	KAKTUS	was	yet	another	provocation	aimed	at	Mboya	and	his	
close	cooperation	with	the	Americans,	which	was	ultimately	to	turn	the	Kenyan	public	
against	him.	The	aim	of	the	action	was	‘in	connection	with	previous	operations	of	the	same	
objective,	 to	 further	 deepen	 political	 discredit	 of	 Mboya	 and	 to	 complete	 his	 political	
elimination.’383	 According	 to	 the	 StB’s	 report,	 Tom	 Mboya’s	 pro‐American	 activities	
concerned	 not	 only	 the	 left	 and	 Odinga	 but,	 in	 the	 last	 months,	 were	 also	 viewed	
negatively	 by	 the	 British	 supporting	 Kenyatta	 and	 Moi.	 Available	 archival	 material	
shows	that	StB	officials	were	shocked	and	surprised	by	Mboya’s	murder.	In	the	days	that	
followed	it,	StB	officers	met	with	several	of	their	contacts	in	an	attempt	to	gather	some	
information	 on	 the	 case384	 but	 found	no	 information	 other	 than	 that	 published	by	 the	
media.	Several	weeks	later	the	Residency	became	fully	occupied	with	the	issues	related	
to	the	Soviet	invasion	of	the	CSSR,	which	meant	the	beginning	of	the	end	for	intensive	CS	
activities	in	Kenya.		
	
	
3.2.4. Action	SPECIAL	and	the	defeat	of	Czechoslovak	ambitions	
Action	SPECIAL	was	 the	most	ambitious	StB	activity	 in	Kenya	and	 its	ultimate	
failure	 had	 a	 far‐reaching	 negative	 effect	 on	 relations	 between	 Kenya	 and	 the	 CSSR.	
Action	 SPECIAL	 was	 planned	 and	 executed	 independently	 of	 the	 Soviets	 and	 it	
represents	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 autonomous	 activities	 of	 the	 Czechoslovak	
government	 in	Africa	 in	 this	period.	As	 I	make	clear	below,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	get	a	 clear	
picture	of	the	motivations	that	led	to	SPECIAL,	or	of	the	reasons	for	its	failure,	or	of	the	
effects	it	had	on	relations	between	Kenya	and	Czechoslovakia.		
Odinga’s	 strong	 position	 in	 the	 Kenyan	 administration,	 initially	 as	 Interior	
Minister,	and	later	as	a	vice‐president	with	a	security	agenda,	was	perceived	by	the	StB	
                                                            
383 ABS 11691_109_2_2, Č.jA. A‐00 311/40‐69, 23.4.1969, 1, l. 73. 
384 ABS 11691_322_3_3, Č.jA?, 7.7.1969, 1, l. 107 
165 
 
as	providing	a	unique	opportunity	to	spread	its	influence	in	the	newly‐formed	system	of	
Kenyan	security	and	affected	internal	as	well	as	external	Kenyan	politics.		Odinga’s	and	
the	 StB’s	 confidential	 contact	 DRUH	 requested	 special	 security	 cooperation,	 which	
became	the	much‐welcomed	invitation	for	the	StB	to	achieve	its	objectives.	Odinga	and	
DRUH	mediated	Kenyatta’s	request	to	assist	Kenya	in	building	a	secret	security	service	
that	 would	 be	 independent	 of	 the	 existing	 British‐controlled	 Special	 Branch.385	
Operatives	were	to	be	Kenyans	trained	in	socialist	countries	and	the	organisation	would	
eventually	merge	with	the	Special	Branch	once	British	experts	had	left,	and	its	officers	
would	take	control	of	the	Special	Branch.	Another	suggestion	was	dissolving	the	Special	
Branch	completely	and	replacing	it	with	the	new	SPECIAL.		
To	 deal	 with	 the	 request,	 in	 October	 1964	 StB	 Headquarters	 sent	 a	 security	
advisor	 to	 Kenya,	 Lieutenant	 Colonel	 Antonín	 K.	 His	 mission	 received	 the	 highest	
priority	and	its	success	was	viewed	as	vital	for	the	future	victory	of	the	left	in	Kenya.	The	
advisor	 was	 supposed	 to	 cooperate	 with	 Odinga’s	 people,	 particularly	 with	 DRUH,	 in	
organising	 this	 new	 Kenyan	 intelligence	 agency	 and	 providing	 training	 for	 its	 first	
operatives.	 In	 respect	of	 this	 new	priority,	Headquarters	provided	 the	Residency	with	
the	 outline	 of	 proposed	 measures.	 The	 most	 illustrative	 of	 the	 CS	 objectives	 are	 the	
following	orders:	
1. The	advisor	 is	 to	 recommend	 creating	a	 small	group	of	operatives	 that	
will	 control	 the	network	of	 collaborators.	Creation	of	 supporting	bodies	
will	be	postponed.		
2. The	 primary	 objective	 will	 be	 to	 target	 the	 internal	 enemy.	 Internal	
enemy	 is	 defined	 as	 persons	 hostile	 to	 Odinga,	 supportive	 of	 capitalist	
development	in	Kenya,	those	resenting	Kenyan	cooperation	with	socialist	
countries	or	those	active	against	the	unifying	processes	in	Africa.	
3. Target	 foreign	 nationals	 only	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 internal	 enemy.	 Avoid	
using	methods	that	might	cause	fear	or	uncertainty.	
4. Establish	close	cooperation	with	DRUH	through	financial	support	and	the	
gift	of	a	car.	Use	DRUH	 to	exert	 the	anti‐imperialistic	orientation	of	 the	
agency.	
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5. Persuade	Odinga	 to	enroot	 the	agency	 legally	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 it	will	
eventually	join	the	current	security	set‐up,	or	that	it	will	take	over	its	role	
once	the	British	and	pro‐British	persons	are	expelled	from	it.386	
	
The	advisor	was	supposed	to	organise	security	so	it	‘could	fight	against	enemies	
of	 liberated	Kenya	and	against	major	 imperialist	 states.	 […]	The	main	duty	of	 the	newly	
created	democratic	security	service	of	Kenyan	left‐wing	patriots	is	to	reveal	the	intentions	
of	right‐wing	pro‐imperialist	persons,	 their	connection	with	colonialists	and	 imperialists,	
to	 acquire	 position	 and	 influence	 amongst	 them	 and	 through	 these	means	 to	 apply	 the	
political	reasoning	and	principles	of	governing	party	KANU	and	of	 the	 left‐wing	 […]	The	
task	of	our	advisor	is	to	create	a	situation	such	that	all	important	information	acquired	by	
Kenyan	 security	 shall	 be	 used	 via	 him	 by	 our	 Residency	 in	 Kenya	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
keeping	track	of	information	about	the	Main	Enemy’s	intentions	and	actions.’387	
The	StB	advisor	stayed	in	Kenya	for	almost	two	years	and	he	cooperated	closely	
with	DRUH,	who	was	responsible	on	the	Kenyan	side	for	the	action	SPECIAL.	DRUH	was	
appointed	the	head	of	security	and	he	was	one	of	a	small	number	of	officers	to	receive	
comprehensive	 intelligence	 training.	 After	 the	 promising	 start,	 however,	 cooperation	
with	DRUH	was	becoming	problematic	and	the	organisation	of	the	security	service	was	
stagnating.	The	StB	 turned	down	DRUH’s	 request	 for	 funding	 for	 the	whole	operation,	
which	proved	to	be	a	major	blow	for	its	final	outcome.	DRUH	promised	that	alternative	
financial	 sources	would	 be	 found	 in	 the	Kenyan	budget.	 This	 funding,	 however,	 never	
materialised	 and	 the	 progress	 of	 the	 action	 was	 threatened.	 The	 StB	 advisor	 was	
repeatedly	 very	 critical	 about	DRUH’s	 lack	 of	 activity	 and	 utter	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	 the	
action.	On	several	occasions	all	activities	in	relation	to	SPECIAL	were	halted	for	fear	of	
disclosure	 by	 the	 Special	 Branch.	 As	 the	 political	 will	 to	 cooperate	 with	 socialist	
countries	weakened	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 1965,	 it	 was	 becoming	 obvious	 that	 Action	
SPECIAL	would	 be	 a	 failure.	 The	main	 causes	 of	 the	 failure	were	 identified	 as	 lack	 of	
political	 support,	 insufficient	 funds	 and	 especially	 DRUH’s	 ignorance	 and	
mismanagement.	 It	 is,	 indeed,	 DRUH’s	 role	 in	 the	 whole	 action	 that	 poses	 a	 range	 of	
questions.	
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During	 the	 1960s	 DRUH	 had	 emerged	 as	 the	 StB’s	 most	 important	 Kenyan	
contact.	A	set	of	hints	and	incomplete	information	allows	us	to	deduce	DRUH’s	identity,	
which	 I	have,	however,	decided	not	 to	 reveal.	DRUH	was	undoubtedly	one	of	Odinga’s	
closest	 collaborators	 and	 a	 fellow	 Luo.	 The	 documentation	 shows	 that	 DRUH	 was	 in	
close	contact	with	President	Kenyatta	and	with	other	political	elites	in	KANU,	including	
some	 of	 the	 right‐wing	 politicians.	 The	 StB	 had	 already	 become	 interested	 in	
cooperating	with	DRUH	in	1964	and,	once	contacted	by	 local	residents,	DRUH	showed	
interest	in	collaborating.	The	nature	of	the	cooperation	indicates	that	DRUH	must	have	
been	aware	of	the	true	mission	of	the	StB	operative	who	was	in	touch	with	him	from	the	
very	beginning.	DRUH	was	one	of	the	CCs	regularly	receiving	financial	rewards	and	gifts	
for	his	 services	and	 it	 seems	 that,	 after	1966,	he	was	enlisted	as	an	agent	 for	 the	StB.	
Collaboration	 with	 DRUH	 was	 established	 and	 further	 developed,	 despite	 some	
warnings	 the	 Residency	 received	 about	 DRUH	 from	 other	 confidential	 contacts,	
especially	 OLEANDER.	Warnings	 that	 DRUH	might	 be	working	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 KANU	
right‐wing	or	even	the	British,	were	noted	by	the	StB,	but	disregarded.	Also,	DRUH’s	past	
training	 in	 Israel,	 which	 was	 pointed	 out	 by	 OLEANDER,	 was	 disregarded	 as	
unimportant.		
Cooperation	with	DRUH	was	considered	vital	for	the	success	of	StB	objectives	in	
Kenya.	The	StB	valued	him	highly	 for	 the	 intelligence	he	 regularly	provided	and,	 once	
Odinga	 lost	 his	 leading	 position	 in	 KANU,	 DRUH’s	 political	 importance	 for	 the	 CSSR	
expanded	even	further.	Unfortunately	for	the	StB,	DRUH	seems	to	have	been	one	of	the	
main	 reasons	 why	 the	 StB	 ultimately	 failed	 in	 its	 objectives.	 Warnings	 foolishly	
disregarded	 by	 the	 StB	 proved	 to	 be	 true.	 The	 object	 description	 available	 in	 the	
archives	duly	describes	 the	person	 that	effectively	defeated	 the	StB	 in	Kenya	and,	 to	a	
great	 extent,	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 left	 in	 its	 quest	 for	 dominance	 in	
KANU.	 ‘[DRUH]	 is	 the	 representative	 of	Kenyan	 security	with	 close	 relations	 to	Kenyan	
vice‐president	 Oginga	 Odinga	 and	 also	 with	 President	 Kenyatta.	 [He]	 behaved	
progressively	 towards	 countries	 of	 the	 socialist	 camp.	 From	 the	 CSSR	 he	 received	 a	
consignment	of	arms	and	also	 special	 training	 for	Kenyan	 security	workers.	He	was	well	
acquainted	 with	 forms	 and	 methods	 of	 Czechoslovak	 intelligence	 work.	 Later	 it	 was	
verified	with	 ever	 greater	 certainty,	 that	 he	 is	 a	British	 IS	 agent,	 deployed	 into	Kenyan	
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government.	 Our	 actions	 undertaken	 in	 Kenya	 were	 revealed	 by	 American	 and	 British	
security	services	and	many	of	our	operatives	exposed.’388		
It	 is	 not	 entirely	 clear	 when	 StB	 operatives	 finally	 realised	 that	 DRUH	 was	
working	 for	 British	 Intelligence.	 The	 first	 serious	 doubts	 about	 his	 loyalty	 appeared	
around	 1967,	 but	 cooperation	 with	 DRUH	 continued	 until	 at	 least	 1969.	 It	 remains	
unclear	when	DRUH	 actually	 started	working	 for	 the	 Special	 Branch.	 The	 information	
about	 timing	 is	vital	 for	establishing	whether	Czechoslovak	activities	would	ever	have	
had	 any	 realistic	 chance	 of	 destabilising	 Kenya’s	 pro‐western	 orientation.	 If	 it	was	 as	
soon	 as	 1964,	 the	 whole	 mission	 of	 building	 SPECIAL	 with	 StB	 assistance	 must	 be	
perceived	as	a	very	effective	case	of	infiltration	of	and	perhaps	sabotage	of	CS	activities	
from	 the	 outset.	 If	 it	 was	 later,	 the	 failure	 of	 SPECIAL	must	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 general	
decline	of	political	power	of	Odinga’s	left	in	KANU.	With	limited	resources	and	the	lack	
of	 political	 support	 on	 Kenya’s	 side,	 the	 success	 of	 Action	 SPECIAL	 was	 simply	
impossible.		
It	 also	 remains	 unclear	 to	 what	 extent	 Kenyatta	 or	 Odinga	 were	 aware	 of	
DRUH’s	links	to	Special	Branch.	It	is	highly	unlikely	that	Odinga	would	have	kept	DRUH	
close	 to	 him	 if	 he	 had	 known	 of	 it,	 as	 it	 is	 now	 clear	 that	 DRUH	 contributed	 to	 large	
extent	 negatively	 to	 Odinga’s	 political	 decline.	 It	 also	 remains	 possible	 that	 DRUH	
started	to	cooperate	with	the	Special	Branch	at	a	later	date,	around	1966,	once	Odinga’s	
political	position	was	significantly	deteriorating.	It	is	hard	to	believe	that	the	SB	would	
have	been	able	to	maintain	an	agent	so	close	to	Odinga	without	his	growing	suspicious.	
Hard,	 yet	not	 impossible,	 to	believe.	Odinga	 repeatedly	proved	 somewhat	naïve	 in	his	
power	struggle,	and	this	might	have	been	just	another	of	his	mistakes.			
	What	 is	 perhaps	 even	 more	 peculiar	 in	 relation	 to	 Action	 SPECIAL	 and	 to	
Kenyan‐CSSR	 cooperation	 in	 general	 is	 the	 role	 of	 President	 Kenyatta.	 Kenyatta’s	
repeatedly	 expressed	 desire	 to	 cooperate	 with	 CSSR	 in	 this	 sphere	 is	 recorded	 in	
multiple	documents	and	is	fully	in	line	with	official	Kenyan	politics	pre‐1965.	Kenyatta	
even	had	his	own	residence	checked	by	StB	technicians	to	prevent	spying	on	his	person	
by	the	British‐dominated	Special	Branch.389	However,	in	the	light	of	the	DRUH	affair,	and	
especially	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 ultimate	 change	 in	 attitude	 against	 socialist	 countries	
Kenyatta	authorised	in	1965,	it	seems	very	likely	that	Kenyatta	was	playing	CS	officials	
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and	 operatives	 from	 the	 beginning.	 A	 simple	motivation	 for	 this	 could	 very	well	 have	
been	a	wish	to	destroy	Odinga’s	political	opportunities	and	the	ambitions	of	his	closest	
socialist	 ally	 to	 interfere	 with	 Kenyan	 politics	 by	 sabotaging	 their	 most	 ambitious	
cooperation.	 An	 alternative	 perspective	 is	 that	 Kenyatta’s	 desire	 to	 cooperate	 with	
Czechoslovakia	 in	 the	 security	 sphere	 was	 sincere	 in	 1964	 at	 least	 until	 the	 final	
arrangement	with	Britain	 could	be	 resolved	 in	 all	 areas	 –	political,	 economic,	 security	
and	military.	In	such	a	scenario	the	failure	of	Action	SPECIAL	could	be	fully	attributed	to	
deliberate	sabotage	by	DRUH,	most	likely	masterminded	by	British	intelligence	from	the	
very	beginning.	None	of	these	interpretations	alters	the	fact	that	Operation	SPECIAL	was	
a	 failure,	 in	 the	same	way	Czechoslovak	cooperation	with	Odinga	 	 later	was.	However,	
unravelling	 the	 true	motivations	with	which	Kenyatta	 sought	 special	 cooperation	with	
the	CSSR	might	shed	more	light	on	two	only	partially	resolved	questions	of	early	Kenyan	
political	development.	The	first	would	be	to	what	extent	the	alternatives	to	pro‐western	
orientation	were	really	considered	by	Kenyatta.	The	second	is	then	linked	to	the	roots	of	
the	subsequent	political	breakup	between	Kenyatta	and	Odinga.		
DRUH’s	 activities	 for	 the	 SB	 completely	 change	 the	 perspective	 to	 be	 applied	
when	 analysing	 all	 other	 StB	 activities	 in	 Kenya.	No	 other	 action	 of	 such	 far‐reaching	
aspiration	was	undertaken	by	StB	once	SPECIAL	failed.	However,	numerous	AMs	might	
have	been	affected	by	DRUH’s	 treason.	To	what	extent	 these	AMs	were	unmasked	and	
exposed	 by	 DRUH	 remains	 uncertain,	 as	 does	 his	 role	 in	 the	 diplomatic	 expulsion	 of	
three	 CS	 nationals	working	 for	 the	 StB.	 It	 is	 not	 unlikely	 that	 it	was	 through	 DRUH’s	
knowledge	of	StB	Residency	members	and	their	activities	that	the	Kenyan	government	
was	able	to	paralyse	it	the	minute	it	decided	to	do	so.		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 assigning	 blame	 for	 the	 failure	 of	 Action	 SPECIAL,	 of	 StB	
activities	 in	 Kenya	 in	 general	 and	 of	 CS	 politics	 in	 Kenya	 as	 such,	 there	 is	 only	 one	
organisation	 to	 blame:	 the	 StB	 itself.	 It	 failed	 to	 provide	 sufficient	 funding	 for	 its	
ambitious	 aims;	 it	 was	 not	 able	 to	 retain	 political	 support	 for	 its	 activities;	 it	 had	
underestimated	the	British	as	its	enemy	that	proved	too	great	to	defeat	with	the	limited	
means	 the	 StB	 allocated	 to	 the	 mission;	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 it	 ignored	 the	
information	 from	 its	 own	 confidential	 sources	 and	 allowed	 the	 enemy	 to	 completely	
sabotage	its	actions.	The	blame	for	the	failure	of	its	objectives	is	thus	allocated,	and	that	
cannot	be	changed	by	any	new	information	yet	to	be	revealed.		
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Amongst	 StB	 papers	 in	 DRUH’s	 dossier,	 there	 is	 set	 of	 files	 illustrating	 how	
subversive	the	actions	of	DRUH	were	for	Odinga.	On	5	August	1965	DRUH	met	with	his	
StB	contact	in	Nairobi.	During	the	meeting	he	expressed	great	disappointment	over	the	
latest	 political	 development	 and	 he	 conveyed	 the	 message,	 allegedly,	 from	 Odinga.	
‘DRUH	claimed	 that	he	got	 the	green	 light	 from	Odinga	and	 that	he	 should	 focus	on	 the	
preparation	 of	 the	 forced	 removal	 of	 right‐wing	 pro‐imperialist	 agents,	 such	 as	 Tom	
Mboya,	 Mungai,	 McKenzie,	 Gichuru,	 Ronald	 Ngala	 and	 others.’390	 DRUH	 stated	 that	
preparations	 in	Odinga’s	group	 for	 the	 coup	were	underway	and	he	asked	 for	 specific	
assistance	from	the	Czechoslovak	embassy.	DRUH	asked	the	CSSR	to	provide	an	advisor	
for	 the	planning	of	 this	 action	and	 for	organising	a	 short	 course	 for	20	officers.	These	
trained	officers	would	afterwards	train	2000	persons	 in	Tanzania	or	Uganda.	The	date	
planned	for	the	coup	was	to	be	the	national	celebrations	in	December	1965.391	DRUH’s	
requests	met	with	a	cool	response,	and	the	StB	operatives	reported	the	whole	case	as	an	
example	 of	 DRUH’s	 and	 Odinga’s	 unrealistic	 perceptions	 of	 the	 political	 situation	 in	
Kenya.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	note	 that	 this	operative	did	not	doubt	DRUH’s	claims	 that	 it	
was	Odinga	who	had	initiated	the	whole	plan,	even	though	such	an	approach	would	have	
been	 in	 striking	 contrast	 with	 his	 political	 past	 and	 there	 is	 no	 other	 evidence	 in	
Czechoslovak	 archives	 indicating	 that	 Odinga	 had	 really	 planned	 for	 	 a	 coup	 d’état	 to	
take		place.	Surprisingly,	StB	officials	were	prone	to	trust	DRUH,	even	though	there	were	
more	and	more	hints	 indicating	his	uncertain	 loyalty.392	 In	 the	 light	of	DRUH’s	 links	 to	
the	 SB	 the	whole	matter	was	with	most	 likely	 aimed	 to	 discredit	 the	 CSSR	 as	well	 as	
Odinga	once	and	for	all.	Luckily	for	Odinga,	the	Nairobi	Residency’s	limited	resources	did	
not	 stretch	 to	 meeting	 DRUH’s	 request.	 It	 is	 very	 likely	 that	 any	 steps	 towards	 the	
preparations	of	a	coup	would	have	been	revealed	and	used	in	Kenya	against	both	Odinga	
and	against	socialist	countries.			
	
	
3.2.5. Czechoslovak	retreat	from	Kenya	
In	 1966	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 Operation	 SPECIAL	 relations	 between	 the	
CSSR	 and	Kenya	 came	 to	 an	 abrupt	 end,	 followed	 by	 Odinga’s	 departure	 from	KANU.	
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During	 late	1965	and	the	 first	months	of	1966	 the	 internal	 rift	within	KANU	widened.	
During	the	full‐scale	KANU	conference	in	February	1966	Mboya	announced	the	plan	to	
introduce	 a	 new	 Constitution.	 Various	 measures	 limiting	 Odinga’s	 powers	 within	 the	
party	 were	 also	 introduced	 and	 were	 effective.	 ‘A	 KANU	 party	 conference	 in	 March	
abolished	 the	Vice‐Presidency	and	 replaced	 the	post	with	eight	 regional	Vice	Presidents,	
thereby	 depriving	 Odinga	 of	 his	 national	 office.’393	 ‘All	 those	 known	 or	 thought	 to	 be	
associated	with	him	[Odinga]	and	the	Radical	group	[…]	failed	to	win	re‐election.’	394	Once	
it	 was	 clear	 that	 Odinga	 had	 no	 political	 future	 in	 KANU,	 he	 opted	 for	 an	 alternative	
political	project.	The	one‐party	system	had	not	at	this	point	been	introduced	in	Kenya,	
so	legally	Odinga’s	plan	could	not	be	challenged.		
The	 Kenya	 People’s	 Union	 (KPU)	 became	 a	 populist	 party	 that	 attempted	 to	
challenge	 the	 government	 by	 using	 long‐standing	 grievances	 of	 various	 groups	 of	 the	
Kenyan	population.	Odinga’s	project	was	not	completely	hopeless	in	the	beginning	as	he	
was	 joined	 by	 Bildad	 Kaggia,	 an	 influential	 freedom	 fighter,	 Kenyatta’s	 close	 ally	 and	
one‐time	fellow	detainee,	a	popular	Kikuyu	politician	who	was	certainly	able	to	attract	
considerable	 Kikuyu	 support	 for	 his	 KPU	 project.	 Odinga	 and	 Kaggia	 emphasised	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 heritage	 of	 freedom	 fighters	 including	Mau	Mau	 veterans,	many	 of	
whom	 felt	 increasingly	 overlooked,	 marginalised	 and	 unrewarded	 by	 the	 KANU	
government.	Former	detainees	and	supporters	of	the	Mau	Mau	insurgency	became	one	
of	 the	 first	 groups	 to	 openly	 support	 the	 KPU.	 Odinga	 also	 raised	 the	 topic	 of	 land	
redistribution.	 ‘KPU	urged	a	 significant	programme	of	 land	redistribution,	 including	 the	
cancelling	of	the	debt	accrued	by	African	smallholders	who	had	joined	settlement	schemes	
on	former	European‐owned	 land.’395	The	KPU	was	more	openly	socialist	than	the	KANU	
cabinet	and	 it	strongly	criticised	some	of	KANU’s	capitalist	development	plans.	Odinga	
was	 also	 understandably	 much	 more	 open	 to	 cooperation	 with	 socialist	 countries	
including	Czechoslovakia	with	which	he	had	very	close	relations.		
The	 KPU	 was	 formed	 initially	 by	 a	 group	 of	 secessionists	 from	 KANU	 when	
twenty‐nine	Members	of	Parliament	left	KANU	to	join	the	new	party.	Odinga	wanted	the	
KPU	 to	 be	 a	 strong	 and	 vocal	 opposition	 in	 parliament	 but	 his	 plans	 suffered	 a	 blow	
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when	KANU	passed	the	Constitutional	amendment	that	all	the	Parliament	members	who	
had	 decided	 to	 swap	 party	 allegiance	 would	 have	 to	 seek	 re‐election	 in	 their	 home	
districts.396	This	move	prevented	more	MPs	 from	 joining	 the	KPU	 for	 their	 fear	of	not	
being	able	 to	 secure	 re‐election.397	The	most	radical	branch	of	KANU,	 the	Youth	Wing,	
was	mobilised	 prior	 to	 these	 supplementary	 elections	 and	 they	 prompted	 attacks	 on	
known	 KPU	 supporters.398	 It	 was	 the	 first	 time	 since	 independence	 that	 such	 violent	
practices	 occurred	 in	 the	 political	 arena	 and	 they	 predestined	 the	 future	 of	 Kenyan	
elections	 for	 decades	 to	 come.	 Youth‐Wing	 actions	 proved	 effective	 as	 only	 nine	 KPU	
MPs	retained	their	seats.		
Some	 evidence	 exists	 that	 it	 was	 Tom	 Mboya	 who	 masterminded	 both	 the	
abolition	 of	 the	 Vice‐President	 post	 and	 the	 Constitutional	 amendment	 to	 weaken	
Odinga’s	position	among	the	Luo	people.399	Despite	the	fact	that	the		KPU	lost	much	of	its	
power	following	the	election,	the	government	was	concerned	about	growing	political	as	
well	 as	 popular	 opposition	 throughout	 Kenya,	 so	 it	 decided	 to	 introduce	 legislation	
which	 allowed	 ‘detention	 without	 trial	 and	 press	 censorship	 in	 the	 name	 of	 national	
security.’400	 Despite	 this	measure	 the	KPU	managed	 to	 operate	 for	 another	 two	 years,	
until	 it	was	banned	in	1969,	 in	reaction	to	riots	of	Luo	people	whose	frustrations	over	
their	 growing	 political	 and	 economic	 marginalisation	 ran	 high	 after	 Tom	Mboya	 was	
assassinated.	Opposition	leaders	were	detained	and	Odinga	eventually	spent	two	years	
in	detention	between	1969	and	1971,	after	his	ultimate	falling‐out	with	Kenyatta.	By	this	
time	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 were	 virtually	 non‐existent	 and	 all	 of	 the	 previous	
objectives	were	cancelled.			
In	his	 attempt	 to	unite	 the	 left	 in	Kenya,	Odinga	once	more	 turned	 to	 the	CSSR	
and	other	socialist	countries	with	requests	for	support.	CS	experts	from	the	MFA	were	
sceptical	about	the	success	of	the	KPU	project,	as	they	were	blaming	mainly	Odinga	and	
his	lack	of	managerial	and	leadership	skills	for	the	defeat	of	the	left	within	KANU.	MFA’s	
report	stated	that	 ‘a	major	shortcoming	of	that	group	[progressive	 forces]	and	especially	
of	Odinga	himself	was	their	 failure	 to	establish	a	nation‐wide	political	platform	and	also	
the	fact	that	the	Left	movement	remained	limited	by	tribal	boundaries.	Odinga	was	unable	
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to	 take	 advantage	 of	 anti‐British	 and	 anti‐American	 tension,	 he	 chose	 tactics	 of	
cooperation	with	the	right	within	KANU	and	eventually	enabled	the	right	wing	to	split	the	
left	wing.’401	Nevertheless,	 lacking	a	credible	political	alternative,	CS	officials	decided	to	
continue	their	support	for	Odinga.	However,	the	pressure	from	the	Kenyan	government	
made	it	virtually	impossible	to	challenge	KANU’s	dominance	effectively.	
During	the	early	months	of	1966,	at	the	time	of	Odinga’s	final	break	with	KANU,	
the	 Kenyan	 media	 and	 government	 officials	 unleashed	 an	 openly	 hostile	 campaign	
against	 the	 socialist	 countries.	 During	 1966	 it	 officially	 expelled	 two	 Soviet	 diplomats	
and	 a	 Soviet	 journalist,	 and	 likewise	 two	 CS	 diplomats,	 a	 ČTK	 journalist	 and	 one	
Hungarian	diplomat.	At	the	same	time	the	Chinese	embassy	was	effectively	paralysed	by	
the	cutting	of	its	staff	number	allocation	to	the	minimum.	Another	Soviet	diplomat	had	
to	 leave	 Kenya	 in	 1967.	 During	 1968	 an	 ANP	 correspondent	 and	 a	 Soviet	 Filmexport	
expert	 had	 to	 close	 their	 offices	 and	 leave	 Kenya	 as	 well,	 to	 be	 followed	 by	 the	 ČTK	
correspondent	 and	 the	 closing	 of	 the	 ČTK	 office.	 In	 an	 MFA	 internal	 document,	 this	
Kenyan	government	campaign	is	described	as	follows:	‘The	number	of	expelled	nationals	
from	 socialist	 countries,	 especially	 Soviet	 ones,	 in	 such	 a	 short	 time	 is	 completely	
unprecedented	not	only	in	Africa,	but	also	in	imperialist	countries.	These	specific	actions	of	
the	Kenyan	government	were	accompanied	by	Kenyan	press	 campaigns	against	 socialist	
countries	and	undermining	activities	of	communists	and	they	were	 linked	to	“subversive”	
KPU	 activity	 ,	 as	 vice‐president	Moi	 informed	 Parliament	 in	 April	 1968	 ,	when	 he	was	
announcing	the	closure	of	the	Nairobi	ČTK	office	.’			
In	 the	 political	 reality	 of	 the	 late	 1960s	Oginga	Odinga’s	 new	political	 project	
was	destined	to	fail	from	the	beginning.	Odinga	counted	on	receiving	more	support	from	
socialist	 countries	 including	 Czechoslovakia	 but	 the	 Kenyan	 government	 made	 it	
impossible	to	provide	the	KPU	with	any	effective	help.	The	Czechoslovak	embassy	after	
1966	 had	 nowhere	 near	 the	 political	 influence	 it	 had	 enjoyed	 in	 1964.	 The	 ambitious	
plans	 of	 1964	 were	 now	 wholly	 abandoned	 and	 the	 embassy	 as	 well	 as	 the	 StB	
Residency	 functioned	 under	 strong	 pressure	 from	 the	 Kenyan	 state	 to	 a	 very	 limited	
modus	operandi.	Constant	supervision	of	Kenyan	 intelligence,	actions	against	embassy	
staff,	 including	the	expulsion	of	diplomatic	as	well	as	technical	personnel	and	a	ban	on	
their	movements,	made	it	very	difficult	 to	provide	any	meaningful	support	to	the	KPU.	
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The	KPU	itself	failed	to	effectively	challenge	KANU’s	position	in	the	state	and,	once	it	was	
banned	 by	 the	 government,	 the	 left‐wing	 political	 forces	 around	 Odinga	 were	
marginalised	in	Kenya	for	more	than	two	decades.	The	end	of	Odinga’s	political	career	
pretty	much	coincided	with	the	ultimate	decline	of	Czechoslovak	activism	in	Kenya.		
The	Soviet	 invasion	of	Czechoslovakia	 in	1968	represented	a	major	disruption	
to	all	government	activities	and	Czechoslovak	activities	in	Kenya	were	no	exception.	The	
Czechoslovak	embassy	in	Nairobi,	as	well	as	the	local	StB	Residency,	had,	after	the	Soviet	
invasion,	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 defection	 of	 several	 operatives,	 whose	 knowledge	 of	 StB	
activities	 contributed	 to	 the	 crippling	 of	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency402.	 StB	 Residency	
activities	were	now	intermittent	and	their	effect	on	the	political	development	in	Kenya	
was	 becoming	marginal.	 Gradually	 the	 Residency	 abandoned	 its	 activities	 against	 the	
Kenyan	 government	 and	 the	Main	 Enemy	 completely,	 and	 officially	 gave	 up	 its	 initial	
political	 objectives,	 to	 concentrate	on	 the	 supervision	and	penetration	of	 the	CS	expat	
community.	Eventually,	 in	 the	 first	half	 of	 the	1970s,	Headquarters	decided	 to	pull	 its	
operatives	from	Nairobi	and	the	Residency	ceased	operating.	A	low‐ranking	StB	officer	
represented	 the	embassy	 for	 the	 following	years	 as	well,	 but	his	 responsibilities	were	
completely	 different	 from	 those	 of	 the	 Residency	 proper.	 The	 decline	 of	 the	 Nairobi	
Residency	is	the	best	illustration	of	the	CS	government‘s	utter	relinquishment	after	1968	
of	its	once	ambitious	political	plans	in	Kenya.	
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4. Czechoslovakia	and	Uganda	between	1945	and	1968	
4.1. Introduction	and	methodological	note	
Chapter	 4	 presents,	 as	 a	 case	 study,	 the	 cooperation	 between	 Czechoslovakia	
and	 Uganda	 during	 the	 formative	 period	 for	 the	 newly	 independent	 Uganda	 in	 the	
1960s;	it	can	be	easily	seen	to	be	one	of	the	most	remarkable	cases	of	CS	involvement	in	
Africa	 during	 the	 Cold	 War.	 	 The	 ideological	 and	 political	 entry	 points	 for	 this	
cooperation	were	much	 the	 same	as	 in	 the	 case	of	Kenya,	but	 the	development	of	 the	
actual	cooperation	between	the	two	countries	and	effects	on	political	development	were	
different.	My	 intention	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 identify	 and	 analyse	 in	what	 crucial	ways	
Uganda	and	Czechoslovakia	interacted	in	this	period	and	how	these	contacts	and	various	
forms	of	 cooperation	 shaped	and	affected	Uganda’s	political	development.	 I	 also	point	
out	 some	of	 the	striking	similarities	with,	 and,	more	 importantly,	differences	 from	the	
other	two	case	studies	covered	in	this	research.		
After	Uganda	received	independence	and	the	UPC	successfully	established	itself	
as	 the	 strongest	 political	 party	 in	 the	 country,	 Obote’s	 government	 started	 to	 seek	
foreign	assistance	in	the	military	and	security	spheres	in	order	to	consolidate	its	control	
over	the	power	institutions	of	the	Ugandan	states.	From	1964	on	Uganda	was	receiving	
extensive	assistance	in	this	field	from	Israel.	The	motivations	of	both	countries	and	the	
form	and	nature	of	this	cooperation	are	well	known	in	academic	circles.	Uganda’s	special	
cooperation	with	other	countries	including	Britain,	the	USA	or	the	Soviet	Union	has	also	
been	at	least	partially	researched.	However,	when	it	comes	to	Czechoslovak	involvement	
in	 developing	 the	 Ugandan	military	 and	 security	 	 spheres	 during	 Obote’s	 and	 Amin’s	
eras	existing	academic	texts	403do	not	give	us	much	more	than	a	brief	acknowledgement	
that	 Czechoslovakia	 did	 indeed	 provide	 Uganda	 with	 some	 special	 material	 during	
Amin’s	rule.	It	seems	that	there	is	no	deeper	academic	knowledge	of	any	special	military	
cooperation	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 Uganda	 evolving	 during	 Obote’s	 regime.	
Similarly,	existing	secondary	 literature	either	 ignores	or	 is	 simply	unaware	of	 the	role	
that	 Czechoslovakia	 played	 in	 forming	 and	 developing	 Obote’s	 intelligence	 apparatus,	
known	 as	 the	 General	 Service	 Unit.	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 effects	 of	 these	 activities	 on	
Ugandan	 political	 affairs	 have	 never	 previously	 been	 analysed	 and	 presented	 to	 an	
                                                            
403 Eg. Ofcansky, Uganda.; Jorgensen, Uganda. 
176 
 
academic	audience.	This	is	true	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	role	of	the	Ugandan	military	is	
amongst	 the	 most	 closely	 studied	 themes	 of	 political	 development	 in	 post‐colonial	
Uganda	 as	 the	 army	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 major	 political	 agent,	 driving	 far‐reaching	
political	change	that	ultimately	caused	the	collapse	of	the	Ugandan	state.		
The	 following	 section	of	 this	 thesis	will	 attempt	 to	 fill	 this	 gap	by	providing	a	
comprehensive	overview	of	Czechoslovak	cooperation	with	Uganda	in	the	field	of	special	
military	 and	 security	 assistance.	 The	 motivations	 for,	 and	 forms	 and	 effects	 of	 this	
cooperation	are	presented	here	in	relation	to	the	major	events	of	political	development	
in	Uganda	in	this	period.	The	Czechoslovak‐Ugandan	special	cooperation	is	viewed	and	
interpreted	here	in	reference	to	existing	academic	discourse	on	the	role	of	the	military	
in	Ugandan	politics	and	other	major	topics	including	the	matter	of	Bugandan	separatism	
or		Obote’s	inclinations	to	a	one‐party	system.	The	significance	of	the	role	that	both	the	
Ugandan	army	and	Ugandan	security	 forces	played	 in	 the	political	development	of	 the	
newly	independent	Uganda	in	the	first	decade	of	its	existence	proved	paramount	in	the	
period	 of	 Obote’s	 rule	 as	 well	 as	 that	 of	 Amin.	 Both	 of	 these	 organisations	 initially	
contributed	to	Obote’s	rise	into	limitless	power,	only	to	add	to	his	fall	a	few	years	later	
by	 increasing	 their	own	 interdisciplinary	 tensions,	 and	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	 army,	 finally	
mounting	the	coup	against	him	and	acquiring	the	control	of	the	state	for	itself.			
The	text	in	this	chapter	is	organised	chronologically	and	thematically	and	covers	
the	period	 from	the	mid‐1950s	when	the	anti‐colonial	processes	 in	Uganda	 intensified	
until	 circa	 1970	when	 the	 rule	 of	 President	 Obote	was	 steadily	 declining	 until	 it	was	
ultimately	challenged	by	the	Ugandan	army	in	the	figure	of	 its	Commander‐in‐chief	 Idi	
Amin.	 	 The	 most	 significant	 effects	 of	 Czechoslovak‐Ugandan	 cooperation	 on	 this	
development	 are	 presented	 against	 the	 background	 of	 crucial	 events	 in	 the	 political	
development	of	Uganda.	 I	 outline	 the	main	 forms	of	 cooperation	 that	were	 typical	 for	
each	 period,	 the	 main	 personalities	 that	 were	 involved	 in	 their	 execution,	 and	 the	
political	effects	that	these	relations	might	have	had	on	regional	or	supra‐regional	affairs.	
Archival	materials	 from	 the	 CS	 records	 are	 the	 only	 source	 of	 information	 on	
this	curious	topic	that	I	have	managed	to	trace.	Archival	records	are	plentiful	enough	to	
aid	an	attempt	at	reconstructing	this	cooperation,	but	they	are	by	no	means	complete.	A	
large	part	of	the	documentation,	especially	that	from	Interior	Ministry	and	StB	sources,	
are	incomplete	and	the	remainder	have	still	to	be	organised.	With	the	stored	materials	
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being	 in	 disarray,	 together	 with	 the	 common	 use	 of	 code	 names	 and	 confidentiality	
measures,	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 full	 image	 of	 this	 cooperation	 is	 somewhat	 of	 a	
challenge.		
I	 gathered	more	 personal	 testimonies	 and	 interviews	 in	 Uganda	 than	 I	 did	 in	
Kenya	and	Tanzania.	Unfortunately,	the	quantity	in	this	case	was	no	guarantee	of	quality	
and	this	part	of	the	field	research	fell	short	of	my	hopes.	I	travelled	to	Uganda	with	a	list	
of	names	that	 I	hoped	would	shed	more	 light	on	some	of	 the	 issues	 left	unresolved	by	
the	 archival	 material.	 Once	 in	 Uganda,	 it	 quickly	 turned	 out	 on	 contact	 with	 local	
authorities	that	none	of	the	figures	from	my	list	would	be	traceable.	Most	of	the	people	
on	my	 list	were	already	dead;	others	had	been	missing	 for	a	 long	 time,	while	 the	 rest	
proved	 impossible	 to	 locate	within	 the	 constraints	of	 time	and	 funds	at	my	disposal.	 I	
was	forced	to	apply	a	different	approach	in	my	data	collection.	Through	contacts	and	the	
help	of	some	Ugandan	officials,	I	decided	to	find	and	interview	people	who	might	have	
been	personally	 involved	in	Czechoslovak	activities	in	Uganda	as	members	of	the	state	
administration,	military	or	security	in	the	periods	when	relations	between	Uganda	and	
the	CSSR	had	peaked.	The	other	group	of	people	who	I	decided	to	interview,	with	little	
hope	 of	 success,	 included	 persons	 who	 might	 not	 have	 had	 direct	 contact	 with	 CS	
activities	but	might	have	gathered	some	knowledge	of	CS	activities	in,	for	example,	the	
Ugandan	military	either	ex‐post	or	indirectly	through	other	people.		
In	my	desperate	quest	for	information,	I	met	and	talked	to	several	current	high‐
ranking	 officials	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 army,	 including	 Brigadier	 Rusoke	 and	 Colonel	 Pecos	
Kutesa.		Most	of	these	people	were	directly	involved	in	the	past	in	the	opposition	to	the	
government	of	Idi	Amin,	who	maintained	his	vital	contacts	with	the	CSSR.	With	the	same	
outlook,	I	interviewed	several	former	politicians	from	Amin’s	period	in	power	or	Obote‘s	
second	regime.	I	placed	a	lot	of	hope	in	contacting	Idi	Amin’s	family	members,	some	of	
whom	 still	 reside	 in	Uganda.	However,	 despite	my	 repeated	 attempts	 to	 acquire	 their	
details	and	contact	them	through	my	network	of	helpers,	Idi	Amin’s	sons	and	daughter	
remained	unreachable.	 In	 the	 end,	 I	 ended	up	 interviewing	 ten	people,	 but	 I	 obtained	
very	 little	 information	 on	 CS	 activities	 in	 Uganda,	 in	 striking	 contrast	 to	 the	 actual	
intensity	 and	duration	of	 these	activities.	Nevertheless,	most	of	 the	 interviews	proved	
helpful	 in	 respect	 of	 providing	me	 with	 a	 unique	 insider‘s	 view	 of	 the	 turbulent	 and	
complicated	historical	development	to	which	the	CSSR	had	contributed.		
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4.2. Towards	Ugandan	independence		
The	1950s	were	 the	period	when	most	African	countries	were	rapidly	moving	
towards	 political	 independence	 and	 the	 British	 protectorate	 of	 Uganda	 –	 though	
somewhat	 of	 a	 latecomer	 –	 was	 no	 exception.	 The	 momentum	 of	 growing	 African	
nationalism	 that	 swept	 through	 British	 Africa	 was	 initially	 much	 weaker	 in	 Uganda	
because	in	the	early	1950s	the	modern	political	parties	were	only	starting	to	emerge	but	
new	 nationalist	 leaders	 eventually	 managed	 to	 catch	 up.	 The	 British	 were	 very	
successful	 in	 Uganda	 in	 sustaining	 the	 ethnic	 divisions	 in	 the	 local	 population	 by	
maintaining	 the	 system	 of	 semi‐autonomous	 kingdoms	 with	 wide‐ranging	 powers	 of	
self‐rule.	This	factor	pretty	much	prevented	the	creation	of	any	kind	of	stronger	uniting	
pan‐Ugandan	 identity	and	had	 far‐reaching	effects	on	political	affairs	 in	Uganda	 in	 the	
decades	 to	 follow.	The	main	 competition	 to	 the	 strong	uniting	Ugandan	 identity	 came	
from	the	traditional	ethnic	and	regional	identities	of	numerous	African	tribes	occupying	
several	kingdoms	of	Uganda.		
Best	organised,	most	advanced	and	most	ambitious	was	the	quasi‐nationalistic	
movement	 of	 Ganda	 people	 in	 the	 largest	 kingdom	 of	 Buganda,	 which	 had	 enjoyed	
special	status	accorded	by	the	British	since	the	1900s.	With	the	end	of	the	Second	World	
War	 some	Ganda	 politicians	 increased	 their	 calls	 for	 complete	 separation	 of	 Buganda	
from	 the	 rest	of	 the	Protectorate.	Eventually,	 the	 formal	 traditional	 leader	of	Buganda	
kabaka404	 Muteesa	 II	 confronted	 the	 British	 Governor	 of	 Uganda	 with	 demands	 for	
separate	and	complete	independence	of	Buganda.	To	deal	with	the	situation	and	to	solve	
the	 causes	 of	 discontent	 of	 Buganda’s	 kabaka	 and	 of	members	 of	 the	 local	 legislative	
body	(called	the	lukiko),	the	British	governor	of	Uganda,	Sir	Andrew	Cohen,	held	many	
meetings	with	 Buganda’s	 leaders.	 These	 however	 failed	 to	 produce	 any	 solution.	 The	
British	 reacted	 by	 detaining	 the	 kabaka,	 which	 in	 the	 long	 term	 only	 improved	 the	
kabaka’s	 popularity	 in	 Buganda,	 and	 they	 rejected	 taking	 any	 political	 steps	 towards	
separate	 independence	 for	 Buganda.	 Eventually	 some	 steps	 towards	 granting	 greater	
powers	 to	both	 the	kabaka	and	 the	 lukiko	were	agreed	upon,	and	 the	 leader	of	Ganda	
people	returned	from	detention	in	1955	with	a	hero’s	glory.	Academics	still	discuss	how	
exactly	 the	 kabaka’s	 detention	 affected	 the	 Ugandan	 process	 of	 moving	 towards	
independence.	Most	 authors	 agree	 that	 the	kabaka’s	detention	 ‘reinforced	particularist	
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attitudes	in	Buganda	and	slowed	down	national	political	development’405.	Later	long‐term	
political	 development	 however	 indicates	 that	 the	 two‐year	 absence	 from	Uganda	was	
decisive	in	allowing	other	mostly	non‐Ganda	political	parties	to	establish	themselves	as	
serious	 political	 competitors	 to	 the	 kabaka	 and	 his	 supporters.	 It	 remains	 a	 fact	 that	
conceding	 greater	 powers	 to	 Buganda’s	 leaders	 strengthened	 the	 special	 status	 of	
Buganda	 within	 the	 Protectorate,	 but	 while	 aspirations	 were	 appeased,	 the	 original	
demands	for	separate	independence	were	effectively	side‐lined	for	long	enough	to	lose	
the	 required	political	momentum.	The	effect	of	 this	was	 two‐fold:	 immediate	and	 long	
term.	 The	 immediate	 effect	 of	 the	 provisional	 surrender	 of	 Buganda’s	 separatist	
aspirations	 was	 that	 	 Uganda’s	 national	 liberation	 movement	 was	 no	 longer	 being	
undermined	and	could	rapidly	advance.	In	the	long	term	a	greater	political	emancipation	
of	 the	 semi‐autonomous	 Buganda	within	 an	 independent	 Uganda	 seriously	weakened	
the	 political,	 economic	 and	 ethnic	 unity	 of	 Uganda	 for	 years	 to	 come	 and	 became	 the	
source	of	major	political	tensions	and	conflict	very	soon	after	independence.		
What	 is	 certain	 is	 that	 the	 two	years	 of	 the	kabaka’s	 detention	 saw	 some	 far‐	
reaching	 changes	 in	 Uganda’s	 political	 landscape.406	 Parallel	 to	 Buganda’s	 political	
struggle,	 the	nationwide	nationalist	Ugandan	political	parties	began	emerging,	most	of	
which	were	seeking	independence	for	Uganda	as	a	whole	and	some	of	which	had	various	
Bugandan	politicians	actively	participating.	Bugandan	separatism	was	thus	provisionally	
overshadowed	and	replaced	by	the	nationwide	struggle	 for	 independence	and	 it	never	
again	had	a	realistic	chance	to	reach	its	original	ambitious	political	goals.		
The	nationalist	movement	led	by	Ugandan	political	parties	began	in	the	first	half	
of	 1950s	 when	 the	 first	 modern‐style	 parties	 were	 formed,	 the	 aim	 of	 which	 was	 to	
move	 Uganda	 towards	 independence.	 Political	 affairs	 in	 the	 Protectorate	were	 at	 this	
point	still	clearly	dominated	by	the	British,	who,	unlike	in	neighbouring	Kenya,	were	not	
faced	with	strong	challenges	to	their	authority.	Many	factors	of	the	anti‐colonial	and	pro‐
independence	movement	that	brought	a	wave	of	politically‐related	violence	to	Kenya	in	
the	early	1950s	were	not	present	in	Uganda.	The	Ugandan	economy	was	providing	most	
native	 labourers	 with	 enough	 resources	 to	 guarantee	 a	 sustainable	 livelihood,	 thus	
largely	 preventing	 the	 outbreak	 of	 social	 grievances	 seen	 elsewhere	 in	 British	 Africa.	
The	 numbers	 of	 white	 British	 settlers	 never	 reached	 significant	 levels	 in	 Uganda,	 a	
                                                            
405 Scott, Roger, The Development of Trade Unions in Uganda, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1966): 
2. 
406 Ofcansky, Uganda, 33‐35. 
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circumstance	 that	 spared	Uganda	 the	 complicated	 and	 politically	 charged	 issue	 of	 the	
white	British	settlers’	community	that	traumatised	Kenya	or	Rhodesia.	Lastly,	the	British	
for	 the	 most	 part	 preserved	 the	 traditional	 system	 of	 historical	 African	 kingdoms	 in	
Uganda,	 which	 in	 effect	 very	 much	 lowered	 any	 urgent	 desire	 of	 the	 native	 African	
population	 to	 seek	 and	 demand	 political	 emancipation	 in	 modern	 terms.	 Crucial	 for	
propelling	 the	 Ugandan	 nationalist	movement	 towards	 independence	was	 the	 foreign	
inspiration	of	Ugandan	nationalist	leaders	who	reflected	aspirations	of	African	societies	
in	 neighbouring	 Kenya	 and	 Tanzania	 but	 also	 those	 of	 Ghana	 and	 the	 more	 distant	
British	colonies.				
The	 first	 political	 parties	 to	 become	 active	 and	 significant	 at	 national	 level	
during	the	1950s	were	the	Buganda‐based	Democratic	Party	of	Benedicto	Kiwanuka	and	
the	Uganda	National	Congress	established	by	Ignatius	Musaazi.	The	important	defining	
characteristic	of	these	parties	was	their	religious	affiliation.	While	the	DP	was	perceived	
as	a	Catholic	party	and	as	such	 in	opposition	to	the	political	establishment	around	the	
kabaka,	 the	UNC	profiled	 itself	as	 the	political	movement	of	Protestants.	Both	of	 these	
parties	 were	 most	 active	 in	 Buganda	 and	 less	 so	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 Protectorate.	
However,	they	failed	to	spread	to	all	regions	of	Uganda	and	they	also	struggled	to	form	
the	 appealing	 nationwide	 political	 programme	 needed	 to	 gain	 them	 broad	 popular	
support.	 Both	 parties	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 mobilise	 supporters	 from	 other	 religious	
camps,	and	the	same	was	true	for	overcoming	traditional	ethnic	allegiances.		
Later	 on	 in	 the	 1950s	 the	 UNC	 began	 to	 fragment	 internally.	 Some	 of	 its	
members	 left	 the	 party,	 while	 several	 others,	 led	 by	 Apollo	 Milton	 Obote,	 formed	 an	
autonomous	 wing	 within	 the	 UNC.	 Eventually	 Obote’s	 wing	 merged	 with	 the	 Uganda	
People’s	Union,	a	party	founded	in	1958	by	two	independent	members	of	the	legislative	
council,	 that	quickly	 gained	widespread	 support	outside	of	Buganda.	 In	1960	 the	UPU	
and	Obote	united	to	form	the	Uganda	People’s	Congress,	a	political	party	that	could	have	
benefitted	 from	 the	 UPU’s	 popular	 support	 in	 the	 most	 of	 Uganda	 and	 from	 Obote’s	
charismatic	 leadership.	 The	 UPC	 quickly	 became	 the	 party	 that	 came	 closest	 to	
resembling	 a	 modern	 political	 party	 in	 Uganda	 but	 it	 also	 struggled	 with	 limited	
financial	 resources,	 low	 membership	 and	 an	 inability	 to	 establish	 a	 country‐wide	
network	of	local	representatives.		
Throughout	the	1950s	and	the	early	period	after	independence	there	were	two	
major	defining	factors	of	Ugandan	politics.	The	main	one	was	the	status	of	Buganda	and	
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its	relationship	with	the	rest	of	Uganda.	The	second	defining	factor	of	Uganda’s	road	to	
independence	 was	 the	 nature	 of	 its	 future	 relationship	 with	 Britain	 as	 well	 as	 with	
British	citizens	living	in	Uganda,	mostly	of	Asian	descent.	
The	 Protestant	 political	 elites	 of	 Buganda	who	were	 gathered	 around	 kabaka	
Muteesa	 II	 renewed	 their	 attempts	 to	 reach	 independence	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	
decade.	 However,	 Britain’s	 continuing	 reluctance	 to	 grant	 Buganda	 greater	 autonomy	
than	the	rest	was	behind	its	refusal	to	participate	in	the	Constitutional	Committee	that	
was	 to	 oversee	 the	 transition	 to	 African	 majority	 rule	 in	 Uganda	 which	 was	 by	 then	
already	under	way.407	 In	effect	 the	main	responsibility	 for	negotiating	with	 the	British	
and	for	stirring	Uganda	to	triumphant	Uhuru	fell	to	the	UPC	and	Obote,	who	thus	earned	
valuable	political	capital	for	establishing	himself	as	a	leader	of	a		united	Uganda.		
In	 1960	 the	 kabaka	 was	 once	 again	 unsuccessful	 in	 proclaiming	 Buganda	
independent	 by	 means	 of	 getting	 a	 legal	 motion	 passed	 in	 the	 lukiko.	 Another	
unfortunate	political	move	 followed	a	 year	 later,	when	 the	kabaka	 and	his	 supporters	
refused	to	participate	in	nationwide	elections	in	reaction	to	their	failure	a	year	earlier.408	
This	resulted	in	the	renegade	catholic	Democratic	Party	led	by	Kiwanuka	winning	most	
of	 the	 seats	 for	 Bugandan	 constituencies	 and	 even	 forming	 Uganda’s	 first	 African	
cabinet.	The	Democratic	Party	held	political	power	in	Buganda	between	1961	and	1962	
but	the	popular	support	of	the	Ganda	people	clearly	favoured	the	kabaka	and	his	allies.	
The	 formation	of	 a	modern‐style	political	 party	became	a	necessity	 in	 order	 to	 finally	
capitalise	 politically	 on	 this	 support.	 This	 decision	 probably	 should	 had	 come	 much	
sooner,	 given	 how	 little	 the	 kabaka	 achieved	 through	 the	 tactics	 of	 boycotting	
cooperation	 with	 Britain.	 In	 1961	 in	 reaction	 of	 DP’s	 ascent	 to	 power	 the	 popular	
gatherings	of	kabaka’s	supporters	resulted	in	establishing	the	movement	named	Kabaka	
Yekka409.	 Kabaka	 Yekka	was	 to	 be	 the	Democratic	 Party’s	main	 challenger	 in	 the	 first	
post‐independence	elections	of	1962	for	seats	in	Bugandan	constituencies	while	Obote’s	
UPC	was	the	main	favourite	in	elections	on	a	nationwide	level.				
			
Uganda	first	came	to	the	attention	of	the	CS	MFA	in	the	second	half	of	the	1950s	
when	the	expansion	of	CS	trade	activities	in	Africa	was	being	considered.	Uganda	was	at	
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this	 point	 on	 the	 periphery	 of	 the	 CS	 MFA	 strategists’	 interest.	 Available	 documents	
clearly	indicate	that	within	the	region	of	British	East	Africa,	Ugandan	affairs	were	almost	
completely	overshadowed	by	its	larger,	richer	and	more	accessible	neighbours	of	Kenya	
and	Tanzania.	The	whole	of	East	and	South	Africa	was	neglected	in	the	first	stage	of	CS	
activism	 in	 Africa	 due	 to	 local	 delays	 in	 the	 decolonisation	 process,	 but	 even	 by	 the	
standards	 of	 this	 overlooked	 region	 Uganda	 was	 given	 a	 considerably	 lower	 priority	
than	 its	 neighbours.	 This	was	mainly	 because	 CS	 planners	 saw	 very	 little	 potential	 in	
Uganda	 to	 affect	 	 political	 affairs	 on	 the	 continent	 and	 similarly	 they	 saw	 very	 little	
potential	 for	 profitable	 business	 cooperation.	 Even	 later	 when	 East	 Africa	 was	 being	
reconsidered	by	CS	foreign	policy	makers,	and	neighbouring	Kenya	and	Tanzania	joined	
the	list	of	African	countries	of	highest	priority	in	approximately	1962,	Uganda	was	still	
marginal	to	the	CS	Africa	policy.	Nothing	at	this	point	indicated	how	far	and	how	quickly	
cooperation	between	the	two	countries	would	eventually	develop.		
Archival	 documents	 show	 that	 there	 was	 inadequate	 knowledge	 of	 Ugandan	
economic	and	political	affairs	at	the	MFA	and	the	small	amount	of	available	information	
was	provided	by	foreign	sources,	 from	East	Germany	or	the	USSR.	The	situation	of	the	
national	 liberation	 movement	 in	 Uganda	 was	 judged	 solely	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	
fragmented	 information	 and	 was	 therefore	 prone	 to	 be	 wrongly	 assessed.	 Available	
analytical	material	from	1960	evaluated	the	situation	of	the	Ugandan	NLM	from	1945	to	
1960	 and	 by	 applying	 a	 completely	 inappropriate	 ideological	 perspective	 it	 led	 to	
numerous	gross	misinterpretations	of	the	political	processes	taking	place	in	Uganda	in	
this	 period.	 The	 analysis	 for	 example	 highlighted	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 ‘widespread	
progressive	 peasant	 movement’410	 in	 such	 a	 context	 that	 it	 implies	 some	 kind	 of	
organised	peasant	movement	forming	a	political	vanguard	for	anti‐colonial	struggle.	In	
the	same	document		the	matter	of	Buganda’s	status	within	a	independent	Uganda	is	then	
defined	 as	 a	 ‘struggle	 of	wide	 popular	masses	 against	 feudalism’411	 whereas	 in	 reality	
Buganda’s	separatist	tendencies	are	an	example	of	a	very	conservative	and	traditionalist	
political	movement	of	a	narrow	group	of	elites	trying	to	preserve	their	own	tight	grip	on	
political	 and	 economic	 power.	 This	 shows	 how	 poorly	 Czechoslovak	 policy‐makers	
understood	 the	 political	 relief	 of	 Uganda	 at	 first	 and	 it	 helps	 to	 explain	 why	 initial	
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contacts	 with	 Ugandan	 politicians	 were	 so	 ineffective	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 far	 more	
fruitful	cooperation	with	the	national	liberation	movement	of	Kenya.					
Due	 to	 the	 lack	of	CS	 activism	 targetting	Uganda	and	 low	 interest	 in	Ugandan	
affairs,	it	was	only	thanks	to	a	Ugandan	initiative	that	communication	between	the	local	
NLM	and	Czechoslovakia	was	established	 in	1960.	High‐ranking	representatives	of	 the	
KSČ	were	directly	approached	by	the	Secretary	of	the	Uganda	National	Congress	(UNC),	
Mr	 Joseph	Kiwanuka.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 initial	 contact	 the	UNC	was	 already	 an	 internally	
deeply	 fragmented	 party,	whose	 significance	within	 the	national	 liberation	movement	
had	been	steadily	declining	for	over	a	year.	Nevertheless,	the	representative	of	the	UNC	
successfully	used	the	fact	that	neither	Czechoslovaks,	nor	the	Soviets,	whom	the	CS	MFA	
consulted	on	the	issue,	had	up‐to‐date	knowledge	of	Ugandan	political	development,	and	
they	successfully	portrayed	the	UNC	as	 the	winner	of	 the	1958	Ugandan	elections	and	
undisputed	leader	of	the	anti‐British	decolonisation	struggle.	After	presenting	this	image	
of	 the	 UNC	 in	 Prague,	 the	 UNC	 representative	 approached	 the	 KSČ	 with	 an	 official	
request	for	financial	support	for	their	anti‐colonial	campaign.	After	consultation	with	the	
Soviets	 the	 Politbyro	 approved	 limited	 financial	 aid	 for	 the	 UNC	 in	 order	 to	 exert	
pressure	on	the	pro‐Western	African	Democratic	Party	(ADP)	which	was	perceived	as	an	
agent	of	British	interests	in	Uganda.412		
An	 important	 supporting	 argument	 for	 CS	 and	 Soviet	 policy	makers	 to	 provide	
assistance	 to	 the	 UNC	was	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 UNC’s	 office	 in	 Cairo	 and	 its	 declared	
intentions	to	cooperate	with	other	African	NLMs	to	mount	continent‐wide	pressure	on	
colonialists.	CS	support	for	the	UNC,	however,	did	not	evolve	into	long‐term	cooperation.	
It	was	only	in	1962	that	the	CS	MFA	finally	realised	that	the	UNC	was	in	a	state	of	utter	
collapse	and	they	refused	any	support	to	this	party	on	the	basis	of	the	on‐going	internal	
crisis	 and	 accusations	 of	 mismanagement	 of	 previously	 allocated	 resources.413	 As	
Obote’s	 UPC	 had	 no	 office	 in	 Cairo,	 the	 Czechoslovaks	 and	 the	 Soviets	 completely	
misjudged	 its	actual	significance	 in	Ugandan	politics	and	thus	 lost	circa	two	years	that	
could	had	been	otherwise	used	for	effective	support	of	Obote.	By	1962	CS	policy‐makers	
were	becoming	more	interested	in	and	better	acquainted	with	Ugandan	affairs	and	they	
chose	a	new	favourite	to	support:	the		Uganda	People’s	Congress.		
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One	year	after	the	opening	meeting	with	the	UNC,	CS	officials	were	contacted	by	
representatives	of	the	Uganda	People’s	Congress	(UPC),	a	party	that	had	recently	been	
profiled	 as	 the	 most	 powerful	 challenger	 to	 the	 pro‐Western	 Democratic	 Party.	 The	
leader	 of	 the	 UPC,	 Apollo	 Milton	 Obote,	 sent	 an	 introductory	 letter	 to	 CS	 officials,	
proclaiming	his	 socialist	orientation	and	requesting	urgent	material	and	 financial	help	
ahead	of	the	coming	elections.414	His	clearly‐expressed	genuine	inclination	to	socialism	
was	an	important	stimulus	for	CS	policymakers	to	grant	more	attention	and	support	to	
Ugandan	affairs.	 In	 immediate	 reaction	 to	 the	 letter,	Obote	was	 invited	 to	 the	CSSR	 in	
October	1961,	where	he	personally	negotiated	financial	help	for	the	upcoming	elections	
that	 would	 determine	 the	 political	 fate	 of	 Uganda	 after	 independence,	 and	which	 the	
British	 decided	 should	 take	 place	 in	 1962.	 Obote’s	 direct	 personal	 involvement	 in	
establishing	working	cooperation	with	CS	officials	from	the	very	beginning	turned	out	to	
be	 an	 important	 factor	 for	 future	 successful	 cooperation	 of	 both	 countries	 especially	
when	 compared	 to	 the	 cases	 of	 Tanzania	 and	 Kenya.	 The	 fact	 that	 Obote	met	 with	 a	
positive	CS	 reaction	 to	 his	 requests	 for	 assistance,	 and	 later	 emerged	 as	 the	 leader	 of	
Uganda,	meant	 that	 Czechoslovakia	 enjoyed	 a	 very	 special	 direct	 personal	 link	 to	 the	
highest	 levels	 of	 Ugandan	 politics.	 Neither	 in	 Kenya,	 nor	 in	 Tanzania	 could	
Czechoslovakia	benefit	from	such	exclusive	access	to	the	ruling	politician	and	his	closest	
collaborators.	Czechoslovakia	enjoyed	as	good	a	reputation	in	Uganda	as	with	other	ex‐
colonial	nations	 in	Asia	and	Africa	 for	 its	practical	 support	and	because	 it	had	no	past	
colonial	 history.	 These	 factors	 resulted	 in	 a	 strong	 position	 in	 Uganda	 for		
Czechoslovakia	from	the	first	days	of	independence.			
	
4.3. The	1962	Elections		
Previously	 to	 the	 1962	 elections	only	 three	political	 parties	 had	 	 held	 serious	
chances	of	acquiring	 leadership	 in	Uganda:	Obote’s	UPC,	Kiwanuka’s	Democratic	Party	
and	the	Bugandan	Kabaka	Yekka.	It	was	apparent	that	the	upcoming	popular	vote	would	
be	decisive	for	setting	the	course	of	political	development	in	Uganda’s	internal	as	well	as	
external	 political	 and	 economic	 affairs.	 Any	 future	 administration	 of	 an	 independent	
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Uganda	would	be	faced	with	several	pressing	issues.	The	main	challenges	were	linked	to	
national	unity	and	Buganda’s	secessionist	tendencies,	to	the	successful	transfer	of	power	
to	 Africans,	 the	 Africanisation	 of	 state	 apparatus	 and	 army,	 to	 the	 maintaining	 of	
relations	 with	 the	 former	 British	 colonial	 power,	 to	 establishing	 Uganda	 as	 a	 new	
sovereign	agent	in	international	political	affairs	and	to	maintaining	economic	prosperity.	
These	 are	 also	 the	 main	 topics	 around	 which	 academic	 discourse	 of	 Ugandan	
independence	revolves	and	to	which	researchers	have	paid	most	attention.		
From	 1960	 a	 series	 of	 talks	 was	 being	 held	 between	 the	 British	 colonial	
administration	 and	 Ugandan	 politicians	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 outlining	 the	 proposed	
decolonisation.	 A	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	 initial	 phase	 of	 political	 development	 after	
independence	was	 provided	 by	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	 drafting	 of	
which	was	a	core	outcome	of	bilateral	talks	between	the	British	and	the	Ugandans.	The	
1962	 constitution	 was	 supposed	 to	 address	 all	 the	 possible	 pitfalls	 threatening	 to	
destabilise	Uganda	after	independence	and	this	it	did	quite	successfully	regardless	of	the	
many	revisions	introduced	in	first	years	after	independence.		
The	vital	constitutional	issue	that	was	the	focus	of	numerous	talks	during	1961	
and	 1962	 was	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	 new	 state,	 the	 status	 of	 traditional	 kingdoms,	
especially	that	of	Buganda,	and	the	proposed	system	for	the	electoral	process.	The	result	
of	the	lengthy	talks	was	a	compromise	between	a	rigid	centralised	state	and	the	call	for	
autonomy	for	traditional	regions.	The	final	version	of	the	approved	Constitution	stated	
that	 Uganda	 was	 to	 be	 organised	 as	 a	 federation	 and	 that	 substantial	 powers	 were	
granted	 to	 the	 traditional	 leaders	of	 the	Ugandan	kingdoms.	The	crucial	 clause	 for	 the	
kabaka	 of	 Buganda	 and	 his	 supporters	 stated	 that	 while	 direct	 elections	 to	 national	
assembly	 were	 to	 be	 held	 around	 Uganda,	 the	 representatives	 for	 Bugandan	
constituencies	 were	 to	 be	 elected	 indirectly	 by	 the	 Lukiko,	 the	 seats	 of	 which	 were	
contested	separately	from	the	rest	of	the	country.415	It	 is	not	completely	clear	why	the	
British	 agreed	 to	 such	 a	 compromise,	 because	 the	 indirect	 elections	 of	 Bugandan	
representatives	meant	a	serious	complication	to	the	aspirations	of	the	Democratic	Party	
which	was	highly	unpopular	there.	The	Democratic	Party	was	perceived	not	only	by	the	
Czechoslovaks	and	by	the	Soviets	as	a	protegé	of	Britain	for	the	purposes	of	ensuring	the	
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continuance	 of	 the	 British	 economic	 and	 political	 grip	 on	Uganda	 and	 as	 such	 a	main	
enemy	 to	 socialist	 countries.416	 Strangely	 enough,	 it	was	 the	 constitution	approved	by	
Britain	 that	 effectively	 disqualified	 the	 DP	 from	 contesting	 political	 leadership	 in	
Uganda.	Whether	 this	was	 an	 intentional	move	by	 the	British	who	believed	 that	 their	
interests	would	be	equally	secure	under	the	government	of	Obote	or	simply	a	political	
miscalculation	 remains	 open	 to	 discussion.	 The	 fact	 remains	 that	 the	 prevailing	
popularity	of	the	Kabaka	Yekka	in	Buganda	meant	that	the	DP	would	find	it	impossible	
to	win	any	support	there	and	that	they	would	subsequently	struggle	to	win	a	majority	at	
nationwide	level.		
The	 electoral	 system	 introduced	 by	 the	 constitution	was	 applied	 in	 the	 1962	
elections,	shortly	before	independence.	The	nationwide	elections	were	held	to	delegate	
representatives	to	the	Legislative	Council,	which	was	to	become	the	National	Assembly	
at	the	moment	of	receiving	full	independence.	Already	before	elections	it	was	becoming	
clear	 that	 Obote’s	 UPC	 and	 the	 Kabaka	 Yekka	 would	 be	 seeking	 to	 create	 a	 political	
partnership	 if	 they	won	enough	seats	 to	dominate	National	Assembly.417	This	 they	did	
because	 the	 Kabaka	 Yekka	 won	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 Bugandan	 seats	 and	 the	 UPC	
managed	 to	 beat	 the	 DP	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country.	 The	 UPC	 and	 the	 KY	 created	 the	
coalition	 government	 in	which	 the	 kabaka	Edward	Mutesa	was	 to	 acquire	 the	 highest	
post	of	Ugandan	President	once	the	British	Governor	left	the	country	and	Obote	became	
the	first	Prime	Minister.418		
From	 today’s	 perspective	 agreeing	 to	 this	 division	 of	 power	 seems	 to	 be	 yet	
another	of	Edward	Mutesa’s	mistake:	 though	a	 formal	head	of	 state	he	held	only	very	
little	 real	 power	 in	 the	 Ugandan	 political	 system	 and	 he	 remained	 out	 of	 touch	 with	
Ugandan	 politics	 in	 following	 years.	 Obote	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 had	 the	 opportunity	 of	
actively	shaping	the	political	affairs	of	the	state.	He	acquired	a	decisive	influence	on	the	
formative	 processes	 of	 the	 state	 institutions	 that	 were	 going	 through	 rapid	
Africanisation,	on	the	distribution	of	the	state’s	economic	resources,	on	the	development	
of	 the	Ugandan	military	 and	 on	 the	 external	 relations	 of	 the	 independent	Uganda.	 All	
these	spheres	he	could	and	did	indeed	use	to	strengthen	his	own	position	and	that	of	the	
UPC.	 He	 quite	 successfully	 and	 rapidly	 created	 a	 network	 of	 loyal	 supporters	 and	
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kinsmen	 from	northern	Uganda	 in	 all	 state	 bodies,	 creating	 a	 kind	 of	 early	 patronage	
scheme.	This	 loyal	network	of	 supporters	proved	decisive	 in	 less	 than	 two	years	after	
independence	when	the	political	unity	of	the	Ugandan	government,	and	that	of	the	UPC	
itself,	began	to	crumble	for	the	first	time.	Obote	emerged	from	this	crisis	victorious	and	
stronger	 than	 before	mainly	 thanks	 to	 the	 loyalty	 of	 his	 kinsmen	 and	 their	 dominant	
position	in	the	institutions	of	power	–	the	army	and	the	intelligence	services.						
It	was	not	only	the	local	network	of	patronage	that	helped	Obote	strengthen	his	
position	but	also	his	valuable	contacts	with	foreign	countries.	Czechoslovakia	proved	to	
be	 among	 the	 most	 important	 with	 the	 different	 forms	 of	 assistance	 it	 provided	 to	
Uganda	 in	 the	 first	 years	 after	 independence.	 Most	 Czechoslovak	 assistance	 was	
executed	 in	 those	 forms	 and	 spheres	 of	 highest	 personal	 interest	 to	 Obote.	 Naturally	
these	were	chosen	not	to	be	in	any	conflict	with	Obote’s	own	ambitions	and	ideally	they	
would	 help	 consolidate	 his	 grip	 on	 all	 decisive	 sources	 of	 power.	 This	 logic	 helps	 to	
explain	 why	most	 Czechoslovak	 assistance	 was	 provided	 in	 the	 security	 and	military	
spheres.	Therefore	 the	 assistance	provided	needs	 to	be	viewed	not	only	 in	 relation	 to	
Ugandan	affairs	in	general	but	also	in	particular	in	relation	to	the	personalities	of	Obote,	
and	 later	Amin,	who	were,	 in	their	respective	periods,	the	defining	figures	 in	Uganda’s	
political	and	economic	development.	In	several	cases	the	performance	of	different	forms	
of	 assistance	 by	 the	 CSR	 had	 an	 inconspicuous	 effect	 at	 first	 but	 far‐reaching	
implications	on	Ugandan	politics	in	the	long	run.		
As	early	as	1962	the	MFA	decided	to	organise	another	visit	of	UPC	leaders	to	the	
CSSR,	during	which	the	first	technical	cooperation	in	the	civil	sphere	was	agreed.	The	CS	
administration	 offered	 the	 UPC	 organisation	 a	 ČTK	 course	 for	 two	 journalists,	 a	
broadcasting	 course	 for	 one	 person	 and	 a	 course	 for	 a	 photographer.419	 Journalism	
courses	were	 viewed	 as	 an	 effective	 propaganda	 tool	 as	 they	 helped	 to	make	 African	
journalists	more	sympathetic	to	the	socialist	cause.	 Ideologically	approved	and	trained	
journalists	could,	of	course,	prove	very	useful	 in	influencing	public	opinion	in	Africa	in	
favour	of	socialist	countries.	
A	 new,	more	 active	 approach	 by	 the	 CS	 administration	was	motivated	 by	 the	
striking	success	that	Obote	and	the	UPC	had	experienced	in	the	elections	of	1962.	 	The	
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MFA	tended	to	approve	of	Obote’s	openly	declared	progressive	orientation420	and	it	was	
this	 repeated	 declaration	 of	 sympathy	 for	 socialism	 that	 won	 Uganda	 and	 Obote	
personally	the	unwavering	support	of	the	CSR	and	the	Soviets	for	the	next	decade.	The	
MFA	 characterised	 the	 UPC	 as	 a	 party	 representing	 a	massive	 popular	movement	 for	
liberation	 from	 colonial	 rule	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 a	 progressive	 intelligentsia.	 UPC	
foreign	policy	was	perceived	in	Prague	as	being	based	for	the	time	being	on	a	principle	
of	 positive	 neutrality.421	 However,	 it	 was	 expected	 that	 Obote	 would	 orientate	 the	
country	later	after	its	independence	more	firmly	towards	socialist	countries.422		
Even	 though	 the	 foreign	 political	 priority	 of	 the	 CSSR	 in	 this	 region	was	 still	
KANU’s	NLM	struggle	and	bringing	independent	Kenya	closer	to	the	socialist	camp,	the	
continued	 delay	 in	 these	 processes	 opened	 up	 an	 opportunity	 for	 cooperation	 with	
Uganda.	 Uganda	 was	 not	 subjected	 to	 a	 similar	 delay	 and	 the	 former	 British	
protectorate,	 advanced	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Prime	 Minister	 Obote,	 to	 a	 formal	
declaration	 of	 independence	 on	 9	 October	 1962.423	 The	 celebrations	 became	 an	
opportunity	for	the	first	formal	bilateral	meeting	between	the	CSSR	and	an	independent	
Uganda.	 A	 CS	 one‐man	 delegation	 reported	 on	 the	 meeting	 as	 follows:	 ‘During	 the	
festivities	 the	prime	minister	paid	extraordinary	attention	 to	Comrade	Valo	and	he	gave	
him	priority	over	all	governmental	delegations.	In	interviews	he	stressed	his	gratitude	for	
help	 provided	 and	 emphasized	 its	 significance	 for	 a	 victory	 of	 the	 People’s	 Congress	 of	
Uganda	party	in	elections.	[…]	At	the	same	time	he	asked	the	CSSR	to	send	its	ambassador	
to	Kampala	as	soon	as	possible,	and	pointed	out	that	he	would	welcome	advice	and	help	in	
dealing	with	the	serious	issues	which	await	independent	Uganda.’424	
The	 months	 that	 followed	 Ugandan	 independence	 were	 used	 for	 legal	
formalisation	of	relations	between	Uganda	and	the	CSSR	in	various	arenas.	Negotiations	
of	 diplomatic	 relations	 had	 already	 been	 opened	 up	 during	 Valo’s	 1962	 mission	 but,	
despite	 mutual	 consent	 and	 interest,	 the	 opening	 of	 a	 diplomatic	 office	 had	 to	 be	
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provisionally	postponed.425	Even	though	Kampala	was	not	involved	in	the	original	plan	
of	diplomatic	offices	for	Africa,	reconsideration	of	this	matter	was	recommended	by	the	
MFA	 due	 to	 the	 delay	 in	 opening	 the	 Nairobi	 office	 and	 to	 promising	 prospects	 of	
Kampala’s	orientation	towards	socialism.426	Despite	this	recommendation,	the	office	was	
not	opened	until	1965	owing	to	cadre	and	financial	problems	that	had	to	be	solved	by	
transferring	 funds	 originally	 allocated	 for	 the	 embassy	 in	 Senegal.	 This	 situation	 is	
illustrative	of	certain	practical	obstacles	 that	Czechoslovakia	 faced	 in	 implementing	 its	
ambitious	Africa	policy,	mainly	due	to	its	limited	human	and	financial	capacities.		
During	 1963	 official	 negotiations	 were	 taking	 place	 for	 the	 trade	 agreement	
which,	 it	was	hoped,	would	 improve	 the	 ‘regrettable	 state’	of	 trade	exchange	between	
the	two	countries.427	The	CS	trade	mission	visiting	Uganda	in	January	1963	with	a	view	
to	dealing	with	these	matters	was	staffed	by	officials	from	the	MFT	and	the	MFA	and	the	
representatives	 of	 several	 foreign	 trade	 enterprises.428	 The	 objectives	 for	 the	mission	
included	 several	 high	 priority	 conditions	 for	 the	 future	 improvement	 of	 mutual	
cooperation,	but	not	all	of	them	were	fully	met.	The	trade	agreement	was	intended	to	be	
negotiated	with	 conditions	 that	would	 remove	 the	main	obstacles	 negatively	 affecting	
trade	relations	in	the	past	–	particularly	 licensing	issues	and	the	condition	of	balanced	
trade	 exchange.	 In	 practice,	 the	 issue	 of	 a	 negative	 trade	 exchange	 on	 Uganda’s	 part	
became	 the	 main	 concern	 for	 Ugandan	 officials,	 despite	 CS	 arguments	 about	 the	
necessity	 of	 breaking	 the	 Western	 trade	 monopoly	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 economy.429	 The	
delegation	was	also	to	present	the	Ugandan	government	with	an	offer	of	loans	that	could	
be	 provided	 by	 Czechoslovak	 Foreign	 Trade	 Enterprises	 on	 goods	 or	 investments.	 In	
addition,	 the	 delegation	 also	 discussed	 the	 matter	 of	 cultural	 agreement,	 but	 any	
practical	steps	were	left	for	future	negotiations.430		
Overall,	it	can	be	said	that	the	objectives	for	the	mission	were	met	only	partially,	
but	they	still	represented	an	important	opening	step	for	future	bilateral	cooperation.	In	
the	mission’s	 report,	 failure	 to	accomplish	all	 the	 tasks	was	blamed	on	 the	absence	of	
any	accredited	CS	diplomat,	who	could	have	prepared	the	ground	for	negotiations,	and	
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on	 the	 lack	 of	 expertise	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 civil	 servants,	 the	 majority	 of	 whom	 were	
inexperienced.	 Most	 of	 the	 blame,	 however,	 was	 directed	 towards	 the	 actions	 of	 the	
British	 consultants	 within	 the	 Ugandan	 state	 apparatus,	 who	 had	 actively	 interfered	
with	the	on‐going	negotiations	of	the	CS	delegation,	a	matter	which	had	to	be	eventually	
reported	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	Magezi,	for	intervention.431		
The	 presence	 of	 British	 nationals	 within	 the	 Ugandan	 administration,	 and	
especially	 their	 grip	 on	 the	 Ugandan	 economy,	was	 not	 dissimilar	 to	 their	 position	 in	
Kenya.	In	this	respect,	the	CSSR	was	facing	the	same	challenges	in	the	political,	economic	
as	well	as	technical	cooperation	spheres.	Upon	the	return	of	the	mission	from	Uganda,	a	
detailed	 report	of	 the	political	and	economic	situation	was	presented	 to	 the	Politbyro,	
which	identified	yet	another	challenge	–	the	presence	of	experts	from	multiple	Western	
countries.	 Experts	 from	 the	 UK,	 the	 USA,	West	 Germany	 and	 Israel	were	 viewed	 as	 a	
potential	threat	to	CS	interests	in	Uganda.432		
A	crucial	precondition	that	was	strikingly	different	to	the	situation	in	Kenya,	and	
which	was	the	most	important	determinant	in	the	prospect	of	a	longer‐lasting	and	more	
successful	cooperation	with	the	CSSR,	was	the	openly	expressed	and	genuine	desire	of	
the	 Ugandan	 government	 to	 seek	 long‐lasting	 cooperation	 with	 the	 CSSR.	 In	 the	
conclusion	of	its	report,	the	MFA	says	that,	despite	all	the	constraints,	‘[i]nterviews	with	
the	Prime	Minister	M.A.	Obote	and	his	deputy	Magezi	confirmed	their	essential	interest	in	
cooperating	 with	 the	 CSSR.	 […]	 A	 positive	 aspect	 of	 these	 interviews	 was	 that	 both,	
especially	Magezi,	talked	about	domestic	and	foreign	politics	quite	openly	and	in	a	friendly	
tone.’433	In	comparison	to	Kenya,	Obote’s	orientation	towards	socialist	countries	proved	
to	be	of	a	much	longer	duration	and	to	be	much	more	substantial,	and	it	survived	some	
of	the	internal	turbulences	within	the	UPC	that	occurred	in	1964.		
Practical	 outcomes	 of	 the	 1962	 Czechoslovak‐Ugandan	 talks	 on	 cooperation	
began	to	materialise	almost	immediately.	The	core	of	negotiations	about	civil	technical	
cooperation	 was	 concerned	 with	 the	 future	 organisation	 of	 professional	 technical	
courses	and	the	provision	of	university	scholarships	for	Ugandan	students.	Even	though	
no	 formal	 agreement	 was	 agreed	 upon	 as	 yet,	 cooperation	 in	 this	 sphere	 went	 on	
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unhindered.	 As	 early	 as	 1962,	 four	 Ugandans	 travelled	 to	 the	 CSSR	 for	 professional	
courses	 –	 three	 were	 trained	 in	 union	 organisation	 and	 one	 in	 the	 unification	 of	
agriculture.	In	1963	the	CS	government	offered	Uganda	twelve	university	scholarships,	
while	 another	 journalism	and	broadcasting	 course	was	 organised	by	 the	CTK	 for	 four	
Ugandan	 candidates.434	 The	 professional	 courses	 in	 broadcasting,	 journalism,	 union	
organisation	 and	 other	 spheres	 were	 successfully	 carried	 out,	 but	 the	 university	
scholarship	 programme	 faced	 certain	 shortcomings	 in	 the	 first	 couple	 of	 years	 after	
independence.	 Uganda	 failed,	 on	 several	 occasions,	 to	 appoint	 students	 for	 the	
scholarships	 that	had	been	allocated	by	 the	CS	Ministry	of	Education.435	 	Whether	 this	
was	the	result	of	poor	management	on	the	part	of	the	Ugandan	Ministry	of	Education	or	
British	pressure	remains	unclear.		
	
4.4. The	1964	Mutiny	and	the	beginnings	of	cooperation	between	Uganda	
and	Czechoslovakia	in	the	military	sphere	
The	influence	of	the	military	on	political	development	was	an	important	factor	
in	 each	 of	 the	 three	 East	 African	 states	 but	 nowhere	 did	 the	 local	 army	 have	 such	 a	
decisive,	far‐reaching	and	ultimately	destructive	influence	on	the	state	as	was	the	case	in	
Uganda.	It	was	indeed	in	relation	to	the	special	assistance	provided	in	the	military	and	
security	spheres	that	Czechoslovakia	actively	interfered	with	and	deeply	influenced	the	
political	development	of	the	independent	Ugandan	state,	though	perhaps	not	always	in	
the	manner	it	intended.	
Upon	 independence	 Uganda	 inherited	 two	 battalions	 of	 the	 former	 colonial	
army	 known	 as	 the	 King’s	 African	 Rifles	 (KAR).	 The	 KAR	was	 a	 military	 body	 which	
served	 the	 colonial	 administration	 and	 the	 main	 responsibility	 of	 which	 prior	 to	
independence	 was	 to	 ‘intimidate	 the	 domestic	 subject	 population.’436	 Traditionally	 the	
officers	of	the	KAR	were	professional	white	British	soldiers,	while	the	ordinary	soldiers,	
‘askaris’,	were	recruited	from	among	the	most	suitable	indigenous	candidates.	Over	the	
years	the	British	colonial	army	in	different	parts	of	the	world	took	a	liking	to	particular	
                                                            
434 MZV F. IV/4 10 TO, č.j. 026.023/63, 11.6.1963, 1‐2. 
435 MZV F. IV/5 č.j. 069/64, 12.6.1964, 1‐3. 
436 Parsons, 1964 Army Mutinies, 12. 
192 
 
ethnic	groups	who	were	regarded	as	naturally	better	suited	than	others	for	the	military.	
Therefore	the	majority	of	local	soldiers	would	belong	to	one	or	two	‘martial’	ethnicities	
of	the	specific	region.437	In	the	case	of	Uganda	such	positions	were	held	predominantly	
by	men	of	northern	tribes,	 in	particular	the	Acholi	 ,the	Lango,	and	the	Nubi	people,	an	
ethnic	group	consisting	of	several	smaller	tribes	who	were	often	regarded	as	being	alien	
to	Uganda.			
There	were	several	problems	linked	to	the	KAR	and	its	planned	transformation	
into	 the	 national	 armies	 of	 newly	 independent	 East	 African	 states.	 Among	 the	 most	
pressing	ones	were	the	lack	of	educated	and	well‐trained	African	officers,	the	ex‐colonial	
forces’	 potential	 unreliability	 and	 uncertain	 loyalty	 to	 the	 national	 governments,	 the	
matter	of	an	undesirable	British	influence	on	national	armies,	and	the	problematic	social	
and	 economic	 status	 of	 soldiers	 in	 the	new	socio‐economic	 reality	 of	 the	 independent	
states.	 ‘Veteran	 askaris	were	 profoundly	 suspicious	 of	 their	 new	 African	 leaders.	 Their	
military	service	isolated	them	from	the	nationalist	politics	of	the	late	colonial	era,	and	they	
had	 few	 ties	 to	 the	new	generation	of	African	political	elites.’438	At	 the	 same	 time,	 new	
post‐independence	African	political	leaders	‘came	from	the	politically	sophisticated	‘non‐
martial’	ethnic	groups	 that	colonial	officers	had	barred	 from	 the	KAR.	Few	of	 the	newly	
empowered	 elites	 from	 these	 communities	had	much	 sympathy	 for	 the	Askaris	who	had	
served	 the	old	colonial	regime	 so	reliably.’439	All	 the	problems	of	 transforming	 the	KAR	
into	loyal	and	functioning	national	armies	and	the	difficulties	of	the	‘askaris’	adjusting	to	
a	new	reality	eventually	resulted	into	the	crisis	of	January	1964	when	a	series	of	army	
mutinies	 swept	 Tanzania,	 Uganda	 and	 Kenya,	 shaking	 the	 weak	 fundaments	 of	 their	
political	systems.		
The	 East	 African	 mutinies	 of	 1964	 shared	 several	 similarities,	 mainly	 in	 the	
soldiers’	initial	motivation	to	rebel,	but	the	uprisings	were	quite	distinct	as	regards	their	
handling	by	the	local	governments	and	the	mutinies’	 long‐term	effects.	 Inspired	by	the	
earlier	 action	 by	 their	 Tanganyikan	 colleagues,	 the	 Ugandan	 army	 mutinied	 on	 23	
January	 1964	 at	 Jinja	 barracks.	 The	 soldiers’	 chief	 demands	 were	 for	 a	 pay	 rise	 and	
immediate	Africanisation	of	the	corps.	Obote	gave	the	issue	the	highest	priority	and	sent	
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Interior	Minister	Onama	(and	later	Minister	of	Regional	Affairs	Obwangor)	to	deal	with	
the	issue	in	person.	Even	though	Obote	initially	refused	to	label	events	a	mutiny,	he	was	
aware	of	 the	potential	 risk	 for	 state	 security	 should	affairs	 turn	bloody,	 or	 should	 the	
army	 decide	 to	march	 on	Kampala.	 Like	Nyerere	 and	 later	 Kenyatta,	 Obote	 asked	 the	
British	army	stationed	in	Kenya	for	military	assistance.	On	the	24	January	talks	between	
Obwangor	and	discontented	soldiers	continued	but	tensions	were	beginning	to	run	high.	
It	 was	 the	 intervention	 of	 Major	 Idi	 Amin,	 one	 of	 a	 handful	 of	 African	 officers	 in	 the	
corps,	 that	calmed	the	situation	until	 the	morning	of	 the	25th	when,	after	a	surprising	
bloodless	 strike	 British	 soldiers	 took	 control	 of	 the	 Jinja	 camp.	 On	 the	 following	 day	
Amin	presented	Obote	with	the	soldiery’s	demands,	which	were	agreed	and	met	by	the	
government.	 To	 prevent	 any	 repeat	 of	 the	 mutiny,	 several	 hundred	 of	 the	 soldiers	
involved	were	discharged	from	the	army	and	most	of	the	mutiny	leaders	were	tried	and	
imprisoned.440	
Unlike	in	Tanzania,	the	reaction	to	the	events	brought	no	fundamental	change	to	
the	Ugandan	army	apart	from	an	accelerated	process	of	Africanisation	of	the	corps.	More	
important,	yet	indirect,	effects	of	the	mutiny	seem	to	be	traceable	in	the	development	of	
Obote’s	stance	towards	the	army	in	the	years	to	follow.	There	are	some	strong	hints	that	
justify	the	speculation	that	the	Jinja	mutiny	of	1964	warned	Obote	of	the	army’s	power	
over	 national	 politics	 where	 it	 decided	 to	 intervene.	 It	 could	 have	 been	 equally	
important	to	realise	that	military	power	firmly	placed	behind	one’s	political	aspiration	is	
a	 potential	 source	 of	 political	 legitimacy	 that	 in	 Ugandan	 conditions	 cannot	 be	
practically	 challenged	 by	 any	 other	 institution	 without	 outside	 involvement.	 Shortly	
after	the	mutiny	Obote	began	to	turn	the	Ugandan	army	into	an	effective	and	powerful	
force.	 He	 needed	 a	 national	 army	 that	 would	 firmly	 back	 his	 government	 and	 he	
provisionally	succeeded	in	creating	a	strong	and	loyal	army,	applying	a	mixed	strategy	of	
three	 core	 principles.	 The	 three	 principles	 were:	 to	 maintain	 the	 dominance	 of	 his	
northern	 compatriots	 in	 the	 armed	 forces,	 to	 ensure	 economic	 prosperity	 for	 the	
soldiery,	 and	 to	 strengthen	 the	 corps	 by	 seeking	 expert	 technical	 assistance	 from	
abroad.	 Cooperation	with	Czechoslovakia	 and	 a	 few	other	 states	helped	 achieve	 these	
last	objectives.				
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Special	 cooperation	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 Uganda	 had	 been	 evolving	
from	1963	onwards	in	two	spheres:	military	and	security.	It	took	Uganda	only	a	couple	
of	 years,	 from	 the	 first	 arms	 and	 weapon	 systems	 presentation	 that	 took	 place	 in	
1963,441	 to	 become	by	 far	 the	 largest	 recipient	 of	 CS	military	 assistance	 in	 the	 region.	
Akena	Adok,	a	close	personal	collaborator	of	Prime	Minister	Obote,	first	approached	CS	
officials	 even	 before	 the	 mutiny	 in	 1963	 with	 Obote’s	 message	 of	 interest	 in	 special	
military	cooperation.	Uganda	was	then	 in	dire	need	of	well‐trained	officers	 in	order	to	
complete	the	process	of	Africanisation.	Ugandan	officials	were	eager	to	receive	training	
for	 army	 cadets	 wherever	 possible	 and	 therefore	 they	 approached	 Israel,	 too,	 at	 the	
same	time;	military	cooperation	with	the	Israelis	also	reached	substantial	levels	during	
Obote’s	 rule.442	 Even	 though	 hard	 evidence	 is	 yet	 to	 be	 found,	 one	 can	 reasonably	
speculate	that	the	mutiny	of	1964	had	a	big	influence	on	Uganda’s	rapid	establishment	
of	military	cooperation	with	Czechoslovakia	and	a	few	other	countries.		
Cooperation	 in	 the	military	sphere	with	 the	Czechoslovak	Ministry	of	National	
Defence	 was	 of	 a	 dual	 nature.	 Firstly,	 the	 CSSR	 organised	 several	 military	 training	
courses	 for	 selected	Ugandan	cadets	 in	various	arms	specialisations.	A	 second	 form	of	
cooperation	 was	 represented	 by	 a	 flourishing	 trade	 with	 arms	 and	 other	 special	
material.	 After	 opening	 negotiations,	 cooperation	 of	 both	 kinds	 started	 in	 1965	 and	
1964	 respectively,	 and	 continued	 more	 or	 less	 uninterrupted	 throughout	 the	 whole	
period	of	President’s	Obote	rule	despite	various	incidents	of	political	turbulence	in	both	
countries.	On	the	CS	part,	some	constraints	occurred	during	the	August	invasion	of	1968	
that	 interfered	with	planned	trade	transactions,	as	well	as	with	the	organisation	of	the	
courses,	but	they	were	relatively	quickly	resolved	and	cooperation	was	resumed.		
In	March	1964	Uganda	and	the	CSSR	came	to	a	bilateral	agreement	on	technical	
cooperation.	 Within	 the	 legal	 limits	 set	 by	 this	 fundamental	 document,	 specific	
agreements	between	the	Ministry	of	Defence	of	Uganda	and	the	CS	MFT	were	soon	to	be	
completed.	 The	 first	 one	was	Contract	Agreement	 5252,	which	 concerned	 training	 for	
Ugandan	pilots	on	CS‐produced	L	29	aircraft.	The	CS	government	warmly	welcomed	the	
fact	that	it	was	to	receive	more	than	166,000	GBP	for	organising	the	course,	making	an	
important	 distinction	 to	 cooperation	with	most	West	 African	 countries	who	 normally	
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received	most	of	the	assistance	in	this	sphere	for	free	or	on	very	favourable	credit	terms.	
Even	before	Contract	5252	was	agreed,	CS	deliveries	of	ten	30mm	PLdvK	cannons	Mk	53	
and	appropriate	ammunition	took	place	in	1964.	The	expert	mission	that	would	provide	
basic	training	for	Ugandan	soldiers	to	use	these	guns	was	sent	to	Uganda	in	1965.443		
On	1	July	1965	the	first	military	course	for	Ugandan	cadets	under	Contract	5252	
started	at	one	of	the	CS’s	Army	training	colleges	in	Přerov.444	The	course	objective	was	to	
train	pilots	as	well	as	technical	air	force	staff,	in	three	different	specialisations	over	the	
course	of	seventeen	months.	The	course,	codenamed	257B,	was	originally	supposed	to	
be	taken	by	eighteen	Ugandan	nationals	–	ten	pilots	and	eight	technicians	–	but	ten	more	
technicians	 actually	 enrolled.	 During	 the	 organisation	 of	 this	 course,	 the	 MND	
successfully	overcame	the	common	limitations	that	many	CS	training	offices	had	faced	in	
the	past,	namely	the	poor	language	skills	of	the	army	instructors.	Just	a	couple	of	years	
previously,	 the	 MND	 had	 created	 a	 reasonably	 successful	 and	 effective	 pattern	 of	
cooperation	with	ELDCs	and	organisation	of	expert	courses	for	 foreigners.	 In	the	early	
1960s	the	MND	successfully	completed	building	its	training	facilities	for	foreign	cadets	
and	 Uganda	 became	 the	 first	 East	 African	 country	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 MND’s	
programme	of	cooperation	with	ELDC	armies.		
During	the	negotiation	of	the	contract	between	the	Ugandan	Minister	of	Security	
and	the	representative	of	MFT‐HTS	in	June	1965,	the	matter	of	further	training	provided	
by	 CS	 military	 experts	 was	 raised	 and	 discussed.445	 The	 Ugandan	 government	 was	
interested	 in	 receiving	 additional	 training	 for	 its	 pilots	 once	 course	 257B	 in	 the	 CSSR	
was	completed.	Twelve	military	experts	from	the	CS	armed	forces	were	to	organise	the	
course	directly	 in	Uganda.	An	important	precondition	for	this	course	to	take	place	was	
the	delivery	of	CS	L	29	aircraft	to	Uganda.446		
During	the	talks	some	other	suggestions	for	military	cooperation	were	raised	by	
both	sides,	but	 they	were	not	 satisfactorily	 resolved.	 In	addition	 to	 training	pilots	and	
technical	 staff,	 the	 CS	 side	 offered	 the	 Ugandan	 delegation	 experts	 in	 artillery	 and	 in	
infantry;	 however,	 because	 of	 the	 fear	 of	 possible	 accusations	 of	 extreme	 political	
orientation	towards	socialist	countries,	Minister	Onama	decided	not	to	accept	the	offer	
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for	the	time	being.447	It	was	around	this	time	that	conflict	within	the	UPC	was	mounting	
and	Obote’s	group,	of	which	Onama	was	 the	prime	member,	was	often	reproached	 for	
socialist	tendencies.		
According	 to	 the	 available	 report	 by	 the	 MFT‐HTS	 delegate,	 Minister	 Onama,	
speaking	on	behalf	of	the	Ugandan	government,	expressed	content	with	the	cooperation	
despite	a	few	shortcomings	in	the	negotiations.	According	to	the	author	of	the	analysis,	it	
was	 ‘possible	to	assume	that	based	on	experiences	from	training	in	the	CSSR	and	gradual	
domestic	 political	 development,	 Uganda	 will	 request	 Czechoslovakia	 to	 provide	 more	
military	 experts.	 It	 could	 be	 assumed	 that	 as	 well	 as	 air	 force	 expertise,	 	 expertise	
regarding	artillery	and	infantry,	which	would	be	connected	to	the	supply	of	material,	will	
be	requested.’448	Material	deliveries	originating	from	Contract	5252	did	not	only	include	
L	 29	 aircraft,	 but	 the	 CS	 MFT‐HTS	 informed	 Ugandans	 of	 additional	 special	 material	
necessary	for	the	regular	service	operations	of	the	newly‐formed	Ugandan	air	force	–	air	
base	 facilities,	 technical	 equipment,	 storage	 for	 spare	 parts,	 and	 a	 service	 depot	 for	
maintenance.449	 	 It	 is,	 however,	 not	 clear	 whether	 the	 CS	 provided	 Uganda	 with	 this	
material,	or	whether	it	was	purchased	elsewhere.	Some	deliveries	of	such	material	from	
Israel	are	documented	in	this	period.450		
Detailed	reports	of	the	proceedings	of	Course	257B,	or	Action	142	as	it	was	also	
marked,	 are	 available	 in	 the	 MND	 archives.	 The	 report	 mentions	 great	 discontent	
experienced	 by	 the	 Ugandan	 cadets	 caused	 by	 financial	 problems,	 as	 the	 Ugandan	
government	 failed	 to	 provide	 them	with	 the	 agreed	 wages	 and	more	 or	 less	 ignored	
them	 for	 several	 months.	 CS	 course	 commanders	 blamed	 the	 discontent	 on	 the	 low	
morale	of	 the	participants,	who	were	otherwise	evaluated	as	 some	of	 the	best	African	
cadets	ever	to	be	trained	in	the	CSSR.451			
In	September	1965	Minister	Onama	visited	the	CSSR	and	led	more	talks	on	the	
special	cooperation	with	 the	CS	MND.	He	expressed	 interest	 in	material	deliveries	and	
the	organisation	of	the	course	for	Ugandan	military	instructors.	The	special	material	that	
Onama	was	interested	in	included	the	BZK	82	cannon,	the	PLK	85	cannon,	the	160mm	
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mortar,	 the	 T	 54A	 tank,	 and	 OT	 62	 and	 OT	 64	 armoured	 vehicles.452	 The	 instructor	
course	 proposed	 was	 a	 twelve‐month	 one	 and	 it	 was	 to	 produce	 twelve	 tank	
commanders,	ten	to	twelve	artillery	commanders,	eight	to	sixteen	tank	technicians,	up	to	
ten	radio‐locator	technicians	and	eight	artillery	technicians.		
Meanwhile,	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	 training	 of	 Ugandan	 pilots	 in	 the	 CSSR	was	
successfully	 completed	 despite	 the	 organisational	 problems,	mentioned	 above,	 caused	
by	the	Ugandan	government.	The	organisation	of	the	advanced	course	was	agreed	as	the	
supplement	 to	 the	 existing	 Contract	 5252.	 The	 absolvents	 of	 the	 first	 course	were	 to	
undertake	the	advanced	training	as	of	December	1966.	This	advanced	course	was	to	be	
the	last	step	before	transferring	the	training	to	Uganda	in	1967	under	the	label	of	Course	
5253.453		
By	 the	 end	 of	 1965	 turbulence	 in	 Ugandan	 politics	 indicated	 far‐reaching	
political	 changes	 were	 about	 to	 take	 place	 in	 the	 country.	 Obote’s	 government	 was	
successful	in	stabilising	the	situation	in	the	national	army	after	the	1964	mutiny	and	the	
Ugandan	 army	 was,	 through	 successful	 cooperation	 with	 foreign	 military	 experts,	
becoming	an	effective	and	powerful	military	force.	Units	of	the	Ugandan	army	engaged	
successfully	 in	 several	 operations	 around	 the	 country	 but	 also	 across	 its	 borders.454	
Modern	 equipment	 and	 quality	 training	 compensated	 for	 the	 army’s	 limited	 size.	 The	
Ugandan	 army	 had	 in	 two	 years	 become	what	Obote	 needed	 it	 to	 be,	 a	 powerful	 and	
loyal	source	of	political	legitimacy	behind	his	government.			
	
4.5. The	development	of	intelligence	services	in	cooperation	with	
Czechoslovakia	
Like	 military	 cooperation,	 collaboration	 in	 the	 security	 sphere	 was	 first	
mentioned	 in	 the	 bilateral	 talks	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 Uganda	 in	 1963,	 but	
practical	negotiations	first	took	place	in	1964,	perhaps	to	some	extent	motivated	by	the		
Ugandan	 army	 mutiny	 and	 the	 fears	 over	 its	 immediate	 reliability.	 The	 person	
                                                            
452 VUA MNO 1965, č.j. H, J, 04550/OTP‐1965, 3.11.1965, 1. 
453 VUA MNO 1966, č.j. H 3, 05432/OTP, Aug 1966, 1. 
454 Lofchie, Michael F., “The Uganda Coup‐Class Action by the Military,“ The Journal of Modern African Studies 
10, No. 1 (May, 1972): 26. 
198 
 
responsible	 for	 negotiating	 conditions	 of	 security	 cooperation	 was	 Akena	 Adoko,	 the	
representative	of	the	Ugandan	administration,	the	President’s	cousin	and	one	his	closest	
collaborators.	During	his	 visit	 to	Czechoslovakia	 in	March	1964	 (as	mentioned	above)	
Adoko	 met	 with	 officials	 from	 the	 Interior	 Ministry	 and	 the	 StB455	 and	 also	 with	 the	
Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs,	Václav	David.456	During	his	talks	with	the	StB	officials	at	the	
Interior	Ministry,	Adoko	put	forward	the	Ugandan	government’s	intention	of	creating	a	
counter‐espionage	 organisation	 that	 would	 help	 to	 solve	 some	 of	 the	 pressing	 issues	
that	the	country	was	facing.		
The	Ugandan	government	was,	according	to	Adoko,	concerned	with	the	growth	
of	 inter‐tribal	conflict	that	was	believed	to	be	fuelled	by	the	British	and	which	posed	a	
threat	to	Ugandan	political	stability.	 	Obote	was	also	concerned	by	what	was	seen	as	a	
further	 potential	 source	 of	 political	 instability,	 namely	 the	 activities	 of	 British	 and	
American	 experts.457	 In	 an	 immediate	 response	 to	 Adoko’s	 requests,	 the	 Interior	
Ministry	prepared	and	suggested	a	plan	to	organise	a	course	 for	six	or	seven	Ugandan	
students	 to	 be	 trained	 in	 intelligence	 work.	 Adoko	 himself	 used	 the	 visit	 to	 get	
acquainted	 with	 some	 of	 the	 basic	 principles	 and	 StB	 practices	 of	 espionage	 and	
counter‐espionage	and	he	used	this	knowledge	to	lay	the	foundations	of	new	intelligence	
organisation	upon	his	return	to	Uganda.458		
Both	 Adoko’s	 requests	 –	 at	 the	 MND	 and	 the	 Interior	 Ministry	 –	 met	 with	 a	
positive	 response	 and	 practical	 cooperation	 in	 both	 areas	 commenced	 in	 1964.	 The	
Interior	Ministry	organised	the	security	expert	course	for	Ugandans	in	the	second	half	of	
1964459	 and,	 during	 his	 visit	 to	 the	 CSSR	 in	 December	 1964,	 Adoko	 expressed	 his	
satisfaction	with	its	provisional	results.	He	used	the	visit	to	negotiate	further	espionage	
training	for	approximately	25	Ugandans	to	take	place	in	following	years.	In	addition	to	
this,	he	asked	the	CS	Interior	Ministry	to	provide	some	of	the	carefully	selected	Ugandan	
students	enrolled	at	CS	universities	with	an	opportunity	to	complete	the	limited	security	
course	during	the	academic	holidays.460		
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Meanwhile,	Adoko	began	the	formation	of	an	intelligence	organisation,	attached	
to	 the	office	of	 the	Prime	Minister,	 and	 later	 to	become	known	as	 the	General	 Service	
Unit	 (GSU).	From	the	outset	Czechoslovak‐Ugandan	cooperation	 in	 the	security	sphere	
contributed	 greatly	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 GSU	 and	 to	 the	 drafting	 of	 its	 operational	
procedures.	Also	from	the	beginning,	graduates	of	the	first	intelligence	course	organised	
in	 the	 CSR	 acquired	 high‐ranking	 positions	 within	 the	 GSU.	 The	 unique	 feature	 of	
Adoko’s	 intelligence	 service	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 for	 several	 months	 its	 existence	 was	
neither	 publically	 announced	 nor	 given	 any	 legal	 standing.	 Therefore	 it	 operated	 in	
obscurity,	 outside	 the	 system	 of	 constitutional	 control,	 unlike	 the	 official	 intelligence	
service	 of	 the	 Special	 Branch	 of	 Ugandan	 police	 inherited	 from	 colonial	 times.	 In	 this	
initial	period	knowledge	of	the	very	existence	of	Adoko’s	service	was	withheld	from	the	
institutions	 of	 the	 state,	 making	 it	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 exert	 any	 kind	 of	 legal	 or	
practical	 control	 over	 the	 GSU	 and	 its	 activities.	 Also,	 it	 gave	 Adoko	 and	 his	 people	 a	
considerable	advantage	over	their	rivals	in	fulfilling	their	operational	objectives.		
In	 some	 respects,	 security	 cooperation	 between	 the	 Czechoslovak	 interior	
ministry	 and	Adoko	bore	many	 similarities	 to	 the	StB’s	Action	SPECIAL	 in	Kenya.	The	
main	objective	in	each	case	was	to	form	an	alternative	intelligence	service	that	would	be	
a	 loyal	 and	 effective	 tool	 to	 aid	 the	 particular	 politician’s	 ascent	 to	 ultimate	 political	
power	 and	 to	 interfere	 effectively	 with	 western	 influence	 in	 the	 country.	 Ideally	 this	
intelligence	 service	 would	 eventually	 substitute	 for	 existing	 security	 institutions	 and	
take	over	their	responsibilities.	While	this	plan	failed	in	Kenya	due	to	Odinga’s	gradual	
exclusion	from	the	top	levels	of	Kenyan	politics,	until	1971	the	story	of	Adoko’s	GSU	in	
Uganda	was	a	success	story.	There	were	several	reasons	for	this,	but	the	main	one	is	that	
in	contrast	to	Kenya,	the	politician	in	whose	favour	the	project	of	the	intelligence	service	
was	 being	 implemented	 did	 not	 lose	 political	 power	 and	 could	 thus	 ensure	 constant	
political	backing	to	it.	Also,	unlike	in	Action	SPECIAL,	most	of	the	Ugandan	graduates	of	
the	CS	security	courses	received	positions	within	the	Ugandan	administration,	including	
in	 the	 office	 of	 the	 President	 and	 in	 various	 ministries,	 thus	 extending	 Obote’s	 and	
Adoko’s	 influence.461	 Adoko’s	 project	 also	 retained	 the	 unwavering	 support	 of	 his	
Czechoslovak	 partners,	 who	 viewed	 Adoko	 and	 his	 colleagues	 as	 vital	 agents	 for	 the	
success	of	the	growth	of	socialism	in	Uganda,	under	pressure	as	it	was	from	the	West.			
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Further	 contacts	 between	 Adoko	 and	 various	 CS	 officials	 were	 regular	 and	
frequent	 in	 the	years	 that	 followed.	Adoko	became	 the	main	point	of	 contact	 for	most	
Ugandan	matters.	 He	 became	 the	 source	 of	 important	 background	 information	 about	
internal	political	affairs	in	the	country;	on	the	CS	side,	contact	was	mostly	conducted	by	
StB	 operatives,	 	 at	 first	 from	 the	Nairobi	 residency,	 then	 later	 from	a	 similar	 office	 in	
Kampala.	 In	Prague’s	view	 the	 legalisation	of	Adoko’s	 intelligence	service	 in	 July	1965	
seemed	promising	for	CS	interests	in	Uganda.	In	1965	one	of	the	graduates	of	the	first	CS	
security	course,	James	Gregory	Otto,	was	formally	appointed	head	of	one	of	the	sections	
responsible	for	counter‐espionage	and	was	directly	answerable	to	the	PM’s	office.		
Legalisation	of	the	status	of	the	GSU	was	perceived	to	be	a	great	success	and	it	
motivated	 the	CS	administration	 to	 approve	additional	 funding	 for	 cooperation	 in	 this	
sphere,	especially	once	the	StB	received	signals	that	the	Israeli‐trained	members,	some	
of	whom	also	joined	Adoko’s	GSU,	were	losing	their	positions	to	newcomers	trained	in	
Czechoslovakia	and	other	socialist	countries,	 including	the	Soviet	Union.462	Provisional	
successes	of	 this	 cooperation	were	also	viewed	as	a	promising	 future	 challenge	 to	 the	
interests	and	activities	of	western	countries	in	Uganda,	particularly	Israel	and	the	USA,	
who	 were	 working	 for	 their	 own	 political	 interests	 in	 Uganda.	 Israel	 also	 provided	
Uganda	 with	 special	 security	 assistance,	 but	 the	 successfully	 developing	 cooperation	
between	Uganda	and	Czechoslovakia	in	this	same	sphere	undermined	Israel’s	position	in	
Uganda.463	The	CS	administration	decided	to	continue	providing	Adoko	with	assistance	
by	 training	 more	 cadres,464	 while	 limited	 deliveries	 of	 professional	 intelligence	
equipment	were	also	approved.465		
Cooperation	between	the	CSSR,	represented	by	StB	operatives,	and	Adoko’s	GSU	
reached	a	new	quality	and	intensity	 in	the	first	months	after	the	service	was	 legalised.	
The	 General	 Service	 Unit,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Adoko,	 Otto	 and	 other	 CS	 security	
course	graduates,	was	profiled	as	a	strict	anti‐American	organisation.	Its	legalisation	in	
1965	coincided	with	the	mobilisation	of	pro‐western	politicians	within	the	UPC,	who,	as	
Adoko	and	Otto	believed,	were	receiving	finances	from	the	Americans.	Activities	of	these	
pro‐western	 politicians	 became	 a	 primary	 concern	 for	 the	 GSU	 in	 this	 period.	 Obote	
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ordered	Adoko	and	his	people	 to	provide	him	with	evidence	of	 collaboration	between	
several	 cabinet	members	 and	 US	 agencies.466	 In	 the	 period	when	 internal	 antagonism	
was	building	against	him,	the	newly‐established	service	and	the	information	it	gathered	
certainly	 strengthened	 the	 position	 of	 Prime	 Minister	 Obote,	 helped	 him	 face	 the	
opposition	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	 victory	 that	 was	 of	 paramount	 importance	 for	 the	
socialist	countries.	Obote	was	well	aware	of	the	CS	connection	with	the	GSU,	and	the	CS	
position	in	Uganda	was	thus	also	significantly	strengthened.		
	
4.6. Political	crisis	1964‐1966		
A	 legislative	 framework,	 according	 to	which	political	power	was	 conducted	 in	
an	 independent	Uganda	was	 sketched	out	 in	 cooperation	with	Britain;	 it	 attempted	 to	
address	the	most	acute	issues	of	the	ethnically	divided	country.	The	1962	Constitution	
proved	 useful	 in	 navigating	 Uganda	 to	 a	 peaceful	 transition	 of	 power	 from	 the	 UK	 to	
Ugandans	but	it	was	not	similarly	successful	in	solving	centrifugal	separatist	tendencies	
of	 the	 Ugandan	 regions	 and	 the	 political	 aspirations	 of	 traditional	 regional	 Ugandan	
leaders.	 ‘The	 Constitution	 was	 by	 no	 means	 a	 charter	 of	 unity,	 nor	 a	 basis	 for	 its	
attainment	at	a	future	date:	rather	it	legally	recognised	and	entrenched	localism.’467	Many	
threatening	sources	of	possible	political	conflict	were	left	unresolved	for	future	dealings	
by	 an	 independent	 government.	 There	 was	 one	 political	 issue	 in	 particular	 inherited	
from	the	colonial	period	that	was	left	unsettled	and	it	caused	an	early	major	rift	 in	the	
Ugandan	administration.	In	Ugandan	affairs	this	issue	is	known	as	the	matter	of	the	‘lost	
counties’	of	Bunyoro.	
The	origins	of	the	‘lost	counties’	issue	can	be	traced	back	into	the	very	beginning	
of	colonial	rule	in	Uganda.	The	kingdom	of	Buganda	provided	the	British	with	assistance	
in	 their	 attempt	 to	 subdue	 the	 kingdom	 of	 Bunyoro.	 When	 the	 British	 conquest	 of	
Bunyoro	and	other	Ugandan	kingdoms	was	successfully	completed,	 the	Bugandan	king	
received	 a	 reward	 from	 the	 British	 for	 his	 services.	 Besides	 receiving	 special	 status	
within	the	British	Protectorate	of	Uganda,	the	kabaka	of	Buganda	also	assumed	control	
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of	two	districts	that	had	originally	belonged	to	Bunyoro.		The	Banyoro	people	however	
never	accepted	this	arrangement	and	with	the	advance	of	 independence	they	renewed	
their	 demands	 for	 the	 return	 of	 their	 lost	 counties.	 Their	 demands	 were	 given	 extra	
substance	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 population	 of	 the	 lost	 counties	was	 still	 predominantly	
Banyoro.	Eventually	it	was	decided	that	the	fate	of	the	lost	counties	should	be	decided	
by	 popular	 vote.	 The	 referendum	 did	 indeed	 take	 place	 in	 November	 1964	 and	 the	
majority	vote	was	for	return	to	Bunyoro.	This	result	was	a	blow	to	President	Mutesa’s	
political	prestige	in	Buganda	and	it	only	contributed	to	a	universal	decline	of	his	power	
that	 was	 increasingly	 manacled	 by	 the	 growing	 dominance	 of	 the	 UPC	 and	 Prime	
Minister	 Obote.468	 The	 ‘lost	 counties’	 affair	 inspired	 similar	 demands	 of	 some	 other	
disputed	micro‐regions	 and	 it	 was	 becoming	 apparent	 that	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 Ugandan	
state	was	being	challenged.	For	Obote	national	unity	was	a	 core	notion	of	his	political	
programme,	partially	as	a	sincere	conviction	that	it	was	a	vital	condition	for	ensuring	the	
survival	of	an	independent	Uganda,	partially	as	a	working	strategy	towards	his	complete	
dominance	of	Ugandan	politics.		
The	 ‘lost	 counties’	 affair	 marked	 the	 end	 of	 political	 cooperation	 between	
Obote’s	UPC	and	Kabaka	Yekka.	As	Obote	successfully	consolidated	state	control	in	UPC	
hands,	 the	membership	 of	 the	 party	 was	 becoming	 a	 necessity	 for	 Ugandans	 seeking	
political	influence	or	a	state	service	career.	From	1964	a	number	of	supporters	of	KY	and	
of	other	political	parties	had	been	joining	the	ranks	of	the	UPC,	seemingly	adding	more	
power	 to	 Obote,	 but	 in	 reality	 increasing	 the	 risk	 of	 internal	 dispute.	 The	 party’s	
incorporation	 of	 new	 members	 from	 Buganda	 brought	 a	 heightened	 threat	 of	
fragmentation	along	ideological	and	ethnic	lines	and	of	possible	intraparty	conflict.	Such	
conflict	did	occur	 in	1964	and	1965	when	an	anti‐Obote	group	was	 formed	within	 the	
UPC,	 challenging	 the	PM’s	 control	 of	 party	 and	of	 the	 government.	These	 events	were	
taking	place	at	the	time	of	Obote’s	declared	intentions	of	introducing	a	one‐party	system	
in	Uganda,	a	move	far	from	infrequent	or	unusual	in	Africa	in	this	period.		
The	years	1964	through	1966	represented	a	period	when	the	course	for	future	
political	development	was	being	decided	by	the	power	struggle	between	Obote	and	his	
opponents	inside	as	well	as	outside	the	UPC.	Even	though	Obote	did	eventually	emerge	
victorious	 from	 the	 confrontation,	 his	 ultimate	 political	 success	 was	 by	 no	 means	 a	
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certainty	 until	 the	 very	 last	 moment.	 There	 were	 several	 decisive	 factors	 to	 Obote’s	
success:	 his	 ability	 to	 use	 ethnic	 and	 personal	 loyalties	 for	 his	 own	 political	 gain,	 his	
success	 in	 containing	 the	power	of	 traditional	 leaders,	 and,	most	 importantly,	 the	 fact	
that	he	consolidated	and	maintained	control	of	the	security	forces	and	the	military	at	all	
critical	 times.	 The	 last	 point	 especially	 represented	 a	 crucial	 condition	 for	 Obote’s	
success	in	the	struggle	for	power	which	resulted	in	1966	in	the		series	of	affairs	known	
as	Obote’s	revolution.	Besides	providing	Uganda	with	effective	assistance	in	the	military	
sphere,	Czechoslovakia	was	also	of	vital	importance	to	Obote	in	his	project	of	building	a	
loyal	 intelligence	service,	 an	 institution	 that	would	 later	play	a	decisive	 role	alongside	
the	Ugandan	army	in	supporting	Obote	in	his	clash	with	the	opposition	and	in	his	move	
to	a	one‐party	state.		
		The	 internal	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 UPC	 that	 began	 in	 1964,	 and	 the	 growing	
intraparty	opposition	to	Obote	resulted	in	the	1966	deep	political	Ugandan	crisis		during	
which	Obote	had	to	defend	his	position	as	PM	and	as	leader	of	the	UPC.	It	still	remains	to	
be	 firmly	 established	 as	 to	what	 extent	 the	 1966	 crisis	was	 imposed	 on	Obote	 by	 the	
actions	of	his	political	opponents,	or	whether	it	was	the	result	of	a	well‐drafted	political	
strategy	by	Obote	himself,	using	the	situation	that	had	arisen	to	sweep	aside	the	whole	
spectrum	of	his	rivals	and	to	change	the	fundamental	organisation	of	the	Ugandan	state	
to	his	preferred	model	of	a	centralised	one‐party	system.	Regardless	of	which	of	those	
two	 possibilities	 is	 closer	 to	 reality,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 Obote	 stayed	 at	 the	 top	 of	
political	developments	in	Uganda	between	1964	and	1966,	and	in	most	cases	it	was	he	
who	was	the	driver	of	the	major	political	changes	to	which	his	opponents	had	to	react.	It	
was	by	Obote’s	decision	 that	 the	coalition	between	the	UPC	and	KY	was	 terminated	 in	
August	1964,	 it	was	his	dealings	on	the	Ugandan	army	mutiny	that	solved	the	military	
crisis	and	started	the	army’s	development	and	it	was	his	declaration	of	intention	to	lead	
Uganda	towards	the	future	of	one‐party	state	that	his	opponents	had	to	react	to.469		
The	 increasing	 internal	 divisions	 of	 the	 UPC	 and	 also	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 cabinet	
were	occurring	mostly	along	ethnic	lines	for	individual	members.	The	division	between	
southerners	 and	 northerners	 was	 not	 only	 a	 tribal	 division	 but	 it	 also	 carried	 the	
implications	of	related	divisions	between	rich	and	poor,	between	kingdoms	supporting	
traditionalists,	and	nationalist	radicals,	between	pro‐West	and	pro‐socialist	camps,	and	,	
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as	 was	 becoming	 ever	 more	 apparent,	 between	 anti‐	 and	 pro‐Obote	 factions.470	 The	
existing	 division	 of	 the	 UPC	 was	 more	 starkly	 exposed	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	
referendum	on	the	‘lost	counties’	when	the	UPC	members	from	Buganda	especially	did	
not	 hold	 back	 from	 expressing	 their	 discontent	with	 Obote.	 Several	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	
cross	 to	 the	 Democratic	 Party	 opposition.471	 In	 this	 period	 a	 group	 critical	 of	 Obote’s	
actions	formed	around	Grace	Ibingira.		
The	Ibingira	group’s	criticisms	of	Obote	mounted	throughout	1965,	especially	in	
connection	to	the	affair	often	referred	to	as	the	‘Congo	gold	scam’.	This	affair	developed	
throughout	 1965	 and	was	 concerned	with	 the	 alleged	 illegal	 receiving	 of	money,	 gold	
and	ivory	from	the	Congo	by	Colonel	Idi	Amin,	Obote	and	the	two	ministers	Nekyon	and	
Onama.	According	to	Obote’s	brief	explanation	the	whole	affair	was	a	matter	of	a	secret	
agreement	 between	 Nyerere,	 Kenyatta	 and	 himself	 in	 providing	 assistance	 to	 the	
Congolese	 Stanleyville	 regime,	 for	which	 it	 paid	with	 this	money,	 gold	 and	 ivory.472	 A	
thorough	investigation	as	called	for	by	Ibingira’s	group	was	repeatedly	postponed	until	
it	finally	resulted	in	February	1966	in	the	ultimate	rift	within	the	Ugandan	cabinet	 ,	by	
then	 also	 split	 between	 Obote’s	 opponents	 and	 his	 supporters.	 Daudi	 Ochieng	 was	
known	to	sympathise	with	Ibingira’s	group	and	he	‘accused	Deputy	Army	Commander	Idi	
Amin	of	 involvement	–	 in	collusion	with	Obote	and	 two	cabinet	ministers,	Adoko	Nekyon	
and	 Felix	 Onama	 –	 in	 a	 gold	 and	 ivory	 scandal.	 Ochieng	 then	 proposed	 a	 motion	
demanding	Amin’s	suspension	from	the	army	pending	an	investigation	of	the	matter.’473	In	
the	absence	of	Obote	and	of	almost	half	 the	cabinet,	 the	 remaining	ministers	–	mostly	
southern	politicians	–	passed	the	motion	to	begin	an	investigation	into	Obote’s	conduct.	
Upon	his	 return	 to	Kampala	Obote	had	 the	motion	annulled	but	 the	 cabinet	 remained	
torn.		
The	crisis	culminated	on	24	February	1966	when	Obote	accused	his	opponents	
of	an	attempted	coup	against	him	and	had	five	cabinet	members	arrested.	Subsequently	
Obote	 suspended	 the	 1962	 Constitution	 and	 acquired	 all	 executive	 powers	 by	
proclaiming	a	state	of	emergency.	To	ensure	the	complete	loyalty	of	the	Ugandan	army	
                                                            
470 Hopkins, Terence K., “Politics in Uganda: The Buganda Question.“ In Boston University Papers on Africa, 
edited by Jeffrey Butler and A.A. Castagno (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967): 277.  
471 Hopkins, “Politics,” 275.  
472 Southall, Aidan, “General Amin and the Coup: Great Man or Historical Inevitability?“ The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1975): 96.  
473 Ofcansky, Uganda, 41. 
205 
 
Obote	 stripped	 the	 Commander‐in‐Chief	 Brigadier	 Shaban	 Opolot	 of	 his	 powers	 and	
appointed	 the	 popular	 and	 loyal	 Northerner	 Amin	 in	 his	 stead.	 In	 April	 1966	 Obote	
introduced	the	new	republican	constitution,	widely	criticised	at	the	time,	which,	among	
other	 measures	 introduced	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 centralisation	 of	 power	 in	 the	 post	 of	
Executive	President,	a	position	 intended	to	substitute	 for	 the	suspended	post	of	Prime	
Minister.	The	same	constitution	also	cancelled	the	special	status	of	Buganda	and	all	the	
constitutional	 rights	 of	 the	 lukiko	 and	 the	 kabaka	 of	 Baganda.474	 This	move	 naturally	
provoked	a	reaction	from	Edward	Mutesa,	the	kabaka	of	Buganda	and	the	President	of	
Uganda,	who	officially	demanded	the	Ugandan	government	to	withdraw	from	Buganda.	
Mutesa	 also	 called	 for	 foreign	 help	 against	 Uganda,	 a	 move	 which	 was	 bound	 to	 be	
controversial,	 given	 the	precedent	 in	East	Africa.	The	crisis	 then	swiftly	escalated	 into	
the	 short	 but	 bloody	 armed	 conflict	 between	 Amin’s	 troops	 and	 the	 Bugandan	 army	
which	ended	with	Buganda’s	defeat,	 the	kabaka’s	exile	and	a	consolidation	of	Ugandan	
power	over	the	rebellious	kingdom,	the	administration	of	which	was	to	be	split	into	four	
separate	regions.475	‘The	army	was	thus	pivotal	as	an	instrument	of	presidential	power	at	
the	 time	 of	 the	 alienation	 of	 Baganda	 support,	 as	 well	 as	 compensation	 for	 the	
organisationally	weak	and	faction‐ridden	Uganda	People’s	Congress.’476		
Besides	the	army,	there	was	one	other	power	institution	of	Ugandan	state	that	
reinforced	Obote’s	position	at	a	time	of	political	crisis.	 It	was	the	Ugandan	 intelligence	
service,	 known	 as	 the	 General	 Service	 Unit,	 which	 was	 organised	 at	 Obote’s	 direct	
request	in	cooperation	with	Czechoslovakia.	Documents	in	Prague	archives	suggest	that	
over	the	critical	period	of	1965	the	GSU	had	been	maintaining	constant	surveillance	over	
the	opposition	group	within	the	UPC.477	To	what	extent	GSU	activities	helped	Obote	to	
defend	his	position	once	 it	was	openly	challenged	 is	difficult	 to	assess,	as	 the	relevant	
information	 on	 GSU	 activities	 is	 largely	 non‐existent	 or	 at	 least	 not	 yet	 locatable.	
However,	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 subsequent	 years	 Obote	 upheld	 security	 cooperation	
arrangements	 with	 Czechoslovakia	 as	 well	 as	 other	 countries	 and	 spent	 extensive	
resources	on	the	development	of	the	GSU,	suggests	that	he	considered	the	GSU	a	useful	
tool	in	ensuring	his	political	survival.	
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4.7. Obote’s	‘Move	to	the	left’		
The	events	of	1966	saw	Obote	emerge	victorious	from	the	most	serious	political	
crisis	of	Uganda	after	independence,	in	what	his	critics	judged	a	constitutional	coup	with	
the	 involvement	 of	 the	Ugandan	 army.	 In	 April	 1966	Obote	 had	 the	 new	Constitution	
passed	 in	 the	National	Assembly	placing	virtually	all	power	 in	his	hands.	Even	 though	
this	step	was	seemingly	legal,	Obote’s	opponents	pointed	out	that	the	Constitution	was	
passed	in	the	National	Assembly	without	being	read	and	in	the	absence	of	the	necessary	
quorum.	Legal	or	not,	the	new	Constitution	was	a	major	step	towards	the	centralisation	
that	Obote	sought	and	effectively	rid	him	of	any	viable	political	opposition.	Obote’s	coup,	
or	 revolution,	 depending	 on	 the	 perspective,	 deeply	 alienated	 and	 frustrated	 large	
sections	of	the	Ugandan	population.	
In	 1967,	 after	 yet	 another	 new	 Constitution	 replaced	 the	 previous	 one,	
completing	the	centralisation	of	the	state,	Obote	held	all	the	political	power	in	Uganda.	
He	had	the	loyalty	of	the	army,	the	police	and	the	GSU,	as	all	of	these	power	institutions	
were	by	now	dominated	by	his	fellow	northerners.	Obote	also	decided	to	prolong	the	life	
of	 the	 serving	 National	 Assembly	 for	 five	more	 years	 because	 he	 believed	 this	would	
allow	him	 to	 implement	 the	desired	reforms	 that	would	win	him	popular	approval.	 In	
subsequent	years	government	under	his	leadership	tried	to	implement	the	programme	
which	 came	 to	 be	 known	 as	 the	 ‘move	 to	 the	 Left’.	 Its	 fundamental	 principles	 were	
progressively	 explained	 in	 several	 documents	 drafted	 by	 Obote	 and	 which	 were	
intended	to	cause	far‐reaching	structural	socio‐economic	changes	in	Uganda.				
Uganda	 originally	 entered	 the	 independence	 era	 with	 comparatively	 good	
prospects	 for	 successful	 economic	 development	 in	 the	 immediate	 future.	 The	 country	
possessed	 a	 functioning	 and	 developing	 economy	 based	 on	 agricultural	 produce	 and	
related	 industries	 and	 was	 blessed	 with	 a	 favourable	 natural	 environment.	 Ugandan	
agriculture	was	productive	enough	to	provide	sustenance	for	the	whole	population.	The	
country	was	able	to	benefit	from	a	well‐developed	transport	infrastructure	and	from	its	
economic	 links	 to	 markets	 in	 Britain	 and	 other	 western	 states.478	 	 Plans	 for	 tighter	
economic	 cooperation	 with	 Kenya	 and	 Tanzania	 were	 promising.	 While	 all	 these	
strengths	were	present	in	the	1960s	in	Uganda,	there	were	also	some	serious	structural	
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weaknesses	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 by	 Obote’s	 government.	 Among	 these	 the	most	 pressing	
issue	was	 to	Africanise	 the	economy	and	 in	some	acceptable	way	 limit	 the	role	of	and	
penetration	by	foreign‐owned	companies.	Furthermore,	reliance	on	a	limited	number	of	
agricultural	commodities	subject	to	fluctuating	prices	always	posed	a	great	risk	for	the	
economic	and	hence	also	the	political	stability	of	Uganda.	Redistribution	of	the	means	of	
economic	production	was	also	on	the	table.			
Obote’s	sympathies	with	socialism	had	been	well	known	since	his	early	ascent	
to	power	and	it	was	obvious	that	in	one	way	or	another	they	would	be	reflected	in	the	
economic	policies	of	his	cabinet	especially	after	1966,	when	he	acquired	all	the	power	in	
Uganda.	 Some	 very	 limited	 economic	 adaptation	 of	 a	 capitalist	 economy	 towards	 the		
principles	of	African	socialism	was	sought	as	early	as	1964,	but	it	was	only	at	the	end	of	
the	decade	that	Obote	announced		(and	attempted	to	implement)	more	radical	socialist	
policies	in	the	country’s	economy.	It	was	only	in	1969	that	Obote	finally	introduced	the	
political	programme	that	would	provide	some	kind	of	theoretical	backing	for	the	 long‐
proclaimed	project	of	building	socialism	in	Uganda.	This	programme	was	declared	in	the	
document	called	the	Common	Man’s	Charter	and	was	presented	on	18	December	1969	to	
the	Annual	Delegate	Conference	of	the	UPC.	Several	fundamental	political	principles	for	
implementation	in	Uganda	can	be	extracted	from	the	document.		
‘The	Charter	professed	 the	 rejection	of	 foreign	exploitation	and	domination.	 […]	
Socialism	was	 to	be	adopted	as	 the	 theory	and	practice	of	 social	 life	 in	Uganda.	 […]	The	
Post‐Independence	Crusade	was	to	fight	against	poverty,	ignorance	and	disease.	[…]	Over	
and	above	 this,	 the	Charter	was	aware	of	 the	problem	of	 integration	 in	Uganda.	Thus	 it	
professed	 that	 efforts	 should	 be	 mobilised	 to	 build	 one	 country	 with	 one	 people,	 one	
Parliament	 and	 one	 Government.	 […]	 It	 was	 also	 written	 in	 the	 Charter	 that	 the	 gap	
between	the	well‐to‐do	and	the	masses	was	 inherited	from	the	pre‐Independence	era.	[…]	
There	was	also	a	hint	that	nationalisation	of	private	property	was	necessary	as	a	fulfilment	
of	 this	principle.’479	While	 the	 Charter	 provided	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 further	
development,	 several	 documents	 and	 speeches	 that	 followed	 it	 in	 1969	 and	 1970480	
added	practical	implementation	guidance.	However	the	practical	application	of	Obote’s	
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ambitious	 reforms	was	much	 less	 successful	 and	much	 slower	 than	would	 have	 been	
needed	to	ensure	Obote	won	the	broad	popular	support	he	so	desired,	but	lacked.	This	
caused	growing	social	discontent,	which	in	combination	with	the	continuing	resentment	
of	 Obote	 in	 Buganda,	 rampant	 corruption	 in	 all	 the	 spheres	 of	 state	 apparatus,	 most	
importantly	 in	 the	military,	 predestined	 Obote’s	 ultimate	 enforced	 fall	 from	 power	 in	
1971.						
The	‘Move	to	the	left’	proved	disastrous	to	Obote’s	political	destiny.	While	some	
of	his	radical	intentions	scared	the	rich,	the	foreign	contingent,	the	business	owners	and	
the	West,	slow	implementation	of	the	proposed	policies	frustrated	and	alienated	the	rest	
of	society.	Therefore	the	programme	which	was	supposed	to	win	Obote	broad	popular	
support	only	brought	him	more	antipathy	 from	his	opponents	and	was	received	badly	
by	 the	West,	 relations	with	which	were	 still	 critically	 important	 for	 the	 health	 of	 the	
Ugandan	economy.	Frustration	over	the	 ‘move	to	the	 left’	only	served	to	 fuel	 the	 long‐
standing	criticism	of	Obote	that	he	had	still	not	sought	confirmation	of	his	status	as	head	
of	 state	 by	 popular	 vote.	 The	 longer	 the	 country	 went	 without	 actual	 elections	 after	
Independence,	 the	 lower	the	 level	of	 legitimacy	of	government’s	actions	and	the	 lower	
its	public	approval.481		
In	 this	 situation	 Obote	 found	 himself	 increasingly	 dependent	 on	 the	 strength	
and	allegiance	of	the	institutions	that	gave	him	his	power.	Obote’s	political	destiny	was	
determined	by	the	support	of	the	army	and	the	GSU,	and	he	needed	these	bodies	to	be	
effective,	powerful	and	loyal.	In	the	period	of	1966	through	1971	he	also	ensured	this	by	
maintaining	 cooperation	 with	 Czechoslovakia	 in	 the	 special	 sphere.	 It	 is	 a	 historical	
paradox	that	Obote	was	perhaps	too	successful	in	this	one	respect.	He	managed	to	create	
an	intelligence	service	that	was	such	a	formidable	threat	that	it	caused	envy	and	fear	in	
the	national	army,	which	was,	on	the	other	hand,	powerful	enough	to	stage	a	successful	
coup	against	the	government.	
It	 is	perhaps	 important	 to	point	out	 that	while	Obote	was	able	 to	organise	an	
effective	 system	 of	 cooperation	 with	 socialist	 countries	 in	 the	 military	 and	 security	
areas,	 he	 had	 no	 similar	 success	 in	 the	 civil	 sphere.	 Socialist	 countries	 including	
Czechoslovakia	were	 incapable	 of	 providing	Obote	with	 the	 instant	 economic	 support	
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for	 his	 implementation	 of	 the	 ‘move	 to	 the	 left’	 that	 would	 have	 made	 this	 reform	
programme	feasible	in	such	a	short	time.	This	situation	can	be	illustrated	once	again	by	
the	 case	 of	 Czechoslovak	 commitment	 in	 Uganda.	While	 special	 cooperation	 between	
Uganda	and	the	CSSR	was	going	through	a	period	of	intense	development,	other	spheres	
of	 cooperation	 lagged	 behind.	 Cooperation	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 civil	 technical	 assistance	
remained	 marginal	 throughout	 1960	 except	 for	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 scholarships	
provided	 for	 a	 handful	 of	 Ugandan	 students.	 CS	 officials	 were	 aware	 that	 the	 main	
Foreign	 Trade	 Enterprise	 Polytechna,	 responsible	 for	 this	 cooperation,	 was	 unable	 to	
compete	with	the	conditions	of	civil	technical	cooperation	that	Western,	and	even	other	
socialist	countries,	were	offering	Uganda,482	but	it	lacked	the	financial	resources,	expert	
cadres	and,	after	1968,	also	the	political	will	to	do	anything	about	it.			
Civil	technical	assistance	for	Uganda	thus	lay	on	the	periphery	of	CS	interest	and	
unlike	 the	special	 cooperation,	 it	did	not	provide	 the	much	needed	support	 to	an	ever	
more	unpopular	Obote.	At	the	same	time,	trade	relations,	after	the	period	of	stagnation,	
were	enjoying	a	positive	development,	especially	in	1968	and	1969.	However,	in	no	way	
could	 they	 aspire	 to	 substitute	 for	 the	 trade	with	 the	British	 should	 they	be	 excluded	
from	 Uganda.483	 Very	 limited	 successes	 were	 recorded	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 cultural	
relations,484	 but	 here	 also	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 CS	 MFA	 and	 various	 civil	 society	
organisations	fell	significantly	short	of	the	ambitious	objectives	sketched	in	the	original	
Africa	 policy	 from	 1961.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 Czechoslovakia	 simply	 did	 not	 possess	 the	
economic	and	expert	 capacities	 to	provide	Obote	with	 substantial	 support	beyond	 the	
special	 sphere.	 Obote	 was	 most	 likely	 aware	 of	 the	 limited	 capabilities	 of	 socialist	
countries	 and	 this	might	 be	 one	 of	 the	 explanations	why	 he	was	 not	 overly	 active	 in	
taking	practical	steps	towards	implementing	his	radical	economic	policies.				
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4.8. Special	cooperation	between	Czechoslovakia	and	Uganda	between	
1967	and	1971	
The	period	 of	 1967	 to	 1971	 saw	 further	 cooperation	between	Czechoslovakia	
and	 Uganda	 in	 both	 the	 military	 and	 the	 security	 spheres.	 However,	 Czechoslovak	
military	experts	were	not	the	only	foreign	military	expert	mission	present	in	Uganda	at	
this	point.	Various	expert	groups	 from	capitalist	and	socialist	countries	 included	those	
from	 Israel,	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 the	 USSR	 and	 China.	While	 some	 of	 these	 countries	
delivered	their	assistance	to	Uganda	on	more	favourable	conditions,	the	CSSR	benefitted	
from	good	personal	relations	with	the	Ugandan	government	and	army	officials,	and	the	
positive	 personal	 experience	 of	 Ugandan	 officials	 from	 their	 frequent	 visits	 to	 the	
CSSR.485	 It	was	 quite	 common	 for	 relations	 to	 be	 fostered	 in	 form	of	 gifts	 to	Ugandan	
officials	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 furthering	 cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 countries.486	 At	 the	
same	time	it	was	however	of	the	utmost	importance	for	Czechoslovakia	to	maintain	its	
image,	 which	 contrasted	 strongly	 with	 the	 powerfully	 manipulative	 influence	 of	 the	
superpowers	 and	 of	 Britain.	 It	was	 Czechoslovakia’s	 reputation	 as	 the	 non‐ambitious,	
help‐providing,	socialist,	 friendly	country	that	opened	the	door	for	years	of	 flourishing	
cooperation.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	political	position	of	 the	CSSR	resembled	 that	of	 Israel	
within	 the	 capitalist	 camp.	 Uganda	 retained	 close	 contacts	 and	 a	 working	 military	
cooperation	with	Israel	despite	denouncing	Israel’s	conflict	with	Arab	countries	in	1967.	
Uganda	defended	its	continuing	cooperation	with	Israel	on	the	basis	of	its	own	neutral	
foreign	 politics.	 Much	 the	 same	 explanation	 could	 be	 used	 to	 describe	 relations	 with	
Czechoslovakia.	
Initial	results	of	cooperation	between	the	CSSR	and	Uganda	in	the	special	sphere	
proved	mutually	beneficial	and,	due	to	the	prime	state	of	relations	between	Obote	and	
Czechoslovak	 officials,	 there	 were	 good	 prospects	 for	 extending	 it	 even	 further.	 For	
Czechoslovakia	special	military	cooperation	with	Uganda	was	a	welcome	source	of	hard	
currency	as	Uganda	was	being	charged	for	most	of	the	assistance	it	received.	At	the	same	
time,	 Czechoslovak	 politicians	 cherished	 good	 relations	 with	 Obote’s	 administration,	
which	was	now	officially	leaning	towards	socialism	as	it	was	one	of	very	few	countries	
that	 posed	 the	 best	 prospects	 for	 the	 successful	 accomplishment	 of	 the	 ambitious	
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foreign	political	objectives	of	the	CSSR	as	defined	in	their	1961	Africa	policy.	Maintaining	
and	eventually	developing	this	working	relationship	was	still	a	priority	despite	the	fact	
that	 previous	 Czechoslovak	 activism	 around	 Africa	 had	 been	 seriously	 reassessed	 by	
now.	 The	 CS	 MND	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 involving	 	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 all	
participating	state	offices	in	this	cooperation.		
Pivotal	for	military	cooperation	in	this	period	was	the	extension	of	the	original	
Agreement	 5252	 by	means	 of	 the	 new	 Contract	 5253.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 execution	 of	
Contract	 5253	 was	 to	 take	 place	 directly	 in	 Uganda	 brought	 the	 special	 military	
cooperation	between	the	two	countries	to	a	whole	new	level.	The	mission	of	CS	military	
experts	in	Uganda	between	1967	and	1970	became	the	largest,	the	most	ambitious	and	
perhaps	the	most	successful	operation	of	 its	kind	conducted	by	the	CS	military	 in	East	
Africa	 during	 the	 Cold	War.	 Specifics	 of	 the	 contract	were	 once	 again	 discussed	with	
Minister	Onama	 in	Uganda	 in	May	1967.	According	 to	 the	original	version	of	Contract	
5253,	CS	experts	were	to	arrive	 in	Uganda	in	the	spring	of	1967;	therefore,	 the	course	
could	 commence	 at	 Gulu	 airport	 in	 June	 after	 the	 delivery	 of	 six	 L	 29	 planes	 was	
completed	in	May	1967.487	Due	to	the	delay	on	the	Ugandan	part	in	preparing	facilities	
for	 the	 course,	 another	 extension	 of	 training	 in	 the	 CSSR	 was	mutually	 agreed	 upon.	
Ugandan	cadets	absolved	another	course	in	the	CSSR	in	the	summer	of	1967	before	they	
eventually	moved	back	to	Uganda.488	Repeated	extensions	of	the	original	course	proved	
lucrative	for	the	CS	MND.489		
During	 negotiations,	 the	 CS	 delegates	 were	 informed	 about	 the	 simultaneous	
disruption	of	 the	 special	 cooperation	between	Uganda	and	 Israel	 caused	by	 conflict	 in	
the	 Middle	 East;	 it	 was	 hoped	 this	 would	 further	 increase	 the	 significance	 of	
Czechoslovak	assistance	 for	Uganda.	On	 the	other	hand,	 from	1966‐67	Czechoslovakia	
was	 facing	 unexpected	 competition	 from	 within	 the	 socialist	 bloc,	 namely	 from	 the	
Soviets	 themselves.	 The	USSR	provided	Uganda	with	 deliveries	 of	 special	material	 for	
the	 Ugandan	 air	 force	 as	well	 as	 other	 units	 and	 it	 did	 so	 gratis.	 This	 caused	 several	
negotiated	 deliveries	 of	 Czechoslovak	weaponry	 to	 be	 cancelled	 because	 the	Ugandan	
government	naturally	chose	the	Soviets	over	the	Czechoslovaks	who	expected	payments	
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for	 the	provided	material.490	For	example,	during	another	visit	of	Minister	Onama	and	
the	 high	 ranking	 officers	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 military	 in	 November	 1967	 the	 Ugandans	
declared	interest	in	purchasing	more	special	material	from	the	CSSR,	including	six	more	
L	29	aircraft.	However,	due	to	the	competition	posed	by	the	Soviet	air	force	experts	and	
Soviet	 air	 force	 hardware,	 this	 transaction	was	 never	 completed.	 This	 case	 illustrates	
that	 cooperation	 between	 the	 USSR	 and	 Czechoslovakia	 in	 providing	 support	 to	
progressive	 African	 regimes	 was,	 surprisingly,	 not	 as	 coordinated,	 collaborative	 and	
effective	as	it	should	have	been.		
The	 military	 mission	 of	 CS	 air	 force	 experts	 was	 finally	 agreed	 to	 arrive	 at	
Uganda	in	October	1967.	Over	the	initially	agreed	period	of	eight	months	they	were	to	
achieve	multiple	aims.	These	mission	objectives	included	the	completion	of	training	for	
operating	L	29	aircraft,	 training	Ugandan	pilots	 in	 standard	operational	 activity	at	 the	
newly‐built	airfield,	 training	pilots	and	 technicians	 in	 the	service	maintenance	of	 their	
aircraft	 and	 other	 material	 in	 the	 local	 environment,	 assisting	 the	 pilots	 to	 operate	
according	to	orders	from	their	headquarters,	contributing	to	building	training	facilities	
for	the	Ugandan	air	force,	etc.491		
This	well‐established	cooperation	had	to	face	serious	practical	constraints	upon	
the	 arrival	 to	 Uganda	 (at	 Gulu	 airport)	 of	 a	 CS	 military	 expert	 group	 led	 by	 Colonel	
Hlaďo.	 The	 repeated	 delay	 in	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	 course,	 poor	management	 of	
preparatory	works	before	the	arrival	of	the	group	and	multiple	errors	on	the	part	of	the	
Ugandan	Defence	Ministry,	as	well	 as	on	 the	part	of	 the	CS	MFT‐HTS	 in	respect	of	 the	
provision	 of	 facilities	 and	 technical	 material	 more	 or	 less	 paralysed	 the	 operating	
schedule	of	Hlaďo’s	group	in	the	first	weeks	after	their	arrival.492	These	initial	troubles,	
however,	 did	 not	 affect	 the	 positive	 outcome	 of	 the	 mission,	 which	 was	 eventually	
extended	 until	 1970	 and	 was	 terminated	 only	 after	 the	 new	 wave	 of	 political	
persecution	began	 in	 the	CSSR	after	 the	Soviet	 invasion.	The	practical	effect	of	project	
5253	was	much	diminished	by	the	Soviet	invasion	and	by	Obote’s	later	fall	from	power.		
After	 1968,	 the	 Ugandan	Defence	Ministry’s	 limited	 budget,	 competition	 from	
other	 countries	 and	 the	 disruption	 on	 the	 Czechoslovak	 side	 caused	 by	 the	 Soviet	
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invasion,	meant	 that	only	a	handful	of	 contracts	were	negotiated.	The	most	 important	
transaction	 of	 this	 period	 was	 the	 delivery	 of	 SKOT	 armoured	 vehicles	 at	 a	 cost	 of	
330,000	GBP.493	In	connection	with	this	transaction	several	groups	of	Ugandan	soldiers	
were	being	trained	in	the	CSSR	in	the	use	of	armoured	vehicles.494	The	transaction	was	
provisionally	suspended	due	to	the	Soviet	 invasion	in	1968	as	well,	but	due	to	its	high	
profitability	for	the	CS	MND	it	was	eventually	resumed	and	completed.495		
	
In	 parallel	 to	 Czechoslovak‐Ugandan	 military	 cooperation,	 security	
collaboration	 was	 also	 developing.	 The	 further	 development	 of	 security	 cooperation	
between	1967	and	1971	is	difficult	to	reconstruct	due	to	the	absence	of	sufficient	data.	
The	 activities	 of	 the	 StB	 Residency	 in	 Kampala	 remain	 for	 the	 greater	 part	 unknown,	
unlike	 those	 of	 Nairobi.	 There	 are	 neither	 any	 archival	 collections	 available	 of	
intelligence	 gathered	 by	 the	 Kampala	 Residency	 nor	 any	 database	 of	 the	 Active	
Measures	 it	 took.	Existing	documents	 indicate	 that	 such	documents	did	once	exist	but	
that	they	were	discarded.	Bits	and	pieces	of	information	on	the	Kampala	Residency	can	
be	 traced	 in	 the	 collections	 that	 cover	 special	 cooperation	with	 Uganda	 and	Ugandan	
students	 in	 the	CSSR	 and	 several	 personal	 files	 such	 as	 that	 of	Akena	Adoko.	 Existing	
secondary	literature	also	fails	to	provide	provide	enough	information	on	the	role	of	and	
importance	 of	 Adoko’s	 GSU	 in	 the	 later	 stages	 of	 Obote’s	 rule.	 Only	 the	most	 general	
informations	available	on	the	GSU	and	on	Czechoslovak	cooperation	with	the	GSU	in	this	
period.			
In	 the	 years	 1966	 and	 1967,	 Adoko	 remained	 in	 regular	 contact	 with	 StB	
operatives	 from	 the	 Kampala	 Residency,	 which	 was	 established	 around	 1965	 and	
operated	 probably	 until	 the	 summer	 of	 1968.	 At	 a	 later	 stage	 he	 was	 also	 regularly	
contacted	 by	 officials	 from	 the	 Nairobi	 Residency,	 for	 whom	 watching	 the	 political	
development	 in	 Uganda	 became	 the	 prime	 objective	 after	 1970	 as	 by	 then	 all	 their	
activities	in	Kenya	had	been	abandoned.496	Adoko	visited	the	CSSR	on	several	occasions	
to	 check	 on	 the	 on‐going	 training	 of	 several	 Ugandan	 students	 and	 also	 to	 receive	
regular	 ‘gifts’.	 In	 1967,	 however,	 open	 criticism	of	 StB	 operatives	was	 expressed	 over	
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deteriorating	collaboration	with	Adoko.	Reports	from	the	Kampala	Resident	throughout	
1967	were	becoming	critical	of	the	low	effectiveness	and	poor	organisation	of	Adoko’s	
intelligence.	As	Adoko	moved	up	the	political	hierarchy	of	Uganda,	cooperation	with	him	
was	becoming	problematic	at	times	and	he	was	not	easy	to	control.	The	StB	plan	of	using	
Ugandan	counter‐espionage	for	its	own	purposes	had	to	be	provisionally	suspended.497	
Adoko’s	new	politically	influential	position	brought	him	regular	contacts	in	the	circles	of	
Kenyan	 opposition	 politicians,	 as	 relations	 between	 Obote	 and	 Kenyatta	 were	 not	
good.498	 StB	 operatives	 thus	 received	 an	 important	 channel	 of	 information	 on	Kenyan	
internal	political	development	which	was	especially	valuable	as	the	Residency	in	Nairobi	
was	at	this	point	largely	immobilised.	Adoko	also	remained	useful	as	a	direct	channel	to	
President	Obote,	but	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Soviet	 invasion	the	relevant	Czechoslovak	
institutions	 were	 partially	 paralysed	 and	 hardly	 seemed	 to	 use	 this	 channel	 for	 their	
operational	objectives.	The	post‐invasion	period	was	marked	by	a	lack	of	determined	CS	
activism	 in	 Uganda	 and	 the	 only	 projects	which	were	 being	 implemented	were	 those	
already	under	way	from	earlier.	
	
4.9. Obote’s	fall	from	power	–	the	army’s	motivations	for	the	coup	d’etat	
There	is	an	expert	analysis	of	the	internal	Ugandan	political	situation	in	1970‐
71	 available	 in	 the	 Czechoslovak	 archives	 which	 evaluates	 the	 stability	 of	 Obote’s	
regime.	 According	 to	 multiple	 situational	 reports	 from	 the	 Czechoslovak	 embassy	 in	
Kampala,	Obote’s	 tight	grip	on	Ugandan	politics	 in	 this	period	was	only	made	possible	
thanks	to	the	power	of	the	army	and	its	loyalty	to	the	Presidential	office.	The	Ugandan	
army,	 in	 striking	 contrast	 to	 the	 situation	 in	 Kenya,	 had	 evolved	 into	 an	 organisation	
with	a	very	strong	position	within	the	country’s	political	system	and	had	also	succeeded	
in	removing	British	experts	from	its	ranks.499	Through	effective	cooperation	with	other	
states,	 including	 Czechoslovakia,	 it	 had	 become	 a	 reasonably	 effective	 and	 impressive	
force	 that	had	 to	be	 taken	 into	account	not	only	 in	 the	security	sphere	but	also	as	 the	
decisive	source	of	political	 legitimacy	 for	 the	Ugandan	government.	However,	with	the	
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growing	public	 discontent	 over	Uganda’s	 development	under	Obote,	 the	 loyalty	 of	 the	
army	was	 not	 as	 guaranteed	 and	 as	 it	 once	 had	 been	 and	 eventually	 it	was	 the	 army	
itself	 that	 removed	Obote	 from	power.	Over	 the	 years,	 several	 academic	 articles	 have	
discussed	the	army’s	motives	for	this	step.	An	overview	of	the	factors	that	contributed	to	
the	Ugandan	army’s	coup	is	given	below.	
Between	 1968	 and	 1971	 issues	were	mounting	within	 the	Ugandan	 army	but	
also	 in	 regards	 to	 relations	between	army	and	government	and	 the	GSU.	 In	December	
1969	Obote	 became	 a	 target	 of	 a	 failed	 assassination	 attempt.500	 Five	weeks	 later	 the	
deputy	 army	 commander	 Brigadier	 Okaya,	 Obote’s	 man	 within	 the	 army,	 was	
assassinated	and	rumours	of	rising	tensions	between	Obote	and	Amin	began	to	spread.	
Some	academics	highlighted	the	possible	 link	between	the	attempt	on	Obote’s	 life	and	
the	 governmental	 audit	 into	 army’s	 spending,	 held	 shortly	 before	 the	 attempted	
assassination,	 which	 found	 gross	 mismanagement	 of	 army’s	 funds	 and	 an	 extensive	
budget	 overspend	 for	which	 army	 headquarters	would	 be	 held	 accountable.501	 It	was	
also	 suggested	 that	 some	of	 the	 army	elites,	who	had	become	 rich	 following	 the	1964	
mutiny,	might	have	resented	the	‘move	to	the	left’	Obote	had	announced.	 	Even	though	
this	 might	 not	 have	 necessarily	 been	 directly	 linked	 to	 the	 assassination	 attempt,	 it	
certainly	contributed	to	the	decline	of	Obote’s	popularity	among	these	army	elites.502			
Two	 more	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 army	 before	 the	 coup	 are	 highly	
relevant	to	this	discussion.	Most	importantly	the	army	was	becoming	increasingly	split	
internally	between	two	ethnic	factions	–	the	members	of	Acholi	and	Lango	tribes	loyal	to	
Obote	and	the	Nubi	people	loyal	to	Idi	Amin.	Most	state	institutions	were	dominated	by	
Acholi	 and	 Lango	 people	 and	 Amin	must	 have	 been	 aware	 of	 his	weakening	 position	
with	 the	 influx	of	new	army	members	 from	these	 tribes.503	 It	would	be	only	natural	 if	
Obote	 had	 decided	 to	 replace	 Amin	 by	 someone	 from	 his	 own	 tribe.	 Given	 Amin’s	
responsibility	 for	 the	 poor	management	 of	 army	 finances,	 such	 a	 step	 could	 be	 easily	
explained	without	his	being	criticised	for	preferential	treatment	along	ethnic	lines.	Some	
of	 the	 earliest	 analyses	 of	 the	 coup	 did	 indeed	 explain	 the	 course	 of	 action	 as	 being	
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Amin’s	 pre‐emptive	 reaction	 to	 the	 rumours	 of	 his	 being	 held	 accountable	 for	
misappropriation	of	army	funds.504		
Last	but	not	least,	the	growing	tension	between	the	GSU	and	the	army	should	be	
mentioned	as	a	likely	contributing	factor	for	the	coup.	‘The	largely	secretive	nature	of	the	
GSU	greatly	magnified	the	danger	 it	seemed	to	represent	to	the	army,	and	 in	the	general	
atmosphere	of	 the	uncertainty	which	pervaded	Uganda	politics	 it	became	 the	 subject	of	
extraordinary	 rumours	and	 speculation.	The	army’s	 fear	of	 the	GSU,	 like	any	 fear	of	 the	
unknown,	 was	 intensified	 by	 an	 inability	 to	 calculate	 the	 magnitude	 and	 potential	
significance	 of	 its	 budgetary	 rival.’505	 The	 available	 StB	 analysis	 also	 identified	 the	
conflict,	 between	 Obote	 and	 Adoko	 on	 the	 one	 side	 and	 Amin	 and	 his	 fellow	 army	
colleague	Oryema	on	the	other,	as	the	ultimate	cause	of	the	coup.506		It	is	noteworthy	that	
once	in	power	one	of	Amin’s	first	actions	was	the	dissolution	of	the	GSU.507		
Some	 academics508	 also	 tried	 to	 follow	 up	 the	 coup’s	 international	 links.	
However,	no	external	involvement	in	Amin’s	coup	was	ever	proven	despite	the	fact	that	
Western	 countries	 in	 particular	 had	 numerous	 reasons	 for	 welcoming	 the	 ousting	 of	
Obote.	 In	 this	 respect	 the	 above	mentioned	 StB	 analysis	which	 identified	 the	 political	
and	 economic	 interests	 of	Britain	 as	 a	 crucial	 contribution	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 coup,	
was,	in	all	probability,	wrong.509	
	
	
                                                            
504 First, ”Uganda,” p.132. 
505 Lofchie, ”The Uganda Coup,” 28. 
506 ABS 11701_000_2_2, Č.jA. A‐00 484/6‐71, 9.2.1971, 5, l. 51. 
507 First, ”Uganda,” 134. 
508 Lofchie, ”The Uganda Coup,” 34‐36.  
509 ABS 11701_000_2_2, Č.jA. A‐00 484/6‐71, 9.2.1971, 6, l. 52. 
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5. Czechoslovakia	and	Tanzania	between	1945	and	1968	
5.1. Introductory	and	methodology	section	
Tanzania	 represents	 the	 third	 and	 last	 case	 study	 amongst	 the	 East	 African	
countries	 that	 concern	 this	 thesis.	 In	 this	 section,	 the	 specifics	 of	 Czechoslovak‐
Tanzanian	 relations	 are	 presented	 as	 they	 evolved	 from	1960	 to	 approximately	 1970.	
The	period	analysed	is	for	obvious	reasons	the	same	as	in	the	previous	two	case	studies	
but	while	in	the	case	of	Kenya	and	Uganda	the	phase	virtually	corresponds	to	the	era	of	
most	 intense	 and	most	 frequent	 relations	with	 Czechoslovakia,	 this	 is	 not	 exactly	 the	
case	 for	 Tanzania.	 In	 many	 respects	 the	 1960s	 period	 in	 relations	 between	
Czechoslovakia	 and	 Tanzania	 can	 be	 better	 interpreted	 as	 the	 preliminary	 stage	 of	
mutual	cooperation.	For	various	reasons,	cooperation	between	the	two	partners	did	not	
fully	evolve	during	the	1960s	and	it	reached	its	climax	with	significant	delay	compared	
to	the	other	two	East	African	cases	between	1975	and	early	1980s.	Having	said	this,	 it	
should	be	pointed	out	 that	even	then	 this	climax	never	actually	came	near	 to	 fulfilling	
the	high	hopes	and	ambitions	of	politicians	from	both	states	in	the	early	1960s,	nor	the	
real	 economic	 and	 political	 potential.	 Why	 cooperation	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	
Tanzania	failed	to	fully	evolve	during	the	1960s	is	one	of	the	major	questions	addressed	
in	this	chapter.		
This	chapter’s	main	concern	is,	meanwhile,	related	to	other	questions,	similar	to	
the	previously	discussed	case	studies	of	Kenya	and	Uganda.	What	were	the	main	forms	
and	spheres	of	cooperation	that	evolved	between	Tanzania	and	Czechoslovakia	during	
the	1960s,	what	were	the	political	and	economic	aspirations	and	objectives	with	which	
politicians	 on	 both	 sides	 engaged	 in	 cooperation,	 to	 what	 extent	 did	 these	 objectives	
materialise	in	this	period,	and	if	they	failed,	why?	Answers	to	these	questions	are	then	
compared	 to	 the	 previously	 discussed	 case	 studies	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 any	 possible	
pattern	or	correlation.	Were	the	most	prominent	 forms	of	relations	the	same	as	 in	the	
case	 of	 Kenya	 and	Uganda?	Were	 they	 executed	 successfully?	What	were	 the	 decisive	
determinants	 for	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 in	 execution	 of	 these	 forms	 of	 cooperation?	
Answers	 to	 these	questions	 should	allow	 for	a	 satisfactory	 conclusion	 to	be	drawn	on	
the	basis	of	the	comparative	analysis.		
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The	 nature	 and	 the	 characteristics	 of	 CS‐Tanzanian	 relations	 bore	 many	
similarities	with,	but,	as	will	be	shown,	also	striking	differences	 to	Uganda	and	Kenya.	
Active	 cooperation	 during	 the	 Cold	War	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 Tanzania	 lasted	
longest	 of	 the	 three	 and	 it	was	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 spared	 any	 radical	 turbulence	 or	 the	
political	changes	that	would	motivate	a	period	of	intense	activity,	followed	by	a	period	of	
reduced	 contact,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 with	 Kenya	 and	 Uganda.	 The	 political	 stability	 and	
continuity	of	Nyerere’s	regime	from	1961	till	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	did,	indeed,	suffer	
some	 highs	 and	 lows,	 but	 none	 of	 them	were	 far‐reaching	 enough	 to	mean	 an	 end	 to	
relations	 between	 the	 CSSR	 and	 Tanzania.	 There	 were	 certainly	 some	 events	 that	
resulted	in	a	temporary	decrease	in	activity	by	one	partner	or	the	other,	but	never	for	a	
prolonged	 period	 or	 to	 a	 critical	 extent.	 Twists	 and	 turns	 of	 political	 or	 economic	
cooperation	 came	about,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 the	Zanzibar	 revolution	 and	
the	Tanganyikan	 army	mutiny	or	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	 Soviet	 invasion	of	 Czechoslovakia.	
The	 case	 study	 of	 Tanzanian‐Czechoslovak	 relations	 is	 presented	 in	 slightly	 different	
way	from	the	previous	two	as	more	room	is	devoted	to	the	context	of	the	internal	as	well	
the	 external	 political	 development	 of	 Tanzania.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 during	 the	
1960s	 it	 was	 mainly	 the	 Tanzanian	 determinants	 that	 decided	 whether	 or	 not	 the	
greater	 cooperation	 with	 Czechoslovakia	 would	 be	 sought.	 To	 understand	 these	
determinants	 properly,	 a	 more	 thorough	 inspection	 of	 them	 is	 needed.	 In	 effect,	
Czechoslovak	activities	 in	Tanzania	are	presented	within	the	narrative	of	major	events	
that	 marked	 internal	 political	 development	 as	 well	 as	 the	 formation	 of	 Tanzania’s	
foreign	policy.		
It	should	perhaps	also	be	mentioned	at	this	juncture	that	the	text	in	this	chapter	
is	organised	somewhat	differently	from	that	in	the	previous	two	case	studies.	While,	in	
the	 Kenya	 and	 Uganda	 case	 studies,	 the	 core	 of	 the	 text	 focusses	 on	 two	 of	 the	most	
important	 spheres	of	 relations	 typical	 of	 cooperation	between	 the	CSSR	and	Kenya	or	
Uganda,	 here	 no	 such	 preferential	 sphere	 of	 relations	 crystallised	 during	 the	 period	
under	analysis.	Therefore	the	findings	and	available	data	presented	in	this	chapter	more	
evenly	 address	 political	 and	 diplomatic	 relations,	 special	 cooperation,	 civil	 technical	
assistance	and	an	attempt	 to	develop	cultural	and	civil	organisation	relations	between	
the	two	countries.		
Tanzania’s	political	development	was	for	the	decades	to	a	great	extent	defined	
by	the	actions	and	ideas	of	Mwalimu	Julius	Nyerere,	his	political	project	of	TANU	and	the	
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building	of	African	socialism.	His	significance	for	Tanzania’s	political	development	was	
decisive,	 and	 this	 was	 also	 the	 case	 for	 Czechoslovak‐Tanzanian	 cooperation.	 In	
interviews,	Nyerere’s	close	collaborators	all	emphasised	the	decisive	role	 that	Nyerere	
played,	 not	 only	 in	 internal	 affairs	 but	 also	 in	 forming	 Tanzania’s	 foreign	 political	
orientation.		It	is	apparent	from	the	available	sources	that	Nyerere,	as	was	not	unusual	
among	 charismatic	 nationalist	 African	 leaders	 at	 this	 time,	 based	 his	 decisive	 foreign	
policy	on	very	personal	motivations	and	preferences,	which	were	thus	formative	for	the	
external	relations	of	the	whole	nation.		
Lastly,	an	important	topic	touched	upon	in	this	chapter	is	the	role	and	position	
of	Dar	es	Salaam	for	the	regional	national	liberation	movements.	It	would	certainly	not	
be	 unreasonable	 to	 say	 that	 Czechoslovak	 relations	 with	 the	 NLMs	 located	 in	 Dar	 es	
Salaam	were	as	important	as	those	with	the	Tanzanian	government,	and	the	importance	
of	the	diplomatic	office	in	Dar	also	has	to	be	considered	in	the	light	of	its	contacts	with	
these	NLMs.		
The	methodology	in	preparing	this	chapter	does	not	differ	significantly	from	the	
other	 case	 studies.	 The	most	 important	 sources	 of	 data	 were,	 once	 again,	 various	 CS	
archive	collections.	However,	due	 to	 the	specific	nature	of	 relations	between	 the	CSSR	
and	Tanzania,	and	due	to	the	fact	that	mutual	cooperation	peaked	slightly	later	than	the	
period	discussed	here,	the	data	collected	in	the	Czechoslovak	archives	from	this	period	
is	not	as	abundant	as	those	for	after	1970.	Nevertheless,	the	documents	still	represent	
an	 invaluable	 source	 of	 information	 especially	 concerning	 the	 underlying	 political	
motivations	and	objectives	of	Czechoslovak	officials	seeking	cooperation	with	Tanzania.	
And	 even	 more	 so,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 unravelling	 how	 President	 Nyerere’s	 status	 in	
Prague	 and	Moscow	 fluctuated	because	 of	 his	 foreign	policy.	 The	 archival	 records	 are	
also	 invaluable	when	 it	 comes	 to	assessing	Czechoslovak	 support	 to	various	NLMs	via	
the	office	in	Dar	es	Salaam.				
As	 in	 the	 previous	 cases,	 during	 the	 field	 data	 collection	 I	 travelled	 to	 the	
country	 in	 question	 in	 order	 to	 conduct	 interviews	 with	 persons	 who	 had	 directly	
participated	in	different	kinds	of	relations	between	the	CSSR	and	Tanzania.	The	number	
of	suitable	and	available	interviewees	proved	rather	limited,	but	three	of	my	Tanzanian	
interviews	were	with	perhaps	 the	best	qualified	persons	 that	 there	are	on	 this	 topic.	 I	
was	 able	 to	 speak	 to	 Dr	 Hassy	 Kitine,	 former	 Head	 of	 Intelligence	 and	 a	 Member	 of	
Tanzania’s	 Parliament,	 Sir	 George	Kahama,	 former	Tanzanian	Minister	 and	 one	 of	 the	
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closest	 political	 colleagues	 of	Mwalimu	 Nyerere,	 and	Mzee	 Joseph	 Butiku,	 head	 of	 the	
Nyerere	Foundation	and	Mwalimu’s	personal	 friend.	 	As	 the	 core	of	 relations	between	
Tanzania	 and	 CS	 lay	 in	 the	 political	 and	 ideological	 sphere,	 most	 of	 my	 questions	
targeted	 these	 topics.	 When	 writing	 on	 the	 Tanzanian	 political	 development	 after	
independence,	 one	 has	 to	 devote	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 personality	 of	 Julius	
Nyerere,	 the	 first	 President	 of	 Tanzania,	 who	 left	 the	 largest	 imprint	 on	 the	 modern	
history	 of	 Tanzania,	 and	 whose	 ideological	 preferences	 determined	 the	 political	
orientation	of	Tanzania	in	the	first	three	decades	after	independence.		
My	discussion	with	Sir	George	Kahama	was	an	invaluable	source	of	information	
regarding	 Mwalimu	 Nyerere’s	 political	 goals,	 motivations	 and	 opinions,	 all	 of	 which	
shaped	Tanzania’s	political	course.	Information	from	Sir	George	helped	to	explain	some	
of	the	decisions	determining	Tanzania’s	foreign	political	orientation,	part	of	which	was	
cooperation	with	the	CSSR.	Discussion	with	Mzee	Butiku	was	yet	another	vital	source	of	
information	 that	 complemented	 the	 images	 of	 Nyerere	 and	 TANU	 provided	 by	 the	
secondary	literature.	This	interview	helped	to	explain	how	some	of	the	crucial	political	
and	economic	issues	including	Nyerere’s	ever‐evolving	allegiance	to	socialist	countries,	
and	 his	 devotion	 to	 the	 project	 of	 ujamaa	 and	 the	 non‐aligned	 movement	 were	
perceived	and	dealt	with	by	the	TANU	political	leadership	and	Nyerere	himself.	Security	
and	internal	political	issues,	and	the	effects	that	cooperation	with	socialist	countries	had	
on	them,	were	the	main	issues	addressed	in	my	interview	with	Dr	Hassy	Kitine.		
In	 addition	 to	 these	 interviews	 collected	 in	 Tanzania,	 another	 interview	
conducted	 in	 Slovakia	 proved	 valuable.	 Mr	 Eduard	 Kukan,	 former	 Slovak	 Minister	 of	
Foreign	Affairs,	and	former	attaché	to	the	Czechoslovak	Lusaka	embassy	between	1966	
and	 1970	 provided	 me	 with	 information	 on	 the	 organisation	 and	 the	 activities	 of	
Czechoslovak	 diplomatic	 offices	 in	 this	 region	 during	 the	 late	 1960s	 period.	 This	
information	 was	 particularly	 useful	 for	 assessing	 the	 role	 and	 the	 significance	 of	 the	
Czechoslovak	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 embassy	 in	 its	 mission	 to	 support	 the	 southern	 African	
national	liberation	movements	of	Mozambique,	Zimbabwe,	South	Africa	and	others.		
The	secondary	literature	was	also	of	the	prime	importance	to	this	chapter,	as	it	
provided	me	with	the	necessary	background	information	on	the	political	development	in	
Tanzania	before	and	after	independence,	on	the	personality	of	President	Nyerere	and	on	
the	principles	as	well	as	the	execution	of	Tanzania’s	foreign	policy,	including	topics	such	
as	Nyerere’s	role	in	the	non‐aligned	movement	and	Tanzania’s	cooperation	with	China.	
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All	 of	 the	 crucial	 topics	 of	 Tanzanian	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 political	 development	
presented	in	this	chapter	could	only	be	understood	and	sketched	out	correctly	thanks	to	
the	abundant	secondary	literature	sources.	This	is	particularly	true	in	case	of	topics	such	
as	the	Zanzibar	revolution,	the	mutiny	of	Tanganyika’s	army,	the	ujamaa	project	or	the	
development	of	Tanzanian	foreign	policy.		
	
5.2. TANU	and	Nyerere	before	independence	
Tanganyika	 and	 later	 Tanzania	 from	 the	 early	 1960s	 became	 another	 East	
African	country	closely	eyed	by	Czechoslovak	foreign	policy	drafters	in	their	outline	of	
political	 objectives	 within	 the	 Africa	 policy	 formulated	 in	 1961.	 In	 the	 early	 1960s	
Tanganyika	bore	some	similarities	to	Uganda	and	Kenya,	but	due	to	its	different	political	
and	 economic	 development	 since	 World	 War	 I,	 some	 characteristics	 made	 its	
cooperation	 with	 Czechoslovakia	 in	 many	 ways	 unique.	 Tanganyika’s	 political	
development	 after	 World	 War	 II	 was	 very	 much	 shaped	 and	 driven	 by	 the	 political	
activities	 of	 its	main	nationalist	 party,	 the	Tanganyika	African	National	Union	 (TANU)	
and	by	its	leader,	Julius	Nyerere.		
Tanganyika,	once	one	of	three	German	African	colonies,	had	been	ruled	by	the	
British	as	a	mandated	territory	of	the	League	of	Nations	since	the	end	of	World	War	I.	
After	World	War	II,	the	original	international	mandate	of	the	League	was	replaced	by	the	
newly	 introduced	 Trust	 of	 the	 United	 Nations.	 The	 fact	 that	 British	 control	 over	 the	
territory	was	not	 as	 exclusive	 and	 strong	as	 in	 the	 case	of	 other	East	African	colonies	
allowed	Tanganyika	to	enjoy,	between	the	wars	only	very	mild	economic	development,	
which	stepped	up	only	with	the	beginning	of	the	Second	World	War	and	intensified	after	
1945.	 This	 economic	 setting	 had	 a	 two‐stage	 effect	 –	 initially	 it	 held	 back	 societal	
processes,	such	as	the	growth	of	labour	force,	higher	village‐to	town‐mobility	and	trade	
unionism	 that	 some	 other	 African	 territories	were	 going	 through	 at	 the	 time,	 only	 to	
experience	 sudden	 and	 very	 steep	 growth	 of	 all	 these	 processes	 once	 the	 economy’s	
growth	boosted	after	1945.510				
                                                            
510 Friedland, William H., “Co‐operation, Conflict, and Conscription: TANU‐TFL Relations, 1955‐1964,“ In Boston 
University Papers on Africa, ed. Jeffrey Butler and A.A. Castagno (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 
1967): 67.  
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As	elsewhere	in	the	British	African	colonial	empire,	the	acceleration	in	economic	
growth	after	 the	Second	World	War	was	accompanied	by	growing	political	activism	of	
the	local	African	population.	In	the	case	of	Tanganyika	this	activism	was	at	first	mainly	
linked	to	trade	unionism	of	 the	growing	 labour	 force.	Trade	unionism	in	many	African	
colonies	 represented	 the	 first	 vital	 and	 often	 for	 a	 long	 time	 the	 only	 opportunity	 for	
future	nationalist	leaders	to	learn	the	political	activism	that	later	naturally	evolved	into	
more	 sophisticated	 forms	of	political	organisation.	Trade	unionism	 in	Tanganyika	was	
originally	 introduced	 and	 managed	 by	 the	 British	 administration	 who	 faced	 several	
strikes	after	WWII.	In	the	first	years	after	they	were	founded	in	1947	the	unions	helped	
in	 several	 cases	 to	 mediate	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 African	 workers	 to	 their	 companies’	
leaders,	 but	 these	 first	 unions	 also	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 structurally	 weak.	 Trade	 unions	
established	themselves	as	more	stable	and	more	powerful	organisations	around	1954‐
55	after	the	first	modern	nationalist	party	TANU	was	formed.	 In	this	period	numerous	
small	Tanganyikan	unions	enjoyed	boosted	membership	but	the	whole	movement	was	
still	 rather	 fragmented	 and	 lacked	 united	 leadership.	 This	 changed	 in	 1956	when	 the	
united	 and	 centralised	 Tanganyika	 Federation	 of	 Labour	 (TFL)	 was	 formed.	 The	 first	
large	 test	of	 its	power	and	determination	was	 the	Dar	es	Salaam	general	 strike	 in	 late	
1956,	the	result	of	which	was	the	establishment	of	a	minimum	wage	in	Dar	es	Salaam.	
Hereafter,	the	unions	enjoyed	growing	popularity	and	political	power.511		
From	1954	onwards,	in	parallel	to	trade	unionism,	Tanganyika	saw	the	ascent	of	
an	organised	nationalist	movement	 led	by	TANU.	TANU	was,	 from	the	very	beginning,	
the	 political	 project	 of	 its	 founding	 father	Mwalimu	 Julius	 Nyerere,	 who	 used	 it	 as	 a	
vehicle	 to	 reach	 political	 goals,	 some	 of	 which	 might	 better	 be	 regarded	 as	 political	
utopias.	Nyerere	very	quickly	established	himself	not	only	as	a	leading	African	politician	
of	Tanganyika	but	also	as	one	of	the	most	charismatic	and	inspiring	anti‐colonial	leaders	
of	 the	 Third	 World.	 Some	 of	 Nyerere’s	 political	 concepts,	 such	 as	 devotion	 to	 pan‐
Africanism	or	 to	non‐alignment,	 earned	him	wide‐spread	popularity	 across	Africa	 and	
Asia	 and	 some	 of	 his	 political	 achievements	 represent	 true	 success	 for	 his	 unique	
political	 project.	 Unfortunately	 for	 Tanzania,	 most	 of	 his	 economic	 concepts,	 in	 later	
stages,	proved	grossly	inadequate	or	downright	harmful	for	Tanzanian	citizens.		
Very	soon	after	TANU	was	established,	it	attracted	a	massive	influx	of	members.	
In	 the	 first	 two	years	TANU	claimed	 to	have	over	100	000	members	and	continued	 to	
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grow	substantially	until	the	end	of	the	decade.512	TANU	became	one	of	Africa’s	first	mass	
parties	 and	 as	 such	 could	 benefit	 from	 a	 strong	 position	 while	 negotiating	 with	 the	
British	for	independence.	 	Britain	hoped	to	limit	the	TANU’s	growing	power	before	the	
first	national	elections	of	1958	but	TANU	emerged	from	this	poll	victorious	despite	the	
strange	ethnic	tripartite	voting	system	applied	by	the	colonial	administration.	After	the	
victory	TANU	became	the	main	political	partner	for	British	governor	Richard	Turnbull	in	
arranging	 the	 Tanganyika’s	 move	 to	 independence.	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade	
several	more	political	parties	 emerged	 in	Tanganyika,	 including	 the	British‐sponsored	
United	Tanganyika	Party	(UTP)	founded	in	1956,	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	in	
1958	 and	 the	 All‐Muslim	National	 Union	 of	 Tanganyika	 (AMNUT)	 in	 1959	 formed	 by	
former	members	of	TANU.	None	of	these	parties	had	any	particular	success	in	 limiting	
TANU’s	dominant	position	in	the	country	around	1960.		
The	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 TANU’s	 political	 programme	 was	 to	 lead	
Tanganyika	 towards	 full	 independence.	 However,	 Nyerere’s	 political	 ambition	 went	
beyond	this	single	objective.	Quite	early	in	his	political	career	Mwalimu	began	to	stress	
the	principles	of	pan‐Africanism,	regional	cooperation	and	later	also	the	foreign	policy	of	
non‐alignment.	He	was	 also	 fully	 devoted	 to	 his,	 ultimately	 very	 successful,	 project	 of	
building	 Tanganyikan,	 later	 Tanzanian,	 nationhood.	 Nyerere	 and	 TANU	 vehemently	
supported	universal	 compulsory	primary	education	and	 the	promotion	of	Kiswahili	 in	
schools	 from	the	very	beginning.	For	Tanganyika’s	population	 the	spread	of	Kiswahili,	
which	quickly	established	 itself	as	 the	 lingua	 franca,	 represented	a	vital	unifying	basis	
for	 the	 new	 sense	 of	 nationhood	 that	 Nyerere	 hoped	 to	 foster.	 It	 helped	 to	 unify	 an	
otherwise	incredibly	ethnically	fragmented	population	that	had	been	made	a	single	one	
state	 entity	 imposed	 thanks	 to	 rivalry	between	European	 colonial	 empires.	Before	 the	
wide	 spread	 of	 Kiswahili	 ‘Tanganyika	 did	 not	 share	 a	 common	 language,	 culture	 or	
religion	on	which	to	base	the	creation	of	a	shared	national	 identity.	What	they	did	share	
was	 subjugation	 to	 foreign	 rule	 and	 a	 common	 enemy.’513	 Nyerere	 and	 TANU	 proved	
more	than	able	to	capitalise	on	this	fact	and	in	a	very	short	time	the	project	of	building	
national	 identity	 proved	 strikingly	 successful.	 The	 success	 of	 Tanganyikan/Tanzanian	
nationhood‐building	 stood	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 to	Kenya	where	 the	division	along	ethnic	
lines	 remained	 a	 source	 of	 political	 frustration	 for	 decades	 to	 come,	 and	 in	 contrast	
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partially	 also	 to	 Uganda	 where	 the	 ethnic	 rivalries	 within	 the	 country’s	 military	
contributed	to	the	demise	of	the	state.	Nyerere’s	accomplishment	also	stood	out	globally,	
as	only	 ‘a	 few	political	 leaders	of	 low‐income	 societies	have	 succeeded	 in	countering	 the	
problems	posed	by	ethnic	diversity	by	superimposing	a	constructed	national	identity.’514			
	
While	most	of	these	core	political	principles	of	Nyerere’s	gained	him	popularity	
at	home	and	abroad,	they	were	at	the	same	time	the	source	of	some	opposition	at	home	
or	certainly	within	his	own	party.	It	was	for	example	the	vision	of	the	political	project	of	
an	 East‐African	 Federation,	 to	 which	 Nyerere	 was	 personally	 devoted	 from	 the	 very	
beginning	of	his	political	 career515,	 that	 caused	 the	 first	major	 rift	between	 the	 	TANU	
and	 the	TFL516	which	 then	worsened	and	 later	 caused	much	political	 tension	between	
1961	 and	 1964.	 Nyerere’s	 eagerness	 to	 pursue	 regional	 cooperation	 threatened	 to	
postpone	Tanganyikan	independence.	For	this	reason	Nyerere	faced	much	criticism	and	
his	 position	 was	 further	 harmed	 by	 his	 being	 in	 close	 contact	 around	 1960	 with	 the	
British	colonial	administration	negotiating	the	country’s	future,	which	compromised	his	
reputation	among	the	most	radical	segments	of	the	population.		
Between	1955	 and	1960	both	 leading	political	 organisations	 (TANU	and	TFL)	
co‐existed	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 also	 cooperated	 towards	 a	 shared	 vision	 of	 an	
independent	Tanganyika.	TANU	 sympathised	with	TFL	 strike	 activities	 and	on	 several	
occasions	used	its	connections	to	support	the	TFL	against	possible	opposition.	At	 later	
stages,	however,	 internal	disputes	within	the	TFL	endangered	cooperation	with	TANU,	
and	 the	 growing	 anti‐British	 radicalism	 of	 some	 union	 leaders	 also	 collided	 with	
Nyerere’s	 political	 leadership	 of	 TANU.517	 Cooperation	 between	TFL	 and	 TANU	 in	 the	
initial	period	was	natural	as	they	both	shared	the	common	enemy	–	the	British	colonial	
administration.	However,	TANU	progressively	switched	from	political	opposition	to	the	
establishment	 role	 replacing	 the	 British,	 and	 the	 clash	 with	 the	 TFL	 thus	 became	
inevitable,	as	it	was	now	TANU’s	administration	facing	all	TFL	demands.518		
In	 1960	 TANU	 as	 the	 election	 winner	 formed	 the	 first	 African	 Tanganyikan	
government.	One	of	the	members	of	the	cabinet	was	Rashidi	Kawawa,	former	leader	of	
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the	TFL	and	 subsequently	one	of	Mwalimu’s	most	 loyal	 collaborators.	Another	 leading	
TANU	personality	 in	this	 formative	period	of	 independence	was	Oscar	Kambona,	often	
regarded	as	the	leader	of	the	socialist	wing	within	TANU.	It	was	Kambona	who	opened	
the	 lines	 of	 communication	 between	 TANU	 and	 socialist	 countries	 and	 he	 was	
particularly	active	in	establishing	relations	with	Czechoslovakia.	Czechoslovak	officials,	
especially	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 mutual	 cooperation,	 were	 very	 fond	 of	 Kambona,	
especially	as	Nyerere	was	hesitating	to	declare	for	the	socialist	cause.519		
From	the	outset	 the	TANU	cabinet	 faced	pressure	 from	union	 leaders	 to	grant	
their	 members	 various	 benefits.	 Cabinet	 however	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 Tanganyika’s	
significant	structural	weaknesses	linked	mainly	to	the	lack	of	trained	bureaucratic	staff	
and	educated	personnel	to	replace	British	civil	servants	and	technical	experts	in	various	
spheres	–	the	economy,	trade,	education,	the	military	etc.	One	of	the	TFL	priorities	was	
the	 rapid	Africanisation	 of	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 economy	and	 state	 institutions,	 but	 it	 hit	
these	limits,	and	contributed	to	the	TFL‐TANU	dispute	520.	The	TFL	did	not	subsequently	
restrain	 itself	 from	openly	 criticising	 the	 government,	which	 ultimately	 led	 to	 conflict	
between	the	former	collaborators.			
	
5.3. Establishing	first	contacts	with	socialist	Czechoslovakia	
Almost	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 relations	 between	 Tanganyika,	 and	 later	
Tanzania,	 with	 the	 CSSR	 were	 between	 two	 sovereign	 states	 as	 no	 substantial	
cooperation	 had	 had	 time	 and	 space	 to	 evolve	 before	 Tanganyika	 received	
independence.	By	1960	Tanganyika	of	all	three	East	African	states	was	the	most	firmly	
set	on	the	path	to	independence	as	Britain	failed	to	introduce	any	effective	institutional	
obstacles	to	slow	this	process	down	or	to	create	a	strong	political	alternative	to	TANU	
and	Nyerere.	Its	wide	popular	support	gave	TANU	such	a	strong	political	position	that,	in	
comparison	 to	 KANU	 and	 partially	 also	 to	 the	 UPC,	 it	 was	 not	 in	 desperate	 need	 of	
external	 support,	 either	 political	 or	 technical	 or	 financial,	 to	 reach	 independence.	
Therefore	in	this	pre‐independence	stage	relations	between	the	CSSR	and	TANU	lacked	
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the	motivation	 that	 propelled	 cooperation	with	 the	 national	 liberation	movements	 of	
Kenya	or	Uganda.	
	The	 initial	 contact	 between	 TANU	 officials	 and	 Czechoslovak	 representatives	
did	indeed	take	place	several	months	before	independence	in	1961,	by	which	time	TANU	
was	 in	 the	 position	 of	 effectively	 ruling	 Tanganyika.	 Therefore	 the	 entry	 point	 for	
developing	working	relations	between	the	CSSR	and	Nyerere	was	notably	different	from	
that	 of	 	 previous	 case	 studies,	 when	 Czechoslovakia	 could	 benefit	 at	 later	 stages	
politically,	 even	 though	 in	 Kenya’s	 case	 for	 only	 a	 limited	 time,	 from	 its	 support	 to	
successful	NLM	missions	prior	 to	 independence.	This	 fact	might	 seem	marginal,	 but	 it	
turns	 out	 to	 be	 significant	 when	 evaluating	 nature	 and	 causality	 of	 political	 relations	
between	Nyerere’s	government	and	Czechoslovakia	in	the	later	period	of	the	1960s.		
When	 TANU	 approached	 the	 CS	 government,	 it	was	 for	 different	 reasons	 and	
from	 a	 very	 different	 position	 from	 those	 of	 KANU	 and	 the	 UPC.	 In	 July	 1961	 Oscar	
Kambona,	General	Secretary	of	TANU,	visited	the	CSSR	during	his	planned	foreign	trip	to	
socialist	countries.521	Unlike	 in	the	cases	of	UPC	and	KANU	already	mentioned,	TANU’s	
delegation	 did	 not	 request	 any	 particular	 assistance	 before	 independence	 as	 its	
negotiations	 with	 the	 British	 were	 already	 quite	 advanced,	 and	 the	 declaration	 of	
independence	planned	for	later	in	1961	was	doubted	by	nobody.522	The	concern	of	TANU	
was	 rather	 to	 seek	 the	 prospect	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 cooperation	 for	 after	
independence,	to	be	further	discussed	by	another	delegation	in	the	autumn	of	1961.		
Kambona’s	 trip	 to	 socialist	 countries	 and	particularly	 to	Czechoslovakia	had	a	
dual	objective.	Firstly,	 it	was	an	 important	 initial	phase	of	Tanganyika’s	 foreign	policy	
intended	by	TANU	and	especially	by	Nyerere	himself	to	be	based	on	balanced	relations	
with	all	countries.	Secondly,	a	proclaimed	desire	to	cooperate	with	Czechoslovakia	after	
independence	was	 part	 of	 Nyerere’s	 strategy	 before	 further	 negotiations	with	 Britain	
took	place.	Exerting	pressure	on	Britain	by	ostentatiously	advertising	the	possibility	of	
cooperation	 with	 socialist‐camp	 countries	 was	 effectively	 the	 same	 as	 the	 strategy	
employed	 by	 Kenyatta	 and	 Odinga	 who	 demonstratively	 held	 parallel	 meetings	 with	
Czechoslovak	officials	during	the	Lancaster	House	talks	in	1962.	Kambona	disclosed	this	
plan	to	CS	officials	during	their	talks.	‘Kambona	indicated	that	should	this	trip	take	place	
before	 the	 Tanganyikan	 declaration	 of	 independence,	 the	 British	 government	would	 be	
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shocked	by	 this	 fact.	 [...]	On	 the	 side	of	Nyerere	and	 the	TANU	 leadership	 it	 is	a	planned	
move	which	is	to	be	used	in	order	to	attain	other	concessions	from	the	British	government	
during	 negotiations	 about	 economic	 help	 to	 Tanganyika.’523	 Czechoslovak	 officials	
approved	of	this	strategy	and	recommended	the	planned	visit	be	carried	out.		
The	 previous	 paragraph,	 and	 especially	 the	 recorded	 words	 of	 the	 TANU	
delegate,	clearly	indicate	the	significance	that	even	the	most	basic	political	contacts	with	
socialist	 countries,	 including	 the	 CSSR,	 might	 have	 had	 on	 the	 position	 of	 national	
liberation	movements	and	their	attitudes	towards	colonialists	even	at	this	late	stage	of	
the	 decolonising	 processes.	 Nyerere’s	 strategy	was	 in	 no	way	 unique,	 but	 Kambona’s	
openness	about	their	intentions	is	somewhat	unusual.		
It	 is	 very	 difficult,	 perhaps	 impossible,	 to	measure	 how	much	 the	 negotiating	
position	of	Tanganyika	 improved	by	applying	such	a	strategy	and	whether	any	British	
concessions	were	 a	 direct	 result.	 It	 is	 however	 perfectly	 clear	 that	 by	making	 himself	
open	 for	cooperation	Nyerere	made	Tanganyika	much	more	attractive	 for	 the	socialist	
countries,	 including	 Czechoslovakia.	 More	 importantly,	 Nyerere’s	 strategy	 was	
successful	 in	 another	 respect	 and	 that	was	 in	 ensuring	 substantial	 aid	 from	 the	West,	
mainly	 from	Britain	but	also	 from	the	USA	or	West	Germany.	The	 fact	 that	 the	quality	
and	 intensity	 of	 Tanzania’s	 relations	 with	 Czechoslovakia	 as	 well	 as	 other	 socialist	
countries	in	the	period	of	1961	to	1964	remained	very	low	indicates	that	the	purpose	of	
this	initiative	was	really	to	attract	more	western	support	rather	than	to	seek	full‐blown	
cooperation	 with	 the	 Soviet	 bloc.	 It	 took	 Czechoslovak	 policy‐makers	 some	 time	 to	
realise	this.		
	
5.4. Political	development	in	Tanganyika	between	1961	and	1964		
On	December	9	1961	Tanganyika	finally	received	independence	and	the	country	
proclaimed	itself	a	republic,	in	order	to	break	most	of	its	institutional	ties	to	the	United	
Kingdom.524	 Prior	 to	 independence	 Tanganyika	 had	 become	 restless	 and	 the	
population’s	 frustrations	 occasionally	 erupted	 on	 a	 limited	 scale.	 Local	 outbursts	 of	
violence	 were	 not	 unheard	 of,	 but	 more	 indicative	 of	 the	 internal	 tensions	 prior	 to	
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independence	were	strikes	and	other	labour	actions	organised	by	the	TFL.	Segments	of	
the	population	were	frustrated	about	the	dominant	position	of	the	Asian	community	in	
the	country’s	economy,	low	levels	of	participation	of	Africans	in	both	economy	and	the	
state,	 and	 the	 continuing	 presence	 of	 British	 nationals	 in	 state	 service.	 Radical	 trade	
union	 leaders,	as	with	the	African	National	Congress	party	and	even	some	members	of	
TANU,	were	 quite	 responsive	 to	 these	 popular	 complaints	 and	 did	 not	 always	 refrain	
from	stirring	up	feelings	of	unrest.525	This	caused	some	serious	worries	about	potential	
violence	against	 foreigners	and	ethnic	minorities	after	 independence.	Nyerere	used	all	
his	political	authority	and	wide‐spread	popularity	 to	prevent	such	a	development;	 this	
proved	successful.		
Any	imminent	risk	of	violence	was	prevented	by	Nyerere’s	activism	and	by	the	
swift	 arrival	 of	 independence,	 but	 it	 was	 this	 sudden,	 abrupt	 and	 even	 surprising	
granting	of	Uhuru	that	was	at	the	same	time	a	source	of	many	governmental	issues	in	the	
first	 years	 of	 independence	 for	 Tanganyika.	 ‘The	 relative	 ease	and	 rapidity	with	which	
Tanganyika	 obtained	 independence	 meant	 that	 the	 party	 leading	 the	 independence	
struggle	 never	 developed	 the	 cohesiveness	 and	 organizational	 discipline	 that	 a	 more	
violent,	 revolutionary	 path	 to	 independence	 might	 have	 created.	 The	 absence	 of	 rigid	
mechanisms	of	internal	party	discipline	meant	that	divisions	within	the	ranks	of	the	party	
that	 took	 over	 the	 government	 in	 late	 1961	 were	 a	 persistent	 feature	 of	 early	 post‐
independence	politics.’526	
Nyerere	was	 aware	 of	 a	 structural	weakness	 in	 TANU	 that	 existed	 despite	 its	
receiving	a	dominant	mandate	by	popular	vote	and	he	decided	to	take	several	measures	
to	strengthen	the	party’s	position.	Worsening	rivalry	with	the	TFL,	as	mentioned	above,	
and	some	internal	opposition	within	the	party	motivated	Nyerere’s	decision	temporarily	
to	resign	as	Prime	Minister	in	1962	in	order	to	restructure	the	organisational	system	of	
TANU	and	 to	prepare	 the	change	 in	Tanganyika’s	political	 system.	TANU’s	reform	was	
successfully	accomplished	by	actively	working	and	communicating	with	 the	grass	root	
branches	 around	 the	 country.	 Nyerere’s	 work	 in	 reforming	 TANU	 and	 establishing	 a	
working	hierarchical	organisation	of	the	party	proved	immensely	important	in	January	
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1964	when	the	army	mutinied	and	a	plot	against	the	government	was	mounted.	At	this	
critical	moment	TANU	remained	unanimously	loyal	to	Nyerere.527		
Radicals	from	the	ANC	and	from	TANU	clashed	with	Nyerere	particularly	on	the	
topic	 of	 rapid	 Africanisation,	 which	 to	 them	 meant	 preferential	 treatment	 for	 black	
Africans	while	holding	back	white	and	Asian	Tanganyikans.	Nyerere	did	not	share	this	
view,	 preferring	 the	 concept	 of	 localisation	 which	 favoured	 all	 Tanganyika’s	 citizens	
regardless	 of	 skin	 colour.	 Nyerere	 eventually	 had	 to	 make	 some	 concessions	 to	 the	
radicals,	when,	at	his	1962	resignation,	he	allowed	Rashidi	Kawawa,	loyal	interim	Prime	
Minister,	 to	 speed	 up	 the	 process	 of	 Africanisation	 of	 high‐ranking	 state	 service	
positions.528	Nevertheless	 in	 the	 long	 term	Nyerere	was	 successful	 in	maintaining	 the	
characteristics	and	the	image	of	Tanganyika	as	a	non‐racial	egalitarian	state,	which	went	
down	 well	 with	 Western	 states,	 including	 the	 USA,	 which	 subsequently	 became	
generous	 donors	 for	 Tanganyika.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 socialist	 countries	 would	 have	
welcomed	more	radical	and	speedier	Africanisation,	because	it	would	have	made	more	
opportunities	and	created	more	demand	for	their	technical	support	and	at	the	same	time	
would	have	had	an	adverse	effect	on	the	position	of	Western	states	in	Tanganyika.			
In	 the	 first	 years	 after	 independence	 both	 the	 ANC	 and	 the	 TFL	 began	
increasingly	 to	 define	 themselves	 most	 of	 all	 as	 anti‐Nyerere	 in	 all	 respects.	 It	 was	
therefore	only	 logical	 that	ANC	 leaders	should	decide	 to	seek	 international	support	by	
establishing	contacts	with	socialist‐camp	countries,	particularly	with	China,529	 in	order	
to	strengthen	their	political	position	at	home.	The	ANC	however	did	not	have	either	the	
time	or	the	means	to	develop	substantial	cooperation	with	China	and	a	few	years	later	it	
was	indeed	Nyerere	who	took	over	ANC	activism	in	relations	with	the	socialist	camp	and	
particularly	 to	 China.	 Overall,	 in	 the	 period	 right	 after	 independence,	 Nyerere’s	
readiness	 to	 cooperate	with	 the	British	and	his	universally	 inclusive	domestic	policies	
won	 him	 the	 reputation	 of	 a	 neo‐colonialist,	 pro‐Western	 puppet	 among	 his	 political	
rivals	at	home	and	this	also	prompted	serious	doubts	as	to	his	suitability	as	a	political	
partner	among	socialist	countries	including	Czechoslovakia.			
Nyerere	used	his	temporary	retreat	from	the	PM’s	office	not	only	to	reconstruct	
TANU	but	to	prepare	the	policies	which	were	to	consolidate	his	grip	on	political	power	
in	 the	 country.	 At	 Nyerere’s	 request	 Tanganyika’s	 legislative	 approved	 far‐reaching	
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changes	 to	 the	 country’s	 political	 system	 by	 introducing	 the	 presidential	 system.530	
Nyerere	 naturally	 acquired	 the	 post	 of	 Tanganyika’s	 first	 	 President.	 Several	 laws	
intended	 to	 limit	 the	 rights	 and	 powers	 of	 the	 TFL	 were	 introduced	 as	 a	 further	
consolidation	measure	 for	Nyerere’s	 administration.531	 This	move	 obviously	met	with	
much	 resentment	 by	 the	 trade	 unionists	 who	 intensified	 their	 criticism	 of	 the	
government	during	the	army	mutiny.	For	their	part	in	plotting	against	the	government	
during	 the	mutiny	 several	 union	 leaders	were	 arrested	 and	 the	TFL	was	dissolved.	 In	
order	to	eradicate	all	opposition	from	the	trade	unions,	 the	government	formed	a	new	
body	 designed	 to	 represent	 workers	 –	 the	 National	 Union	 of	 Tanganyika	 Workers	
(NUTA).	 The	 government	 had	much	 better	 control	 of	 this	 organisation,	 appointing	 its	
leadership;	 this	move	proved	effective	 in	 limiting	 the	political	 ambitions	of	 the	 labour	
movement.532		
	
5.5. Tanzania’s	foreign	policy		after	independence		
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1960s	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 saw	 Tanganyika	 as	 the	
most	 promising	 destination533	 for	 the	 export	 of	 socialism	 to	 East	 Africa.	 Such	 an	
optimistic	view	of	Tanganyika	was	most	likely	derived	from	initially	promising	contacts	
with	 Oscar	 Kambona.	 The	 CSSR	 at	 this	 point	 felt	 Nyerere	 was	 an	 important	 political	
partner	 and	 this	 attitude	was	 soon	 reflected	 in	 practical	 diplomatic	 steps,	 the	 first	 of	
which	 was	 the	 Czechoslovak	 delegation	 visit	 at	 the	 declaration	 of	 independence	 in	
December	1961.	 This	 opportunity	was	used	 to	 officially	 establish	 diplomatic	 relations	
between	 the	 two	 countries.	More	practical	 political	 and	 diplomatic	 steps	 followed	 the	
next	 year,	 such	 as	 the	 first	 inter‐governmental	 talks	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 CS	
embassy	in	Dar.		
Archival	 documents	 illustrate	 how	 high	 and	 how	 quickly	 Czechoslovak	 hopes	
rose	 in	regard	 to	Nyerere’s	willingness	 to	cooperate,	as	declared	 in	1961.	However,	 in	
the	 period	 after	 independence	 CS	 officials’	 high	 expectations	 quickly	 clashed	 with	
political	 reality.	 Nyerere’s	 foreign	 policy	 was	 not	 leaning	 at	 all	 towards	 the	 socialist	
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camp	 and	 the	 British	 position	 had	 remained	 reasonably	 strong	 even	 after	 the	 1961	
independence.	 This	 is	 why	 MFA	 analysts	 paid	 great	 attention	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 anti‐
Nyerere	radicalism	inside	and	outside	of	TANU.	In	this	period	it	was	Oscar	Kambona,	not	
Julius	Nyerere,	who	was	considered	the	vital	figure	within	TANU	for	developing	higher	
intensity	cooperation	with	the	CSSR.	Nevertheless,	Mwalimu	Nyerere’s	foreign	political	
priorities	did	not	 lie	 in	relations	with	socialist	countries,	but	rather	 in	 the	non‐aligned	
movement,	pan‐Africanism,	and	in	maintaining	close	collaboration	with	Britain.		
It	is	important	to	understand	that	Nyerere’s	later	tendencies	towards	socialism	
and	the	socialist	camp	were	nowhere	as	clear	and	as	definite	in	the	time	of	Tanganyika’s	
independence.	At	independence	Nyerere	had	no	ideological	aspirations	to	introduce	any	
kind	of	Marxist	or	even	socialist	policies	to	Tanganyika.534	In	reality	he	faced	some	of	the	
strongest	 intraparty	 opposition	 by	members	 calling	 for	 socialist	 policies,535	 (including	
Mwalimu’s	 own	 brother	 Joseph)	 and	 who	 were	 therefore	 labelled	 as	 Communist.	 In	
1962,	while	consolidating	his	power	within	TANU,	Nyerere	expelled	a	number	of	 such	
members	 from	 the	party.536	This	move	 illustrates	Nyerere’s	 political	 preferences	 soon	
after	 independence	 and	 this	must	 be	 acknowledged	when	 attempting	 to	 explain	 why	
Nyerere’s	 political	 leaning	 towards	 socialist	 countries	was	 initially	much	 slower	 than	
Czechoslovak	 policy‐makers	 had	 hoped	 and	 expected.	 It	 was	 very	 much	 Nyerere’s	
personal	reluctance	to	commit	to	close	cooperation	with	socialist	countries	that	stood	in	
the	 way	 of	 faster	 and	 more	 intensive	 cooperation	 between	 Tanganyika	 and	
Czechoslovakia	in	the	first	years	after	independence.			
Nyerere	 was	 initially	 open	 to	 cooperation	 with	 socialist	 countries	 only	 to	 a	
limited	 extent,	 because	 it	 was	 very	 important	 for	 Tanganyika	 after	 independence	 to	
retain	 the	 vital	 channels	 of	 cooperation	 with	 the	 British.	 The	 future	 arrangement	 of	
relations	with	the	former	colonial	power	became	the	source	of	an	ideological	rift	within	
TANU	when	 the	more	 radical	 youth	movement	members	demanded	Tanganyika	 leave	
the	Commonwealth.	Nyerere,	however,	advocated	retaining	membership,	though	under	
very	specific	conditions,	and	he	used	all	his	political	sway	to	repel	domestic	opposition	
inside	and	outside	of	 the	party.537	Radical	 rupture	of	all	 links	with	Britain	would	have	
been	disastrous	for	Tanganyika’s	economy,	as	Nyerere	was	aware.	
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In	the	first	post‐independence	years	maintaining	relations	with	Britain	and	the	
West	was	 not	 only	 an	 economic	 necessity	 and	 a	 politically	 sound	decision,	 but	 it	was	
realistically	 the	 only	 feasible	 option	 to	 ensure	 Tanganyika’s	 immediate	 survival	 and	
possible	development.	Had	existing	ties	with	Britain	and	other	Western	countries	been	
torn,	 the	 country’s	 economy	 as	well	 as	 the	 state	 apparatus	 would	 have	 collapsed.	 ‘In	
1961	approximately	80%	of	her	 total	 trade	was	with	 the	 sterling	area,	 the	EEC	and	 the	
United	States,	85%	of	her	development	revenue	came	 from	British	 loans	and	grants	and	
only	one‐quarter	of	the	senior	and	middle‐grade	posts	in	the	civil	service	were	held	by	the	
country’s	own	citizens.’538	The	imperative	of	economic	development	put	the	government	
in	 dire	 need	of	 donors	 and	 in	 this	 period	most	would	 be	Western	 countries,	 first	 and	
foremost	 the	United	Kingdom	itself.	Between	1961	and	1964,	 therefore,	 relations	with	
the	West	and	particularly	with	Britain,	though	criticised	by	some,	remained	intact.		
	
	
5.5.1. Nyerere	and	pan‐Africanism		
From	the	outset	Nyerere	was	one	of	the	leading	pan‐Africanists	and	he	saw	the	
movement	 as	 a	 viable	 and	 highly	 desirable	 route	 for	 the	 continent’s	 political	
development.	However,	he	soon	became	disillusioned	by	the	slow	progress	that	African	
leaders	were	achieving	here	and	he	became	increasingly	doubtful	as	to	their	sincerity.	At	
the	 1964	 summit	 of	 the	 OAU	 (Organisation	 of	 African	 Unity)	 in	 Cairo	 he	 was,	 for	
example,	very	critical	of	Nkrumah’s	Ghana,	stating,	 ‘We	[African	statesmen]	are	divided	
between	 those	who	 genuinely	want	 continental	 government	 and	 patiently	work	 for	 its	
development,	 and	 those	 who	 use	 the	 phrase	 ‘Union	 government’	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
propaganda.	[…]Some	people	are	willing	to	use	their	great	talent	to	wreck	any	chance	of	
unity	on	our	continent,	as	long	as	some	stupid	historian	can	record	that	they	wanted	unity	
when	nobody	else	did.’				
The	 vision	 of	 establishing	 effective	 continental	 government	 was	 only	 one	
dimension	 of	 the	 pan‐African	 movement	 in	 the	 1960s.	 Another,	 perhaps	 even	 more	
significant	 for	 its	 immediate	political	 impact,	was	 the	on‐going	mission	 to	 support	 the	
remaining	national	liberation	movements	of	those	African	nations	who	were	latecomers	
to	 the	decolonising	struggle.	Virtually	all	 influential	nationalist	African	 leaders	such	as	
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Sékou	 Touré	 or	 Kwame	Nkrumah,	who	 achieved	 political	 sovereignty	 for	 their	 states,	
were	 devoted	 to	 this	 objective.	 Nyerere’s	 long	 period	 in	 power	 was	 an	 important	
prerequisite	 in	 this	 respect	 for	 the	 real	 positive	 impact,	 as	was	 the	 fact	 that	Tanzania	
was	very	close	to	the	region	where	most	of	these	NLMs	were	based.		
Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 Nyerere	 became	 perhaps	 the	 most	
outspoken	 advocate	 for	 freedom	 fighters	 of	 the	 whole	 southern	 African	 region.	
Nyerere’s	dedication	to	this	cause	was	reflected	in	the	very	substantial	help	provided	by	
Tanzania	 to	 African	 freedom	 fighters	 in	 late	 1960s	 and	 1970s.	 Both	 Nyerere	 and	
Kambona	were	 very	much	 behind	 the	OAU	motion	 to	 establish	 the	African	 Liberation	
Committee	that	was	to	operate	from	Dar	es	Salaam.539	In	this	period	Tanzania’s	capital,	
together	with	fellow	socialist	Kenneth	Kaunda’s	Lusaka,	became	a	foreign	headquarters	
for	 freedom	 fighters	 mainly	 from	 Mozambique,	 South	 Africa	 and	 Southern	 Rhodesia;	
Nyerere	 himself	 had	 close	 personal	 relations	 with	 most	 of	 the	 freedom	 fighters’	
leaders.540	 Nyerere’s	 government	 created	 favourable	 conditions	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam,	 as	
well	as	across	the	Tanzanian	countryside,	for	practical	cooperation	between	NLMs	and	
their	 international	 supporters,	 mainly	 from	 socialist	 countries,	 to	 take	 place,	 which	
became	another	source	of	concern	for	West.541		
	
	
5.5.2. Tanzania	and	the	non‐aligned	movement	
After	receiving	independence	Tanzania	very	much	identified	itself	with	the	bloc	
of	Afro‐Asian	 states	 as	well	 as	with	 the	wider	movement	 of	 non‐aligned	 states.	 In	my	
interviews,	 members	 of	 the	 former	 Tanzanian	 political	 leadership,	 fully	 in	 line	 with	
Nyerere,	all	voiced	pride	 in	 the	Tanzanian	role	within	 the	non‐aligned	movement,	and	
they	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 political	 partnership	 with	 leaders	 such	 as	 Tito,	
Indira	Gandhi,	Nehru,	Nasser	and	others.	Nyerere	was	devoted	to	the	project	of	a	non‐
aligned	movement,	especially	at	a	later	stage	so	as	not	to	keep	Tanzania	from	receiving	
economic	 and	 technical	 help	 from	 both	 rival	 blocks.	 Even	 though	 Tanzania	 was	
economically	weak,	it	became	one	of	the	most	influential	members	of	this	third	Cold	War	
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camp,	mainly	due	to	the	outspoken	zeal	of	President	Nyerere	in	working	for	its	common	
cause.	
	The	 non‐aligned	 movement	 was	 attractive	 for	 Tanzania	 for	 several	 reasons.	
Over	 the	 years,	 even	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 radical	 policies	 defined	 by	 the	
Arusha	 declaration,	 Nyerere	 repeatedly	 expressed	 his	 wish	 to	 maintain	 friendly	
relations	 with	 all	 countries	 and	 reserved	 right	 to	 choose	 to	 cooperate	 and	 receive	
assistance	 from	anybody;	 this	he	did	quite	 successfully.542	The	non‐aligned	movement	
was	 the	 ideal	 platform	 to	 seek	 such	 relations.	 Countries	 loosely	 united	 in	 this	 group	
cooperated	effectively	in	the	UN	and	other	international	organisations.	Through	political	
partnership	 and	 close	 cooperation	 their	 ideological	 and	 political	 stance	 carried	 a	
comparatively	 greater	 weight	 than	 if	 they	 had	 acted	 separately.	 This	 was	 apparent	
especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Tanzania	 increasing	 its	 international	 influence	 considerably	
through	membership	of	the	non‐aligned	movement.		
Secondly,	 its	 declared	 neutrality	 and	 active	 participation	 in	 the	 non‐aligned	
movement	made	Tanzania	immune	to	a	certain	extent	in	this	period	to	Cold	War	rivalry.	
Tanzanian	officials	I	 interviewed	unanimously	perceived	the	non‐aligned	movement	as	
crucial	protection	from	the	much	more	invasive	superpowers’	interference	in	Tanzanian	
politics.	 This	 became	 apparent	 especially	 at	 the	 time	 of	 increased	 tensions	 after	 the	
Zanzibar	uprising,	when	both	camps	very	closely	observed	the	course	of	revolutionary	
events,	and	the	active	intervention	of	a	foreign	power	was	not	being	 	completely	ruled	
out.543		
Thirdly,	 especially	 in	 the	 later	 period,	 relations	 with	 some	 of	 the	 partner	
countries	 from	 the	non‐aligned	movement	became	 the	 source	of	much	welcome	 trade	
activity	 that	 helped	 Tanzania‘s	 struggling	 economy.	 In	 this	 respect,	 perhaps	 the	most	
valued	 were	 the	 relations	 with	 Tito’s	 Yugoslavia,	 the	 source	 of	 substantial	 trade	
exchange	 but	 also	 a	 provider	 of	 development	 aid	 to	 Tanzania.544	 It	 was	 not	
a	coincidence,	rather	a	conscious	gesture	of	Tanganyika’s	position	in	the	bipolar	world,	
that	Nyerere	chose	to	travel	to	Yugoslavia	just	before	independence	for	one	of	his	first	
official	visits	as	the	Head	of	State.545	
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5.6. Czechoslovak	activities	in	Tanganyika	between	1961	and	1964	
Pan‐Africanism,	the	non‐aligned	movement,	and	close	collaboration	with	Britain	
were	 characteristic	 for	 Tanganyika’s	 foreign	 policy	 in	 this	 period.	 Meanwhile,	
Czechoslovak	 policy‐makers	 struggled	 with	 ineffective	 attempts	 to	 initiate	 a	 working	
relationship	with	Tanganyika	and	to	establish	an	influential	position	similar	to	the	ones	
they	 had	 in	 Uganda	 or	 Kenya.	 Absence	 of	 any	 history	 of	 effective	 cooperation	 before	
independence	was	making	 this	 task	more	difficult	 in	 comparison	 to	Kenya	or	Uganda.	
Also,	 given	 that	 establishing	 a	 working	 partnership	 with	 Tanganyika	 was	 a	 higher	
priority	 than	cooperation	with	Obote’s	Uganda	had	 initially	been,	and	that	many	more	
personnel	were	assigned	to	this	task,	it	is	surprising	how	little	was	accomplished	in	this	
period.	Tanganyika	was	not	completely	oblivious	to	Czechoslovak	attempts	and	contacts	
of	 high‐ranking	 cabinet	 officials	 were	 not	 uncommon,	 but	 with	 limited	 results.	 For	
various	 reasons	 these	 contacts	 failed	 to	 transform	 into	 intense	 and	 effective	
cooperation.		
One	 important	 factor	 preventing	 more	 effective	 cooperation	 was	
Czechoslovakia’s	position	as	prime	Soviet	ally.	Even	though	Nyerere	was	quite	open	to	
seeking	 relations	with	 any	 country,	 close	 cooperation	with	 the	 Soviet	Union	was	 very	
low	 on	 the	 list	 of	 Nyerere’s	 foreign	 political	 priorities	 prior	 to	 1965.	 Nyerere	was	 on	
occasion	 quite	 critical	 of	 the	 Soviets,	 as	 for	 example	 in	 1963,	 when	 he	 criticised	
unspecified,	but	clearly	implied,	rich	socialist	countries	that	were	using	their	wealth	for	
acquiring	political	power	and	prestige.546	 It	was	very	much	 this	personal	 reluctance	of	
Nyerere’s	to	engage	into	close	cooperation	with	the	Soviets	and	their	loyal	satellites	that	
stood	 in	 the	way	 of	more	 rapid	 and	more	 intensive	 cooperation	 between	 Tanganyika	
and	 Czechoslovakia	 in	 the	 first	 years	 after	 independence.	 Nyerere’s	 continued	
reservation	 towards	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 certainly	 cast	 a	 shadow	 over	 	 Czechoslovak	
activities	in	Tanganyika,	but	it	was	most	of	all	the	inability	of	Czechoslovakia	to	support	
Tanganyika‘s	economic	development	effectively	that	should	be	blamed	for	their	 failure	
to	 achieve	 the	 1961	 Africa	 policy	 objectives.	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 were	 aware	 of	
Nyerere’s	 reservations,	 and	 therefore	 they	 tried	 to	 get	 round	 this	 situation	 by	
maintaining	 frequent	 contacts	 with	 other	 Tanganyikan	 politicians,	 mainly	 with	 Oscar	
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Kambona,	who	played	a	similar	role	to	that	of	Oginga	Odinga	in	Czechoslovak	contacts	
with	Kenya.			
Political	 relations	 between	 the	 CSSR	 and	 Tanzania	 continued	 to	 develop	
immediately	after	independence.	The	CS	MFA	opened	their	embassy	in	Dar	es	Salaam	a	
few	months	 after	Tanganyikan	 independence	was	declared.	The	embassy	very	quickly	
became	 the	 main	 point	 of	 contact	 with	 Tanganyikan	 officials	 and	 it	 mediated	 all	
communication	on	cooperation	 issues	between	the	countries.	The	embassy	 in	Dar	was	
very	active	in	organising	the	visits	and	cooperation	of	various	professional,	cultural	and	
civil	society	organisations	including	unions,	agricultural	co‐operatives,	women’s	groups	
and	youth	organisations.547	Contacts	with	 these	civil	organisations	became	much	more	
common	and	much	richer	 in	comparison	 to	activities	 in	 this	 field	 in	Kenya	or	Uganda.	
The	 shortcomings	 of	 technical	 and	 economic	 cooperation	 were	 being	 covered	 up	 by	
exaggerated	reports	of	success	in	these	other	forms	of	relations	and	the	embassy	in	Dar	
was	responsible	for	much	activism	in	this	field.	The	opening	of	a	trade	office	at	the	Dar	
es	 Salaam	embassy	was	viewed	by	both	 sides	 as	welcome	progress	 and	a	 crucial	 step	
towards	improving	the	regrettable	state	of	the	common	trade	exchange.548	
The	CS	MFA	followed	the	internal	political	development	of	the	country	closely,	
and	 tried	 to	 identify	 the	 best	 entry	 point	 for	 practical	 steps	 to	 establish	 a	 working	
relationship	between	the	two	countries.	The	visits	of	 Interior	Minister	Oscar	Kambona	
and	of	the	Treasury	Secretary	of	Tanganyika,	Paul	Bomani,	in	the	spring	and	summer	of	
1962	 presented	 ideal	 opportunities.	 During	 the	 talks	 with	 both	 members	 of	 the	
Tanganyikan	government,	the	need	was	expressed	for	CS	experts	in	various	fields	who	
would	 help	 to	 solve	 Tanganyika’s	 dependency	 on	 British	 cadres	 and	 would	 bring	
socialist	practices	into	the	country’s	economy.549	Bomani	expressed	particular	interest	in	
the	methods	of	planning	economy	and	 in	 learning	 from	experts	 in	 this	 field.550	He	also	
discussed	the	provisional	plans	 for	student	scholarships,	 inter‐governmental	scientific‐
technological	 agreements	 and	 agricultural	 cooperatives.	 Bomani	 explained	 that	
Tanganyika	would	 cooperate	 closely	with	 the	 CSSR	 and	 other	 socialist	 countries	 as	 it	
was	 felt	 necessary	 to	 restore	 the	 balance	 in	 political	 leverage	 after	 the	 substantial	
economic	loans	made	by	West	Germany	and	the	UK.	
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Several	months	after	Bomani’s	visit,	the	Tanganyikan	government	contacted	the	
CS	embassy	at	Dar	with	a	 request	 for	CS	assistance	 in	 training	pilots	 for	Tanganyika’s	
government.551	Slight	optimism	marked	 the	prospects	of	 further	relations	between	 the	
two	 countries	when	 	 the	 trade	 agreement	was	 signed	 in	 January	 1963.552	 It	 provided	
better	 access	 to	 the	 Tanzanian	 market	 for	 CS	 traders,	 as	 a	 range	 of	 various	 license	
limitations	 was	 lifted.	 It	 did	 not,	 however,	 greatly	 improve	 the	 regrettable	 state	 of	
Tanganyika’s	 exports	 to	 Czechoslovakia,	 a	 source	 of	 frustration	 for	 Nyerere’s	
government.553	In	order	to	 lessen	the	problems	caused	by	the	growing	trade	deficit	on	
the	 part	 of	 Tanganyika’s	 government	 the	 CS	 MFA	 expressed	 interest	 in	 Tanganyikan	
imports,	 especially	 of	 cotton	 and	 sisal.554	 This	 political	 gesture,	 however,	 could	 not	
change	the	gloomy	reality	of	mutual	trade	exchange.	
Between	 1961	 and	 1964	 practical	 cooperation	 in	 all	 spheres	 of	 technical	
assistance	between	the	CSSR	and	Tanganyika	was	negatively	marked	by	the	absence	of	
bilateral	 agreement	 on	 science‐technological	 cooperation	 and	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Tanganyikan	government	was	reluctant	to	cover	even	the	smallest	portion	of	expenses	
for	technical	cooperation.555	This	matter	was	urged	upon	several	times	as	 it	 interfered	
with	the	practical	implementation	of	the	proposed	projects.556	The	MFA	officials	blamed	
political	pressure	from	Britain	for	the	slow	progress	of	formalisation	of	mutual	relations.	
One	of	the	largest	technical	cooperation	projects	planned	by	Czechoslovakia	at	this	stage	
was	building	a	 ceramics	 factory,	but	 the	commencement	of	works	 remained	uncertain	
due	to	the	absence	of	a	legal	framework	for	mutual	cooperation.		
The	 lack	 of	 a	 bilateral	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	 execution	 of	 technical	
cooperation	can	also	be	blamed	for	the	poor	state	of	educational	cooperation,	as	well	as	
the	 stagnation	 of	 technical	 assistance	 via	 the	 expert	missions.557	 The	 exact	 number	 of	
Tanganyikan	students	studying	at	CS	universities	between	1962	and	1965	is	not	known;	
however,	 available	 documents	 indicate	 that	 especially	 in	 the	 beginning	 the	 state	 of	
cooperation	 was	 highly	 unsatisfactory.	 To	 change	 this,	 the	 Czechoslovak	 government	
allocated	15	scholarships	for	Tanganyikan	students	and	another	5	for	Zanzibaris	for	the	
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1963/64	academic	year.	Later	during	1964,	perhaps	in	reaction	to	the	changed	political	
situation,	the	CS	government	urged	that	the	number	of	newly	allocated	scholarships	be	
further	increased	by	eight.	Despite	improvements	during	1964	it	was	clear	that	the	state	
of	 educational	 assistance	 for	 Tanganyika	 had	 certainly	 not	 reached	 its	 full	 potential.	
While	 other	 spheres	 of	 technical	 cooperation	were	 stagnating,	 Czechoslovakia	 should	
certainly	 have	 provided	 a	 greater	 number	 of	 scholarships	 for	 Tanganyikan	 students	
much	sooner,	especially	when	one	takes	into	consideration	the	total	number	of	African	
students	studying	at	Czechoslovak	universities	in	this	period.558				
Czechoslovak	officials	also	increased	their	activities	in	the	field	of	civil	technical	
assistance	 in	 1963	 and	 prepared	 a	 range	 of	 courses	 for	 Tanganyikan	 participants.	 In	
1963	six	Tanganyikans	were	enrolled	for	journalism	and	photography	courses.	For	the	
following	year,	in	an	attempt	to	further	develop	civil	technical	cooperation	and	to	enter	
the	 new	 technical	 sphere,	 the	 CS	 government	 also	 offered	 Tanganyika	 20	 six‐month	
places	 for	 co‐operative	 practice	 for	 agricultural	 planning	 and	 management.	
Czechoslovak	officials	were,	however,	quite	sceptical	of	Tanganyika’s	 interest	 in	taking	
up	the	places	offered.559	
Other	factors	that	could	be	blamed	for	the	lapse	in	practical	cooperation,	despite	
the	expressed	political	will	on	both	sides,	are	not	all	entirely	clear.	On	the	Czechoslovak	
part,	 budget	 constraints	 and	 insufficient	 funding	 of	 governmental	 organisations	 that	
were	 expected	 to	 pursue	 cooperation	with	 Tanganyika	were	 certainly	 	major	 factors.	
Tanganyika,	on	the	other	hand,	was	dealing	with	the	lack	of	educated	and	experienced	
professional	 cadres	 in	 the	 state	 service	 and	 in	 the	 handful	 of	 Tanganyika‐owned	
enterprises	 who	 could	 effectively	 manage	 cooperation	 projects	 with	 Czechoslovakia.	
Poor	management	 and	 low	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 organisational	 structure	 on	both	 sides	
interfered	with	the	swift	execution	of	ambitious	plans.	Blame	should	also	be	directed	at	
Czechoslovak	 policy‐makers,	 whose	 plans	 were	 far	 too	 elaborate	 to	 be	 effectively	
executed	in	such	a	short	time	as	was	desired.		
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5.7. The	Zanzibar	revolution	and	the	creation	of	Tanzania	
The	island	of	Zanzibar,	though	located	very	close	to	Tanganyika’s	mainland,	had,	
until	 1964,	 been	 following	 its	 own	political	 development	quite	 independent	 of	 nearby	
Tanganyika.	 The	 island	 had	 had	 a	 long	 history	 of	 colonial	 dominance	 not	 only	 by	
European	powers,	but	also	by	Omani	Arabs	who	had	controlled	the	island	for	almost	200	
years.	 For	 centuries	 Zanzibar	was	 the	 commercial	 centre	 for	 the	 slave	 trade	managed	
mainly	 by	 the	 Arab	 traders,	 as	 well	 as	 for	 other	 commodities	 common	 in	 the	 Indian	
Ocean	area.	Over	the	course	of	several	centuries	Zanzibar	progressively	became	one	of	
the	 centres	 of	 distinct	 Swahili	 culture.	 The	 Swahili	 language	 that	 originated	 here	was	
eventually	to	spread	as	lingua	franca	not	only	to	Tanzania,	but	to	a	certain	extent	to	the	
whole	 of	 East	 Africa.	 Traditionally,	 Zanzibar	 was	 ruled	 by	 the	 Sultan	 of	 Zanzibar.	 In	
1890,	however,	it	became	a	Protectorate	of	the	United	Kingdom	and	so	it	remained	until	
independence	was	granted	in	1963.		
Complex	political	and	social	development	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	
century	 allowed	 inter‐ethnic	 tensions	 to	 arise	 in	Zanzibar	 from	 the	 end	of	 the	 Second	
World	 War	 and	 with	 them	 the	 question	 of	 the	 island’s	 political	 future.	 The	 self‐
determining	 anti‐colonial	 nationalist	 struggle	 that	 had	 been	 progressively	 spreading	
across	Africa	since	the	late	1950s	was	not	going	to	be	an	appropriate	solution	to	solve	
Zanzibar’s	growing	tensions	because	the	growing	Arab	nationalism	was	a	conservative	
and	 highly	 non‐inclusive	 process.560	 Social	 mobility	 in	 East	 Africa	 had	 increased	
considerably	since	World	War	I	and	one	of	its	effects	was	significant	change	in	the	ethnic	
structure	of	 the	 island’s	population,	which	had	always	been	very	much	determined	by	
the	 influx	 of	 foreign	 settlers.	 In	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 it	 was	 first	 the	 wave	 of	 Arab	
colonisers	 from	 the	 Arab	 peninsula	 that	 very	much	 changed	 the	 local	 ethnic	 balance.	
Later,	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 south	 Asian	 immigrants	 arrived	when	 the	 British	 took	
control	of	the	island	and	of	the	greater	part	of	East	African	mainland,	too.	Both	of	these	
groups	 quickly	 and	 successfully	 established	 themselves	 in	 the	 island’s	 economy	 as	
traders,	 merchants	 or	 land	 owners.	 The	 influx	 of	 immigrants	 continued	 between	 the	
wars	 and	 especially	 after	 the	 Second	World	War,	 but	 this	 time	 it	 was	mainly	 African	
immigrants	 from	mainland	 Tanganyika,	 Kenya	 or	 the	 even	more	 distant	 Uganda	 that	
were	arriving	in	Zanzibar.	For	them	it	was	often	a	hopeless	struggle	to	compete	with	the	
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political	and	economic	dominance	of	Arabs	and	Asians.	Africans,	even	though	the	most	
numerous	 group,	 found	 themselves	 increasingly	 impoverished,	 socially	 oppressed	 and	
politically	marginalised.	In	this	social	and	economic	setting,	a	political	struggle	was	to	be	
fought	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	 not	 only	 for	 independence	 from	 British	 rule,	 but	 also	 for	
political	dominance	over	the	island.			
As	 elsewhere	 in	 Africa,	 Zanzibar	 also	 experienced	 the	 spread	 of	 political	
activism	when	 the	 first	political	parties	were	established	 in	 the	 late	1950s.	The	major	
party	 supported	 by	 the	 British	 and	 Arabs	 and	 expected	 to	 lead	 the	 country	 after	
independence	was	the	Zanzibar	Nationalist	Party	(ZNP).	The	ZNP	was	a	predominantly	
Arab	 party	 supported	 by	 the	 Arab	 aristocracy	 as	 well	 as	 by	 most	 Asian	 middle‐class	
business‐owners.	 Despite	 general	 expectations	 to	 the	 contrary	 the	 ZNP	was	 seriously	
challenged	by	 the	Afro‐Shirazi	Party	 (ASP)	 in	 the	very	 first	 elections	organised	on	 the	
island	 in	 1961.	 Like	 the	 ZNP	 the	ASP	was	 also	 built	 along	 ethnic	 allegiances,	 drawing	
most	 of	 its	 electoral	 support	 from	Africans	 and	 people	 of	 Shirazi561	 descent.	 The	 ASP	
benefitted	from	the	fact	that	ethnic	groups	from	which	they	recruited	most	supporters,	
African	and	Shirazis,	were	clearly	dominant	in	numbers:	only	65	000	Arabs	and	Asians	
as	against	270	000	Africans	and	Shirazis.	The	third	relevant	party	in	this	period	was	the	
Zanzibar	and	Pemba	People’s	Party	(ZPPP),	established	after	the	internal	rift	of	the	ASP.	
In	1963,	a	last	influential	pre‐independence	party	was	established	by	an	internal	rift	in	
the	ZNP.	 Its	name	was	Umma	and	 it	was	headed	by	Sheikh	Babu	who	supported	quite	
radical	 socialist	 policies,	 for	 which	 Umma	 had	 already	 been	 banned	 by	 the	 British	
in1963.	Even	though	Umma	failed	to	establish	any	substantial	membership	rate,	it	was	a	
party	important	to	Zanzibar’s	political	future	for	its	ties	to	socialist	countries,	making	it	a	
possible	future	partner.	Representatives	of	the	Umma	party	were	very	quick	to	establish	
relations	with	Czechoslovakia	in	August	1963.	Czechoslovaks	and	Soviets	saw	potential	
in	 developing	 cooperation	 with	 Umma	 alongside	 similarly	 oriented	 parties	 of	 East	
Africa.562					
	In	the	elections	of	June	1961	and	July	1963	the	ASP	dominated	the	polls	but	the	
electoral	 system,	 similar	 to	 the	 British	 one,	 prevented	 the	 ASP	 from	 forming	 a	
government.	In	both	cases	the	ASP	recorded	a	higher	total	number	of	votes	than	the	ZNP	
and	 ZPPP	 combined,	 but	 the	 uneven	 spread	 of	 popular	 support	 did	 not	 achieve	 a	
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majority	of	seats	in	the	constituencies	that	had	been	won.	In	both	cases	the	ZNP	formed	
a	 coalition	 government	 with	 the	 ZPPP	 and	 further	 added	 to	 the	 frustrations	 of	 the	
majority	African	population.	‘For	many	Africans	the	election	results	appeared	to	rule	out	
any	 constitutional	 means	 of	 addressing	 the	 existing	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	
imbalances	within	Zanzibar	society	and	stood	in	contrast	to	the	movement	towards	Uhuru	
(freedom)	 in	mainland	East	Africa.’563	Already	 in	1961	growing	 tensions	had	 led	 to	 an	
outburst	of	inter‐ethnic	violence	causing	more	than	60	deaths.564	To	prevent	such	events	
recurring	the	elections	of	1963	were	marked	by	extreme	security	measures.	The	ZNP’s	
leadership	 under	 Ali	 Muhsin	 was	 aware	 of	 the	 risks	 that	 this	 charged	 atmosphere	
carried,	 but	 he	 was	 able	 and	 willing	 to	 make	 only	 minor	 improvements	 to	 Africans’	
social	 and	 economic	 positions,	 mainly	 because	 greater	 concessions	 would	 be	 highly	
unpopular	among	the	richest	Zanzibari	Arabs,	the	ZNP’s	main	sponsors	.565											
	As	 the	 ZNP‐ZPPP	 cabinet	 failed	 to	 improve	 the	 situation	 by	 introducing	 any	
substantial	 reforms,	 in	 the	 approach	 to	 independence	 it	 had	 to	 resort	 to	 ever	 more	
authoritarian	 measures	 to	 preserve	 its	 dominant	 position.	 One	 such	 measure	 was	 a	
reconstruction	of	the	police	force	in	which	a	substantial	share	of	positions	was	held	by	
Africans,	and	ZNP’s	cabinet	began	to	doubt	its	future	loyalty.	Over	the	course	of	1963	a	
large	number	of	African	policemen	were	dismissed	and	the	government	tried	to	replace	
them	with	Arab	or	Asian	recruits.	The	ZNP	intended	to	improve	the	security	of	the	island	
by	forming	loyal	police	forces	manned	by	members	of	the	Arab	and	Asian	ethnicities,	but	
in	reality	 it	did	the	exact	opposite.	The	police	force	was	not	only	short	of	men,	but	the	
new	 recruits	 were	 poorly	 trained	 and	 lacked	 experience.	 The	 government’s	
mismanagement	of	 this	reform	made	 it	vulnerable	 to	any	aggression	that	might	occur.	
Unrest	 was	 becoming	 ever	 more	 likely	 as	 Africans	 felt	 let	 down	 by	 constitutional	
measures	and	 thought	 they	were	 left	only	with	 the	option	of	a	violent	uprising.	While	
President	 Nyerere	 was	 aware	 of	 such	 a	 risk,	 and	 even	 warned	 the	 British	 in	 this	
respect,566	 the	ZNP	government	 failed	 to	 fully	appreciate	 the	possible	outcome	should	
the	situation	turn	violent.				
When	the	Sultanate	finally	received	Independence	on	10	December	1963,	Arab	
and	Asian	 citizens	 celebrated	 the	 event,	 but	 for	many	Africans	 national	 independence	
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meant	 only	 the	 change	 of	 colonial	 master.	 By	 this	 time	 there	 existed	 in	 Zanzibar	 a	
subversive	 group	 of	 Africans	 led	 by	 Ugandan‐born	 John	 Okello.	 The	 group	 evolved	
partially	 from	 ASP	 members	 around	 Okello	 and	 partially	 from	 discontented	 Africans	
active	in	local	trade	unions.	Over	the	course	of	1963	it	gained	considerable	support	from	
experienced	 policemen	 expelled	 from	 the	 Zanzibar	 police	 force.	 The	 intentions	 of	 this	
revolutionary	 group	 were	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 coup	 against	 the	 government	 to	 unseat	 the	
Sultan	and	end	Arab	dominance	in	Zanzibar.	The	group	was	about	2000	men	strong	but	
with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 former	 policemen	 they	 lacked	 the	 appropriate	 training	 and	
were	also	short	of	arms.													
	The	insurgency	against	the	Sultan	and	the	ZNP	government	started	in	the	early	
morning	on	12	January	1964	in	the	form	of	several	simultaneous	attacks	on	police	posts	
around	Zanzibar	Island.	Decisive	for	the	success	of	the	operation	was	perhaps	the	attack	
on	the	police	station	in	Stone	Town	led	by	John	Okello	in	person.	Despite	being	poorly	
armed	and	despite	some	of	Okello’s	partisans’	reluctance	to	fight	once	the	attack	started,	
the	 insurgents	 were	 able	 to	 capture	 the	 main	 police	 station.	 Here	 they	 get	 hold	 of	
automatic	weapons	 from	 a	 police	 armoury.	With	 proper	 arms	 they	were	 now	 able	 to	
withstand	the	counter‐attack	by	small	government	para‐military	units.	Over	the	course	
of	several	hours	the	insurgents	dispersed	the	remaining	loyal	government	forces	and	got	
control	 of	 all	 significant	 positions	 in	 the	 capital.	 The	 Sultan	 and	 the	 government	
meanwhile	fled	the	island	on	the	royal	yacht.	The	revolution	was	successfully	completed	
over	the	course	of	nine	hours.567		
In	the	early	aftermath	of	the	revolution	numerous	mob	attacks	on	the	Arab	and	
Indian	 populations	 took	 place,	 resulting	 in	 several	 thousand	 deaths.	 Estimates	 of	 the	
death	 toll	 that	 the	subsequent	rioting	caused	varies	greatly,	but	 there	 is	no	doubt	 that	
for	 the	 size	 of	 population	 and	 the	 low	 political	 significance	 of	 the	 island,	 events	 of	
Zanzibar’s	revolution	were	exceedingly	bloody.	In	the	following	days	the	chaotic	events,	
that	 the	 leader	 of	 Umma	 party	 Abdulrahman	 Babu	 called	 ‘the	 lumpen	 revolution’,568	
received	more	coherent	political	oversight,	and	the	new	coalition	government	of	the	ASP	
and	Umma	parties	was	formed.	The	new	head	of	state	was	the	ASP	leader	Abeid	Karume	
as	Zanzibar’s	President	and	the	influential	position	of	the	country’s	Foreign	Minister	was	
acquired	by	Babu.		
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The	 revolution	 in	 Zanzibar	 and	 the	 far‐reaching	 political	 turn	 of	 events	 that	
occurred	with	the	formation	of	the	new	government	shocked	Britain	and	the	USA.	The	
ideological	aims	of	the	ASP	were	not	completely	clear	but	those	of	Umma	were	among	
the	most	 radically	 socialist	 in	 the	whole	of	East	Africa.	Both	Britain	and	 the	US	 feared	
that	 Zanzibar	 might	 become	 an	 Indian	 Ocean	 analogy	 to	 Cuba.	 The	 new	 Zanzibar	
government	 quickly	 showed	 such	 fears	 were	 well‐founded	 as	 it	 managed	 to	 develop	
working	 cooperation	 with	 several	 socialist	 countries	 in	 the	 course	 of	 only	 a	 few	
weeks.569	 The	 front	 runner	 in	 providing	 swift	 and	 effective	 assistance	 to	 the	 Zanzibar	
government	proved	to	be	East	Germany	while	other	socialist	countries	were	among	the	
first	 to	officially	recognise	the	new	government.	Britain	and	the	USA	tried	to	 influence	
President	Karume,	using	Nyerere	as	the	mediator,	to	get	rid	of	Babu	and	other	radicals,	
but	without	success.	
	
5.8. Czechoslovak	relations	with	Zanzibar	
In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 1960s	 the	 CS	 MFA	 followed	 political	 developments	 in	
Zanzibar	very	closely,	and	its	experts	treated	it	as	an	independent	political	entity	until	
the	 end	 of	 1964.	 The	 initial	 contacts	 between	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 and	 Zanzibar	
nationalists	 came	 even	 sooner	 than	 similar	 contacts	 with	 Tanganyika.	 In	 1960	 the	
Czechoslovak	embassy	in	Cairo	was	approached	by	the	local	branch	of	the	Zanzibar	NLM	
requesting	 several	 scholarships	 for	 Zanzibari	 nationals.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
Czechoslovak	 Addis	 Ababa	 embassy	 was	 visited	 by	 representatives	 of	 the	 Zanzibar	
Federation	of	Labour	also	requesting	scholarships	and	professional	training.	In	response	
to	 these	 requests	 two	 scholarships	 were	 awarded,	 but	 the	 number	 allocated	
subsequently	never	exceeded	three	due	to	limited	availability.	570			
In	 1962	 and	 1963	 Zanzibar’s	 potential	 for	 future	 socialist	 development	 was	
considered	higher	than	that	of	Tanganyika	as	anti‐British	sentiments	were	growing	on	
the	 island.	MFA	 analysts	 also	 correctly	 identified	 revolutionary	 tendencies	 against	 the	
feudal	 system	 represented	 by	 the	 Sultan	 long	 before	 they	 actually	 transformed	 into	 a	
full‐blown	 socialist	 revolution.	 In	 order	 to	 support	 the	 Zanzibar	 national	 liberation	
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movement,	 the	 Czechoslovak	 MFA	 maintained	 contacts	 with	 the	 island’s	 emerging	
nationalist	 political	 parties.	 In	 late	 1960	 initial	 contacts	 were	 established	 between	
Czechoslovak	 diplomats	 at	 the	 Cairo	 embassy	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	 Zanzibar	
National	Party	(ZNP).	The	Cairo	ZNP	office	approached	CS	officials	 to	request	material	
help.	At	the	same	time	the	ZNP	was	also	approaching	other	socialist	country	embassies,	
most	notably	that	of	East	Germany.	Based	on	information	provided	by	the	East	German	
officials,	 the	Czechoslovak	MFA	approved	aid	to	 the	ZNP	by	providing	two	typewriters	
and	a	tape	recorder.571	According	to	the	MFA	document	available	the	ZNP	was	perceived	
in	 this	period	as	a	significant	nationalist	 force	 that	could	realistically	challenge	British	
dominance	over	 the	 island.	 The	MFA	 emphasised	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 sizable	 proportion	 of	
ZNP	members	were	of	a	progressive,	socialist	orientation.	This	perception	of	the	ZNP	as	
a	progressive	nationalist	party	with	socialist	tendencies	was	further	enhanced	in	1961	
and	1962	when	a	group	of	ZNP	activists	travelled	to	Cuba	for	training.	The	Czechoslovak	
embassy	 in	 Havana	 established	 contact	 with	 this	 group	 and	 followed	 their	 training	
process	closely.572		
In	 1961	 the	 Cairo	 ZNP	 office	 repeatedly	 asked	 the	 CS	 embassy	 for	 more	
assistance.	 Three	 ambulances,	 three	 tractors,	 medicine	 and	 school	 utilities	 were	
requested,	but	 the	KSČ	Politibyro	did	not	approve	the	grant.573	The	Czechoslovak	MFA	
found	 itself	 increasingly	 flooded	with	 requests	 for	assistance	by	various	African	NLMs	
and	 its	available	budget	was	 limited.	 It	was	 therefore	decided	after	consultations	with	
other	relevant	ministries	that	assistance	for	the	ZNP,	alongside	aid	for	ZAPU,	would	be	
revoked	and	funding	redirected	for	the	support	of	KANU.574		
Besides	demands	 for	 immediate	assistance,	 contacts	with	ZNP	representatives	
also	 concerned	 future	 arrangements	 for	 effective	 cooperation	 between	 Zanzibar	 and	
socialist	 countries.	 In	 1961	 Ali	 Sultan	 Issa,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Cairo	 ZNP	 office,	 visited	
Prague	and	held	several	meetings	with	MFA	and	MFT	representatives.	Issa	declared	his	
intention	to	break	away	completely	from	the	British	economic	sphere	of	influence	after	
independence	 and	 he	 introduced	 plans	 for	 restructuring	 Zanzibar’s	 economy	 by	
implementing	 radical	 socialist	 policies.	 Issa	 sought	 among	 other	 things	 to	 establish	 a	
plan	 for	 viable	 economic	 cooperation	 with	 socialist	 countries	 to	 supplement	 existing	
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economic	 links	 with	 the	 West.575	 These	 plans	 and	 intentions	 were	 naturally	 eagerly	
approved	of	by	CS	officials.	
Potential	links	with	the	leaders	of	the	ZNP	sustained	a	hard	blow	in	April	1962	
with	the	internal	ZNP	power	struggle.	With	British	administration	approval,	the	socialist	
wing	of	the	party’s	leadership	was	deposed	and	the	most	influential	socialists	detained,	
in	the	case	of	Abdulrahman	Mohammed	Babu,	or	expelled,	in	the	case	of	Ali	Sultan	Issa.	
The	 ZNP	 became	 completely	 dominated	 by	 the	 conservative	 politicians,	 led	 by	 Ali	
Hamsin,	who	also	took	over	the	ZNP’s	Cairo	office.		
Concerned	about	this	development,	socialist	countries	including	Czechoslovakia	
naturally	 retracted	 all	 planned	 support	 for	 the	 ZNP.	 In	 this	 turbulent	 situation	 the	
Czechoslovak	MFA	approved	the	establishment	of	cooperation	with	the	ASP	which	had	
been	 regarded	 until	 then	 as	 a	 pro‐British	 political	 power.	 MFA	 analysts	 were	 not	
convinced	about	the	ASP	ideological	profile,	but	the	unanimous	approval	it	had	received	
from	TANU,	KANU	and	the	UPC	spoke	in	its	favour.		In	the	course	of	1963	Czechoslovak	
officials	considered	supporting	both	the	ASP	and	the	Umma	party	established	by	Babu	
after	his	definite	break	up	with	 the	ZNP.	Provision	of	 five	university	 scholarships	was	
finally	 approved	 for	 the	 ASP,	 but	 due	 to	 their	 inability	 to	 find	 five	 candidates	 with	
secondary	 education	 qualifications,	 it	 was	 Babu	 who	 promised	 to	 choose	 suitable	
candidates	 for	 the	 scholarships.576	 	 Abdulrahman	 Babu	 maintained	 regular	 contacts	
throughout	 1963	 with	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 and	 held	 several	 meetings	 at	 the	 CS	
embassy	 in	Dar.	He	eventually	became	 the	main	 favourite	of	 socalist	 countries	 for	 the	
future	 leadership	 of	 an	 independent	 Zanzibar	 and	maintaining	 close	 cooperation	with	
him	was	considered	of	prime	importance.			
The	 Zanzibar	 revolution	 to	 depose	 the	 ZNP	 government,	 which	 had	 been	
regarded	as	a	conservative,	pro‐feudal,	anti‐socialist	power,	was	naturally	welcomed	by	
the	 socialist	 countries	 including	Czechoslovakia	who	were	quick	 to	 recognise	 the	new	
government	 officially.	 CS	 diplomats	 in	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 were	 approached	 as	 early	 as	
February	 1964	 by	 Babu,	 Zanzibar’s	 newly	 appointed	 Minister	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 to	
establish	official	diplomatic	relations.		The	Zanzibar	government	addressed	a	request	in	
the	first	post‐revolution	months	for	urgent	assistance	to	several	socialist	governments,	
including	Czechoslovakia.	The	CS	Politbyro	gave	the	issue	high	priority	and	support	was	
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swiftly	 approved.	 The	 Zanzibar	 government	 received	 two	 ambulances,	 a	 substantial	
amount	of	medicine	and	100	tonnes	of	sugar	from	Czechoslovakia.577	For	the	time	being	
the	Czechoslovak	government	did	not	approve	special	assistance,	or	military	training	for	
the	 Zanzibar	 army,	 as	 also	 requested	 by	 the	 Zanzibar	 government.	 The	 most	 likely	
explanation	for	their	refusal	to	provide	special	assistance	was	that	East	Germany	and	the	
Soviet	Union	as	well	as	China	had	agreed	to	provide	some	assistance	in	this	sphere.578		
Meanwhile	the	political	development	in	Zanzibar	was	viewed	very	cautiously	as	
the	Soviets	and	their	allied	governments	were	aware	that	USA	or	Britain	might	step	in	to	
reverse	 the	 results	 of	 the	 revolution,	 and	 they	 knew	 socialist	 countries	 could	 do	 only	
very	 little	 to	 prevent	 such	 a	 development	 from	 taking	 place.	While	 the	 revolutionary	
events	 in	 Zanzibar	 were	 welcome,	 the	 Tanganyikan	 army	 mutiny	 and	 especially	 the	
subsequent	 British	 intervention	 were	 noted	 with	 the	 utmost	 frustration.	 Nyerere’s	
decision	 to	 call	 in	 the	 British	 was	 heavily	 criticised.579	 Immediately	 after	 the	 British	
intervention	the	author	of	a	situational	report	 for	the	MFA	stated,	 ‘The	 impression	that	
Tanganyika	is	an	independent	state	fell,	when	the	British	attack	mounted	against	African	
soldiers	upon	the	request	of	an	African	government	demonstrated	Nyerere’s	neo‐colonialist	
orientations.	 […]	 His	 [Nyerere’s]	 power	 apparatus	 has	 strengthened	 so	 it	 can	 increase	
attacks	against	the	left.’580										
When	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Zanzibar	 federation	 with	 Tanganyika	 was	
announced	 in	 April	 1964,	 Czechoslovak	 officials	were	 cautiously	 optimistic.	 However,	
they	 viewed	 the	 new	Zanzibar	 government	with	 Babu’s	 participation	 as	 an	 important	
foothold	 in	 the	 region.	MFA	 analysts	 were	 unsure	 about	 the	 potential	 viability	 of	 the	
proposed	union	and	they	warned	of	possible	adverse	effects	any	dissolution	of	the	union	
might	 have	 on	 Zanzibar.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 union	 was	 welcome	 because	 it	 was	
believed	 that	 the	 socialist	 element	 of	 the	 government	 of	 Zanzibar	 would	 eventually	
strengthen	socialist	 tendencies	within	TANU	and	push	the	whole	country	closer	to	 the	
socialist	camp.	This	prediction	did	eventually	prove	correct.			
Once	Zanzibar	 joined	 in	 the	 federation	with	Tanganyika,	MFA	 interest	 in	 local	
affairs	decreased.	The	MFA	 lacked	 the	human	 resources	needed	 to	deal	with	Zanzibar	
separately	 and	 it	 was	 also	 aware	 of	 East	 German	 interest	 in	 the	 island,	 which	would	
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suffice	 to	 defend	 the	 socialist	 countries’	 interests	 there.581	 After	 1965,	 Zanzibar	 was	
regularly	visited	by	officials	from	the	Dar	es	Salaam	embassy,	and	technical	assistance	or	
material	support582	was	even	provided	occasionally	for	Zanzibar,	but	it	was	not	of	high	
political	interest	for	the	CS	MFA.	Czechoslovak	officials	tried,	however,	to	maintain	good	
relations	 with	 Zanzibari	 socialists,	 who	 joined	 the	 federal	 government	 and	 became	
influential	members	of	TANU.		
	
5.9. The	1964	army	mutiny		
On	several	occasions	between	1961	and	1963	there	were	rumours	of	growing	
discontent	 amongst	 the	 soldiery	 of	 East	 African	 states	 threatening	 to	 develop	 into	
mutiny,	 but	 they	 never	 materialised.	 Even	 though	 these	 rumours	 had	 always,	 before	
January	1964,	proved	false,	 they	were	 founded	on	real	 frustrations	of	African	soldiers,	
formerly	known	as	the	King’s	African	Rifles	(KAR).	Eventually	in	January	1964	the	East	
African	soldiers’	tensions	and	frustrations	finally	erupted	into	mutiny	over	several	days.	
Of	all	the	three	mutinies	that	occurred	consecutively	in	Tanganyika,	Uganda	and	Kenya,	
it	was	this	first	mutiny	of	the	Tanganyikan	army	which	was	the	most	important,	setting	
an	 example	 as	 it	 did	 for	 similar	 events	 in	 the	 other	 two	 countries.	 The	 reasons	 and	
grievances	that	stood	behind	this	mutiny,	the	progress	of	the	mutiny	itself,	and	its	main	
political	effects	are	the	subject	of	the	following	paragraphs.		
		As	already	mentioned	in	the	chapter	on	Uganda,	with	independence	advancing	
upon	East	African	states,	the	African	soldiers	of	the	former	colonial	KAR	army	struggled	
to	find	their	place	in	the	new	political	settings	of	the	independent	states.	KAR	units	were	
always	the	power	arm	of	the	colonial	administration	and	having	been	loyal	servicemen	
of	 the	 hated	 colonisers	 it	was	 not	 easy	 for	 African	 soldiers	 and	 the	 new	 independent	
African	 administrations	 to	 find	 accord	 and	 build	 mutual	 trust.	 In	 Tanganyika,	 this	
inherited	 atmosphere	 of	 distrust	 was	 further	 deepened	 by	 the	 slow	 progress	 of	
Africanisation	within	the	military.	African	soldiers	during	colonial	times	had	never	been	
allowed	 to	 have	 officer	 status;	 the	 higher	 ranks	 were	 reserved	 for	 the	 British.	 On	
independence	 the	Tanganyikan	 army	 retained	 its	British	officer	 corps,	 thus	 effectively	
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remaining	under	British	command.	Naturally,	African	soldiers	hoped	this	army	structure	
would	 change	 quickly	 with	 them	 acquiring	 commanding	 posts	 within	 the	 national	
armies’	ranks.	However,	the	pace	of	Africanisation	in	Tanganyika	was	much	slower	than	
expected.		
From	1961	the	Tanganyika	government	tried	to	speed	up	the	training	of	African	
officers,	 but	 they	 struggled	 to	 find	 appropriate	 candidates.	 The	 country’s	 Minister	 of	
Defence,	Oscar	Kambona,	tried	to	solve	this	issue	by	agreeing	to	Israel’s	offer	for	training	
of	15	cadets.	However,	upon	the	candidates’	return	the	government’s	Officers	Selection	
Board	 in	 January	 1964	 found	 them	 unsuitable	 for	 promotion.	 Tanganyikan	 soldiers	
blamed	the	British	command	for	the	absence	of	promotions,	even	though	the	British	had	
provided	 the	 government	 with	 a	 list	 of	 African	 soldiers	 suitable	 for	 advancement,	
including	for	the	highest	command.583	The	rejection	of	promotions	came	at	the	time	of	
the	critical	governmental	decision	on	general	Africanisation.	Only	two	weeks	before	the	
mutiny	took	place,	Nyerere	announced	that	the	Africanisation	processes	in	Tanganyika	
were	to	be	halted	in	order	to	prevent	the	creation	of	first	and	second	class	citizenship	in	
the	country.584	It	seems	that	it	was	this	announcement	that	became	the	last	straw	for	the	
soldiery	and	their	frustrations	erupted.	Discontent	already	ran	high	as	soldiers’	pay	had	
been	 lowered	 in	 1963.585	 Eventually	 the	 heightened	 frustrations	 of	 African	 soldiers	
broke	out	in	open	mutiny	on	the	morning	of	20	January.				
The	 mutiny	 started	 when	 all	 the	 British	 officers	 of	 the	 1st	 Battalion	 of	
Tanganyika	 Rifles	 stationed	 at	 Collito	 barracks	 were	 arrested	 by	 their	 Tanganyikan	
soldiers.	The	commanding	officer	of	 the	Tanganyikan	army,	Brigadier	Sholto	Douglass,	
was	not	among	the	prisoners	as	he	was	away	from	the	camp	at	the	time	of	the	mutiny.	
Soldiers	were	 very	 quick	 to	 take	 control	 of	 all	 the	 important	 positions	 in	 the	 capital,	
including	 the	 post	 office,	 airport,	 railway	 station,	 radio	 station,	 and	 bank.	 The	
Tanganyikan	government	as	well	as	British	officers	were	taken	completely	by	surprise	
and	 especially	 in	 the	 first	 hours	 of	 the	mutiny	 it	was	not	 clear	what	 the	 intentions	 of	
rebellious	army	were.	A	 full‐blown	coup	d’état	 attempt	seemed	 likely.	For	 that	 reason	
President	Nyerere	and	the	majority	of	the	cabinet	went	into	hiding,	while	the	Minister	of	
Defence,	Oscar	Kambona,	was	rushed	to	the	Collito	base	to	meet	the	mutineers	and	hear	
their	demands.	The	soldiers	demanded	the	immediate	removal	of	European	officers	and	
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a	 substantial	 pay	 rise	 of	 some	 150%.	 Significantly,	 the	 soldiers	 were	 not	making	 any	
political	demands.	Kambona	informed	them	that	he	had	no	constitutional	right	to	agree	
such	measures,	but	he	also	did	not	dismiss	the	demands	out	of	hand.	The	soldiers	were	
quite	confident	that	their	demands	would	be	met	as	they	were	clearly	in	the	position	of	
power.	Meanwhile	some	rioting	and	looting	occurred	in	Dar	es	Salaam	streets	that	police	
struggled	 to	 contain	 as	 many	 officers	 had	 been	 transferred	 to	 Zanzibar	 some	 days	
earlier.	 Several	 attacks	 against	 Asians	 and	 Arabs	 took	 place	 and	 peace	 was	 restored	
eventually	only	by	 the	 rebellious	army	units	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 some	of	 the	soldiers	
had	previously	also	joined	in	the	looting.	The	number	of	casualties	was	quite	substantial	
at	the	end	of	the	day	with	14	dead	and	20	being	seriously	injured.586				
Meanwhile,	on	 the	second	day	of	mutiny	 the	2nd	battalion	of	Tanganyika	rifles	
stationed	in	Tabara	also	arrested	all	of	its	officers.	They	raised	the	same	demands	as	the	
1st	 battalion	 a	 day	 earlier	 and	 they	 too	 met	 with	 Minister	 Kambona	 who	 technically	
accepted	 their	 demands.	 This	 initially	 calmed	 the	 situation	 as	 there	 had	 been	 some	
rioting	 and	 violence	 here,	 too.	 It	 was	 only	 on	 22	 January	 that	 President	 Nyerere	
appeared	in	public	to	inspect	the	results	of	looting	and	rioting.	In	his	public	address	on	
the	situation	the	President	refused	to	recognise	any	connection	between	the	mutiny,	(or	
strike	as	the	soldiers’	action	was	alternatively	called)	and	the	revolution	on	Zanzibar	or	
any	other	political	cause.	The	 fact	 that	 the	President	came	out	of	hiding	 indicated	 that	
the	 situation	 had	 calmed	 down	 somewhat.	 Negotiations	 with	 the	 soldiers	 eventually	
began	on	the	specifics	of	concession	to	their	demands.		
During	 these	 talks	 the	government	 found	 itself	 in	a	peculiar	position	as	 it	was	
virtually	 defenceless	 should	 the	 army	 rise	 again	 or	 should	 it	 formulate	 any	 political	
demands.	Nyerere	hesitated	to	deal	with	the	matter	as	a	 full‐blown	mutiny	because	as	
such	it	would	have	to	 lead	to	serious	punishment	of	the	participating	soldiers,	and	the	
government	 simply	 lacked	 the	 power	 to	 execute	 such	 actions.	 In	 this	 stalled	 situation	
rumours	spread	of	preparations	of	a	plot	by	the	opposition	group	of	former	TFL	leader	
Victor	Mkello	 and	 politician	 Christopher	 Tumbo	 to	 overthrow	 the	 government.	When	
this	group	contacted	the	mutiny	leaders	and	asked	them	to	take	over	control	of	the	state	
in	their	name,	Nyerere	had	no	other	option	than	to	ask	for	external	military	aid.587		
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On	 24	 January	 Nyerere	 contacted	 the	 British	 government	 and	 requested	
assistance	to	put	down	the	mutiny	and	the	suspected	plot	to	overthrow	the	government.	
On	25	January	such	assistance	was	swiftly	provided	by	the	British	navy	that	had	arrived	
into	the	vicinity	of	Dar	es	Salaam	soon	after	the	news	of	mutiny	spread.	In	the	aftermath	
of	what	was	perceived	in	London	to	be	a	communist	coup	on	Zanzibar,	a	similar	fate	for	
Tanganyika	 was	 considered	 a	 great	 threat	 to	 British	 interests	 in	 the	 region.	 British	
troops	were	 quick	 to	 take	 control	 of	 both	 rebellious	 units	 and	 all	 the	 important	 hubs	
around	 the	 capital.	 The	 Tanganyikan	 soldiers	 were	 disarmed	 and	 arrested	 and	 the	
national	army	thus	effectively	ceased	to	exist.588	
In	 the	 days	 that	 followed	 the	 successful	 suppression	 of	 the	 mutiny,	 the	
government	attempted	to	regain	full	control	of	state	and	security	affairs.	It	also	needed	
to	regain	some	of	the	prestige	that	had	been	severely	harmed	not	only	by	the	fact	that	
the	 national	 army	 mutinied,	 but	 especially	 because	 it	 had	 had	 to	 ask	 the	 British	 for	
assistance.	A	 number	 of	 arrests	 took	place,	 including	 those	 of	 rebellious	 soldiers,	 plot	
leaders,	 trade	union	 leaders,	 some	politicians	 and	 several	dozen	 rebellious	policemen.	
Prosecution	of	participators	took	place	over	several	weeks	following	the	mutiny.	All	of	
the	 ordinary	 soldiers	were	 dishonourably	 discharged	 from	 the	 army,	 the	 ring‐leaders	
received	between	5	and	15	years’	imprisonment	and	the	plot	leaders	spent	two	years	in	
detention	before	their	release.589	The	Tanganyikan	army	was	never	to	be	reconstructed	
in	its	original	form.						
The	 revolution	 on	 Zanzibar	 followed	 by	 the	mutiny	 of	 the	 Tanganyikan	 army	
meant	a	major	disturbance	to	the	political	setting	of	Tanganyika	and	threw	the	country	
into	the	midst	of	Cold	War	rivalry	virtually	overnight,	the	effects	of	which	had	until	then	
been	almost	negligible.	President	Nyerere	found	himself	facing	several	critical	scenarios	
which	 endangered	 the	political	 stability	 of	 Tanganyika,	 especially	 considering	 the	 fact	
that	 after	 the	mutiny	 Tanganyika	was	 left	without	 its	 own	 army.	 The	 British	military	
presence	was	eventually	replaced	by	the	more	welcome	and	less	controversial	mission	
of	 the	Nigerian	army,	but	 it	 could	have	not	been	a	 long	 term	solution	 to	Tanganyika’s	
military	 crisis;	 military	 reform	 was	 urgently	 needed.	 The	 fact	 that	 Zanzibar	 was	
controlled	 by	 a	 government	 that	 involved	Umma	 radicals	 posed	 a	 threat	 to	Nyerere’s	
position,	 which	 was	 repeatedly	 challenged	 by	 the	 more	 radical	 socialists	 inside	 and	
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outside	of	TANU.	Left	radicals	would	have	certainly	received	an	effective	support	from	
Zanzibar	should	they	have	decided	to	plot	a	coup	against	Nyerere.	At	 the	same	time,	a	
substantial	risk	would	have	been	posed	to	the	stability	of	Tanganyika,	should	Britain	or	
USA	 decide	 to	 mount	 an	 attack	 or	 to	 support	 counter‐revolution	 on	 Zanzibar.	 Such	
intervention	 was	 indeed	 being	 seriously	 considered	 by	 American	 and	 British	
governments.590	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day	 it	 was	 not	 executed,	 because	 in	 April	 1964	
Nyerere	 and	Karume	announced	 their	 plan	 to	 form	a	 Federation	between	Tanganyika	
and	 Zanzibar.	 The	 plan	 came	 as	 a	 surprise	 to	 many,	 but	 it	 proved	 perhaps	 the	 best	
solution	to	an	unusual	and	politically	charged	situation.		
		
5.10. The	effects	of	the	mutiny	and	the		Zanzibar	revolution	
The	formation	of	the	United	Republic	of	Tanzania	in	April	1964	had	far‐reaching	
implications	 for	 the	 internal	 politics	 of	 Tanzania,	 but	 even	 more	 so	 for	 its	 external	
affairs.	Dar	es	Salaam	granted	limited	political	powers	to	Zanzibar,	but	most	important	
decisions	were	reserved	for	the	federal	government.	Nyerere	proved	a	skilful	tactician	in	
offering	 the	 Vice‐President	 post	 to	 Karume	 while	 Babu	 and	 five	 other	 Zanzibaris	
received	federal	ministerial	positions.	This	inclusive	policy	designed	by	Nyerere	proved	
very	effective	in	appeasing	the	political	aspirations	of	Zanzibari	leaders,	and	by	keeping	
most	of	 them	 in	Dar	he	 lowered	 the	 risk	of	 their	mounting	 the	coup	against	him	 from	
Zanzibar.	He	also	very	much	neutralised	the	extreme	left	tendencies	of	these	politicians	
by	 progressively	 introducing	 more	 socialist	 policies.	 Inclusion	 of	 the	 radicals	 into	
Tanzanian	 government	 was	 certainly	 not	 welcomed	 by	 the	 West	 and	 from	 1964	
relations	 between	 the	West	 and	Nyerere	 deteriorated.	 This	was	marked	 among	 other	
things	by	the	diplomatic	crisis	with	West	Germany	protesting	over	the	newly	established	
diplomatic	 ties	 between	 Zanzibar	 and	 East	 Germany.	 President	 Nyerere	 however	
refused	 to	 give	 in	 on	 Tanzania’s	 right	 to	 seek	 diplomatic	 relations	 with	 any	 country,	
which	resulted	in	all	the	substantial	West	German	aid	being	revoked.				
Meanwhile	 ‘[t]he	 mutiny	 pushed	 Nyerere	 towards	 a	 much	 stronger	 executive	
orientation	 in	 the	government	to	avoid	 future	 threats	 to	 the	 state,	and	 towards	an	even	
more	 active	 role	 in	 the	 liberation	movement	 to	 channel	military	 energy	 and	 prove	 his	
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credentials	after	the	British	intervention.	 The	liberation	policy	also	helped	outflank	African	
nationalist	extremism	at	home.	 Inviting	Chinese	aid	 for	 the	 liberation	movement	helped	
manage	Chinese	political	pressure,	which	was	particularly	keen	among	the	revolutionaries	
in	Zanzibar.‘591	Nyerere	found	himself	 in	need	of	building	a	complete	new	military,	but	
he	lacked	the	necessary	capacities.	Despite	the	fact	that	objectively	he	had	not	had	any	
option	 for	 defending	 his	 government’s	 position	 his	 political	 prestige	 at	 home,	 but	
especially	in	the	rest	of	Africa,	was	deeply	damaged	by	his	having	resorted	to	calling	for	
military	 action	 by	 the	 former	 colonial	 power	 against	 his	 own	 national	 army.	 As	 with	
Obote	and	Kenyatta	who	also	faced	army	mutiny,	Nyerere	needed	to	decide	the	way	to	
rebuild	 the	military	 as	well	 as	 establish	 its	 future	 format.	Deeply	 disappointed	by	 the	
disloyalty	of	 the	army	inherited	from	the	British,	Nyerere	decided	to	break	away	from	
British	military	tradition	and	instead	he	opted	to	reconstruct	it	with	external	help	from	
various	 Western	 as	 well	 as	 socialist	 countries.592	 The	 realities	 of	 Cold	 War	 rivalry	
determined	 which	 countries	 would	 eventually	 participate	 in	 the	 reconstruction	 of	
Tanzanian	 army	 –	 China,	 East	 Germany,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 Czechoslovakia,	 and,	 to	
balance	the	socialist	countries‘	influence,	Canada.			
	
The	alienation	between	Tanzania	and	the	West	progressed	steadily	over	the	18	
months	that	followed	the	mutiny.	While	the	army	mutiny	initially	enhanced	the	intensity	
and	 quality	 of	 cooperation	 with	 Britain,	 because	 it	 was	 the	 former	 colonial	 power	
providing	 Tanganyika	with	 assistance,	 the	 radical	military	 reform	 that	 followed	 these	
events	 had	 exactly	 the	 opposite	 effect.	 Western	 countries	 and	 Western	 media	 were	
openly	critical	of	developments	in	Tanzania,	which	was	received	very	bitterly	in	Dar	es	
Salaam.	The	growing	misunderstanding	and	distrust	was	further	deepened	by	rumours	
of	 the	 US	 preparing	 a	 coup	 against	 the	 Tanzanian	 government.593	 All	 these	 events,	
together	with	the	frustration	over	development	aid	from	the	West	being	 less	generous	
than	 expected,	 led	 to	 the	 revision	 of	 foreign	 policy.	 ‘More	 substantial	 contacts	 were	
established,	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 with	 the	 socialist	 countries	 (which	 now	 appeared	 more	
responsive),	and,	on	 the	other	hand,	with	 the	 less‐committed	Western	 countries,	notably	
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Canada,	 the	Netherlands,	Denmark	and	 Sweden.	 In	 this	 context,	China	began	 to	 replace	
Israel	as	the	main	model	for	development.’594			
	
	
5.10.1. Tanzanian	move	towards	socialist	countries	
Nyerere’s	move	 to	 the	 left	 and	 his	 seeking	 greater	 cooperation	with	 socialist	
countries	were	not	without	limits	or	certain	reservations.	One	can	most	clearly	identify	
how	 Nyerere’s	 personal	 belief	 in	 principles,	 such	 as	 democracy,	 human	 rights,	
egalitarianism,	 education	 for	 self‐reliance	 and	 women's	 liberation,595	 prevented	 him	
from	seeking	full	unrestrained	cooperation	with	the	Soviet	camp,	even	at	the	time	of	his	
increased	criticism	of	the	West.	This	remained	true	despite	the	fact	that	Nyerere	was,	at	
this	stage	of	his	political	career,	becoming	devoted	to	a	socialist	orientation,	and	under	
his	leadership	Tanzania	became	effectively	a	one‐party	state.	Dr	Hassy	Kitine	recalled	in	
some	detail	how	much	Nyerere’s	view	on	Soviet‐style	socialism	was	also	affected	by	his	
visit	to	the	Soviet	Union	in	1969.	The	visit	to	Russia	formed	Nyerere’s	perception	of	the	
Soviet	Union	as	one	of	a	rather	gloomy,	sad	and	un‐free	society,	paralysed	by	fear	and	
resignation.596		
The	sombre	image	of	Soviet	society	that	Nyerere	came	away	with	after	his	visit	
to	 the	 USSR	 was	 not	 the	 only	 factor	 that	 interfered	 with	 the	 development	 of	 close	
partnerships	 between	 Tanzania	 and	 the	 Soviets	 and	 their	 satellites.	 Soviet	 policy	 in	
Africa,	especially	during	Brezhnev’s	era	but	also	earlier,	was	one	of	political	hegemony	
with	 clearly	 stated	objectives	 of	political	 dominance.	Nyerere	 remained	 critical	 of	 this	
aspect	 of	 the	 Soviet	 regime	 which	 he	 perceived	 as	 just	 another	 form	 of	 imperialism.	
Especially	 in	 the	 1970s	 this	 opinion	was	 supported	 by	 substantial	 evidence	 as	 Soviet	
conduct	in	Africa	and	its	relations	with	many	African	leaders	was	far	removed	from	the	
subtlety	of	the	early	1960s.		
It	was	not	only	the	ideological	rift	that	prevented	closer	collaboration	with	the	
socialist	 camp	 but	 perhaps	 even	 more	 importantly	 it	 was	 the	 inability	 or	 perhaps	
unwillingness	of	these	countries	to	assist	Tanzania	economically.	Even	though	relations	
with	Soviet	satellites	such	as	Czechoslovakia	or	East	Germany	might	have	differed	from	
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those	with	 the	 USSR	 itself,	 their	 clearly‐stated	 role	 in	 the	 Soviet	 political	 scheme	 still	
disqualified	them	to	a	certain	extent	 in	cooperation	with	Tanzania.	This	was	especially	
recognisable	 in	comparison	to	the	successful	development	of	Tanzania’s	relations	with	
Yugoslavia,	Egypt	and	especially	with	Mao’s	China.	It	is	for	the	lack	of	China’s	apparent	
imperial	 or	dominating	ambition	 that	 cooperation	with	China	was	preferred	over	 that	
with	the	Soviet	bloc.		
	
Of	 all	 the	 socialist	 countries	 it	was	Mao	Ze	Dong’s	 China	 that	 benefitted	most	
from	Nyerere’s	declared	wish	 to	 cooperate	with	 the	 socialist	 camp	after	1964.	China’s	
position	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	was	not	one	of	a	superpower,	and	generous	economic	
cooperation	 and	 technical	 assistance	 for	 Tanzania	 came	 from	 China	 without	 any	
unwelcome	ideological	subtext	or	political	conditions.	Cooperation	with	the	Soviets,	East	
Germans	and	Czechoslovaks	was	certainly	of	no	minor	importance	to	Tanzania;	in	fact,	
the	contrary	was	true,	but	it	always	carried	political	implications.	The	case	of	China	was	
different,	 and	 much	 more	 acceptable	 for	 Nyerere’s	 political	 profile.	 After	 his	 visit	 to	
China	in	1965,	Nyerere	became	infatuated	with	China	and	Chinese	socialism	and	to	some	
extent	he	modelled	his	own	ujamaa	project	on	it.597	
There	were	 some	 important	 distinctions	 between	China	 and	 the	 Soviet	Union	
that	 predestined	 the	 former	 to	 become	 the	 vital	 economic	 partner	 of	 Tanzania	 in	 the	
second	 half	 of	 the	 1960s.	 Tanzania’s	 political	 leadership	 perceived	 China	 as	 a	 fellow	
Third	World	 country	 that	had	 its	own	adverse	historical	 experience	with	 imperialism.	
China	criticised	actions	of	both	superpowers	in	Africa,	proclaiming	itself	the	only	power	
which	 could	 legitimately	 speak	 and	 act	 on	 behalf	 of	 Third	 World	 countries.	 China’s	
outspoken	 denunciation	 of	 Soviet	 imperialism	 had	 one	 main	 objective	 –	 to	 establish	
itself	as	 the	 third	major	global	power	by	attracting	wide	support	 for	 its	actions	across	
Africa	 and	 Asia.	 An	 important	 arena	 for	 Chinese	 politics	 in	 Africa	was	 the	 Afro‐Asian	
Solidarity		Committee	meeting.	`For	Peking,	maintaining	an	Afro‐Asian	organisation	that	
would	reflect	the	non‐aligned	movement	was	essential,	for	it	was	the	only	one	that	would	
enable	 Peking	 to	 participate	while	 excluding	 the	 Soviet	 Union…For	 these	 two	 powerful	
countries,	however,	 the	benefits	of	 this	 competition	were	ultimately	 rather	 limited…As	 it	
was,	 the	 growing	 spread	 of	 a	non‐aligned	 movement	 in	 which	 neither	 of	 the	 two	
communist	 powers	 was	 involved	 reflected	 the	 reluctance	 of	 Third	World	 states	 to	 let	
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themselves	be	drawn	into	an	uncertain	struggle.`598	In	the	case	of	Tanzania	this	objective	
was	partially	successful	but	elsewhere	in	Africa	less	so.		
It	is	important	to	note	that	it	was	the	substantial	economic	and	military	support	
provided	 by	 China	 rather	 than	 any	 ideological	 closeness	 that	 was	 behind	 effective	
cooperation	with	Tanzania.	China	was	one	of	the	few	countries	providing	Tanzania	with	
effective	military	assistance	after	 the	mutiny	of	Tanganyika‘s	army.599	 In	 the	 following	
year	 China	 also	 provided	 very	 generous	 development	 aid	 and	 in	 1967,	 together	with	
Zambia,	 Tanzania	 negotiated	 Chinese	 funding	 for	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 infrastructural	
projects	 in	 Africa,	 the	 TAZARA	 railway	 from	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 to	 Lusaka.600	 After	 1970	
China	 became	 Tanzania‘s	 largest	 donor	 and	 also	 the	 largest	 provider	 of	 military	
assistance.	 The	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 its	 satellites	 tried	 to	 challenge	 China’s	 position	 in	
Tanzania	but	they	failed	to	provide	such	effective	support	in	the		civil	technical	as	well	as	
the	special	military	spheres.			
	
5.11. Czechoslovak	cooperation	with	Tanzania	between	1964	and	1968	
Tanzania’s	 gravitation	 towards	 socialist	 countries	 and	 especially	 the	 rapidly	
growing	competition	of	Mao’s	China	called	for	intensified	effort	on	the	part	of	the	CSSR	
to	 develop	 working	 cooperation	 with	 Tanzania	 in	 multiple	 spheres.	 For	 that	 reason	
several	meetings	took	place	between	Czechoslovak	officials	and	Tanzanian	government	
members	 as	 early	 as	 summer	 1964.	 More	 practical	 steps	 in	 the	 spheres	 of	 trade,	
economic	assistance	and	technical	assistance	were	discussed	during	the	visit	of	the	vice‐
president	of	Tanzania,	Rashidi	Kawawa,	to	the	CSSR.	The	main	subjects	discussed	were	
the	 various	 forms	of	 Czechoslovak	 cooperation	 in	 the	next	 five‐year	 plan	 of	Tanzania.	
Suggested	 forms	 of	 cooperation	 included	 delegations	 of	 CS	 expert	 advisors,	 financial	
loans	 and	 training	 for	 Tanzanian	 experts	 in	 CS	 organisations.601	 Tanzania	 was	 slowly	
transforming	its	economy	under	a	planning	system	which,	together	with	the	decreasing	
interest	 of	 the	 British	 in	 the	 country’s	 affairs,	 was	 bringing	 TANU	 closer	 to	 socialist	
                                                            
598 Laidi, Superpowers, 28‐29. 
599 Baynham, ”Mutinies,” 170. 
600 Bailey, ”Tanzania and China,” 40. 
601 MZV F. IV/5, č.j. 01413/62‐OTP, 22.12.1962. Příloha 1, 1‐3. 
256 
 
countries.602	In	contrast	to	the	past	Nyerere	would	often	get	directly	involved	in	the	talks	
and	he	showed	constant	interest	in	the	progress	of	cooperation.603		
The	 Tanzanian	 government	was,	 at	 this	 point,	 negotiating	 economic	 help,	 not	
only	with	the	CSSR	but	also	with	Poland,	East	Germany	and	the	Soviet	Union.	Available	
documents	 show	 the	 specific	 requests	 that	 Tanzanians	 made	 of	 the	 Soviets	 in	 1964,	
namely	building	a	metallurgic	complex,	alongside	a	coal	and	 iron	mine,	building	an	oil	
refinery,	 a	 700	 km	 railway	 to	 Northern	 Zambia	 and	 the	 financial	 loan	 of	 600	million	
Roubles.604	 The	 Polish	 government	 also	 handled	 requests	 for	 technical	 assistance	 in	
industry,	 mainly	 in	 the	 field	 of	 mining	 and	 heavy	 industry.	 605	 All	 this	 information	
illustrates	 how,	 after	 initial	 hesitation,	 relations	 between	 Tanzania	 and	 socialist	
countries	began	to	flourish	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Zanzibar	revolution	and	the	creation	
of	the	United	Republic	of	Tanzania.		
	
	
5.11.1. Czechoslovak	 ‘special’	 activities	 in	 Tanzania	 and	 support	 to	 various	
regional	NLMs	
Between	1961	and	1964	the	sphere	of	special	military	and	security	cooperation	
was	 largely	 neglected	 within	 Czechoslovak‐Tanganyikan	 cooperation.	 The	 political	
situation	in	this	period	was	not	ripe	for	 it	especially	due	to	the	British	presence	 in	the	
Tanganyika’s	 army	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 state	 service.	 Despite	 this	 fact	 Czechoslovakia	
decided	 to	 open	 a	 local	 intelligence	 office	 at	 the	 Czechoslovak	 embassy	 soon	 after	
independence,	but	 in	 the	 first	year	of	 its	existence	the	main	operational	objectives	did	
not	 include	 special	 cooperation	 with	 Tanganyika’s	 government.	 Instead,	 the	 main	
concerns	of	the	Dar	es	Salaam	StB	Residency	was	Tanzania’s	significance	in	the	ongoing	
anticolonial	 struggle	 and	 Nyerere’s	 strong	 and	 open	 support	 of	 various	 national	
liberation	movements	in	this	part	of	Africa.	The	StB	Residency	in	Dar	was	supposed	to	
establish	 working	 contacts	 with	 various	 freedom	 fighters,	 which	 would	 later	 develop	
into	effective	cooperation.		
The	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	Residency	was	 established	 in	 1963	 or	 1964	 and	 operated	
until	1969,	when	it	was	provisionally	suspended	and	its	operatives	were	recalled	to	the	
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Prague	 headquarters	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	 Soviet	 invasion.606	 As	 was	 the	 case	 with	 the	
Nairobi	 Residency,	 for	 the	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 Residency	 it	 is	 quite	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	
between	 the	 responsibilities	 and	 activities	 of	 the	 MFA	 and	 those	 of	 the	 StB.	 Dar	 es	
Salaam	 Residency	 archive	 material	 amounts	 to	 some	 4000	 pages	 and	 includes	
intelligence	 reports,	 personal	 profiles	 and	 reports	 of	 the	 active	 measures	 of	 local	
operatives	over	more	than	20	years	extending	until	the	early	1980s.		
The	Residency	was	 reopened	 in	1970	with	new,	politically‐approved	staff	 and	
operated	at	 least	until	1975.607	The	Dar	Residency	was	 the	 first	 to	come	 into	action	 in	
East	 Africa	 and	 the	 experience	 gained	 during	 its	 organisation	 and	 the	 first	months	 of	
operation	were	later	used	in	the	creation	of	similar	offices	in	Nairobi	and	Kampala.	The	
Residency’s	 officers	 cooperated	 closely	 with	 diplomatic	 staff	 and,	 legitimised	 as	
members	 of	 the	 diplomatic	 corps,	 they	 were	 responsible	 for	 a	 number	 of	 official	
embassy	activities.	Besides	cooperation	with	and	support	for	local	NLMs,	the	Residency	
had	 a	 range	 of	 other	 aims,	 amongst	 which	 were	 acquiring	 intelligence	 and	 working	
actively	 against	 the	 Main	 Enemy	 and	 later	 also	 cooperating	 with	 the	 Tanzanian	
government	in	the	special	sphere.		
During	 the	 first	 year	 of	 its	 operations	 the	 Dar	 Residency	 faced	 many	
shortcomings.	The	 chief	Resident,	Viliam	Ciklamini,	 had	 to	put	up	with	his	operatives’	
lack	of	experience,	which	caused	low	effectiveness	and	brought	repeated	criticism	from	
headquarters.	Poor	organisation	and	mismanagement	affecting	so	many	spheres	of	the	
socialist	state	and	economy	negatively,	did	not	bypass	the	StB	either,	and	the	first	years	
of	operation	of	the	Dar	es	Salaam	Residency	can	serve	as	a	prime	example.	The	Resident,	
for	example,	had	managing	operatives	who	lacked	basic	language	skills.	Their	inability	to	
speak	Swahili	or	even	English	was	indeed	a	blow	to	the	pursuit	of	the	stated	objectives	
and	made	intelligence	work	difficult	and	sometimes	downright	ridiculous.608		
The	specific	operational	objectives	formulated	by	the	Prague	headquarters	were	
changing	regularly,	but	mostly	they	involved	the	collecting	of	intelligence	on	the	enemy	
states	 in	 East	 Africa	 that,	 over	 time,	 involved	 Britain,	 Canada,	 USA,	 Israel	 or	 West	
Germany.	 Three‐year	 objectives	 formulated	 in	 1965	 stated	 the	 following:	 ‘Britain	
remains	our	main	 enemy	 in	Tanzania.	The	 elementary	 long‐term	 task	of	 residency	 is	 to	
penetrate	 into	organizations	 through	which	Great	Britain	 influences	 the	development	 in	
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Tanzania	and	politics	of	Tanzania’s	government	with	the	aim	of	obtaining	especially	such	
documents	and	evidence	of	activities	of	British	embassy	and	other	British	organizations,	
which	could	be	used	 to	 limit	British	 influence	 in	Tanzania	and	 simultaneously	 to	deepen	
cooperation	and	understanding	between	Tanzania	and	socialist	camp	countries,	especially	
between	Tanzania	and	CSSR.’609	 In	 addition	 to	actions	against	 the	British,	 other	enemy	
states	 were	 to	 be	 targeted	 according	 to	 these	 objectives.	 ‘USA	 and	 West	 Germany	
constantly	show	greater	political	and	economic	interest	in	Tanzania.	The	task	of	residency	
is	 to	 obtain	 documents	 and	 important	 information	 about	 activities	 of	 these	 states	 in	
Tanzania,	especially	on	activities	of	American	intelligence.’610	
In	 the	 first	 years	 of	 operation	 the	 Residency	 was	 also	 to	 follow	 the	 internal	
political	 development	 and	 foreign	 political	 orientation	 of	 the	 Tanzanian	 government	
closely.	 611	 In	 1964,	 the	main	 objective	was	 ‘observing	 relations	between	 Zanzibar	and	
Tanganyika	and	 their	projection	on	 the	relations	with	 the	CSSR	and	 the	countries	of	 the	
socialist	 camp.’612	 As	Residency	 operatives	 gained	 experience,	 objectives	 became	more	
ambitious.	In	1966	President	Nyerere	was	set	as	the	primary	observation	object	for	the	
Residency.	The	Residency	was	 to	collect	all	 the	 information	on	activities	of	 the	British	
and	other	enemies	that	might	undermine	Nyerere’s	political	position.	They	were	also	to	
collect	 the	 appropriate	 intelligence	 to	 support	 Nyerere’s	 progressive	 political	
orientation	 and,	 via	 different	 channels,	 provide	 Nyerere	with	 intelligence	 discrediting	
Western	 experts,	 especially	 Canadian	military	 experts.613	 The	 permanent	 objective	 for	
the	Dar	 es	Salaam	Residency	was	also	 to	maintain	 contact	with	 local	NLMs,	providing	
them	with	support	and	collecting	information	on	developments	amongst	various	NLMs,	
but	also	within	different	organisations.614		
Ciklamini	 and	 his	 operatives	 created	 a	 network	 of	 contacts	 that	 included	
Tanzanian	and	Zanzibar	politicians,	diplomats	from	other	African	countries,	delegates	of	
local	branches	of	the	OAU	and	other	international	organisations,	members	of	NLMs,	local	
journalists,	 students	 and	 university	 staff,	 and	 even	 some	 nationals	 of	Western	 states.	
Maintaining	 contact	 with	 all	 these	 people	 was	 much	 easier	 in	 comparison	 to	 similar	
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activities	of	the	Nairobi	Residency.	StB	Residents	in	Dar	es	Salaam	had	very	good	legal	
diplomatic	cover	and,	even	if	there	were	a	suspicion	of	their	working	for	CS	intelligence,	
they	were	still	viewed	as	representatives	of	a	friendly	socialist	state.	At	no	point	did	the	
Dar	es	Salaam	Residency	have	 to	 face	state	persecution	or	active	measures	against	 its	
operatives,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 in	 Nairobi	 where	 StB	 operatives	 faced	 permanent	
surveillance,	bans	on	movement	and,	eventually,	expulsion.		
By	 1966	 the	 Resident	 and	 his	 operatives	 had	 a	 small	 network	 of	 confidential	
contacts,	 amongst	 whom	 were	 high‐ranking	 officials	 of	 the	 Tanzanian	 and	 Zanzibar	
governments,	 including	 ministers;	 by	 this	 means	 the	 Residency	 acquired	 substantial	
intelligence	 on	 Nyerere‘s	 plans:	 internal	 as	 well	 as	 foreign	 policy.615	 Via	 these	 people	
they	 were	 also	 well‐informed	 about	 Tanzania’s	 cooperation	 with	Western	 states	 and	
they	tried	to	infiltrate	some	of	the	Western	organisations	with	their	CCs.	Contacts	within	
the	Tanzanian	government	were	used	to	execute	CS	influence	on	government	decisions	
and	 there	 are	 reports	 of	 multiple	 active	 measures,	 mostly	 disinformation	 and	
discreditation	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 Western	 states,	 being	 conducted	 through	 these	
people.616	
	
As	was	mentioned	above,	civil	technical	assistance	was	mostly	stagnating	in	the	
first	half	of	 the	1960s;	but,	as	 in	most	cases,	 the	CSSR	was	more	effective	 in	providing	
assistance	 in	 the	special	 sphere,	even	 though	 it	 in	no	way	reached	the	 intensity	of	 the	
special	 cooperation	 with	 Uganda.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 1964	 the	 Interior	 Minister	 of	
Tanzania,	 J.M.	 Lusinde,	 visited	 Prague	 and	 officially	 requested	 security	 assistance	 for	
Tanzania	 mainly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 weapons	 and	 ammunition.	 The	 MFA	 dealt	 with	 this	
request	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	 Interior	 Ministry.	 The	 Tanzanian	 request	 was	 only	
partially	met,	as	‘the	Interior	Ministry	does	not	consider	it	wise	immediately	to	fully	meet	
all	requests	at	the	initial	stage	of	cooperation.	We	shall	reserve	the	opportunity	for	future	
high‐level	meetings	 and	 reassess	 the	 usefulness	 of	 providing	 arms	 in	 the	 future.’617	 The	
Politbyro	eventually	approved	the	delivery	of	360	Mk	23	or	58	machine	rifles,	and	30	Mk	
52/57	machine‐guns.	CS	help	fell	short	of	what	Lusinde	requested	by	200	machine	rifles.	
This	material	delivery	was	viewed	as	the	first	step	to	a	further	cooperation	of	security	
forces.	More	courses	for	Tanzanian	cadets	were	expected	to	be	sought	once	the	delivery	
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of	 material	 was	 completed.618	 According	 to	 Lusinde	 himself,	 the	 CSSR	 was	 the	 first	
socialist	country	to	provide	Tanzania	with	assistance	in	this	sphere.619				
Zídek	summarised	cooperation	between	 the	CSSR	and	Tanzania	 in	 this	sphere	
well.	 ‘In	1963	a	 six‐month	 ‘security	 course’	 for	 four	operatives	of	Tanganyika’s	 counter‐
espionage	took	place.	Following	the	consignment	of	arms	requested	by	Minister	Lusinde,	a	
six‐month	counter‐espionage	course	for	five	operatives	commenced	in	October	1964.	[…]	In	
November	 1965,	 a	 similar	 course	 was	 completed	 by	 fifteen	 Tanzanian	 security	
operatives.’620	 Upon	 the	 completion	 of	 each	 course,	 the	 cadets	 received	 personal	 arms	
and	a	limited	amount	of	intelligence	material.621	A	peculiarity	in	this	sphere	is	linked	to	
the	MND	Action	141,	which	was	officially	organised	as	military	 training	 for	Tanzanian	
cadets.	In	reality,	this	action	involved	members	of	the	South	African	military	wing	of	the	
ANC	Spear	of	Nation,	who	received	 false	 identities	and	documents	provided	by	 the	CS	
police	for	confidentiality	purposes.622		
Help	 provided	 in	 the	 security	 sphere	 was	 delivered	 with	 a	 very	 different	
perspective	 from	that	offered	to	Kenya	and	Uganda.	 In	Kenya,	 the	security	sphere	was	
believed	 to	have	a	major	 impact	on	CS	 competition	with	Britain	 and	 it	was	 thought	 it	
might	 contribute	 to	 the	 victory	 of	 the	 left	 wing	 of	 KANU.	 In	 Uganda,	 both	 security	
assistance	 and	 military	 assistance	 were	 also	 provided	 with	 the	 vision	 of	 substantial	
empowerment	 of	 a	 progressive	 government	 under	Obote.	 Commercial	 profit	 from	 the	
approved	 transactions	 was	 also	 a	 much‐appreciated	 aspect	 of	 special	 military	
cooperation	with	Obote’s	Uganda.		
In	Tanzania,	 special	 cooperation	was	 considered	 a	political	 priority	 in	neither	
the	 security	 nor	 the	 military	 sphere.	 In	 the	 initial	 period,	 Czechoslovak	 officials	
realistically	 assessed	 the	 internal	 political	 situation	 as	 not	 suitable	 for	 effective	
cooperation	 with	 Tanganyika’s	 government.	 The	 lack	 of	 local	 political	 support	 from	
Nyerere	and	the	heavy	presence	of	British	experts	would	have	made	any	such	effort	fail	
before	 it	 began.	 No	 substantial	 cooperation	 in	 these	 spheres	 developed	 either	 at	 any	
later	stage,	besides	the	few	exceptions	mentioned	above.	In	the	special	military	sphere	
the	 reason	 for	 this	 was	 perhaps	 competition	 from	 the	 Chinese	 and	 the	 Canadians.	
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Meanwhile,	in	the	security	sphere	it	was	perceived	to	be	more	effective	to	use	the	StB’s	
own	active	measures	executed	by	StB	operatives	with	the	aim	of	further	strengthening	
Nyerere’s	 position.	 Therefore	 no	 overly	 ambitious	 results	 were	 expected	 from	
Czechoslovak	 activities	 in	 this	 sphere,	 except	 for	 potential	 financial	 gains	 from	 future	
special	material	trading	and	for	counterbalancing	some	measures	of	Western	countries	
in	 this	 sphere.	 These	 were,	 however,	 not	 perceived	 as	 a	 critical	 threat	 to	 Tanzanian	
political	stability	and	socialist	orientation.				
	
From	 1965	 it	 was	 becoming	 clear	 that	 Tanzania	 was	 stabilised	 and	
progressively	oriented	in	its	foreign	policy.	At	the	same	time,	however,	reports	from	the	
Dar	 embassy	 began	 to	 admit	 that	 the	 ideological	 and	 political	 closeness	 between	
Tanzanian	 and	 socialist	 countries	 had	 not	 transformed	 into	 a	 working	 economic	
cooperation.	 While	 the	 decreasing	 British	 influence	 was	 welcomed,	 the	 ever	 more	
apparent	economic	orientation	of	China	was,	during	the	period	of	deepest	political	rift	
between	 China	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 socialist	 camp,	 viewed	 rather	 negatively.623	 No	
ambitious	plans	materialised	and	 the	execution	of	planned	projects	had	 in	most	 cases	
not	even	started.	Czechoslovak	cooperation	with	Tanzania	in	this	field	was	no	different	
from	other	 socialist	 countries.	The	CS	cabinet	approved	a	 loan	of	40	million	Kčs	 to	be	
used	by	1970	on	CS	projects,	including	a	tyre	factory,	the	previously	mentioned	ceramics	
factory,	and	technical	infrastructure	for	a	textile	factory.	A	critical	lack	of	available	funds	
to	cover	even	the	most	basic	preparatory	works	for	these	projects	on	the	Tanzanian	side	
was	 a	main	 obstacle	 to	 their	 execution,	which	was	 therefore	 to	 remain	 unresolved.624	
Negotiations	 on	 these	 issues	 in	 1965	 and	 1966	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 CS	 conditions	 for	
providing	 loans	were	unable	 to	match	China’s	 conditions	and	 therefore	 the	Tanzanian	
side	was	not	overly	keen	to	acquire	them.			
In	the	second	half	of	the	1960s	relations	between	Tanzania	and	the	CSSR	were	
not	 able	 to	 overcome	 the	 economic	 limitations	 of	 both	 states	 and	 they	 stagnated.	
Cooperation	in	the	security	sphere	did	not	continue	after	the	last	course	finished	in	1965	
and	CS	hopes	of	trade	relations	of	special	material	did	not	materialise,	either.625	Regular	
contacts	were	maintained	in	the	diplomatic	sphere	and	occasional	visits	of	mid‐ranking	
government	officials	took	place,	but	the	planned	visit	by	President	Nyerere	to	the	CSSR,	
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which	might	have	given	mutual	relations	a	new	boost,	never	took	place	due	to	the	Soviet	
invasion	 of	 Czechoslovakia.	 Cooperation	 continued	 in	 the	 educational	 sphere,	 but	 the	
records	 of	 Tanzanian	 students	 at	 CS	 Universities	 are	 very	 incomplete.	 Some	 hope	 for	
stagnating	relations	was	raised	after	the	cultural	agreement	was	finally	signed	by	both	
countries	 in	 February	1968,	which,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 finally	 provided	 a	 legal	 and	
practical	 framework	 for	 the	 civil	 expert	 missions	 to	 Tanzania.	 Before	 this	 agreement	
could	have	any	effect	on	mutual	relations,	however,	the	Soviet	invasion	of	the	CSSR	took	
place.	
	
	
5.11.2. Dar	 es	 Salaam	 as	 a	 base	 for	 Czechoslovak	 support	 to	 ZAPU	 and	
FRELIMO	
The	core	principle	of	Czechoslovak	 involvement	 in	Africa	during	 the	Cold	War	
was	its	anti‐colonial,	anti‐imperial	and	pro‐independence	stance.	These	principles	were	
stressed	 again	 and	 again	 by	 CS	 officials	 on	 the	 floor	 of	 different	 international	
organisations,	 as	 well	 as	 during	 bilateral	 talks	 with	 African	 countries.	 Spreading	 the	
message	 of	 the	 CS	 stance	 everywhere	 became	 perhaps	 as	 important	 as	 the	 practical	
steps	 that	 this	 stance	motivated.	 The	 actions	 of	 the	 CS	 government	might	 not	 always	
have	been	as	effective	as	the	message	that	it	got	out	there	but	the	emphasis	on	political	
support	was	often	as	important	as	the	material	aid.	Contacts	with	freedom	fighters	from	
ZAPU	 and	 FRELIMO	 and	 support	 to	 the	 on‐going	 struggle	 of	 the	 NLM	 of	 Southern	
Rhodesia	 and	 Mozambique	 became	 one	 of	 the	 main	 objectives	 of	 the	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	
embassy	as	well	as	the	local	StB	Residency	and	the	headquarters	in	Prague.	CS	support	
of	 these	organisations	 included	political	support,	 ideological	 training,	military	training,	
technical	education,	material	and	special	material	deliveries	and	financial	aid.					
Tanzanian	 political	 support	 of	 NLMs	 in	 the	 region	 became	 vital	 for	 their	
eventual	success.	The	location	of	Tanzania	close	to	the	conflict	zone,	its	ports,	railways	
and	road	infrastructure	became	the	crucial	factors	in	the	external	support	of	NLMs	that	
was	provided	mainly	by	socialist	countries	including	Czechoslovakia.	The	MFA	analysis	
describes	its	importance	as	follows:	 ‘The	capital	of	Tanzania	Dar	es	Salaam	has	become	
another	 important	 centre	 of	 resistance	 activities	 of	 the	 African	 liberation	 movement.	
Transport	of	military	material	of	different	organizations	operating	in	Tanzania’s	territory,	
distribution	of	books	 for	school	 in	 tropical	 forests,	 training	of	soldiers	recruited	amongst	
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inhabitants	 of	 countries	which	are	under	 colonist	 rule,	 relocation	 of	Chinese	 instructors	
used	for	training	in	military	camps	[…]	are	very	common	events	in	the	capital	of	Tanzania.	
[…]	Tanzania	secures	training,	transport	of	materials	and	psychological	help	to	resistance	
organizations.’626	 Tanzania	 also	 hosted	most	 of	 the	 political	 headquarters	 of	 NLMs	 as	
well	as	the	executive	secretariat	of	the	Liberation	Committee	of	the	OAU.	Other	forms	of	
support	for	NLMs	were	provided	by	Zambia,	in	whose	capital	the	CSSR	also	operated	an	
important	embassy.	Zambia,	meanwhile,	was	used	by	fighters	of	these	organisations	as	
an	operational	base	for	their	cross‐borders	operations.627		
From	approximately	1965	the	Dar	es	Salaam	embassy	was	effectively	in	charge	
of	 maintaining	 contacts	 and	 mediating	 help	 for	 ZAPU,	 Joshua	 Nkomo’s	 NLM	 from	
Zimbabwe.	 The	 first	 contact	 between	 CS	 and	 ZAPU	 took	 place	 in	 1962	 when	 ZAPU	
officials	 requested	assistance.628	No	details	of	 this	 request	are	known.	 In	1963,	ZAPU’s	
request	for	financial	help	was	declined.629	Another	request	for	assistance	was	addressed	
to	the	Dar	es	Salaam	embassy	in	1964.	A	request	for	special	material	for	50,000	people	
was,	 however,	 rejected	 by	 the	 MFA	 as	 unrealistic;	 but,	 as	 it	 viewed	 ZAPU	 as	 a	 well‐
established	 political	 power,	 it	 recommended	 some	 special	 assistance	 be	 provided.	
Eventually,	 the	 Politbyro	 approved	 the	 delivery	 of	 special	material	 for	 1,500	 to	 2000	
soldiers	 that	 included,	amongst	other	equipment,	500	Mk	98	rifles,	200	Mk	27	pistols,	
500	Mk	23/25	machine‐rifles,	1000	grenades,	50	Mk	26	submachine	guns	and	20	Mk	43	
S	 heavy	 machine	 guns,	 together	 with	 1,	000	 kg	 of	 TNT.630	 Means	 of	 delivery	 were	
discussed	with	the	Tanzanian	Vice‐President	Kawawa,	who	agreed	with	delivery	being	
officially	addressed	to	Tanzania.631	During	the	1960s	the	CSSR	also	provided	ZAPU	with	
a	limited	number	of	university	scholarships.632	
The	 CS	 MFA	 also	 had	 contacts,	 mainly	 via	 the	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 embassy,	 with	
representatives	of	ZANU	from	1963;	however,	after	initial	hesitation,	it	had	decided	not	
to	support	ZANU	which	was	receiving	substantial	assistance	from	China.	That	is	why,	in	
1966,	all	 their	 requests	were	 rejected	on	 the	grounds	 that	CS	officials	did	not	support	
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the	 fragmentation	 of	 Zimbabwe’s	 liberation	 movement	 and	 it	 also	 viewed	 ZANU	 as	
rather	more	right‐oriented	than	ZAPU.		
From	the	 first	contacts	 in	1965,	 relations	between	ZAPU	and	CS	officials	went	
through	 phases	 of	 fluctuating	 intensity	 of	 cooperation.	 These	 were	 mostly	 caused	 by	
internal	conflict	within	ZAPU	or	political	turbulence	in	the	CSSR.633	The	Soviet	invasion	
in	the	period	after	1968	was	the	major	temporary	disruption	to	mutual	relations.	The	CS	
embassies	in	Dar	es	Salaam	and	Lusaka	turned	down	multiple	requests	for	educational	
and	material	 support,	while	 their	 contacts	with	other	NLMs	were	 limited	 to	 acquiring	
intelligence	and	expressing	political	support	 for	 their	cause.	According	to	MFA	reports	
from	1971	onwards,	relations	with	ZAPU	had	normalised	again.		
	
The	 second	half	 of	 1960s	was	 a	period	of	 high	 intensity	 cooperation	between	
FRELIMO	and	Czechoslovak	officials	from	the	MFA	as	well	as	the	Dar	es	Salaam	embassy	
and	Residency.	Armed	actions	by	FRELIMO	began	 in	September	1964	and,	one	month	
later,	the	CSSR	was	visited	by	the	front’s	leader,	Eduardo	Mondlane.	Mondlane	asked	the	
CS	 government	 for	 assistance,	 particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 political	 and	 technical	
training	 of	 FRELIMO	 cadres	 that	was	 to	 take	 place	 in	 Tanzania.634	 Before	 this	 request	
could	be	met,	the	first	delivery	of	special	material	for	FRELIMO	was	approved.	In	1965,	
the	 Politbyro	 approved	 special	 material	 help	 for	 FRELIMO,	 which	 was	 to	 include,	
amongst	other	things,	500	Mk	98	rifles,	200	pistols,	500	machine	rifles,	50	light	machine	
guns,	20	heavy	machine	guns,	1000	hand	grenades,	and	1000	kilograms	of	TNT.	Delivery	
was	 almost	 identical	 to	 that	 of	 another	 delivery	 for	 ZAPU	 and	 was	 also	 officially	
addressed	 to	 the	 Tanzanian	 Defence	 Ministry,	 which	 forwarded	 it	 to	 FRELIMO	
fighters.635		
CS	 support	 for	FRELIMO	 in	 this	period,	 in	 spheres	other	 than	special	material	
deliveries,	was	eventually	approved	as	well.	In	1966	the	StB	sent	its	specialist	to	teach	at	
the	Mozambique	Institute	in	Dar	es	Salaam.	Dr	Vilím	became	the	fourth	member	of	the	
local	 Residency	 and	 he	 regularly	 reported	 on	 his	 progress	 at	 the	 Institute.	 Dr	 Vilím	
officially	taught	several	courses	at	the	Institute,	where	he	was	in	everyday	contact	with	
young	Mozambicans,	many	of	whom	were	affiliated	to	FRELIMO.	Apart	from	his	official	
activities,	 Dr	 Vilím	 led	 multiple	 ideological	 courses	 for	 FRELIMO	 members	 and,	
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according	 to	 the	 available	 documents,	 he	 was	 also	 asked	 to	 organise	 some	 military	
training	 for	 FRELIMO	 cadets	 directly	 in	 Tanzania.	 Vilím	 used	 his	 contacts	 with	 the	
leaders	 of	 FRELIMO,	 especially	 Marcellino	 Dos	 Santos,	 to	 influence	 the	 ideological	
orientation	 of	 this	 organisation.	 He	 also	 followed	 all	 FRELIMO	 activities	 closely	 and	
intelligence	 acquired	 was	 forwarded	 via	 the	 local	 Residency	 to	 the	 Prague	
headquarters.636	 In	 the	 following	 years	 the	 Dar	 es	 Salaam	 embassy	 remained	 in	 close	
contact	 with	 FRELIMO	 officials,	 but	 no	 other	 technical	 assistance	 of	 any	 kind	 is	
mentioned	in	the	archives.		
	
5.12. The	introduction	of	ujamaa	
From	1964	on	the	government	of	Tanzania	sought	more	intensive	relations	with	
socialist	countries.	This	move	was	not	welcome	in	the	West	and	Tanzania	was	beginning	
to	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 socialist	 country.	 Even	 though	 at	 first	 such	 claims	 were	 not	
completely	 justified,	 because	 Tanzania	 had	 still	 been	 very	 much	 devoted	 to	 non‐
alignment,	 over	 the	 course	 of	 1966	 and	 1967	 internal	 political	 developments	 saw	 the	
progressive	 introduction	of	 socialist	policies	 to	 the	country’s	political	 life	as	well	as	 to	
the	 economy.	 From	 1967	 and	 especially	 during	 the	 1970s	Nyerere	 came	 to	 personify	
African	 socialism	and	Tanzania	became	a	 case	 study	 for	a	unique	 socialist	 experiment	
under	African	conditions.	Besides,	not	many	countries	established	and	maintained	such	
tight	 relations	 for	 so	 long	with	 various	 socialist	 countries	 as	 Tanzania	 did.	 Tanzania’s	
move	 towards	 socialism	 was	 determined	 by	 the	 mixture	 of	 factors	 –	 the	 West’s	
controversial	 role	 in	 the	 affairs	 of	 the	 Congo	 and	 Ghana,	 falling‐out	with	 Britain	 over	
Southern	 Rhodesia,	 Nyerere’s	 resolution	 to	 give	 effective	 support	 to	 southern	 African	
NLMs,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 Zanzibar’s	 socialist	 politicians	 in	 the	 cabinet,	 the	 rapidly	
decreasing	amount	of	 foreign	aid	to	Tanzania	and	the	necessity	to	replace	 it	with	help	
from	the	East.					
An	 important	 step	 towards	 the	 introduction	 of	 socialism	 in	 Tanzania	was	 the	
passing	of	a	new	Constitution	 in	1965	 that	officially	 introduced	a	one‐party	 system	 to	
the	 country	 while	 banning	 other	 political	 parties	 and	 restructuring	 the	 trade	 union	
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system.637	 This	 constitutional	 amendment	 caused	 much	 less	 domestic	 opposition	 in	
comparison	 to	 similar	 developments	 in	 Uganda,	 coming	 as	 it	 did	 soon	 after	 the	
triumphant	Uhuru;	 TANU	 and	Nyerere	were	 still	 at	 the	 height	 of	 their	 popularity,	 the	
alternative	political	parties	had	so	far	failed	to	gain	significant	popular	support	and	the	
country	had	operated	as	a	de	facto	one‐party	state	since	independence.		
The	new	Constitution	was	openly	socialist	in	emphasising	the	responsibility	of	
government	 to	 effectively	 control	 the	 means	 of	 production	 and	 facilitate	 collective	
ownership	of	the	country’s	resources.638	The	government	claimed	that	the	introduction	
of	the	one‐party	system	did	not	threaten	the	democratic	nature	of	the	Tanzanian	state	as	
membership	 of	 TANU	 was	 very	 high	 and	 intra‐party	 competition	 for	 political	
nominations	remained	in	place.	In	this	period	also	military	reform	took	place	when	the	
new	People’s	Militia	was	introduced.	This	new	voluntary	military	force	was	not	apolitical	
anymore	as	 it	was	 linked	to	TANU’s	Youth	League	which	provided	most	cadets	 for	the	
militia.639	 Between	 1965	 and	 1967	 the	 role	 of	 the	 country’s	 Parliament	 was	
progressively	marginalised	when	most	 of	 the	 effective	policies	were	being	decided	by	
the	National	Executive	Committee	(NEC),	a	party	organ	dominated	by	low‐ranking	TANU	
officials,	rather	than	by	the	cabinet	or	Parliament	members.640			
In	 1967	 Nyerere	 finally	 introduced	 a	 document	 that	 became	 known	 as	 the	
Arusha	 Declaration.	 It	 ‘provided	 a	 blueprint	 for	 the	 country’s	 socialist	 development	
strategy,	established	the	principle	of	state	ownership	and	control	of	the	national	economy.	
The	declaration	emphasized	the	need	for	self‐reliant	national	economic	development	that	
would	be	less	dependent	on	foreign	capital.’641	The	Arusha	Declaration	further	expounded	
on	 the	 three	 fundamental	principles	of	Tanzanian	 socialism	as	declared	by	Nyerere	 in	
1966.	These	were:	communal	socialism,	public	ownership	and	control	and	curiously	also	
dedication	to	non‐alignment.642	The	Arusha	Declaration	itself	was	more	concentrated	on	
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the	so‐called	ujamaa	principles	which	besides	the	public	ownership	already	mentioned	
put	much	emphasis	on	egalitarianism,	hard	work	and	national	self‐reliance.643		
To	 put	 the	 Arusha	 Declaration	 principles	 into	 practice	 the	 Tanzanian	
government	 supported	 the	 creation	 of	 so‐called	 ujamaa	 villages	 which	 were	 loosely	
similar	 to	 Israel’s	 concept	of	 the	kibbutz.	The	development	of	ujamaa	 villages	 tried	 to	
establish	 the	 blend	 of	 traditional	 Tanzanian	 peasant	 system	 with	 some	 modern	
improvements,	 in	 order	 to	 form	 self‐reliant	 communities	 as	 the	 fundamental	
constituents	 of	 Tanzanian	 society.	Ujamaa	 villages	 were	 by	 far	 not	 the	 only	 practical	
outcome	 of	 the	 Arusha	 declaration.	 The	 government’s	 initiatives	 were	 ambitious	 and	
they	addressed	every	sphere	of	the	country’s	political	and	economic	environment.	‘They	
included:	 the	 nationalization	 of	 the	 banks,	 the	 foreign‐owned	 plantations	 growing	
Tanzania’s	 export	 crops,	 and	 important	 parts	 of	 the	 limited	 industrial	 sector;	 the	
introduction	 of	 a	 stringent	 leadership	 code	which	 sought	 to	 contain	 corruption	 and	 to	
block	the	emergence	of	private	economic	activities	and	the	employment	of	wage	labour	by	
political	leaders	and	by	senior	party	and	government	officials;	a	sustained	effort	to	reform	
the	educational	system	 in	Tanzania	so	that	young	Tanzanians	would	embrace	the	values	
and	acquire	 the	skills	appropriate	 to	 the	society	of	equals	 they	were	committed	 to	build;	
the	 major	 effort	 by	 TANU	 to	 induce	 peasants	 to	 farm	 collectively;	 […]	 an	 attempt	 to	
regulate	 in	 detail	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 private	 economic	 activities;	 and	 an	 extensive	 state	
takeover	of	household	properties	that	were	not	occupied	by	their	owners.’644	Later,	and	not	
unrelated	 to	 the	Arusha	Declaration,	 the	plan	of	building	a	new	capital	Dodoma	 in	 the	
very	centre	of	the	country	was	also	introduced.		
The	 introduction	 of	 ujamaa	 naturally	 created	 various	 reactions	 at	 home	 and	
abroad.	West	 clearly	 did	 not	 approve	 this	 further	move	 to	 the	 left,	while	 the	 socialist	
countries	 saw	 new	 possibilities	 for	 exerting	 their	 influence	 now	 that	 Tanzania	 had	
openly	 declared	 itself	 socialist.	 From	 1966	 the	 Soviet	 government	 was	 increasingly	
pleased	with	Tanzania’s	development,	but	even	though	ujamaa	had	been	perceived	as	a	
step	in	the	right	direction	by	them,	the	ultimate	objective	of	the	Soviets	in	Tanzania	was	
to	achieve	full	acceptance	of	the	principles	of	scientific	socialism.645	Dr	Kitine	recalls	the	
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meeting	that	President	Nyerere	had	with	the	Soviet	ambassador	in	the	late	1960s,	when	
Tanzania’s	president	patiently	and	sturdily	defended	his	ujamaa	socialism	as	a	feasible	
and	 a	 more	 appropriate	 alternative	 for	 Africa	 than	 the	 Soviet‐modelled	 scientific‐
socialism.		
Within	 TANU	 itself	 reactions	 varied	 greatly:	 universally	 the	 ujamma	 policies	
were	accepted	by	most	members,	but	exceptions	did	exist.	On	one	side	of	the	spectrum,	
that	 of	 left	 radicals,	 there	was	 some	 opposition	 because	 they	wanted	 to	 impose	 even	
more	 drastic	 policies	 based	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 either	 scientific	 socialism,	 Marxism‐
Leninism	 or	 Maoism.646	 Mwalimu	 Nyerere	 repeatedly	 denounced	 the	 growing	
infatuation	of	some	TANU	members	with	Marxism‐Leninism.647	At	the	other	end	of	the	
opinion	spectrum	were	the	fears	of	some	members	of	the	reform’s	being	too	radical	and	
having	adverse	social	and	economic	effects.	Oscar	Kambona	was	also	in	this	last	group:	
once	 one	 of	 the	 most	 fervent	 socialists	 within	 KANU,	 he	 found	 himself,	 however,	
increasingly	 excluded	 from	 the	main	 circle	 of	 power,	 until	 he	 ultimately	 fell	 out	with	
Nyerere	and	opted	 for	exile	 in	Britain	 in	1967.648	Kambona	was	not	 the	only	victim	of	
the	growing	illiberalism	within	TANU.	Between	1967	and	1970	several	influential	party	
members	 were	 detained,	 tried	 and	 some	 even	 executed	 for	 their	 criticism	 and	 their	
failure	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 political	 course	 the	 TANU	 government	 had	 set.649	
Nevertheless,	 none	 of	 these	 events	 could	 really	 alter	 the	 course	 firmly	 set	 towards	
building	socialism	in	Tanzania	over	the	following	two	decades.		
	
5.13. The	1968	Soviet	invasion	of	Czechoslovakia	and	its	effect	on	
Czechoslovak‐	Tanzanian	relations	
The	 invasion	 of	 the	 CSSR	 by	 Warsaw	 Pact	 armies	 led	 by	 the	 Soviets	 had	 an	
immense	effect	on	affairs	between	the	CSSR	and	Tanzania	and	was	significantly	reflected	
in	 these	 relations.	 As	 in	 Uganda,	 the	 change	 of	 Czechoslovak	 political	 leadership	
resulting	from	the	invasion	meant	the	end	of	previous	partially	independent	activism	in	
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Tanzania.	 Even	 though	 cooperation	 between	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 Tanzania	 did	
eventually	 resume	 and	 even	 surpassed	 the	 intensity	 of	 relations	 in	 the	 1960s,	
Czechoslovakia	never	again	aspired	to	practise	its	own	partially	independent	politics	in	
Tanzania.	Rather,	it	became	fully	subject	to	the	Soviets,	while	its	place	was	taken	by	East	
Germany.	
The	 invasion	 of	 Czechoslovakia	 initially	 also	 affected	 relations	 between	
Tanzania	and	the	Soviet	Union.	Nyerere,	never	overly	fond	of	the	Soviets,	was	to	become	
one	of	the	loudest	critics	of	the	Soviet	 invasion.	In	an	immediate	reaction	to	the	Soviet	
invasion,	Nyerere	 cancelled	his	 planned	 state	 visit	 to	 the	USSR	and	postponed	 it	 until	
such	 time	as	 the	Soviets	would	retreat	 from	the	CSSR.650	The	Tanzanian	Foreign	Office	
reacted	 to	 the	 situation	with	 a	 statement	 of	 full	 support	 and	 approval	 of	 CS	 political	
developments	 prior	 to	 the	 invasion,	 developments	which	 had	 been	 considered	 by	 the	
Soviets	a	dangerous	deviation	from	socialist	principles.651	The	spontaneous	reactions	of	
Tanzanian	politicians	and	public	are	best	illustrated	by	the	telegrams	that	Ambassador	
Josef	 Virius	 sent	 to	 Prague.	 ‘Tanzanian	government	denounced	aggression	as	 an	act	 of	
colonialism.	 […]Tanzanian	newspapers	resolutely	denounce	occupation	of	CSSR	 since	 the	
beginning.’652	 The	 official	 declaration	 of	 Nyerere’s	 government	 on	 this	 matter	 stated,	
amongst	other	things,	that	the	‘Tanzanian	government	is	deeply	shaken	by	the	occupation	
of	 the	 CSSR.	 […]	 This	 act	 of	 aggression	 constitutes	 betrayal	 of	 all	 principles	 of	 self‐
determination	and	national	sovereignty.	[…]	Tanzania	 is	against	all	 forms	of	colonialism,	
new	as	well	as	old,	in	Africa,	in	Europe,	everywhere.’653	According	to	Virius,	the	Tanzanian	
media	 reported	 fully	 in	 line	 with	 information	 provided	 by	 the	 CS	 government	 and	
ignored	Soviet	explanations.	Official	political	statements	were	 followed	 in	 the	 first	 few	
days	 after	 the	 invasion	 by	 demonstrations	 organised	 by	 student	 organisations	 and	
officially	 led	by	 the	Foreign	Secretary	of	Tanzania.	Demonstrators	marched	across	Dar	
es	Salaam	in	front	of	the	Soviet	and	the	CS	embassies	on	several	occasions.654		
The	Czechoslovak	 ambassador,	 Josef	Virius,	 himself	 an	outspoken	 critic	 of	 the	
Soviet	 invasion,	 reported	 numerous	 declarations	 of	 support	 received	 by	 Tanzanian	
officials,	but	also	by	members	of	other	diplomatic	missions,	including	African	missions,	
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with	 the	 obvious	 exception	 of	 representatives	 of	 countries	 participating	 in	 the	
invasion.655	According	 to	Virius’	 reports	on	 the	 local	 situation,	 the	Soviet	 invasion	was	
heavily	 criticised	 by	 representatives	 of	 African	 NLMs	 including	 FRELIMO656	 and	 by	
several	African	countries	with	vital	relations	with	the	Soviets,	for	example	the	Egyptian	
President	Nassir.	The	Tanzanian	reaction	to	the	invasion	was	among	the	strongest	and	
most	 critical	 that	 the	 Soviets	 faced	 in	 Africa,	 but	 especially	 amongst	 the	 socialist	
countries	of	the	world.		
Nyerere’s	reaction	to	the	Soviet	 invasion	of	the	CSSR	was	certainly	daring,	but	
Tanzania	was	 in	no	economic	position	 to	abandon	all	 contacts	with	 the	USSR	 for	 long.	
According	 to	 the	 recollections	 of	 Nyerere’s	 closest	 colleagues,	 Nyerere’s	 personal	
opinion	 of	 the	 USSR	was	 extremely	 negative,	 but	 this	 view	 could	 not	 have	 been	 fully	
reflected	 in	Tanzanian	 foreign	policy	 in	 the	 long	 term.	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	Tanzanian	
orientation	 towards	 China	 deepened	 further	 after	 1968,	 economic	 and	 technical	
cooperation	 with	 the	 Soviets	 was	 also	 sought,	 and	 occasional	 inter‐governmental	
meetings	could	not	be	avoided.657		
Eventually,	 as	mentioned	 above,	 Czechoslovakia	 also	 resumed	 its	 activities	 in	
Tanzania.	 Archival	 documents	 illustrate,	 however,	 how	 cautious	 and	 reserved	
Tanzania’s	officials	were	towards	the	newly	arrived	representatives	of	the	Czechoslovak	
state.	 The	 diplomatic	 and	 expert	 staff	 present	 in	 Tanzania	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 invasion	
decided	for	the	greater	part	to	break	links	with	home	and	opt	for	exile.	The	continuum	of	
relations	 with	 Tanzanian	 officials	 as	 well	 as	 various	 NLMs	 being	 supported	 was	
disturbed	somewhat	by	 this	development	and	 it	 took	some	 time	 for	cooperation	 to	be	
fully	reinstated.							
Czechoslovak	political	and	diplomatic	relations	with	Tanzania	after	1968	were	
deeply	 affected	 not	 only	 by	 the	 invasion	 itself,	 but	 mostly	 by	 the	 change	 of	 political	
leadership	that	took	place	in	the	CSSR	and	which	Nyerere	was	rather	cautious	about.	It	
took	 several	 years	before	CSSR	 foreign	political	 activities	were	 resumed.	 In	 respect	of	
sub‐Saharan	Africa,	the	1973	MFA	report	stresses	the	effective	cooperation	successfully	
established	with	‘brother	states’,	namely	the	USSR,	Poland,	Hungary	and	East	Germany,	
all	of	which	took	part	in	the	1968	invasion	of	the	CSSR.658	This	best	illustrates	the	nature	
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and	extent	of	 the	political	 turnaround	that	 took	place	 in	 in	 the	early	1970s	during	 the	
period	of	harsh	‘normalisation’	of	the	political	situation	in	Czechoslovakia.		
In	 the	 plans	 of	 the	 ‘normalised’	 MFA,	 which	 were	 based	 on	 the	 objectives	
approved	by	the	XIV	KSČ	Congress	and	by	the	Politbyro,	Tanzania	was	 included	 in	the	
group	of	progressive	African	states,	with	whom	future	relations	were	to	be	a	priority.659	
The	 political	 coldness	 of	 Tanzania	 towards	 the	 new	 CS	 government	 was	 slowly	
diminishing	and	 in	December	1971	a	CS	government	delegation	was	 invited	 to	 attend	
the	 national	 celebrations.660	 Mutual	 interest	 in	 re‐establishing	 cooperation	 led	 to	 an	
economic	 agreement	 envisaging	 projects	 of	 up	 to	 10	 million	 USD.661	 Available	
information,	 however,	 indicates	 that	 once	 again	 these	 ambitious	 plans	 of	 economic	
cooperation	did	not	materialise	and	all	 that	remained	were	political	gestures	and	joint	
declarations.					
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
				
                                                            
659 MZV F. IV/8 8TO, č.j. 024.096/73‐8, 18.7.1973, 2. 
660 Zídek, and Sieber, Československo, 208. 
661 MZV F. IV/8 8TO, č.j. 024.096/73‐8, 18.7.1973, 3. 
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6. Czechoslovakia	and	Africa	after	1968	
The	 Soviet	 invasion	 in	 August	 1968	 became	 the	 major	 historical	 event	 in	
modern	 CS	 history	 and,	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways,	 it	 also	 affected	 CS	 relations	 with	 East	
Africa.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 would	 be	 grossly	 inaccurate	 and	 wrong	 to	 identify	 21	 August	
1968	as	a	moment	of	crucial	turnaround	in	CS	relations	with	all	African	countries.	The	
Soviet	 invasion	of	Czechoslovakia	carried	differing	implications	even	for	relations	with	
three	 East	 African	 countries.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Kenya	 the	 Soviet	 invasion	 only	 added	 to	
Czechoslovakia’s	swift	and	ultimate	retreat	which	began	in	1966	and	sped	up	from	then	
on.	For	Czechoslovak	activities	in	Uganda	the	effects	of	the	Soviet	invasion	were	perhaps	
the	 least	 significant.	 A	 much	 greater	 disturbance	 that	 marked	 the	 end	 of	 one	 era	 of	
mutual	cooperation	and	the	beginning	of	another	was	Idi	Amin’s	coup	d‘état.	Only	in	the	
case	 of	 Tanzania	 were	 the	 effects	 of	 	 the	 Soviet	 invasion	 what	 they	 were	 for	
Czechoslovak	state	in	general	–	major	disruption,	the	end	of	a	euphoric	stage	of	socialist	
development	and	 the	beginning	of	new	period	of	an	unambitious,	 ineffective,	 subdued	
Soviet	satellite	whose	position	was	claimed	by	other	socialist	countries.	
	
Between	1965	and	1968	various	levels	of	criticism	of	past	CS	activities	in	Africa	
were	being	formulated	by	different	government	offices.	An	assessment	of	past	relations	
with	 ELDCs	 approved	 by	 the	 Politbyro	 in	 December	 1967	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 positive	
evaluations.	 ‘Latest	 developments	 have	 confirmed	 the	 correctness	 of	 our	 basic	 strategy	
[towards	 ELDCs]	 based	 on	 accomplishing	 these	 tasks:	 to	 execute	 mutually	 beneficial	
cooperation	 with	 developing	 countries	 of	 Asia,	 Africa,	 Latin	 America,	 to	 support	
progressive	 social	 forces	 in	 these	 countries	 in	 their	 fight	 against	 imperialism,	 neo‐
colonialism	 and	 against	 the	 exportation	 of	 contra‐revolution,	 support	 in	 their	 effort	 to	
attain	 full	political	and	economic	 independence	and	social	progress,	and	 to	offer	general	
support	to	national	liberation	struggles	of	oppressed	nations.’662	One	has	to	be	aware	that	
it	was	unacceptable	for	the	Politbyro	to	denounce	its	past	practice	towards	ELDCs	where	
no	major	reason	for	such	step	existed.	For	political	and	ideological	reasons	it	was	much	
more	 useful	 to	 portray	 its	 past	 activities	 as	 successful,	 even	 though	 many	 of	 the	
objectives	from	the	beginning	of	the	decade	had	not	been	met.		
                                                            
662 NAA F. 1261/0/5, č.j. 3526/9, 13.12.1967, 2.  
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MFA	 officials	 were	 much	 more	 critical	 of	 the	 accomplishments	 of	 CS	 foreign	
policy	 in	 Africa.	 As	 shown	 in	 internal	 documents,	 in	 1966	 they	 had	 already	 begun	 to	
express	criticism	towards	the	developments	in	Africa	in	the	previous	decade.	They	were	
aware	that	plans	to	cripple	capitalist	camps	via	close	and	effective	cooperation	between	
the	 socialist	 countries	 and	African	 states	had	not	been	 fulfilled.	Most	 of	 the	blame	 for	
this	failure	they,	however,	addressed	towards	the	Africans.	The	MFA	analysis	identified	a	
range	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 reasons	 for	 the	 failure	 of	 their	 plans.	 Poor	 economic	
performance,	 minimal	 economic	 growth,	 excessive	 economic	 dependency	 on	 the	
markets	of	former	colonial	masters	and	the	archaic	structure	of	African	societies	are	the	
reasons	cited	for	economic	disappointment.	The	on‐going	economic	struggle	had	had	an	
effect	 on	 the	 political	 instability	 of	 local	 regimes	 and	 subsequent	 dependency	 on	 the	
West.	 Political	 turbulences	 had	 effectively	 put	 a	 stop	 to	 the	 continental	 wave	 of	 the	
national	liberation	cause,	which	was	yet	to	be	completed.663		
The	 poor	 state	 of	 the	 political‐economic	 landscape	 across	 Africa	 in	 the	 late	
1960s	was	much	more	challenging	and	much	less	favourable	to	socialist	countries	than	a	
decade	earlier.	A	more	realistic	approach	to	Africa,	reconsideration	of	past	errors	and	of	
overly	optimistic	objectives,	as	well	as	reassessing	the	actual	political	potential	of	Africa	
within	the	global	context,	were	necessary	steps	to	be	taken	by	CS	policy‐makers	at	the	
end	 of	 the	 1960s.	 The	 approach	 taken	 towards	 Africa	 during	 the	 next	 period	 was	
characterised	as	follows:	‘Tropical	Africa,	where	it	is	possible	to	develop	diverse	relations	
on	the	basis	of	mutual	benefits	and	advantages	(especially	in	the	economic	area),	remains	
an	attractive	region	for	our	foreign	politics,	[…].	It	should	not	be	forgotten	that	due	to	the	
multitude	of	African	 states,	 tropical	Africa	 remains	an	 important	 factor	at	 international	
forums.	Despite	current	political	 instability	of	the	majority	of	these	countries	and	despite	
the	 reduced	 pace	 of	 national	 liberation	 movement,	 which	 has	 not	 been	 completely	
eliminated	by	imperialism,	one	has	to	take	into	account	that	in	the		long‐term	perspective,	
the	 inclination	 of	 this	 part	 of	 the	 world	 towards	 speeding	 up	 political	 and	 economic	
emancipation	 will	 resurface.	 [...]	 Cooperation	 with	 socialist	 countries	 could	 be	 an	
important	factor.	Certain	evidence	of	such	a	trend	can	already	be	observed	in	some	eastern	
African	countries.’664			
                                                            
663 MZV PK 126, č.j. 104.876/69‐8, 17.3.1969, 17‐20. 
664 MZV PK 126, č.j. 104.876/69‐8, 17.3.1969, 20.  
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As	 is	 obvious	 from	 the	 previous	 citation,	 CS	 officials	 were	 aware	 that	 the	
intensive,	 euphoric	but	often	erroneous	development	of	 the	 early	1960s	needed	 to	be	
revoked.	 They	 also	 realised	 that	 potential	 CS	 success	 in	 Africa	 would	 not	 have	 a	 far‐
reaching	 effect	 on	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	 East	 and	West.	 The	 global	 political	
significance	 of	 Africa	 also	 needed	 to	 be	 realistically	 reconsidered.	 It	 is	 important	 to	
realise	 that	 the	 wave	 of	 de‐colonialism	 and	 hasty	 unprepared	 independence	 of	
numerous	African	states	that	followed	was	an	unprecedented	historical	event.	As	such,	it	
was	impossible	for	CS	officials	to	ready	themselves	for	what	was	to	come	and	it	is	only	
natural	 that	 some	 of	 the	 original	 assumptions,	 expectations	 and	 plans	 proved	 faulty.	
Despite	 all	 the	 limitations	 and	 shortfalls	 that	 agents	 of	 CS	 relations	 with	 African	
countries	had	 to	cope	with,	 their	high	aspirations,	proven	abilities	and	results	of	 their	
activities	achieved	in	less	than	a	decade	must	be	perceived	positively.	
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Conclusion	
The	 story	 of	 Czechoslovak	 involvement	 in	 East	 Africa	 in	 the	 late	 colonial	 and	
early	 post‐colonial	 period	 is	 a	 story	 of	 unlikely	 yet	 important	 and	 influential	 political	
relations	that	came	into	existence	as	one	of	many	episodes	which	together	represent	the	
wide	and	complex	historical	epoch	of	the	Cold	War.	Czechoslovak	cooperation	with	East	
Africa	was	 very	much	 a	 result	 of	 the	 state	 of	 global	 international	 relations	 but	 at	 the	
same	time	it	was	also	a	second	phase,	or	an	extension	of	sorts,	of	an	earlier	Czechoslovak	
presence	in	the	African	continent	from	before	the	Second	World	War.		
A	 deep	 exploration	 of	 recently	 opened	 Czechoslovak	 archive	 collections	
produced	a	 large	mass	of	original	historical	sources	that	allowed	the	reconstruction	of	
Czechoslovak	activities	in	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika	and	a	subsequent	analysis	of	a	
variety	of	 aspects	 that	 characterised	Czechoslovak	 involvement.	Most	of	 the	questions	
formulated	 in	 the	very	beginning	of	 this	research	project	as	well	as	 those	which	arose	
during	data	collection	or	in	relation	to	the	analysis	of	existing	secondary	literature	have	
been	 fully	or	at	 least	partially	answered	by	 these	 findings.	The	documentary	evidence	
collected	also	 allowed	 for	 the	primary	hypothesis	of	 this	 thesis	 formulated	during	 the	
research	 to	 be	 satisfyingly	 proved.	 Some	 of	 the	 answers	 to	 research	 questions	
highlighted	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 thesis	 have	 been	 answered	 clearly	 by	 the	
documentary	 evidence	 collected,	 while	 some	 others	 had	 to	 be	 derived	 from	 a	
combination	of	primary	and	secondary	sources.		
	
Czechoslovak	 activities	 in	 East	 African	 in	 the	 late	 colonial	 and	 early	 post‐
colonial	 period	 took	 place	 as	 part	 of	 the	 new	 quest	 of	 socialist	 countries,	 led	 by	 the	
Soviet	 Union,	 to	 establish	 themselves	 in	 Africa.	 In	 the	 late	 1950s	 a	 wave	 of	
decolonisation	 started	 in	 West	 Africa	 and	 eventually	 reached	 the	 eastern	 part	 of	
continent	a	few	years	later.	In	this	period	Czechoslovakia	and	Soviet	Union	successfully	
initiated	contacts	with	several	West	African	countries	thus	providing	themselves	with	a	
policy	 framework	 and	 an	 applicable	 strategy	 to	 react	 effectively	 to	 the	 intensifying	
liberation	movements	of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika.		
There	 were	 several	 main	 objectives	 of	 Czechoslovak	 and	 Soviet	 activities	 in	
Africa	 at	 this	 stage.	 At	 first,	 socialist	 countries	 aimed	 to	 provide	 effective	 support	 to	
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African	 national	 liberation	movements	 in	 order	 to	 end	 the	 colonial	 dominance	 of	 the	
British	 and	 the	 French.	 They	 believed	 that	 providing	 local	 freedom	 fighters	 with	
effective	support	in	their	pursuit	of	independence	would	help	to	establish	firm	ties	with	
the	new	East	African	regimes.	Through	these	relations,	which	would	be	taking	place	in	
various	 forms	and	 in	various	spheres,	East	African	political	 regimes	would	be	brought	
closer	 to	 the	 socialist	 camp.	 An	 ultimate	 goal	 was	 to	 influence	 local	 governments	 to	
adopt	 socialism	as	 the	political	 and	economic	 system	 for	 their	 countries.	 Such	a	move	
would	necessarily	lead	to	a	decrease	of	Western	influence	in	East	Africa	and	to	a	partial	
victory	in	the	global	political	rivalry	between	the	socialist	East	and	the	capitalist	West.		
			Czechoslovakia	used	various	means	to	reach	its	objectives	in	East	Africa.	In	the	
first,	 pre‐independence,	 stage,	 it	 needed	 to	 establish	 working	 channels	 of	
communication	 which	 would	 enable	 it	 to	 react	 effectively	 to	 the	 requirements	 and	
demands	of	East	African	NLMs.	 In	 the	 case	of	Kenya	and	Uganda	 these	 channels	were	
established	via	KANU’s	and	the		UPC’s	office	in	Cairo,	who	were	in	regular	contact	with	
officials	of	the	Czechoslovak	embassy	in	Egypt.	The	Cairo	offices	of	KANU	and	the	UPC	
remained	 in	 regular	 contact	with	 CS	 officials	who	were	 thus	 able	 to	 respond	 to	 their	
requests	for	support.	At	this	stage	the	most	effective	forms	of	support	proved	to	be	the	
provision	 of	 financial	 and	 technical	 help	 to	 both	 KANU	 and	 the	 UPC,	 and	 organising	
professional	 training	 for	 selected	 applicants,	 at	 this	 point	 mainly	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	
propaganda	 and	 journalism.	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 were	 aware	 that	 expertise	 of	 that	
kind	would	be	vital	in	order	to	advertise	the	political	cause	the	NLMs	were	following	and	
to	attract	wide	public	support	for	it.	Another	form	of	relations	of	high	significance	in	this	
period	was	Czechoslovakia’s	 outspoken	political	 support	 of	 the	 anti‐colonial	 efforts	 of	
African	NLMs,	thus	not	only	helping	KANU,	the	UPC	and	also	TANU	to	exert	pressure	on	
the	 British	 and	 gain	 some	 concessions	 from	 them,	 but	 also	 enhancing	 the	 image	 of	
Czechoslovakia	as	a	fervent	supporter	of	anti‐colonial	effort	in	general,	which	helped	in	
establishing	 relations	 with	 other	 Third	 World	 countries.	 Czechoslovaks	 were	 very	
successful	 in	 their	 choice	 of	 political	 organisations	 to	 support,	 as	 KANU,	 the	UPC	 and	
TANU	 emerged	 as	 the	 strongest	 political	 parties	 once	 independence	 was	 won.	
Colonialism	 was	 deconstructed	 in	 East	 Africa	 much	 sooner	 than	 had	 been	 originally	
anticipated	and	Czechoslovakia	certainly	played	a	part	in	it	through	effective	support	of	
the	national	liberation	movements.		
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Once	the	countries	of	East	Africa	achieved	independence,	the	political	landscape	
changed	 radically.	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanganyika	 sought	 to	 ensure	 political	 stability	
and	economic	development,	but	 they	 faced	a	number	of	constraints	 in	achieving	 these	
goals.	 Their	 political	 institutions	 were	 weak	 and	 immature	 and	 they	 had	 inherited	
various	 pressing	 issues	 from	 the	 colonial	 times.	 They	 also	 lacked	 trained	 professional	
cadres	able	to	fill	in	all	the	gaps	in	civil	service,	education,	military	and	health	care.	The	
means	 of	 economic	 production	 were	 	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 former	
colonists,	 which	 hindered	 the	 chances	 of	 economic	 development.	 To	 address	 these	
weaknesses	 all	 three	 East	 African	 countries	 sought	 international	 support,	 which,	
however,	entailed	some	political	implications.	
Independence	 for	 East	 African	 countries	 involved	 some	 important	 changes	 to	
Czechoslovak	activities	in	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika.	The	new	main	objective	was	
to	bring	 these	 countries’	 politics	 close	 to	 the	 socialist	 camp	and	eventually	 enable	 the	
implementation	 of	 socialism	 in	 their	 political	 systems.	 There	 were	 two	 interlinked	
strategies	for	this.	It	was	to	strengthen	the	position	of	the	dominant	political	party	and	
that	 of	 the	 leader	 thought	 the	 most	 promising	 candidate	 for	 safeguarding	 the	 main	
Czechoslovak	 objectives	 while	 ensuring	 	 Czechoslovakia	 retained	 access	 	 to	 and	
influence	 over	 this	 politician.	 A	 second	 strategy	 was	 to	 provide	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	
Tanganyika	 with	 effective	 technical	 and	 economic	 support	 that	 would	 make	
Czechoslovakia	a	viable	alternative	to	 the	West.	 In	 theory	the	successful	application	of	
both	 strategies	 would	 seriously	 undermine	 the	 position	 of	Western	 countries	 in	 East	
Africa,	 consolidate	 the	 decisive	 political	 power	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 friendly	 ruling	
political	party	and	eventually	lead	to	the	inclusion	of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika	in	
the	 socialist	 camp.	 Of	 course,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 make	 these	 successes	 of	 a	 more	
permanent	 nature	 some	 serious	 opposition	 by	 the	West	would	 have	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	
together	with	ensuring	lasting	political	stability	of	these	African	regimes.		
Czechoslovakia	enjoyed	differing	rates	of	success	in	applying	the	two	strategies	
and	 in	 reaching	 its	 ultimate	 objectives.	 In	 Kenya	 Czechoslovak	 officials	 initially	
benefitted	from	their	strong	position	which	was	established	thanks	to	effective	support	
provided	to	KANU	before	independence.	Czechoslovak	officials	had	very	close	relations	
with	 the	 second‐in‐command	 of	 KANU’s	 government,	 vice‐president	 Odinga.	 In	 an	
attempt	 to	strengthen	Odinga’s	position	 in	 the	party,	while	at	 the	same	 time	seriously	
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undermining	 the	 British	 position,	 it	 was	 decided	 to	 provide	 Kenya	 with	 support	 in	
special	 security	 and	 military	 assistance.	 However,	 the	 news	 of	 Odinga’s	 close	
cooperation	with	Czechoslovakia	and	other	socialist	countries	spread,	mainly	thanks	to	
the	activity	of	British,	and	 this,	 together	with	 the	growing	 ideological	 conflict	between	
Kenyatta	 and	 Odinga,	 caused	 Odinga’s	 fall	 from	 power.	 His	 political	 decline	 meant	
Czechoslovakia	 lost	 all	political	 influence	at	 the	 top	of	Kenyan	politics	and	with	 it	 any	
real	chance	of	reaching	the	set	political	objectives	in	Kenya.			
Meanwhile,	in	Uganda	Czechoslovakia	benefitted	from	direct	access	to	and	very	
good	 relations	 with	 President	 Obote,	 who	 was	 open	 to	 cooperation	 with	 socialist	
countries.	 Here,	 too	 Czechoslovakia	 opted	 for	 providing	 special	 military	 and	 security	
support.	This	was	executed	in	such	a	way	that	both	military	and	security	organisations	
would	be	loyal	to	Obote	and	thus	would	safeguard	his	political	position	in	the	country.	
At	the	same	it	was	perceived	as	a	chance	to	undermine	the	West’s	position	in	Uganda.	
This	 strategy	 was	 quite	 successful	 and	 it	 worked	 in	 bringing	 Uganda	 to	 the	 verge	 of	
introducing	socialism.	However,	all	 these	achievements	were	hindered	by	the	 fact	 that	
socialist	 countries,	 including	 Czechoslovakia,	 failed	 to	 provide	 Uganda	 with	 similarly	
effective	economic	support	and	the	country	thus	remained	economically	dependent	on	
Britain.	 A	 failing	 economy	 combined	with	 unresolved	 socio‐political	 issues	 eventually	
prompted	the	military	coup	that	did	away	with	all	the	successes	of	Czechoslovak	policy	
in	Uganda.	Nevertheless,	Czechoslovakia’s	effort	in	Uganda	in	reaching	the	set	objectives	
has	to	be	considered	reasonably	successful	as	it	initially	reached	several	of	its	aims,	and	
only	failed	in	providing	the	conditions	that	would	protect	the	regime	thus	created	from	
external	as	well	as	internal	disturbances	in	the	long	term.	
The	last	analysed	case	study	–	Tanganyika	–	is	different	from	the	previous	two.	
The	 Czechoslovak	 position	 in	 the	 country	 was	 initially	 rather	 weak	 as	 there	 was	 no	
history	 of	 substantial	 cooperation	 before	 independence.	 President	 Nyerere	 was	 the	
unchallenged	 leader	 of	 TANU	 and	 Tanganyika	 and	 before	 1965	 efforts	 by	 socialist	
countries	 to	 establish	 themselves	 in	 Tanganyika	 were	 greatly	 limited	 by	 Nyerere’s	
reservations	 towards	 the	 Soviet	 camp.	 Once	 this	 changed,	 Czechoslovakia	 tried	 to	
intensify	cooperation	in	the	field	of	civil	technical	assistance,	and	regular	contacts	of	civil	
society	 organisations	 took	 place.	 Special	 cooperation	 remained	 restricted	 throughout	
the	1960s.	Czechoslovakia	was	not	able	 to	provide	civil	 technical	assistance	on	such	a	
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scale	 and	 under	 such	 conditions	 that	would	 have	 been	 able	 to	 challenge	 the	 growing	
importance	of	China.	Contacts	of	civil	society	organisations	and	the	flourishing	cultural	
exchange	 proved	 ineffective	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 political	 influence	 in	 Tanzania	 because	
economic	 and	 trade	 relations	 had	 remained	 seriously	 underdeveloped.	 The	 fact	 that	
Tanzania	opted	for	socialism	had	very	little	to	do	with	Czechoslovak	efforts.		
The	 three	 case	 studies	 support	 the	 primary	 research	 hypothesis,	 that	 if	
Czechoslovakia	was	to	have	a	realistic	chance	of	reaching	any	of	its	political	objectives	in	
East	Africa	a	combination	of	specific	conditions	had	to	be	met.	The	most	effective	form	of	
exerting	 influence	 on	 political	 development	 in	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanganyika	 turned	
out	to	be	special	military	or	security	assistance.	However,	it	proved	effective	only	when	
Czechoslovakia	 was	 able	 to	 ensure	 political	 support	 of	 the	 Kenyan,	 Ugandan	 or	
Tanganyikan	political	leadership.	In	order	to	sustain	the	political	influence	gained,	it	was	
necessary	 to	 provide	 the	 country	 in	 question	 with	 effective	 economic	 support	 or	
technical	 assistance	 that	 would	 drive	 its	 development.	 If	 all	 of	 these	 conditions	were	
met,	 Czechoslovakia	 would	 be	 able	 to	 actively	 influence	 the	 political	 development	 of	
local	 states,	 undermine	 the	 position	 of	 the	 West	 and	 come	 close	 to	 reaching	 and	
sustaining	her	political	objectives.	However,	if	any	of	these	conditions	were	not	present	
or	other	forms	of	support	were	provided	instead,	the	Czechoslovak	ability	to	influence	
political	development	of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika	was	very	low.					
	
The	main	limitation	of	this	historical	research	was	linked	to	the	data	collection	
stage.	 Original	 plans	 for	 the	 data	 collection	 were	 hindered	 by	 totally	 unsatisfactory	
results	 of	 collection	 of	 personal	 testimonies	 in	 Czechoslovakia.	 Also	 the	 gathering	 of	
personal	testimonies	in	Africa	failed	to	fully	reach	the	high	expectations	of	acquiring	the	
range	of	original	historical	data	that	would	enrich	the	African	perspective	on	this	topic.	
However,	 the	greatest	 frustration	of	 the	data	collection	phase	arose	 from	the	 fact	 that	
archival	research	in	Kenya	and	Uganda	had	produced	no	relevant	historical	data	in	the	
former	 case,	 and	 could	 not	 even	 take	 place,	 for	 reasons	 beyond	 control	 of	 this	
researcher,	in	the	latter.	Should	this	subject	matter	ever	be	addressed	by	future	projects	
of	historical	 research,	a	 repeated	attempt	at	archival	 research	 in	East	Africa	will	most	
certainly	have	to	be	an	initial	task.		
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Even	though	this	research	project	was	reasonably	successful	 in	addressing	the	
majority	of	the	research	questions	raised,	 there	are	still	several	 issues	needing	further	
investigation	 if	 they	 are	 to	 be	 explained	 satisfactorily.	 Limitations	 of	 the	 research	
methodology	 applied	 did	 not	 allow	 for	 certain	 aspects	 of	 Czechoslovak‐East	 African	
relations	 to	 be	 adequately	 examined.	 An	 obvious	 area	 for	 widening	 the	 scope	 of	 this	
research	 exists	 in	 relation	 to	 further	 data	 collection.	 Time	 constraints	 as	 well	 as	 the	
length‐limitation	 set	 for	 a	 doctoral	 thesis	 were	 the	main	 reasons	 for	 not	 engaging	 in	
archival	research	in	Britain	and	Russia.	It	is	quite	likely	that	British	and	Russian	archival	
collections	 keep	 a	 range	 of	 historical	 documentary	 evidence	 that	 would	 certainly	
provide	a	different	perspective	on	Czechoslovak	activities	in	East	Africa	in	the	period	of	
the	imminent	independence	of	Kenya,	Uganda	and	Tanganyika.		
Russian	archives	could	be	useful	to	explain	more	clearly	some	of	the	aspects	of	
the	 Czechoslovak‐Soviet	 partnership	 for	 their	 mission	 to	 spread	 socialism	 to	 Africa.	
Investigating	 sources	 on	 Russian	 foreign	 policy‐making	 towards	 Africa	 could	 help	 to	
explain	the	cooperation	mechanism	that	existed	between	Czechoslovakia	and	the	Soviet	
Union	and	 to	establish	 to	what	extent	 the	execution	of	Czechoslovak	Africa	policy	was	
directly	controlled	by	the	Soviets,	and	more	precisely	to	establish	how	independent	and	
autonomous	Czechoslovak	policy‐making	was.	It	would	also	be	interesting	to	find	out,	if	
at	all	possible,	how	much	the	formation	of	Russian	policy	towards	Africa	was	influenced	
by	 Czechoslovak	 expert	 knowledge	 of	 the	 continent.	 Russian	 archives	 could	 also	 shed	
more	light	on	how	the	Soviet	attitude	towards	Czechoslovakia	as	its	main	collaborator	in	
executing	their	African	objectives	started	to	change	in	the	run‐up	to	1968.		
British	archival	collections	on	the	other	hand	could	perhaps	help	to	unravel	how	
the	 British	 administration	 perceived	 Czechoslovak	 activities	 and	 how	 serious	 a	
challenge	 they	 felt	 them	 to	 be,	 both	 before	 and	 after	 independence.	 It	 would	 also	 be	
interesting	 to	 see	 what	 strategies	 the	 British	 designed	 to	 contain	 Czechoslovak	 and	
Soviet	activities	and	how	such	strategies	were	implemented.		
A	 natural	 direction	 for	 further	 research	 on	 this	 topic	 would	 be	 to	 expand	 its	
scope	to	the	later	periods	of	Cold	War	development	in	the	1970s	and	early	1980s	when	
Czechoslovak	 activities	 in	 Africa	 came	 from	 a	 significantly	 different	 domestic	 political	
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situation	 and	 from	 Czechoslovakia’s	 very	 different	 role	 in	 the	 Soviet	 foreign	 political	
framework.	 Such	 an	 extension	 to	 the	 present	 research	 could	 benefit	 from	 later	
collections	 in	 the	 various	 archives	 gradually	 being	 made	 available,	 and	 from	 greater	
access	to	oral	testimonies	of	figures	directly	involved	in	the	execution	of	these	relations.	
It	would	be	interesting	to	see	how	Czechoslovakia’s	political	objectives	and	the	forms	of	
cooperation	in	East	Africa	changed	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	in	relation	to	the	Brezhnev	
regime’s	new	foreign	political	doctrine	.	Alternatively,	further	research	could	investigate	
Czechoslovak	 relations	 to	 a	 different	 set	 of	 African	 states	 and	 offer	 a	 comparative	
analysis	of	the	two	regions	studied.		
Even	though	some	shortcomings	of	this	research	were	identified	above	as	well	
as	number	of	 issues	that	would	still	need	to	be	addressed,	 the	results	and	conclusions	
established	here	and	presented	in	this	thesis	are	certainly	useful	and	relevant	enough	to	
have	justified	the	decision	to	undertake	this	project.	This	thesis	has	potential	to	be	not	
only	 a	 stand‐alone	 work	 of	 historiography,	 but	 to	 become	 a	 valid	 extension	 of	
historiographic	 discourse	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 as	 well	 as	 of	 national	 historiographies	 of	
Czechoslovakia,	 Kenya,	 Uganda	 and	 Tanzania,	 not	 to	 mention	 its	 applicability	 for	 the	
academic	discourse	of	international	relations.								
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353	NAA	1261/0/4	Předsednictvo	ÚV	KSČ	1962	‐	1966,	rejstříky,	sv.	40‐41,	a.j.	45,	b.	9,	
č.j.	 2273/13,	Poskytnutí	pomoci	 stranš	Keňský	africký	národní	 svaz,	4.11.1963,	5,	 l.	
10.	
354	VUA	MNO	1963,	OTP,	i.č.	1012,	kt.	361,	č.j.	H,	02305/64‐OTP,	Zpráva	o	služební	cestě	
do	Keně,	March	1964,	2.	
355	VUA	MNO	1963,	OTP,	i.č.	1012,	kt.	361,	č.j.	H,	02305/64‐OTP,	Zpráva	o	služební	cestě	
do	Keně,	March	1964,	2.	 	
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356	VUA	MNO	1963,	OTP,	i.č.	1012,	kt.	361,	č.j.	H,	02305/64‐OTP,	Zpráva	o	služební	cestě	
do	Keně,	March	1964,	3‐6.	
357	VUA	MNO	1963,	OTP,	i.č.	1012,	kt.	361,	č.j.	H,	002164/64‐OTP,	Zhodnocení	činnosti	
za	rok	1964	v	akcích	137	a	141,	1965,	7.	
358	VUA	MNO	1963,	OTP,	i.č.	1012,	kt.	361,	č.j.	H,	02305/65‐OTP,	Technická	pomoc	zemi	
137‐	návrh,	1963?,	20.	
359	VUA	MNO	1965,	GŠ	OTP,	 i.č.731/732,	kt.	232,	č.j.	H,	 J,	01375/OTP,	Ukončení	kurzu	
keňských	posluchačů,	6.4.1965,	1.	
360	VUA	MNO	1965,	GŠ	OTP,	 i.č.731/732,	kt.	232,	č.j.	H,	 J,	01375/OTP,	Ukončení	kurzu	
keňských	posluchačů,	6.4.1965,	1.	
361	 MZV	 F	 IV/6	 Keňa,	 kt.	 1,	 2,	 č.j.	 011/66‐Ro	 (020293),	MURUMBI‐	 charakteristika,	
8.1.1966,	3‐6.	
362	ABS	11691_108_1_1,	I	správa	MV,	s.4,	K	otázce	možného	vojenského	převratu	v	Keni,	
10.2.1966,	1,	l.	11.	
364	 ABS	 11691_000_2_4,	 I	 správa	MV,	 8.O,	 Č.jA.	 A‐1/00	 444/81‐63,	Návrh	 na	 zřízení	
rezidentury	v	Keni,	16.12.1963,	1,	l.	76	
365	 ABS	 11691_000_2_4,	 I	 správa	MV,	 8.O,	 Č.jA.	 A‐1/00	 444/81‐63,	Návrh	 na	 zřízení	
rezidentury	v	Keni,	16.12.1963.	1,	l.	76	
366	ABS	80955_200_1_1,	I	správa	MV,	s.1‐6,	1967‐72.	
367	ABS	11691_000_4_4,	I	správa	MV,4.O,		Č.jA.	11691/012,	Keňa,	1.11.1966,	3,	l.	146.	
369	ABS	80952_000_1_5,	I	správa	MV,	4.O,	Č.jA.	A1‐00	562/40‐64,	Zásilka	č.5,	21.9.1964.	
370	 ABS	 80952_000_1_5,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 4.O,	 Č.jA.	 A1‐00	641/40‐64,	 Zásilka	 č.7,	
20.10.1964,	1,	l.	43	
371	 ABS	 80952_000_1_5,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 4.O,	 Č.jA.	 A1‐00	641/40‐64,	 Zásilka	 č.7,	
20.10.1964,	2,	l.	45	
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372	 ABS	 80952_000_4_5,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 4.O,	 Č.jA.	 A1‐00	110/40‐66,	 Zásilka	 č.2/1,	
22.2.1966,	1,	l.	187.	
374	ABS	80952_000_2_5,	I	správa	MV,		4.O,	Č.jA.	A1‐00	91/40.65,	Zásilka	2/1,	24.2.1965,	
1,	l.	87	
375	ABS	80952_000_2_5,	I	správa	MV,		4.O,	Č.jA.	A1‐00	91/40.65,	Zásilka	3,	18.3.1965,	1‐
2,	l.	92‐93		
376	ABS	80952_000_2_5,	I	správa	MV,		4.O,	Č.jA.	A1‐00	91/40.65,	Zásilka	2/1,	24.2.1965,	
1,	l.	87	
377	ABS	80952_000_2_5,	 I	 správa	MV,	 4.O,	 Č.jA.,	K	projednání	na	 rezidentuře	 v	Nairobi	
v	lednu	1965,	5.1.1965,	1,	l.	69.	
378	 ABS	 80952_000_4_5,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 4.O,	 Č.jA.	 A/1‐0	110/40‐66,	 Zásilka	 2/1,	
22.2.1966,	1,	l.	187.	
379	 ABS	 11691_109_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 4.O	 Č.jA.	 A/1‐0		 692/40‐65,	 Ideový	 návrh	 na	
komplexní	AO	proti	pravici	a	VB	v	Keni,	6.9.1965,	2,	2.		
380	ABS	11691_109,	I	správa	MV,	4.O	Č.jA.	A/1‐0		692/40‐65,	Ideový	návrh	na	komplexní	
AO	proti	pravici	a	VB	v	Keni,	6.9.1965,	2‐3,	l.	2‐3.	
381	ABS	11691_109,	I	správa	MV,	4.O	Č.jA.	A/1‐0		692/40‐65,	Ideový	návrh	na	komplexní	
AO	proti	pravici	a	VB	v	Keni,	6.9.1965,	1‐3,	l.	1‐3.	
382	ABS	11691_109_1_2,	I	správa	MV,	4.O	Č.jA.	A/1‐0	692/40‐65,	1‐51,	l.	1‐58.	
383	ABS	11691_109_2_2,	I	správa	MV,		4.O,	Č.jA.	A‐00	311/40‐69,	23.4.1969,	1,	l.	73	
384	ABS	11691_322_3_3,	I	správa	MV,		4.O,	Č.jA?,	Zásilka	8/69‐3,	7.7.1969,	1,	l.	107	
385	ABS	11691_100_3_6,	I	správa	MV,	4.O,	Č.jA?,	Návrh	tezí	plánu	činnosti	poradce	v	Keni,	
22.10.1964,	1,	l.	126	
386	ABS	80952_000_2_5,	 I	 správa	MV,	4.O,	Č.jA?,	Speciál‐	zpráva	o	 jednání	v	Nairobi	ve	
dnech	13.	a	14.1.1965,	19.1.1965.,	1‐2,	l.	76‐77.	
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387	ABS	11691_100_3_6,	I	správa	MV,	4.O,	Č.jA?,	Návrh	tezí	plánu	činnosti	poradce	v	Keni,	
22.10.1964,	1‐6,	l.	126‐131.	
388	ABS	11691_301_1_1_6,	I	správa	MV,		Č.jA?,	Poznámka	k	fondu,	3		
389	ABS	11691_100_3_6,	I	správa	MV,	4.O,	Č.jA.	A/1‐00	928/40‐64,	Návrh	na	vyslání	do	
zahraničí,	15.12.1964,	1,	l.	170.	
390	ABS	11691_100_5_6,	I	správa	MV,	4.O,	Č.jA?,	Záznam,	25.8.1965,	1,	l.	284.	
391	ABS	11691_100_5_6,	I	správa	MV,	4.O,	Č.jA?,	Záznam,	25.8.1965,	1‐3,	l.	284‐285.	
392	ABS	11691_100_5_6,	I	správa	MV,	Č.jA.	A/1‐00769/40‐?,	7.10.1965,	l.296.		
401	 NAA	 ÚV	 KSČ	 A.	 Novotný,	 f.32,	 Afrika	 –	 Asie,	 č.j.	 264261/1,	 Jednání	 v	3.	 africkém	
odboru,	1966,	1.	
402	 ABS	 80955_110_1_3,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 Č.jA?,	 Ing.	 Václav	 Albert‐	 poznatky	 k	osobě,	
30.11.1969,	l.	9.	
410	 MZV	 F	 IV/5	 Uganda,	 	 kt.	 1,	 príloha	 k	č.j.	 026.907/60,	 O	 zprávě	 ústavní	 komise	
Ugandy,	nazvané	“Wilde	Committee.“	16.6.1960.	1.				
411	 MZV	 F	 IV/5	 Uganda,	 	 kt.	 1,	 príloha	 k	č.j.	 026.907/60,	 O	 zprávě	 ústavní	 komise	
Ugandy,	nazvané	“Wilde	Committee.“	16.6.1960.	1.				
412	NAA	F.	1261/0/11	Politické	byro	ÚV	KSČ	1954	‐	1962,	rejstříky,	sv.	251,	a.j.	334,	b.	
18,	 č.j.	 4958/17,	 Poskytnutí	 finanční	 pomoci	 straně	 Národního	 kongresu	 Ugandy,	
27.2.1960,	1‐5.	
413	MZV	F	IV/5	Uganda,		kt.	1,	č.j.	0289/61	(029096),	Žádost	UNC	o	pomoc,	2.8.1961.	
414	MZV	 F	 IV/5	 Uganda,	 	 kt.	 1,	 príloha	 k	 č.j.	 029.609/61‐10,	 Lidový	 kongres	Ugandy,	
10.7.1961.	
416	 MZV	 PK	 66	 č.j.	 033.557/61‐10,	 Koncepce	 čs	 zahraniční	 politiky	 vůči	 koloniálním	
územím	v	Africe,	18.12.1961,	11‐12.	
419	NAA	F.	1261/0/11	Politické	byro	ÚV	KSČ	1954	‐	1962,	rejstříky,	sv.	354,	a.j.	444,	b.	
29,	č.j.	10835/14,	Přijetí	delegace	Ugandy	a	pomoc	při	školení	kádrů,	16.6.1962,	5.	
421	 MZV	 PK	 66	 č.j.	 033.557/61‐10,	 Koncepce	 čs	 zahraniční	 politiky	 vůči	 koloniálním	
územím	v	Africe,	18.12.1961,	11.	
422	 NAA	 1261/0/4	 Předsednictvo	 ÚV	 KSČ	 1962	 ‐	 1966,	 rejstříky,	 sv.	 1,	 č.j.	 10835/8,	
Příjetí	delegace	Ugandy	a	pomoc	při	školení	kádrů,	Příloha	III,	16.6.1962,	1	
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424	NAA	 1261/0/4	 Předsednictvo	 ÚV	 KSČ	 1962	 ‐	 1966,	 rejstříky,	 sv.	 2,	 č.j.	 11763/8,	
Výsledky	 jednání	 čs.	 vládní	 delegace	 na	 oslavách	 vyhlášení	 nezávislosti	 Ugandy,	
Příloha	III.,	5.11.1962,	1.	
425	 NAA	 1261/0/4	 Předsednictvo	 ÚV	 KSČ	 1962	 ‐	 1966,	 rejstříky,	 sv.	 2,	 č.j.	 11763/8,	
Výsledky	 jednání	 čs.	 vládní	 delegace	 na	 oslavách	 vyhlášení	 nezávislosti	 Ugandy,	
Příloha	IV.,	5.11.1962,	1.	
426	NAA	1261/0/4	Předsednictvo	ÚV	KSČ	1962	 ‐	1966,	 rejstříky,	 sv.	2,	 č.j.	 00391/63,	
23.7.1963,	1.	
427	MZV	 F	 IV/4	 10	 TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 026.023/63,	Materiály	pro	konzultaci	 s	PLR	o	Africa,	
Uganda,	11.6.1963,	1.	
428	MZV	F	 IV/4	10	TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 020.930/63‐10,	 Zpráva	o	 cestě	 čs.	 obchodní	mise	do	
Východní	Afriky,	13.2.1963,	1.	
429	MZV	F	 IV/4	10	TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 020.930/63‐10,	 Zpráva	o	 cestě	 čs.	 obchodní	mise	do	
Východní	Afriky,	13.2.1963,	6.	
430	MZV	F	 IV/4	10	TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 020.930/63‐10,	 Zpráva	o	 cestě	 čs.	 obchodní	mise	do	
Východní	Afriky,	13.2.1963,	11	
431	MZV	F	 IV/4	10	TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 020.930/63‐10,	 Zpráva	o	 cestě	 čs.	 obchodní	mise	do	
Východní	Afriky,	13.2.1963,	11‐12.	
432	MZV	F	 IV/4	10	TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 020.930/63‐10,	 Zpráva	o	 cestě	 čs.	 obchodní	mise	do	
Východní	Afriky,	13.2.1963,	1‐2.	
433	MZV	F	 IV/4	10	TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 020.930/63‐10,	 Zpráva	o	 cestě	 čs.	 obchodní	mise	do	
Východní	Afriky,	13.2.1963,	13.	
434	MZV	 F	 IV/4	 10	 TO,	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 026.023/63,	Materiály	pro	konzultaci	 s	PLR	o	Africa,	
Uganda,	11.6.1963,	1‐2.	
435	MZV	 F	 IV/5	 Tanzánie,	 kt.1,	 2,	 č.j.	 069/64,	 Zpráva	 ze	 služební	 cesty	 s.Vomáčku	 do	
Ugandy,	12.6.1964,	1‐3.	
441	VUA	MNO	1963,	kt.	326,	č.j.	E,	H,	 J,	03182/OTP‐1964,	Poskytnutí	 technické	pomoci	
Ugandě,	12.3.1964,	1.		
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443	VUA	MNO	1965,	GŠ	OTP,	i.č.731/732,	kt.	232,	č.j.	H,	J,	04550/OTP‐1965,	Technická	
pomoc	Ugandě‐	vyslání	specialistů,	3.11.1965,	1.	
444	VUA	MNO	1965,	PVOS	a	let.,	 i.č.	927,	kt.	303,	č.j.	38/3‐8,	14,	20,	21	044197,	Výcvik	
techniků	Ugandykurs	257B‐	nařízení,	30.6.1965,	1.	 	
445	VUA	MNO	1965,	PVOS	a	let.,		i.č.	927,	kt.	303,	č.j.	38/3‐8,	14,	20,	21,	042862,	Zpráva	
plukovníka	Mikuláša	Šingloviče	o	 služební	 cestě	do	Ugandy	ve	dnech	17.5.‐18.6.1965.,	
Aug	1965?,	3‐5.	
446	VUA	MNO	1965,	PVOS	a	let.,	i.č.	927,	kt.	303,	č.j.	38/3‐8,	14,	20,	21,	042862,	Zpráva	
plukovníka	Mikuláša	Šingloviče	o	 služební	 cestě	do	Ugandy	ve	dnech	17.5.‐18.6.1965.,	
Aug	1965?,	3‐5.	
447	VUA	MNO	1965,	PVOS	a	let.,	 	 i.č.	927,	 	kt.	303,	č.j.	38/3‐8,	14,	20,	21,	04242,	Vyběr	
pracovníka	MNO	na	cestu	do	Ugandy,	28.4.1965,	1	
448	VUA	MNO	1965,	PVOS	a	let.,		i.č.	927,		kt.	303,	č.j.	38/3‐8,	14,	20,	21,	042862,	Zpráva	
plukovníka	Mikuláša	Šingloviče	o	 služební	 cestě	do	Ugandy	ve	dnech	17.5.‐18.6.1965.,	
Aug	1965?,	4.	
449	VUA	MNO	1965,	PVOS	a	let.,		i.č.	927,	kt.	303,	č.j.	38/3‐8,	14,	20,	21,	042473,	Učební	
plán	a	kalkulace	pro	akci	142,	13.4.1965,	1.	
451	VUA	MNO	1965,	GŠ	OTP,	 i.č.731/732,	 	kt.	232,	č.j.	H,	 J,	04478,	Informační	zpráva	o	
pohovoru	s	posluchači	A‐142	v	Přerově	dne	8.9.1965,	Sept	1965?,	1‐4.	
452	VUA	MNO	1965,	GŠ	OTP,	i.č.731/732,		kt.	232,	č.j.	H,	J,	04550/OTP‐1965,	Technická	
pomoc	Ugandě‐	vyslání	specialistů,	3.11.1965,	1.	
453	VUA	MNO	1966,	GŠ,	 i.č.763,	kt.	245,	č.j.	H	3,	05432/OTP,	Doplněk	 č.1	ke	kontraktu	
č.5252,	Aug	1966,	1.	
465	 ABS	 11701_300_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 	 4.O,	 Č.jA.	 A/1‐0645/40‐65,	 Adoko	 z	Ugandy‐	
návšteva	v	ČSSR,	2.10.1965,	1,	l.	98.		
466	 ABS	 11701_300_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 4.O,	 Č.jA?,	 25.3.1964,	 Záznam	 z	rozhovoru	 s.	
náměstka	Kudrny	s	p.Adoko,	vedoucím	protokolu	předsedy	vlády	Ugandy,	1,	l.31.	
326 
 
467	VUA	MNO	1963,	kt.	326,	č.j.	E,	H,	 J,	03182/OTP‐1964,	Poskytnutí	 technické	pomoci	
Ugandě,	12.3.1964,	1.		
468	 ABS	 11701_300_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 	 4.O,	 Č.jA?,	 25.3.1964,	 Záznam	 z	rozhovoru	 s.	
náměstka	Kudrny	s	p.Adoko,	vedoucím	protokolu	předsedy	vlády	Ugandy,	1‐2,	l.	31‐32.	
469	 ABS	 11701_300_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 4.O,	 Č.jA?,	 25.3.1964,	 Záznam	 z	rozhovoru	 s.	
náměstka	Kudrny	s	p.Adoko,	vedoucím	protokolu	předsedy	vlády	Ugandy,	1‐2,	l.	31‐32.	
470	MZV	 F	 IV/5	 Tanzánie,	 kt.1,	 2,	 č.j.	 069/64,	 Zpráva	 ze	 služební	 cesty	 s.Vomáčku	 do	
Ugandy,	12.6.1964,	2.	
471	 ABS	 11701_300_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 	 Č.jA?,	 Záznam	 z	rozhovoru	 s	p.Adoko	 A.‐	
ugandským	státním	příslušníkem,	7.12.1964,	1‐4,	l.	63‐66	
472	 ABS	 11701_300_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 	 Č.jA?,	 Záznam	 z	rozhovoru	 s	p.Adoko	 A.‐	
ugandským	státním	příslušníkem,	7.12.1964,	3,	l.	65.	
473	ABS	11701_300_1_2,	Č.jA.	A/1‐04657,	14.7.1965,	1,	l.	83.	
474	 NAA	 F.	 1261/0/11	 Politické	 byro	 ÚV	 KSČ	 1954	 ‐	 1962,	 rejstříky,	 č.j.	 6650/8,	
Poskytování	 dlouhodobých	 úvěrů	 nesocialistickým	 hospodářsky	 méně	 vyvinutým	
zemím	v	období	třetí	pětiletky,	3.12.1960,	1.	
475	ABS	11701_300_1_2,	I	správa	MV,		4.O,		Č.jA.	A/1‐04657,	ADOKO	z	Ugandy‐	návšteva	
v	ČSSR,	14.7.1965,	1‐4,	l.78‐84.	
476	 ABS	 81029_000_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 	 Č.jA?,	Návrh	 usnesení‐	 Předsednictvo	 ÚV	 KSČ,	
Uganda,	21.5.1966,	3,	l.	37.	
477	 ABS	 11701_300_1_2,	 I	 správa	 MV,	 	 4.O,	 Č.jA.	 A/1‐0645/40‐65,	 Adoko	 z	Ugandy‐	
návšteva	v	ČSSR,	2.10.1965,	1,	l.	98.		
482	VUA	MNO	1965,	PVOS	a	let.,		i.č.	927,	kt.	303,	č.j.	38/3‐8,	14,	20,	21,		 	
484	MZV	F	IV/6	Uganda	kt.	1,	č.j.	016/68,	UGANDA‐	Situační	zpráva	,	22.11.1968,	10‐11.	
485	 MZV	 F	 IV/6	 Uganda	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 0189/68,	 Zpráva	 o	 naších	 vztazích	 k	ugandskému	
ministerstvu	obrany,	1.2.1968,	1‐4.	
487	VUA	MNO	1966,	GŠ,	 i.č.763,	kt.	245,	č.j.	H	3,	05432/OTP,	Doplněk	 č.1	ke	kontraktu	
č.5252,	Aug	1966,	1.	
488	VUA	MNO	1967,	HT‐SVD,	i.č.	1025,	kt.	343,	č.j.	015112,	065695,	Souhrnná	zpráva	o	
splnění	kontraktu	č.5252,	23.10.1967,	1.		
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489	VUA	MNO	1967,	 GŠ,	 i.č.	 441,	 kt.	 160,	 č.j.	 G,	 H,	 02041,	Zpráva	 z	cesty	do	Ugandy	a	
Sudánu,	4.7.1967,	2.	
491	VUA	MNO	1967,	GŠ,	i.č.	441,	kt.	160,	č.j.	G,	H,		Příloha	č.1	ke	kontraktu	5252,	2.	
492	VUA	MNO	1967,	GŠ,	i.č.	441,	kt.	160,	č.j.	G,	H,	02732,	26.10.1967,	1.	
493	 MZV	 F	 IV/6	 Uganda	 kt.	 1,	 č.j.	 0189/68,	 Zpráva	 o	 naších	 vztazích	 k	ugandskému	
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Appendix	1:	Original	versions	of	foreign	language	
quotations	
Number	refers	to	particular	footnote	in	main	body	of	text		
60	Klimek,	and	Kubů,		Československá,	9.		(„Naše	vnitřní	politika	bude	ovplyvňována	tou	
zahraniční	víc	než	kdekoliv	jinde.”)	
67	 Krofta,	 Zahraniční	 politika	 československá,	 5.	 („Všichni	 národové,	 velicí	 i	malí,	 jsou	
rovnoprávními	státními	a	kulturními	individualitami	a	mají	právo	o	sobě	rozhodovati.“)	
74	 Dejmek,	 Československo,	 336.	 („V	 polovině	 roku	 1921,	 kdy	 byla	 organizace	
československého	 diplomatického	 sboru	 ukončena,	 fungovalo	 kolem	 světa	 23	
velvyslanectví,	20	generálních	konzulátů	a	29	konzulátů	a	honorárních	konzulátů.”)	
101	Petruf,	Taliansko,	94.	(„Armáda	bola	vyzbrojená	najmodernejšími	zbraňami	vrátane	
letectva,	tankov	a	obrnených	vozidiel,	ba	i	chemických	zbraní,	najmä	yperitu.“)	
110	 Beneš,	 Paměti,	 43.	 („Nemůžeme	 zapomenout,	 že	 Vaše	 Excelence	 sympatizovala	 s	
Etiopii	v	čase	kdy	tato	postrádala	zbraně	a	byla	napadena		fašistickou	Italií.	I	když	pro	
přátelské	 krajiny	 bylo	 velice	 obtížné	 poskytnout	 Etiopii	 zbraně,	 Československo	
ignorovalo	tyto	překážky	a	pomohlo	utlačované	krajině	dodat	tento	materiál.	Obvinění	
vznesena	agresorem	nepohla	československou	pozicí	ani	o	kousek.’)	
181	 Kalvoda,	 	 Role,	 175.	 („	 byl	 velice	 spokojen,	 že	 Československo	 bylo	 zahrnuto	 do	
sovětské	sféry	operací.”)		
184	 Kalvoda,	 	 Role,	 144	 (	 „Podpis	 Smlouvy	 o	přátelství,	 vzájemné	 pomoci	 a	poválečné	
spolupráci	mezi	 Československem	 a	Sovětským	 svazem	 12.	 prosince	 1943,	 která	měla	
dvacetiletou	platnost,	měl	však	dalekosáhlé	dúsledky	nejen	pro	samotné	Československo,	
ale	i	pro	celou	střední	a	východní	Evropu.“)	
189	Slovenská	národná	rada.	Košický	vládny	program,	quoted	in	Zbořil,	Československá	a	
česká,	207.	 („Základy	naší	zahraniční	politiky	byly	položeny	 již	během	uplynulé	války.	
Spojenectví	 se	 Sovětským	 svazem,	 vyjádřené	 smlouvou	 z	r.1943,	 zůstává	 vedoucí	
zásadou	naší	zahraniční	politiky	i	v	době	míru,	neboť	dobře	víme,	že	je	to	právě	Sovětský	
svaz,	který	nám	je	nejspolehlivější	zárukou	naší	svobody	a	samostatnosti.	[...]	Vyjadřujíc	
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neskonalou	 vděčnost	 českého	 a	slovenského	 národa	 k	Sovětskému	 svazu,	 bude	 vláda	
pokládat	 za	 neochvějnou	 vúdčí	 linii	 československé	 zahraniční	 politiky	 nejtesnejší	
spojenectví	s	vítěznou	slovanskou	velmocí	na	Východě.	Smlouva	[...]	o	vzájemné	pomoci,	
přátelství	 a	poválečné	 spolupráci	 bude	 určovat	 pro	 veškerou	 budoucnost	 zahraničně	
politickou	pozici	našeho	státu.“)	
185	 Průcha,	 Hospodářské	 a	 sociální,	 269	 (	„Jako	 průmyslově	 nejvyspělejší	 země	
sovětského	bloku	bylo	Československo	pověřováno	předimenzovanými	výrobními	úkoly:	
na	 jedné	 straně	 se	 čs.	 průmysl	 významně	 podílel	 na	 industrializaci	 ostatních,	
ekonomicky	 méně	 vyspělých	 členských	 zemí	 RVHP,	 na	 druhé	 straně	 se	 překotně	
rozšiřovala	zbrojní	výroba.	ČSR	se	stala	objektem	tlaku	Sovětského	svazu	a	dalších	zemí	
na	maximalizaci	tempa	růstu	strategicky	významné	produkce.)	
186	Průcha,	Hospodářské	a	sociální,	280.	(„cílem	Projektu	bylo	vyzbrojit	čs.	armádu	tak,	
aby	do	konce	roku	1953	byla	připravena	na	vedení	aktivní	obrany“)	
190	Petruf,	Československá	zahraničná	politika,	11.	 („ČSR	 spája	 so	ZSSR	 trvalé,	úprimné	
a	dôsledné	spojenectvo,	ktoré	sa	nikdy	nestane	predmetom	straníckych	sporov.	Zároveň	
máme	aj	trvalý	záujem	o	priateľské	vzťahy	s	Veľkou	Britániou,	USA	a	Francúzskom.“)	
197	 Zídek,	 Československo	 a	francouzská	 Afrika,	 22‐23.	 („Dostupné	 dokumenty	
neumožňují	 fungování	 předsednictva	 přesne	 rekonstruovat...Není	 však	 zcela	 zřetelné,	
jakým	 způsobem	 se	 jednotlivá	 usnesení	 přijímala...zda	 se	 o	 konkrétních	 bodech	
hlasovalo,	či	se	schvalovaly	jednomyslně.“)	
200	 Zídek,	Československo	 a	francouzská	Afrika,	 23.	 („Sekretariát	 se	 zabýval	 především	
personálními	 problémy:	 do	 jeho	 kompetence	 patřilo	 mimo	 jiné	 jmenování	 do	 všech	
nižších	diplomatických	funkcí.	Do	oblasti	zahraniční	politiky	zasahoval	sekretariát	také	
tím,	 že	 schvaloval	 výjezdy	 do	 ciziny	 novinářům,	 vědeckým	 a	 kulturním	 pracovníkům,	
periodicky	 mu	 také	 byly	 předkládány	 zprávy	 o	 zahraničních	 stycích	 různých	
organizací.“)	
202	 Průcha,	 Hospodářské	 a	 sociální,,	 566.	 („...byl	 zahraniční	 obchod	 vyhlášen	 státním	
monopolem,	 jehož	 vrcholným	 orgánem	 se	 stalo	 Ministerstvo	 zahraničního	 obchodu.	
V	širším	pojetí	šlo	o	státní	monopol	vnějších	ekonomických	vztahů.“)	
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204	 Průcha,	 Hospodářské	 a	 sociální,	 566.	 („zabezpečení	 ekonomické	 nezávislosti	 na	
kapitalistických	zemích,	ochranu	před	výkyvy	světového	trhu,	usnadnění	spolupráce	se	
socialistickými	 zeměmi,	 zapojení	 centrálně	 regulovaného	 obchodu	 do	 systému	
národohospodářského	plánování	a	jednotné	řízení	dovozu	i	vývozu	v	souladu	s	obchodní	
politikou	a	celospoločenskými	zájmy.“)	
231	NAA	F.	1261/0/11,	č.j.	00/1509/61,	 June	1961,	6.	(„Monopol	na	hospodářské	styky	
imperialistických	zemí	s	HMVZ	byl	zlomen	vznikem	socialistické	světové	soustavy,	která	
tím,	že	rozvíjí	s	těmito	zeměmi	hospodářské	styky	na	základě	rovnoprávnosti,	vzájemné	
výhodnosti	 a	 nevměšování	 se	 do	 vnitřních	 záležitostí	 aktivně	 ovlivňuje	 charakter	
mezinárodních	hospodářských	styků	kapitalistických	zemí	navzájem.“)	
234	NAA	F.	1261/0/43,	č.j.	148/98,	1962,	31.	 („Díky	úspěchům	v	rozvoji	zbrojní	výroby	
bylo	možno	v	roce	1955	a	1956	poskytnout	 též	významnou	pomoc	Egyptu	a	některým	
dalším	 státům	 hospodářsky	 málo	 vyvinutým,	 které	 se	 vymanili	 z	koloniálního	
poddanství.	 Politický	 význam	 těchto	 dodávek,	 na	 nichž	 se	 vedle	 Sovětského	 svazu	
podílela	 i	ČSSR	byl	mimořádný	(viz.	Například	tzv.	Suezskou	krizi	a	ztroskotání	anglo‐
francouzské	agrese).“)	
239	 NAA	 F.	 1261/0/5,	 č.j.	 893/9,1966,	 37.	 („...uplatnit	 se	 především	 v	oborech,	
rozhodujících	 pro	 řešení	 hlavních	 problémů	 rozvoje	 rozvojových	 zemí	 a	 na	 takových	
místech,	odkud	 lze	nejlépe	nenásilnou	 formou	pozitivně	ovlivňovat	 jak	další	 orientaci	
vnitřního	 vývoje,	 tak	 vztahy	 příslušných	 zemí	 k	ČSSR	 a	 k	ostatním	 socialistickým	
státům.“)	
240	NAA	 F.	 1261/0/5,	 č.j.	 893/9,1966,	 37.	 („...musíme	usilovat	 o	 to,	abychom	 zejména	
v	pokrokových	 zemích	 postupně	 prosadili	 náhradu	 některých	 poradců	
z	imperialistických	 států	 v	důležitých	 orgánech	 státní	 správy,	 ozbrojených	 sil,	
hospodářství,	kultury	a	propagandy	našimi	odborníky...“)	
242	 MZV	 PK	 1,	 č.j.	 022.704/61‐10,	 4.3.1961.	 2.	 („Prohlášení	 porady	 představitelů	
komunistických	 a	 dělnických	 stran	 konané	 v	Moskvě	 v	listopadu	 1960[…]	 konstatuje:	
„Úplný	krach	kolonialismu	je	nevyhnutelný.	Zhroucení	systému	koloniálního	otroctví	pod	
tlakem	 národně	 osvobozeneckého	 hnutí	 je	 svým	 historickým	 významem	 druhým	
nejdůležitejším	jevem	po	vzniku	světové	socialistické	soustavy.’’)	
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243	 MZV	 PK	 1,	 č.j.	 022.704/61‐10,	 4.3.1961.2.	 („Naše	 republika	 má	 vzhledem	 ke	své	
průmyslové	vyspělosti	a	vysoké	úrovni	školství	a	kultury	příznivé	podmínky	k	tomu,	aby	
účinně	pomáhala	osvobozujícím	se	národům	Afriky	v	jejich	hospodářském	a	kulturním	
rovzoji.“)	
244	MZV	PK	1,	 č.j.	 022.704/61‐10,	 4.3.1961.	 8.	 („Úkolem	našich	 školských	a	kulturních	
styků	 je	 pomáhat	 osvobozeným	 africkým	 národům	 urychleně	 likvidovat	 neblahé	
důsledky	 kolonialismu	 na	 vzdělání	 afrického	 lidu,	 budovat	 a	 rozvíjet	 africké	 školství	
všech	 stupňů,	 odstraňovat	 technickou	 zaostalost,	 pomáhat	 při	 zakládání	 a	 rozvíjení	
vědy	a	podporovat	rozkvět	uměleckých	oborů.“)	
245	 MZV	 PK	 1,	 č.j.	 022.704/61‐10,	 4.3.1961.,	 8.	 („Úkolem	 naší	 kulturně	 propagační	
činnosti	v	Africe	 je	přesvedčivě	ukazovat	obrovské	úspěchy	při	budování	socialistckého	
Československa,	populární	a	přístupnou	formou	seznamovat	africkou	veřejnost	s	vysoce	
humánními	 a	 demokratickými	 zásadami	 našeho	 života,	 zakotvenými	 v	socialistické	
Ústavě	naší	republiky,	šířit	znalosti	o	úspěších	československé	techniky,	vědy	a	kultury,	
seznamovat	 s	vysokou	 životní	 úrovní,	 sociálními	 vymoženostmi	 a	 výsledky	 práce	
československého	 lidu	 vůbec.	 Přitom	 rozbíjet,	 zvlášte	 v	zemích	 Severní	 Afriky,	 falešné	
představy	o	nadřazenosti	evropských	kapitalistických	států	a	o	jejich	nepostradatelnosti	
pro	rozvoj	afrického	hospodářství	a	kultury.“)	
246	MZV	PK	1,	č.j.	022.704/61‐10,	4.3.1961,	8.	(„...kteří	jsou	pro	naše	myšlenky	vnímavější	
než	stará	generace,	formovaná	feudálním	systémem	a	ideologii	kolonizátorů.“)	
250	 NAA	 F.	 1261/0/43,	 č.j.	 010027/62‐SM,	 6.1.1962,	 6.	 („Navazování	 a	 rozšiřování	
našich	styků	po	 linii	cirkevních	organizací	představuje	další	nevyužité	možnosti	našich	
styků	s	africkými	zeměmi.	Náboženské	vlivy	v	Africe	jsou	silné	a	imperialisté	je	používají	
jako	 velmi	 účinné	 nástroje	 na	 udržení	 svých	 vykořisťovatelských	 zájmů.	 ČSSR	 má	
v	tomto	 směru	 větší	 možnosti	 než	 ZSSR	 a	 bylo	 by	 správné	 v	tomto	 směru	 vyvinout	
maximální	aktivity.“)	
259	 NAA	 F.	 1261/0/43,	 č.j.	 003.950/61,	 1961,	 4.	 („Důsledným	 stoupencem	
protimperialistického	 boje	 je	 místopředseda	 strany	 Oginga	 Odinga,	 který	 prosazuje	
spolupráci	se	zeměmi	socialistického	tábora.	Odinga	má	podporu	většiny	strany	a	teší	se	
velké	 oblibě	mezi	 jejími	 členy.	 ČSSR	 udržuje	 již	 delší	 dobu	 styky	 s	levicovým	 křídlem	
KANU,	jehož	představitel	Odinga	navštívil	v	létě	1960	ČSSR.“)	
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260	VUA	MNO	1961,	č.j.	30/3/3,	001634,	1961?,	1.		(„Oginga	Odinga,	místopředseda,	teší	
se	 sympatiím	mladých,	 pod	 jejichž	 tlakem	 byl	 do	 programu	 strany	 vložen	 požadavek	
„plánovaného	hospodářství’.“)	
279	 NAA	 F.	 1261/0/11,	 č.j.	 11103/14,	 20.7.1962,	 2.	 („Africký	 národní	 svaz	 Kenje	
potřebuje	naléhavě	pomoc	 ihned.	V	Kenji	začiná	předvolební	kampaň,	která	do	značné	
míry	 rozhodne	 o	 budoucím	 postavení	 pokrokových	 sil	 v	zemi.	 USA	 a	 Velká	 Británie	
vrhají	 do	 Kenje	 velké	 sumy,	 aby	 korupcí	 udržely	 své	 pozice	 v	této	 oblasti.	 K	tomu	
nemalou	mírou	 přispíva	 stočlenný	 generální	 konsulát	 USA	 v	Nairobi	 [...]	 toto	 odbobí	
rozhoduje	o	nejbližší	budoucnosti	Kenje	a	[	 ...]	pokrokové	síly	spoléhají	 jedině	na	země	
socialistického	tábora,	z	nichž	především	na	SSSR	a	ČSSR	[...]	jestli	ČSSR	chce	pomoci,	je	
nutno	pomoc	poskytnout	nyní,	aby	se	neopakovala	historie	Konga.	)	
285	 ABS	 11691_000_2_4,	 Č.jA	 ?,	 Kenjya,	 1963?,	 1,	 l.	 81.	 („Ve	 spolupráci	 vojenského	 a	
jiného	 důvěrného	 charakteru	 se	 bude	 Kenya	 po	 vyhlášení	 nezávislosti	 orientovat	 na	
země	 socialistického	 tábora,	 zatímco	 přirozeně	 nebude	 odmítat	 hospodářskou	
spolupráci	 se	 Západem,	 případně	 nebízenou	 ekonomickou	 pomoc	USA	 a	Mezinárodní	
banky	pro	rozvoj.“)	
301	 NAA	 F.	 1261/0/44,	 č.j.	 	 010.021/62‐SM‐6,	 7.2.1962,	 2..	 („vyvíjeli	 aktivitu	 nám	
nepřátelskou,	 nabádaly	 studenty	 k	odchodu	 z	ČSSR,	 pomluvám	 a	 nepřátelským	
projevům	po	opuštění	našeho	území.“)	
318	MZV	 F.	 III/5	 Keňa,	 č.j.	 01028/64,	 ,	 27.4.1964,	 1.	 („...prohlásil,	 že	Keňa	 hodlá	 úzce	
spolupracovat	 se	 zeměmi	 socialistického	 tábora	 a	 počítá	 s	naší	 pomocí.	 Řekl	 dále,	 že	
Keňa	 hodlá	 využít	 dobrých	 zkušeností	 socialistických	 zemí	 při	 budování	 politicky	 a	
ekonomickz	nezávislé	Keně.	Prohlásil	 též,	 že	 se	nemáme	nechat	mýlit	 tím,	mluví‐li	 se	
nyní	v	Africe	o	Africkém	socialismu,	neboť	hlavní	zásady	socialismu	jsou	na	celém	světě	
tytéž.“)	
321	MZV	F.	 IV/4,	 č.j.	01028/64,	27.4.1964,	2.	 („Nevýhodou	spolupráce	s	Odingou	a	 jeho	
skupinou	 je	 to,	že	on	sám	a	všichni	 jeho	spolupracovníci	pocházejí	z	kmene	Luo,	 takže	
naše	spolupráce		s	toutou	skupinou	by	mohla	dát	záminku	k	akcím	proti	nám.“)	
322	MZV	 F.	 IV/4,	 č.j.	 01028/64,	 27.4.1964,	 2.	 („Bude	 zapotřebí	 vyhledávat	 též	 těsnější	
styky	 zejména	 s	lidmi	 blízkými	 samotnému	 Kenyattovi	 a	 zastupujícími	 v	ústředních	
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orgánech	nejsilnější	kmen	Kikuju.		I	když	se	na	první	pohled	zdá	táto	otázka	malicherná,	
není	 ji	možné	přehlížet.	Kmenové	rozpory,	které	v	době	boje	za	nezávislost	ustupovaly	
do	 pozadí,	 nabyly	 po	 získání	 nezávislosti,	 zejména	 v	době,	 kdy	 bylo	 nutné	 obsazovat	
vedoucí	 místa	 v	nově	 budovaném	 státním	 aparátě,	 na	 intensitě	 a	 je	 nutné	 s	touto	
skutečností	počítat.“)	
323	 MZV	 F.	 IV/4,	 č.j.	 01028/64,	 27.4.1964,	 3.	 („Kenyatta	 […]	 prohlásil,	 že	 vítá	 naší	
přítomnost	 v	Keni	a	přislíbil	nám	plnou	podporu	při	 veškeré	naší	 činnosti	 v	Keni.	 […]	
Kenyatta	vyjádřil	ochotu	těsně	s	námi	spolupracovat	na	nejrůznějších	úsecích	a	požádal	
o	konkrétní	pomoc	na	úsecích	týkajícich	se	 	obrany	země	vzhledem	k	tomu,	že	koncem	
roku	odejdou	z	Keně	britská	vojska.“)	
325	 MZV	 F.	 IV/4,	 č.j.	 01028/64,	 27.4.1964,7.	 („...prohlásil,	 že	 byl	 vždy	 pro	 těsnou	
spolupráci	 s	námi	a	 že	podpoří	 ve	 vládě	každý	návrh	na	 spolupráci	 s	ČSSR.	Toto	 jeho	
prohlášení	je	tím	pozoruhodnější,	že	se	jedná	o	vyloženě	proamerického	exponenta,	což	
je	 o	něm	 všeobecně	 známo.	 […]	Minister	T.	Mboya	 sám	 vystupuje	 aktivně	 v	celé	 řadě	
dalších	otázek	a	mluví	k	problému	žen,	africké	jednoty,	jižní	Afriky	a	k	celé	řadě	dalších	
otázek.	Veškeré	projevy	mu	připravuje	skupina	asi	5	amerických	expertů,	specialistů	na	
jednotlivé	ekonomické	a	politické	otázky.	Lze	se	protom	domnívat,	že	jeho	prohlášení	o	
spolupráci	s	námi	jsou	více	méně	pokrytecká	a	sloužila	spíše	k	zamaskování	jeho	práve	
orientace.“)	
347	MZV	F.	IV/6,	č.j.	092/65‐Ks,	28.7.1965,	2.	(„Bylo	zjištěno	a	prověřeno,	že	Angličané	a	
Američané	mají	 v	současné	 době	 eminentní	 zájem	 na	 jednotě	 a	 spolupráci	 těchto	 tří	
pravicových	skupin.“)	
349	MZV	F.	IV/6,	Keňa,	č.j.	05/66	(020288),	6.1.1966,	1.	(„Nedocenili	jsme	ekonomickou	a	
politickou	a	vojenskou	závislost	země	na	Velké	Británii	a	její	pozice	ve	státním	aparátě	a	
hospodářství	 […]	 v	 zemi,	 kterou	 take	 ona	 ze	 svých	 hledisek	 považuje	 za	 klíčovou	 v	
oblasti	 Východní	 Afriky.	 […]	 Aby	 zabránila	možnému	 zvratu	 ve	 vnitřní	 I	 zahraniční	
politice	 země,	 využívala	 Velká	 Británie	 ekonomické	 a	 vojenské	 závislosti	 Keni	 ke	
zvýšenému	 nátlaku	 na	 pravicové	 síly	 ve	 vládě.	 Ruku	 v	 ruce	 s	 tím	 hrály	 svou	 úlohu	 i	
půjčky	západních	zemí.“)	
351	 MZV	 F.	 IV/6,	 Keňa,	 č.j.	 05/66	 (020288),	 6.1.1966,	 2.	 („Keňa	 zůstáva	 i	 nadále	
důležitou	 zemí	 Afriky	 jak	 z	hledisek	 vztahových	 s	ČSSR,	 tak	 z	hledisek	 perspektivního	
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posílení	 pozic	 pokrokových	 sil.	 Kromě	 toho	 její	 dúležitost	 a	 význam	 neklesl	 ve	
východoafrické,	ani	celoafrické	problematice.“)	
352	NAA	1261/0/4,	č.j.	2273/13,	4.11.1963,	5,	 l.	10.	(„...požádal	o	vyškolení	nejméně	20	
důstojníků	pro	keňskou	armádu	v	jednoletých	anebo	dvouletých	kurzech	a	30	důstojníků	
pro	 bezpečnost	 v	6‐měsíčním	 kurze.	 Podle	 Othiena	mají	 důstojníci,	 vyškoleni	 v	ČSSR,	
nahradit	postupně	britské	odborníky.	Levice	KANU	hodlá	 též	po	nezávislosti	nakoupit	
zbraně	v	ČSSR	a	přeškolit	u	nás	vybrané	důstojníky,	nyní	školené	ve	V.	Británii.“)	
353	 NAA	 1261/0/4,	 č.j.	 2273/13,	 4.11.1963,	 5,	 l.	 10.	 („...pomoc	 při	 reorganizaci	 a	
vybudování	nového	bezpečnostního	aparátu	 .	 Jedná	 se	hlavně	o	 vyškolení	potřebného	
počtu	 kádrú	 v	 ČSSR	 a	 případné	 vyslání	 československých	 expertů	 k	vypracovaní	
organizace	a	metod	řízení	tohoto	úseku.“)	
354	VUA	MNO	1963,	č.j.	H,	02305/64‐OTP,	March	1964,	2.	(„...nedojde‐li	v	průběhu	roku	
1964	 k	prudkým	 politickým	 zvratům,	 na	 začátku	 roku	 1965	 by	mohlo	 dojít	 k	vyslání	
menší	 skupiny	 čs	 vojenských	 expertů	Keně.	Tato	 úvaha	 spočívá	 na	 předpokladech,	 že	
britské	jednotky	odejdou	z	Keně	do	12.12.1964	(tak	jak	bylo	stanoveno).“)	
360	VUA	MNO	1965,	 č.j.	H,	 J,	01375/OTP,	6.4.1965,	1.	 („Vzhledem	k	uvedené	 situaci	 lze	
očekávat,	 že	 Kenja	 bude	 při	 získávání	 speciálního	materiálu	 ze	 zemí	 socialistického	
tábora	 postupovat	 velmi	 opatrně,	 aby	 nedala	 záminku	 k	odvetným	 hospodářským	
sankcím	Anglie.“)	
370	ABS	80952_000_1_5,	Č.jA.	A1‐00	641/40‐64,	20.10.1964,	1,	 l.	43.	 	 („Od	rezidentury	
očekáváme,	že	bude	průběžně	zasílat	oficiální	materiály	 i	agenturní	poznatky	ke	všem	
institucím	 a	 úřadům	 VB	 v	Keni,	 k	anglickým	 státním	 příslušníkům,	 kteří	 pracují	
v	keňském	státním	aparátě,	k	ostatním	osobám,	které	mají	k	objetktům	(i	osobám)	HN	
přímy	vztah.“)	
371	ABS	80952_000_1_5,	Č.jA.	A1‐00	641/40‐64,	20.10.1964,	2,	l.	45.	(„Centrála	očekává,	
že	do	dovolené	v	roce	1965	se	rezidentuře	podaří	vytypovat	nejméně	šest	vhodných	osob	
se	vztahem	k	HN,	z	toho	dva	rozpracovat	do	stadia	před	verbovkou.“)	
379	ABS	11691_109_1_2,	6.9.1965,	2,	 2.	 („...odhalit	neokolonialistické	metody	pronikání	
VB	do	Keně	a	demaskovat	pravicové	činitele	KANU	jako	nástroj	britské	politiky	v	Keni.“)	
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383	ABS	 11691_109_2_2,	 Č.jA.	 A‐00	311/40‐69,	 23.4.1969,	 1,	 l.	 73.	 („...v	návaznosti	na	
dříve	námi	s	tímto	záměrem	realisované	operace‐	prohlubovat	politickou	kompromitaci	
Mboyi	a	pomáhat	k	jeho	konečné	politické	likvidaci.“)	
387	 ABS	 11691_100_3_6,	 22.10.1964,	 1‐6,	 l.	 126‐131.	 („...aby	 mohla	 bojovat	 proti	
nepřátelům	osvobozené	Keni	a	proti	hlavním	imperialistickým	státúm.	[…]	Hlavní	náplní	
práce	nově	vytvořené	demokratické	bezpečnosti	 levicových	vlasteneckých	sil	Keni	musí	
být	 odhalovat	 úmysly	 reakčních	 pravicových	 proimperialistických	 živlů,	 jejich	
vzájemnou	svázanost	s	kolonialisty	a	imperialisty,	získavat	mezi	nimi	pozice	a	vliv	a	tak	
uplatnňovat	politickou	 linii	a	zásady	 vládní	 strany	KANU	a	levice.	 […]	Úkolem	našeho	
poradce	 je	 vytvoření	 takové	 situace,	 aby	 veškeré	 důležité	 poznatky	 získané	 keňskou	
bezpečností	byly	 jeho	prostřednictvem	využívány	pro	rozvědnou	práci	naši	rezidentury	
v	Keni,	aby	byl	získán	přehled	o	hlavním	nepříteli,	jeho	úmyslech	a	činnosti.“)	
388	 ABS	 11691_301_1_1_6,	 Č.jA?,	 Poznámka	 k	fondu,	 3	 („Představitel	 kenyijské	
bezpečnosti	 s	úzkými	 vztahy	 ke	 kenyijskému	 viceprezidentovi	 Odinga	 Oginga	 i	
k	prezidentovi	Kenyattovi,	vystupoval	pokrokově	vúči	ZST.	Od	ČSSR	získal	zásilku	zbraní	
i	odborné	 školení	pro	pracovníky	kenyijské	bezpečnosti.	Poznal	dobře	 formy	a	metody	
práce	čs	bezpečnosti.	Později	se	stále	s	větší	jistotou	prověřovalo,	že	jde	o	agenta	britské	
IS,	 nasazeného	 do	 vlády	 Kenye.	 Naše	 akce	 podnikané	 v	Kenyi	 byly	 před	 USA	 a	 VB	
rozvědkou	dekonspirovány	jakož	i	řada	našich	KP.“)	
390	ABS	11691_100_5_6,	Č.jA?,	Záznam,	25.8.1965,	1,	l.	284.	(„prohlásil,	že	má	od	Odingy	
zelenou	 a	 má	 se	 zabývat	 přípravou	 násilného	 odstranění	 některých	 pravicových	
proimperialistických	 činitelů	 jako	 je	Tom	Mboya,	Mungai,	McKenzie,	Gichuru,	Ronald	
Ngala	a	další.“)	
401	 NAA	 ÚV	 KSČ	 A.	 Novotný,	 č.j.	 264261/1,	 1966,	 1.	 („Jako	 závažný	 nedostatek	 této	
skupiny	 [progresivních	 činitelů]	nutno	uvést,	 že	 se	 jí	a	 obzvláště	Odingovi	nepodařilo	
vytvořit	 celonárodní	 politickou	 platformu	 a	 že	 levicové	 hnutí	 zůstalo	 v	podstatě	
omezeno	 tribálními	 hranicemi.	 Odinga	 neuměl	 využít	 protianglických	 a	
protiimperialistických	nálad,	volil	taktiku	spolupráce	s	pravicí	KANU	a	umožnil	nakonec	
pravici,	aby	rozštěpila	levici.“)	
411	 MZV	 PK	 66	 č.j.	 033.557/61‐10,	 18.12.1961,	 11.	 („rozšířené	 pokrokové	 rolnické	
hnutí“)	
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412	 MZV	 PK	 66	 č.j.	 033.557/61‐10,	 18.12.1961,	 11.	 („snažení	 šírokého	 lidového	 hnutí	
proti	feudalizmu.“)	
424	NAA	1261/0/4,	č.j.	11763/8,	5.11.1962,	1.	(„V	prúběhu	oslav	ministerský	předsedsa	
projevoval	 s.Valo	mimořádnou	 pozornost	 a	 dával	mu	 přednost	 před	 všemi	 vládními	
delegacemi.	 V	rozhovorech	 zdůraznil	 vděčnost	 za	 poskytnutou	 pomoc	 a	 vyzdvihl	 její	
význam	 pro	 volební	 vítězství	 strany	 Lidový	 kongres	 Ugandy	 (UPC).	 […]	 Současně	
požádal,	 aby	 ČSSR	 vyslala	 pokud	možno	 co	 nejdříve	 svého	 velvylance	 do	Kampaly,	 a	
zvláště	 zdůraznil,	 že	 by	 uvítal	 jeho	 rady	 a	 pomoc	 při	 řešení	 závažných	 otázek,	 které	
očekávají	nezávislou	Ugandu.“)	
433	MZV	F.	 IV/4	10	TO,	 č.j.	 020.930/63‐10,	13.2.1963,	13.	 („Rozhovory	 s	ministerským	
předsedou	M.A.Obote	a	 jeho	zástupcem	Magezim	potvrdili	zásadní	zájem	o	 spolupráci	
s	ČSSR.	[…]	Kladné	v	těchto	rozhovorech	bylo,	že	oba,	hlavně	však	Magezi	mluvili	o	jejich	
vnitřní	a	zahraniční	politice	zcela	otevřeně	v	přátelském	duchu.“)	
448	 VUA	 MNO	 1965,	 č.j.	 38/3‐8,	 14,	 20,	 21,	 042862,	 Aug	 1965?,	 4.	 („Dá	 se	 však	
předpokládat,	že	na	základě	zkušeností	z	výcviku	v	ČSSR	a	s	postupným	vnitropolitickým	
vývojem	přistoupí	ugandská	strana	k	požadavku	na	čs.	vojenské	odborníky	pro	Ugandu.	
Dají	se	předpokládat,	kromě	leteckých,	hlavně	dělostřelecké	a	pěchotní	odbornosti,	které	
budou	navazovat	na	materiálové	dodávky.“)	
523	MZV	F.	IV/5,	č.j.	0225/61,	3.7.1961.	(„Kambona	naznačil,	že	dojde‐li	k	realisaci	této	
cesty	 ještě	 před	 vyhlášením	nezávislosti	Tanganjiky,	 bude	 britská	 vláda	 tímto	 faktem	
šokována.[…]	ze	strany	Nyerereho	a	vedení	TANU	 jde	o	přemyšlený	krok,	 jehož	má	být	
využito	 k	 dosažení	 dalších	 ústupků	 na	 britské	 vládě	 při	 rozhovorech	 o	 hospodářské	
pomoci	Tanganijce.“)	
580	MZV	F	IV/4,	č.j.	0322_64,	12.2.1964,	3.	(„Dojem,	že	Tanganyika	je	nezávislým	státem	
padl,	 když	 Britové	 provedli	 útok	 proti	 africkým	 vojákům	 na	 žádost	 africké	 vlády,	 co	
demonstrovalo	 Nyerereho	 neo‐koloniální	 orientaci.	 […]	 Jeho	 silový	 aparát	 tak	 mohl	
zvýšit	svoje	útoky	proti	levici.“)	
609	ABS	81038_000_2_4,	Č.jA?,	25.8.1965,	4,	l.	94.	(„Našim	hlavním	nepřítelem	v	Tanzanii	
zůstává	Velká	Británie.	Základním	dlouhodobým	úkolem	 residentury	 je	proniknout	do	
organisací,	 kterými	 Velká	 Británie	 ovlivňuje	 vývoj	 v	Tanzánii	 a	 politiku	 tanzanijské	
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vlády	 s	cílem	získávat	především	 takové	materiály	a	důkazy	o	 činnosti	britského	ZU	a	
dalších	 britských	 organisací,	 které	 by	mohly	 být	 využity	 k	omezování	 britského	 vlivu	
v	Tanzánii	a	současně	k	prohlubování		spolupráce	a	porozumění	mezi	SRT	a	ZST,	zvláště	
pak	mezi	Tanzánii	a	ČSSR.“)	
610	 ABS	 81038_000_2_4,	 Č.jA?,	 25.8.1965,	 4‐5,	 l.	 94‐95.	 („Stále	 větší	 politický	 a	
hospodářský	zájem	o	Tanzanii	projevují	USA	a	NSR.	Úkolem	residentury	bude	získávat	
dokumenty	 a	 závažné	 informace	 o	 aktivitě	 těchto	 států	 v	Tanzanii,	 zejména	 pak	 o	
aktivitě	americké	rozvědky.“)	
612	ABS	80958_011_1_2,	Č.jA?,	15.6.1964,	2,	 l.	2.	(„Sledování	vztahů	mezi	Tanganikou	a	
Zanzibarem	a	jejich	odraz	ve	vztahu	k	ČSSR	a	ZST.“)	
617	 NAA	 1261/0/4,	 č.j.	 4400/7,	 12.10.1964,	 2.	 („Ministerstvo	 vnitra	 nepovažuje	 za	
správné,	 aby	 hned	 v	počátcích	 spolupráceplné	 požadavky	 uspokojovalo.	 Nechává	 si	
možnost	dalších	jednání	na	vysoké	úrovni	a	zároveň	bude		proveřovat	,	zda	bude	účelné	
dodávat	jim	v	budoucnu	další	zbraně.“)	
620	 Zídek,	 Sieber,	 Československo,	 207.	 („V	 roce	 1963	 se	 pak	 konal	 šestiměsíční	
„bezpečnostní	kurs“	pro	 čtyři	pracovníky	 tanganijcké	kontrarozvědky.	V	návaznosti	na	
dodávku	zbraní	vyžádaných	ministrem	Lusinde	začal	v	říjnu	1964	šestiměsíční	kurs	pro	
pět	pracovníků	kontrarozvědky.	[…]	V	listopadu	1965	absolvovalo	podobný	kurz	už	15	
příslušníků	tanzanské	bezpečnosti.“)	
626	NAA	ÚV	KSČ	G.	Husák,	č.j.	01021/73,	1.3.1973,	1‐2.	(„Hlavní	město	Tanzanie	Dar	Es	
Salaam	 se	 stalo	 dalším	 důležitým	 střediskem	 pro	 odbojovou	 činnost	 afrického	 hnutí	
osvobození.	 Doprava	 vojenského	 materiálu	 různých	 organizací	 působících	 na	
tanzánském	 území,	 distribuce	 knih	 pro	 školy	 v	pralese,	 výcvik	 vojáku	 rekrutovaných	
z	obyvatel	 zemí,	 která	 jsou	 nadále	 pod	 koloniální	 správou,	 přemísťování	 čínskych	
instruktorů	používaných	pro	výcvik	ve	vojenských	táborech		[…]	jsou	velmi	častým	jevem	
v	hlavním	 městě	 Tanzánie.	 	 […]	 Tanzanie	 zajišťuje	 výcvik,	 dopravu	 materiálu	 a	
psychologickou	pomoc	odbojovým	organizacím.“)	
652	MZV	F.	IV/6,	č.j.	025.801/68‐8,	29.8.1968.	(„Tanzanijská	vláda	odsudzuje	agresi	jako	
akt	kolonialismu.	[…]	Tanzanijské	denníky	od	samého	počátku	ostře	odsoudili	okupaci.’)	
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653	 MZV	 F.	 IV/6,	 č.j.	 025.801/68‐8,	 22.8.1968.	 („Vláda	 Tanzánie	 je	 hluboce	 otřesena	
okupací	 ČSSR.[…]	 Tento	 akt	 představuje	 zradu	 všech	 principů	 sebeurčení	 a	 národní	
suverenity.	 […]	Tanzánie	 je	proti	kolonialismu	 všeho	druhu,	 jak	nových	 tak	 starých,	 v	
Africe,	v	Evropě	i	jinde.“)	
662	NAA	F.	 1261/0/5,	 č.j.	 3526/9,	 13.12.1967,	 2.	 („Dosavadní	 vývoj	potvrdil	 správnost	
naší	 základní	 koncepce	 spočívající	 v	plnění	 těchto	 úkolů:	 uskutečňovat	 vzájemně	
prospěšnou	spolupráci	s	rozvojovými	zeměmi	Asie,	Afriky,	Latinské	Ameriky,	podporovat	
pokrokové	společenské	síly	těchto	zemí	v	jejich	boji	proti	imperialismu,	neokolonialismu	
a	 vývozu	 kontrarevoluce,	 v	jejich	 úsilí	 o	 dosažení	 plné	 politické	 a	 hospodářské	
nezávislosti	 a	 společenského	 pokroku,	 poskytovat	 všestrannou	 podporu	 národně	
osvbozeneckému	boji	porobených	národů.“)	
664	MZV	PK	126,	č.j.	104.876/69‐8,	17.3.1969,	20.	 („Oblast	 tropické	Afriky	zůstává	pro	
naši	 zahraniční	 politiku	 zajímavou	 oblastí,	 s	níž	 lze	 rozvíjet	 nejrůznejší	 vztahy	 na	
základě	oboustranné	 výhodnosti	a	prospěchu	 (především	na	 ekonomickém	úseku)	 [...]	
Rovněž	nelze	přehlížet	skutečnost,	že	při	své	početnosti	zůstávají	země	tropické	Afriky	
důležitým	 činitelem	 na	mezinárodních	 fórech.	 I	 přes	 současnou	 politickou	 nestabilitu	
většiny	 těchto	 zemí	a	přes	 zpomalení	 tempa	 rozvoje	národně‐osvobozeneckého	hnutí,	
jež	 se	 však	 imperialismu	 nepodařilo	 zlikvidovat,	 je	 nutno	 počítat	 s	tím,	 že	 v	delší	
perspektivě	se	v	této	části	světa	znovu	výrazněji	projeví	tendence,	směrující	k	urychlení	
politické	a	i	ekonomické	emancipace,	přičemž	spolupráce	socialistických	zemí	múže	být	
významným	 faktorem.	 Určité	 náznaky	 tohoto	 vývoje	 lze	 již	 pozorovat	 	 například	
v	některých	zemích	východní	Afriky.“)	
	
	
	
	
	
